Posts by user "Someone Somewhere" [Posts: 44 Total up-votes: 79 Pages: 3]

Someone Somewhere
2025-06-18T13:29:00
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Post: 11905251
Originally Posted by EDML
Once again tdracer confirmed the PMGs for the FADECs in the first AI171 thread. He even explained the logic behind it and the connections with the onboard electronics:
- Each engine has a PMG for the FADECs
- Only for engine start the FADECs are powered by the aircraft
- Once the engines are running, this connection is opened
- It is verified, that the FADECs are then no longer connected to the aircraft electrical system. A failure to open the connection triggers a "No dispatch" message
- In case the PMG fails, the FADECs are once again powered by the aircraft electrical system
Yes. That is what I have read here, that is my assumption, that is how Airbus does it, that is what makes sense .

But I am being told elsewhere by someone with an A&P badge that that is not quite the whole story, and that the FADEC PMGs do double-duty as the flight control PMGs.

I am hoping for some documentation to confirm/refute that.

Subjects: AI171  EDML  FADEC

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-18T19:30:00
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Post: 11905495
Originally Posted by Util BUS
Based on my previous speculation regarding a BTB short, I wonder how aircraft engines might react in a situation where initially a transient power fault is followed by only battery power being available? As I understand it, there are no longer cable connections to the engines, given no valid inputs from the.thrust levers, what thrust mode would the FADEC's revert to?
Battery power should still result in a controllable aircraft and controllable thrust.

Thrust lever resolvers are powered by the FADECs, so as long as the engine remains running, it will know what requested thrust is from the pilots. You presumably loss A/T.

Originally Posted by EEngr
A different set of PMGs.
I certainly expect and hope so. But I can't find any 787 or even 777 documentation confirming it.

Whether the PMA for the FADEC is certified as part of the FADEC... not sure.

Subjects: FADEC

Someone Somewhere
2025-06-19T10:54:00
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Post: 11905921
Originally Posted by EDML
I still think that the small black area is the back of the engines visible through the small gap of the extended flaps.

Furthermore: The small hydraulik pump of the RAT only powers some of the flight controls that are powered by the center hydraulic system. The ones powered by the engine driven pumps will not work once the engine(s) failed.
Engines generally deliver hydraulics while running down, as they operate down to a much lower speed than the generators do. Useful flight control power might be available from windmilling alone (hence why the 747 didn't have a RAT until the -8). That's subject to similar speed issues to the RAT but the engines have much more inertia. The Virgin Atlantic 024 report (A340 partial-gear-up landing at Heathrow) notes an expected 25-30 seconds of useful hydraulics after engine shutdown.

This doesn't apply if the pumps are depressurised by a fire handle, or to allow easier engine relight.

Subjects: EDML  Engine Failure (All)  Engine Shutdown  Generators/Alternators  RAT (All)

Someone Somewhere
2025-06-19T12:25:00
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Post: 11905981
RAT types vary significantly by aircraft family. The 777 and 787 types (along with most BBD aircraft) are indeed dual hydraulic-electric (lifted from the 2010 FCOM available online):


Other types are different. The A350/A380 do have an electric-only RAT with adequate electric flight controls.

The A320/A330 have a hydraulic-only RAT with a separate hydraulic-driven electrical generator. The 757/767 are similar except the generator is optional.

Some used an electric RAT to drive an electric hydraulic pump.

Be careful when attempting to transfer knowledge from one type to another.

Last edited by Saab Dastard; 19th Jun 2025 at 15:45 . Reason: Reference to deleted post removed

Subjects: FCOM  Generators/Alternators  Hydraulic Failure (All)  Hydraulic Pumps  RAT (All)

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T01:02:00
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Post: 11906517
Originally Posted by StudentInDebt
No, it doesn’t “only” happen in these cases!
It is very, very, very close:

Both engines failed: yup, both engines have failed.
Triple hydraulic pressure low: either you've been hit by a SAM/uncontained engine failure causing massive fluid leaks, or both engine driven pumps have failed (likely because the engines have failed) and all four electric pumps have failed (because the engines have failed).
Loss of all electric power to flight instruments both sides: total AC electric loss, and I think battery/static inverter too? Given four generators and four buses, either massive electrical failure (swimming pool in E&E bay) or engines have failed. Note failure of an individual contactor that can tie two buses together should not cause a quad-bus outage.
Loss of all four electric motor pumps: total AC failure, see above.

Subjects: Electrical Failure  Engine Failure (All)  Engine Shutdown  Generators/Alternators  Hydraulic Failure (All)  Hydraulic Pumps

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T04:18:00
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Post: 11906574
Originally Posted by Lead Balloon
Just so I have this clear, are you saying that the implementation of the TCMA functionality involved no new components being added to the pre-existing FADEC? Are you saying, in effect, that the two switch relays described in the TCMA patent application, which relays and their configuration achieves the described two channel redundancy, were already there as components or are mere depictions of what the software does itself?

I am not suggesting you are wrong and, as I've said before, the descriptions and schematic in the patent application are just 'big hands / small maps' concepts. However, if TCMA functionality "is simply a bit of software in the FADECs", merely sending a 1 or 0 or other signal into a point in the pre-existing FADEC that already had control over fuel cutoff (with the TCMA software merely monitoring data busses, rather than direct sensor outputs, to work out thrust lever position and whether or not the aircraft is 'on the ground' for TCMA purposes) I for one would really like to know that for sure and get my head around the implications.
That is the implication I have heard all along, particularly from tdracer's posts.

It uses existing thrust-lever-angle inputs, existing N1 inputs, and (presumably) existing WoW inputs, does software stuff inside the ECU, and if necessary uses the existing overspeed cutout outputs to stop the engine.

Subjects: FADEC  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  TCMA (All)

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T08:41:00
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Post: 11906722
Engine failure due to water contamination is surely a different investigation to biocide contamination? I expect they're looking into both, but they're not that closely linked.

Surprising that you can do nearly a minute of takeoff+climbout then fail cleanly and silently within seconds of each other.

Subjects: Biocide  Engine Failure (All)

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T09:07:00
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Post: 11906746
Originally Posted by ignorantAndroid
In general, we can classify computer errors into 3 categories:
  1. Errors in system design, specifications, or algorithms. These are cases where the computer does exactly what it was designed to do, but the design itself was flawed or inadequate, or had unforeseen consequences. This would include things like MCAS on the 737 MAX.
  2. Software errors. These are cases where the computer does exactly what the code tells it to do, but not what the designers wanted it to do. This results from mistakes in writing the actual code, and this is usually what we'd refer to as a "bug." This includes things like race conditions, loops that fail to terminate, incorrect type conversion, etc.
  3. Hardware malfunctions. These are cases where the computer does something different from what the code instructs. It can involve memory corruption or data bus corruption. It can result in a system that appears to work, but returns incorrect outputs, e.g. a calculator saying 2+2=5. It can also cause the computer to execute valid instructions, but at an inappropriate time. It can result from manufacturing defects in components, cosmic rays (SEU or SEE), radiofrequency interference (HIRF), moisture ingress, failed solder joints, and numerous other things.
I would add that we appear to have already seen a Cat 1 or Cat 2 error in TCMA: the ANA 787 that lost both engines on landing. I don't remember the exact details.

I am slightly surprised that they went for a contour-type design rather than more of a "thrust lever below 5% for >2 seconds, N1 above 50%" type check, if the concern is solely around RTO/landing.

Subjects: TCMA (All)

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T09:14:00
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Post: 11906758
Originally Posted by martinebrangan
I would, of course, presume, that take-off roll performance was within expected limits, otherwise they would have aborted by V1. They reached VR before running totally out of runway, and achieved a short-lasting climb. What one single point of failure occurred very shortly after aircraft went nose-up and would it be possible that the fuel feed in some way affected by virtue of that angle in the context of some failure?
Is this a rhetorical question?

Runway performance seems to be still under some speculation but I thought it was fairly solidly shown that they rotated in about the normal position.

Two events that I see are rotate (g-forces/deck angle causing fuel sloshing) and weight-on-wheels going false due to lift-off.

The engines would be fed separately by the left and right pumps in the centre tank as there's >34t of fuel onboard; one pump per engine. I am not sure how physically separated they are in the tank.

Subjects: Centre Tank  Takeoff Roll  V1

Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T09:17:00
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Post: 11906760
Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
The bleeding obvious didn't work on the Jeju Air 737.

The 787s recorder/s have obviously been damaged so much/missing data they are being taken to the US.
The Jeju recorders survived the crash relatively fine. Recorders weren't on the emergency power supply because power is scarce and you want to minimise the number of loads that could cause a fault.

Circuit breakers tripping on a fault without causing a brownout to other services becomes much more questionable once you start talking about higher-impedance batteries. Every extra circuit is another opportunity for failure.

Do we have a source for one/both EAFRs operating on standby power?

Subjects: None

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T09:48:00
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Post: 11906783
Originally Posted by MaybeItIs
On that point, the gear, as far as I can establish (not openly published according to Google), weighs around 8-odd to 10 tonnes. Typically, retracts in about 10 seconds. I estimate it's no more than a 2 metre lift. As far as I can work out (using 3m to make the value higher), that requires about 30kW (rough estimate, budgetary figure, not accounting for it being a curved path, so it's probably higher closer to fully up), but whether wind pressure affects it, I have no idea. Anyway, 30kW isn't a huge (additional) load on a 225kVA alternator. Less than I'd imagined.

Now I'm wondering how big (power ratings) the hydraulic pump and motor are? No doubt, they're driven by a VSD. Can anyone comment, please?
Listed here as 37GPM at 4750PSI each for the EMPs, and 27GPM for the EDPs - most unusual to have beefier EMPs than EDPs. Source looks like it could be a wealth of other information.

37GPM at 4750PSI is ~76kW before considering pump, motor, and converter losses. Ouch.

Very surprised they kept the demand pumps for left/right systems the same size given they only do flight control and perhaps reverser loads - and reverser operation off an EMP is presumably rare as it implies the EDP failed (or was MELed) without the corresponding engine.

777 centre EMPs were apparently only 6GPM 3000PSI with gear/flaps using the air-driven demand pumps.

(we may be re-approaching 'hamster wheel' territory)

Subjects: Generators/Alternators  Hydraulic Failure (All)  Hydraulic Pumps

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-21T23:39:00
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Post: 11908153
Re the SAFRAN FADEC Gen 3 : It was used on the CFM56-5B and -7B and some CF6s amongst others. Unless those engines were re-FADECed later (seems unlikely), the FADEC dates to at least the early 90s.
Safran has some pictures that looks suitably early-90s high tech:




(I wouldn't be too certain that the second image shown is this generation FADEC, as it's also shown on the Gen 4 (LEAP) FADEC page).
(I recognise that soldering iron... Metcal makes good stuff).

There is some limited detail on the air/ground system here . It shows two truck tilt and two strut compression sensors on each of the two MLGs, 8 sensors total. Truck tilt sensors give 'fast' A/G detection; truck tilt + struts gives 'slow' A/G detection. Two systems but no mention of exactly how voting works. No mention of radalt but that could be handled separately before being provided to the FADECs.

I am also now thoroughly satisfied that the FADECs have their own alternators, and that these are separate to the flight control alternators integrated into each VFSG.

Subjects: FADEC  Generators/Alternators  MLG Tilt

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-22T11:01:00
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Post: 11908441
Originally Posted by Icarus2001
Always possible, however since a pilot made a radio call there was some emergency leve l power available, which suggests the EAFR would be powered.

The Jeju recorders were okay if I recall correctly, they just had no input, was that the case?

Somoeone made a good point above about the German Wings FDR/CVR being available the next day after the aircraft was aimed at the ground like a missile. These things are built tough, as you know, this may be type specific but….
The equipment on RAT/battery is limited:


(from the online 2010 FCOM)


(from the maintenance training )

The 787 battery fire report says the two recorders are on the left and right 28VDC buses. I don't think those get powered on RAT by the looks of it. I would wager you get whatever is on the 235VAC 'backup bus', plus the captain's and F/O's instrument buses via C1/C2 TRUs. You won't get all of that (like the F/O's screens) because the 787 energises/de-energises specific bits of equipment, not just whole buses.

Losing recorder power looks entirely expected.


Originally Posted by mh370rip
SLF Engineer (electrical - not aerospace) so no special knowledge

Perceived wisdom may be applicable in normal circumstances but not when all the holes line up.

For example I've seen it quoted many times that the engine FADECs are self powered
by the engines, the TCMAs-whether part of the FADEC or a separate unit, similarly self contained
within the engine. The perceived wisdom seems to be that there is no common single fault
which can take out both engines.

And yet we're also told that the TCMA function can only function in ground mode and receives ground-air
signals from a combination of inputs from Rad Alts and WOW sensors.
There is therefore a connection from the central EE bay to the engine.

Yes I'm sure the Rad/Alt and WOW sensor processing will use different sensors for each side and powered from different
low voltage buses.
However as an analogy, in your house your toaster in the kitchen may be on a separate circuit from the water heater in
the bathroom, each protected by a fuse at the main switchboard. In normal operation a fault in one cannot affect the other.
However a lightning strike outside the house can send much higher voltages than normal operation throughout the entire
system and trash every electrical appliance not physically disconnected at the time.

Now I'm not suggesting the aircraft was hit by lightning but FDR has proposed a single event, buildup from a water leak entering
one of the EE bays at rotate. It would be possible for one or more of the HV electrical buses to short so that all the low voltage
buses go high voltage. I have no knowledge of how the FADEC / TCMA systems connect to or process the Ground-Air signals but
there is a single fault mechanism whereby high voltage could be simultaneously and inappropriately applied to both engine control systems.
It would be unfortunate if this failure mechanism did cause power to be applied to drive the fuel shut off valve closed.

Since the likelihood is that we're looking at a low probability event then perceived wisdom about normal operations and fault modes
might not be applicable.
400VAC/540VDC (+-270V) is not really known for blowing past input protection in the same way as actual HV or lightning. I would expect some optocouplers and/or transformers to be both present and adequate. There's definitely some big MOVs scattered around the main 235VAC buses.

Weight on wheels appears to go into data concentrators that go into the common core system (i.e. data network).

Presumably there is a set of comms buses between the FADECs and the CCS to allow all the pretty indicators and EICAS alerts in the cockpit to work. The WoW sensors might flow back via that, or via dedicated digital inputs from whatever the reverse of a data concentrator is called (surely they have need for field actuators other than big motors?). Either way, left and right engine data should come from completely different computers, that are in the fwd e/e bay (or concentrators/repeaters in the wings, maybe) rather than in with the big power stuff in the aft e/e bay.

Subjects: EAFR  Electrical Busses  FADEC  FCOM  FDR  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Mayday  RAT (All)  TCMA (Activation)  TCMA (All)  Water Ingress  Weight on Wheels

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-22T22:03:00
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Post: 11908842
Originally Posted by FullWings
That\x92s the nature of a common mode bug. If the software was vulnerable to Mars being in the house of Uranus, the scent of lilacs and the DOW being less than 42,000 then you\x92d expect the failure to occur everywhere when these conjoined. Same when an aeroplane\x92s systems and/or the environment present data that triggers an unplanned/unforeseen response in something like an EEC/FADEC. The experts still appear to think that this is unlikely but we have been presented with an unlikely occurrence...
BA038 is a classic example of this happening in the hardware space. Never seen before, but when you get exactly the right trigger conditions, both engines are unable to provide thrust at exactly the same time

Subjects: None

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-27T08:11:00
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Post: 11911760
Originally Posted by Roo
Thanks for doing this.
Someone else created an external page a few days ago that indexed and sorted all the topical posts in this thread and the original one under major headings.
I can no longer find it. Did that get deleted by mods for non compliance or is it still around somewhere?
That is here, in the Moderation thread: Moderation of Air India accident threads

Subjects: None

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-28T05:36:00
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Post: 11912338
The FAA is saying it's a problem . Any suggestion that it's related to this incident is pure speculation. Possibly brought on by that slop 'report', which may have itself been somewhat inspired by the ADs.

The engines controllers are powered internally, and the control signals appear to be redundant wiring to the thrust lever module. Perhaps there are joints in the E/E bays (probably to be avoided) but asserting liquid intrusion would cause simultaneous loss of all four signals seems laughable.

Flight controls are primarily in the fwd E/E bay but there is a set of actuator control electronics in the aft E/E bay. So even if one bay gets a deluge, it shouldn't take out all flight controls. And the flight path isn't consistent with uncontrolled flight, much less uncommanded flight with high thrust.

Consider that there's standby instruments with independent sensors and computing and mostly independent power. Thrust and flight control is subject to greater scrutiny and requirements.

Subjects: FAA  Water Ingress

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-28T13:08:00
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Post: 11912484
Originally Posted by Sailvi767
I suspect both recorders will contain the same data. Given the radio transmission after the loss of thrust the aircraft still had at least the emergency electrical bus powered. This should have kept both recorders online. It is however possible given the 10 minute battery backup that Boeing chose to put the the recorders on another bus but that\x92s not the norm.
I am not certain on that. Remember the 737 didn't have them on the standby bus (Jeju). The NTSB doc states they're powered from the L/R 28VDC buses on the 787.



This shows the centre TRUs can only power the instrument buses not the L/R DC buses, the RAT can't really power the right TRU without powering both R1/R2 buses, and powering the left TRU would require powering the left 235/115 ATU which would probably be a lot of magnetising current even if not much actual load. The contactor naming supports that.

My money is on the L/R DC buses being unpowered in RAT operation; only the CA/FO instrument buses and the 235VAC backup bus.

Subjects: Electrical Busses  NTSB  RAT (All)  TRU

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-29T13:33:00
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Post: 11913035
I note that the A350 has four similar lithium-ion main batteries and has not had high-profile events, nor has the 787 had high-profile battery failures since the initial ones. The battery issues appear effectively solved.

Subjects: None

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-30T12:37:00
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Post: 11913598
Originally Posted by Loose rivets
I was puzzled by the total absence of replies to Godfrey's talking heads post way back in a main thread. He talked with clarity and implied authority but I was left wondering if people discounted him because of his research into encoded data in radio waves and its connection to the 370 search.

One thing he claimed, in a log of several 171 flights, was that the runway used was greater on the crash flight. Not huge, but significant since the other 6? listed were all about the same. On PPRuNe threads it has been repeatedly stated that the runway used was not unusual.
I fail to see the reason behind the assumption that the aircraft was in a simple unaccelerated glide from maximum altitude to impact. It has been generally assumed here that they were above stall speed at the peak, and traded speed for increased glide distance, flaring/stalling in the last seconds before impact.

This implies perhaps a 180-140kt deceleration (90-70m/s) over the same ~18 seconds. That's about 1m/s^2 or 0.1g. To decelerate a 200t object by that much, you need an extra ~20t or 44000lbf of drag, outstripping his assumed 4000lbf of 'missing' thrust by an order of magnitude.

Last edited by Someone Somewhere; 30th Jun 2025 at 13:02 .

Subjects: None

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Someone Somewhere
2025-07-01T06:48:00
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Post: 11914048
Originally Posted by megan
Hold your horses there Bloggs , I didn't say they did, I said centre tanks were typically turned on at that altitude (using a certain 737 operator as a guide). As the check list that you posted shows the centre pumps will automatically turn off because of load shedding once an engine is started.
The pumps are load shed during (and possibly before) engine start. Available power is presumably somewhat limited when on APU only (two generators not four) and especially when you're electrically cranking the engines. When on ground and with engines stopped, aircon, IFE, and galley probably takes priority over pumping fuel to nowhere.

Once both engines are running and the four VFSGs are online, I would not expect any load shedding and certainly not of flight loads like fuel pumps.

The Airbus manuals imply or clearly state that centre pumps are inhibited when the flaps are extended, so both engines draw from the wing/main tanks. I haven't seen anything clearly matching in the Boeing manuals.

Subjects: APU  Fuel (All)  Fuel Pumps  Generators/Alternators