Posts by user "Pinkman" [Posts: 6 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 1]

Pinkman
June 15, 2025, 07:27:00 GMT
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Post: 11902184
Originally Posted by Australopithecus
1. The original video, not the video of a video, has the distinctive audio signature of a deployed RAT.

2 That video shows something dangling down where the RAT is located.

3. There are no typical engine sounds heard.

4. The flaps are extended in that video, and the slats at least are extended in the wreckage pictures.

5. There was no tail strike, so you would conclude that the performance figures were at least close to the actual mass and thrust required.

6. Given the above, and the straight flight path without rudder deflection which ends in a crater instead of Gatwick, you pretty much have all the evidence you need to conclude that there wasn\x92t sufficient thrust and that what little thrust there may have been was symmetrical.

7. While there are many things common to both engines, the most frightening are a system failure and inappropriate crew action. Oh, and some previously unheralded MX action.
To me, the last sentence of (7) in Australopithicus' post nails it and here's why: We already know that this aircraft was cannibalized for spares as was apparently customary at AI and then brought back into service. The problem with this MX culture is that you lay yourself open to the "law of unintended consequences", such as replacing something with a part or pcb/software version that looks right and fits/works but may not perform as designed either physically (think Air Transat - Azores) or software wise (think the "roll back" bug). It isnt necessarily a problem if there is decent paperwork accompanying and authorising this "borrowing" but you can be sure that the investigation will want to see traceability paperwork.

Last edited by Pinkman; 15th June 2025 at 10:43 .

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): RAT (All)  RAT (Deployment)

Pinkman
June 16, 2025, 09:17:00 GMT
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Post: 11903301
Originally Posted by CHfour
With the information we have accumulated so far, is the following a possible scenario? Normal departure up to VR, then a total electrical failure at lift off (possibly as the ground/air logic switches to air.) All hydraulics lost and cabin lights flicker plus RAT deploys. All fuel boost pumps fail so engines only have suction feed. Engines roll back. The aircraft seems to me to have gone too far to have suffered a total loss of thrust at lift off. There must have been some energy being provided by the engines? Such a system failure "can't happen", of course but nothing is impossible!
What you are saying is, as several have said before, is that everything started to fail at or shortly before rotation. Joining the dots from two other branches in this thread is it correct to say that there are only two things that happen at that point: the aircraft transitions from "ground" to "air" (multiple sensors) and there is a change in orientation such that any liquid (eg potable water) that has found its way into the EE bay will move. Question: the aircraft was routed DEL-AMD-LGW. Where was the potable water tankage topped up? Presumably prior to the longest sector? In addition to the inspection list that the Indian AAIB has mandated should they also inspect peer aircraft for EE bay corrosion...?

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AAIB (All)  AAIB (India)  Electrical Failure  Fuel (All)  RAT (All)

Pinkman
June 19, 2025, 07:55:00 GMT
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Post: 11905808
Originally Posted by Aerospace101
I too watched his explanation with interest. However I believe he is not considering the possibility of C hydraulics failure prior to wheels lift-off, because I speculated this is the more likely reason the gear trucks remained in a forward tilt position, see my earlier post here . I believe the crew never got as far as calling for the Gear Up... many possible reasons for this, flickering instrument screens during the electrical switchover to battery power, flurry of EICAS messages. For any of those things happening around time of rotation, I would be advocating delaying gear up decision until safely climbing away above AA and as a crew you have chance to discuss safest course of action. Not putting the gear up shouldn't kill you.

Point is the gear truck tilt is a clue of a C hydraulics failure, but we cant determine if hydraulics failed prior to wheels off runway or prior to gear doors opening in retraction sequence.
Presumably the RAT was deployed (with an "humungous" bang) when the residual pressure in the "C" hydraulic system decayed to zero: there was initially enough to tilt the trucks but thats it.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): EICAS  RAT (All)  RAT (Deployment)

Pinkman
June 20, 2025, 01:43:00 GMT
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Post: 11906532
Originally Posted by framer
User989 thanks for a nice summary
I am at risk of turning into one of those folks who gets their mind locked on one possibility and keeps banging on about it but here goes;

If the authorities determined that the accident aircraft had been treated by maintenance for microbial growth in the fuel tanks within the last week or so, and they suspected that that procedure was carried out in a way that could result in fuel contamination, then that would explain

1/ No other aircraft being affected
2/ No measures taken at the airport
3/ No AD\x92s from the regulators
4/ No grounding of 787\x92s
5/ Flight profile
6/ Rat deployment etc etc

I agree with your statement that dual flameout due fuel contamination is very unlikely, but we ARE dealing with something that is very unlikely. I favour the theory because an error in treating the fuel is so predictably human and simple, and a dual engine failure being related to fuel is also a simple and obvious idea, and it satisfies all we know both about the aircraft\x92s behaviour, and the authorities behaviour post accident.
I posted a report earlier of a 787-8 powered by the same engine type have both engines roll back sub-idle within a minute of each other while airborne due to this, so we know it can happen in theory.

Now\x85\x85I want to be clear that I\x92m not saying I think I know what happened, I\x92m an average Joe with my hands full just flying the line, but I am a bit surprised that the idea of \x91fuel contamination specific to that airframe\x92 doesn\x92t get discussed more on this thread.
Thanks again for the clear summary of discussion thus far.
Fuel guy here. I've been "sitting on my hands" as requested by the mods but I will bite on that. Because dual engine failure is a "common mode fault" contamination is one of simplest explanations. Forget wax, think sediment, water or misfuelling. The only reason this has been discounted in favour of an electromechanical/software fault is that there is no yaw, i.e. both engines ran down at the same time at more or less the same rate, and would have to have been fed from the same tank (so the contaminated fuel reaches the engines at EXACTLY the same time on each side - is that even possible?). Its a stretch but I suppose it is possible, however the retention samples should have been tested by now. I would be interested in confirmation that they were taken and tested. I would also want to know if there is a "hot hydrant" system at AMD or if there are bowsers and if any maintenance had been done (think Cathay at Surabaya). But honestly, the fuel supply chain is usually rigorous...[edit: I have just seen a Reddit post pointing to a major construction project involving the fuelling facilities at Ahmedabad...will try to find out more...]

Last edited by Pinkman; 20th June 2025 at 02:32 .

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Dual Engine Failure  Engine Failure (All)  Fuel (All)  Thread Moderation

Pinkman
July 12, 2025, 10:43:00 GMT
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Post: 11920473
Originally Posted by The Brigadier
It seems to me that there must have been further dialogue after the bland "I didn't". To have nothing reported after that two-line exchange, until the MAYDAY at 08:09:05, is a highly suspect omission from the interim report. In a two-crew cockpit, facing a sudden dual engine rollback just after rotation, I find it very hard to believe that this two-line exchange was the only interaction captured.
Originally Posted by Nick H.
They are guarded. To refresh everyone's memory here's a photo from the previous thread.

Having studied human factors, that's not what I would call a switch guard. This is what I would call a guard:

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Human Factors  MAYDAY  Switch Guards

Pinkman
July 12, 2025, 12:17:00 GMT
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Post: 11920576
Originally Posted by Contact Approach
Having studied HF, how many flights since the beginning of time have BOTH of those switches been inadvertently moved during takeoff? If that number is 1 or less you were probably better off studying statistics.
This is the old saw about designing for "Low probability/high consequence" events. In many cases designing for LPHC events is eye wateringly expensive or difficult to justify - but this isnt one of them..even if it only prevented 1 accident.

Subjects: None