Posts by user "PPRuNeUser548247" [Posts: 33 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 2]

PPRuNeUser548247
July 11, 2025, 21:50:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11919854
Agreed, it's most unfortunate that that the preliminary report hasn’t closed off speculation, it's simply created opportunity for more.

It confirms that both fuel cutoff switches were moved to OFF at Vr, within a one second interval which is as extreme and inexplicable as it gets. Then it gives us a CVR quote that’s so neutered, "Why did you cut off?” / “I didn’t”, that it raises more questions than it answers. If the goal was to reassure or clarify, it’s had the opposite effect.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Preliminary Report

PPRuNeUser548247
July 11, 2025, 21:55:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11919864
Originally Posted by GroundedSpanner
One item in the report is the position of the LG Lever - Down.
Given the lack of a full transcript, and in trying to defend the crewmembers intentions , Is it possible that at the point of "Positive Rate - Gear Up" - PM Brain farted, and performed a different muscle memory action? Thus they would deny moving the Switches - and take a few seconds to compute what they just did?
The landing gear lever is forward and up on the centre instrument panel, adjacent to the PFD. The two fuel control switches are aft and low, on the thrust pedestal. There's no reasonable way to confuse one for the other in terms of position, hand movement or 'muscle memory'.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Gear Lever  Muscle Memory

PPRuNeUser548247
July 11, 2025, 22:26:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11919912
The phrasing “Why did you cut off?” doesn’t suggest surprise at an EICAS message, it implies direct observation or perception of manual action. This quote from the preliminary report reads exactly like what it appears to be; one pilot reacting to a control input he didn’t expect for which there was no plausible explanation .

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): EICAS  Preliminary Report

PPRuNeUser548247
July 12, 2025, 07:28:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920280
It's established fact both fuel control switches moved to CUTOFF 4 seconds after Vr, a deliberate guarded action, not easily done accidentally.
The CVR records one pilot asking “Why did you cut off?”, the other replies “I didn’t”. Then a bland Mayday attributed to the Captain “engine failure, returning” in the middle of the crisis.

The language, if reported correctly, feels strangely detached. No confusion, no urgency, no clear troubleshooting. Not drawing conclusions, but does anyone else see signs of performative behaviour, that is saying the right things outwardly, while being at odds with the underlying cause?

I appreciate that both crew members lost their lives, however if we avoid discussing uncomfortable patterns, we miss the point of investigation and learning.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  MAYDAY  RUN/CUTOFF  Switch Guards

PPRuNeUser548247
July 12, 2025, 07:49:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920305
There’s a line of argument in some of the discussion around AI171 that gives me pause. Understandably, nobody wants to rush to judgement, especially when the crew can’t speak for themselves. But I’m concerned we’re leaning too far in the opposite direction: treating almost any possibility, even when it stretches beyond reason, other than unintentional error as "off-limits"

I’m not suggesting intent. But at some point, professional integrity requires us to ask hard questions. If the evidence points to deliberate human action, whether through disorientation, procedural lapse, or something worse, we can’t just explain it away with ambient heat and "muscle memory".

The aircraft didn’t crash itself. If we're unwilling to face uncomfortable data, we risk turning investigation into deflection.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AI171  Muscle Memory

PPRuNeUser548247
July 12, 2025, 08:49:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920371
If anyone believes both guarded switches flipped to OFF by accident, one after the other in under a second, I’d genuinely like to hear the cockpit ergonomics that make that plausible. Because from where I sit, it doesn’t happen unless someone means it, or at minimum, fails to follow any known SOP.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Switch Guards

PPRuNeUser548247
July 12, 2025, 08:57:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920381
Originally Posted by AIMINGHIGH123
Agree.

I can’t see it being possible with 1 hand. Those switches are not easy to move fast. Pretty sure they are same ones as on 737 Max.

You would need both hands. Which would mean you aren’t even in your seat unless you are in some extreme yoga position within your seat.
In everyday operations (e.g. shutdown at the gate), pilots often move them with one hand in quick succession. lift guard, toggle switch, repeat. Certainly no need to leave your seat.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Switch Guards

PPRuNeUser548247
July 12, 2025, 21:09:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920832
As there has been no mention, not even a hint, of software anomalies, electrical faults, or mechanical failures in the AI171 interim report, it's difficult to escape the logical conclusion that the initiating cause of the accident lies in human action. The known data points are physical actions and recorded speech, timestamped and internally consistent. Unless new evidence emerges to contradict the physical sequence described in the report, continuing to entertain unlikely alternatives is just manufacturing a comforting narrative.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AI171

PPRuNeUser548247
July 13, 2025, 11:32:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11921252
At this point, we may just be going in circles until more data or the final report is released. There's clearly a divide: some posters are trying to reconcile the known, timestamped sequence of events; others are exploring increasingly unlikely alternatives in the absence of any evidence - appeals to uncertainty. Understandable, but maybe we’ve reached the point where further progress can only come from investigators, not speculation. Appreciate the discussion so far but just wondering if we’ve hit diminishing returns until new facts emerge.

Last edited by PPRuNeUser548247; 13th July 2025 at 11:54 .

Subjects: None

PPRuNeUser548247
July 13, 2025, 12:31:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11921288
It sometimes seems that short of a signed note explicitly confirming intent, some PPRuNe contributors here will never accept that a pilot's deliberate action is even a possibility, let alone a likely explanation. Of course, all plausible scenarios should be considered, and premature certainty is unwise. But that cuts both ways. Dismissing deliberate action out of hand, even when available evidence begins to point in that direction, is just as unhelpful as jumping to conclusions.

Subjects: None

PPRuNeUser548247
July 13, 2025, 17:38:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11921475
Noteworthy that many of the posts on this thread are grounded in logical fallacies; maybe before posting check if you are falling into the trap of -

Appeal to ignorance: Lack of evidence is not proof of a preferred alternative.
Appeal to authority: Past experience or titles don’t exempt anyone from flawed logic.
False equivalence: two scenarios are presented as equally plausible or causally comparable, despite significant differences in probability, evidence, or implications.
Post hoc reasoning: Asserting that a known service bulletin was not followed by by Air India must explain the incident confuses correlation with causation.
False dichotomy: Framing the situation as either technical failure or scapegoating of pilots creates an artificial binary.
Hasty generalisation: Drawing broad conclusions from a single word choice (“transitioned”) or partial CVR transcripts from a preliminary report overreaches what the evidence supports.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR  Preliminary Report

PPRuNeUser548247
July 14, 2025, 08:51:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11921972
Originally Posted by etrang
The Captain reportedly had been suffering from depression and mental health issues.

Telegraph
Well, that certainly provides food for thought, not least as it's confirmed the Captain found time to communicate a Mayday call 4 seconds before impact.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): MAYDAY  Mental Health

PPRuNeUser548247
July 14, 2025, 14:23:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11922251
Originally Posted by Loose rivets
Having said the "Why have you" question was said in subservient manner, I'd implied it must have been the captain that cut the fuel. However, I'm profoundly puzzled by the fact that he would hardly leave his old dad alone since he was going to devote his life to him - and to do it in such horrific circumstances which his father might have fully comprehended.

While depressed people get lost in their thoughts, this would have been a total reversal of his caring nature. It's just another factor that just doesn't make sense.
People suffering from depression or acute psychological distress don’t always behave in ways that match their past character. In fact, it’s common for those closest to them to be blindsided. In some cases, what looks like devotion from the outside can feel like entrapment from within, particularly when grief from death of one parent, societal expectations/sense of duty and a loss of personal freedom collide.

Subjects: None