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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-18T13:29:00 permalink Post: 11905251 |
Once again
tdracer
confirmed the PMGs for the FADECs in the first AI171 thread. He even explained the logic behind it and the connections with the onboard electronics:
- Each engine has a PMG for the FADECs - Only for engine start the FADECs are powered by the aircraft - Once the engines are running, this connection is opened - It is verified, that the FADECs are then no longer connected to the aircraft electrical system. A failure to open the connection triggers a "No dispatch" message - In case the PMG fails, the FADECs are once again powered by the aircraft electrical system But I am being told elsewhere by someone with an A&P badge that that is not quite the whole story, and that the FADEC PMGs do double-duty as the flight control PMGs. I am hoping for some documentation to confirm/refute that. 1 user liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-18T19:30:00 permalink Post: 11905495 |
Based on my previous speculation regarding a BTB short, I wonder how aircraft engines might react in a situation where initially a transient power fault is followed by only battery power being available? As I understand it, there are no longer cable connections to the engines, given no valid inputs from the.thrust levers, what thrust mode would the FADEC's revert to?
Thrust lever resolvers are powered by the FADECs, so as long as the engine remains running, it will know what requested thrust is from the pilots. You presumably loss A/T. I certainly expect and hope so. But I can't find any 787 or even 777 documentation confirming it. Whether the PMA for the FADEC is certified as part of the FADEC... not sure. Subjects: FADEC |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-19T10:54:00 permalink Post: 11905921 |
I still think that the small black area is the back of the engines visible through the small gap of the extended flaps.
Furthermore: The small hydraulik pump of the RAT only powers some of the flight controls that are powered by the center hydraulic system. The ones powered by the engine driven pumps will not work once the engine(s) failed. This doesn't apply if the pumps are depressurised by a fire handle, or to allow easier engine relight. Subjects: EDML Engine Failure (All) Engine Shutdown Generators/Alternators RAT (All) |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-19T12:25:00 permalink Post: 11905981 |
RAT types vary significantly by aircraft family. The 777 and 787 types (along with most BBD aircraft) are indeed dual hydraulic-electric (lifted from the 2010 FCOM available online):
![]() Other types are different. The A350/A380 do have an electric-only RAT with adequate electric flight controls. The A320/A330 have a hydraulic-only RAT with a separate hydraulic-driven electrical generator. The 757/767 are similar except the generator is optional. Some used an electric RAT to drive an electric hydraulic pump. Be careful when attempting to transfer knowledge from one type to another. Last edited by Saab Dastard; 19th Jun 2025 at 15:45 . Reason: Reference to deleted post removed Subjects: FCOM Generators/Alternators Hydraulic Failure (All) Hydraulic Pumps RAT (All) 10 users liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T01:02:00 permalink Post: 11906517 |
It is very, very, very close:
![]() Both engines failed: yup, both engines have failed. Triple hydraulic pressure low: either you've been hit by a SAM/uncontained engine failure causing massive fluid leaks, or both engine driven pumps have failed (likely because the engines have failed) and all four electric pumps have failed (because the engines have failed). Loss of all electric power to flight instruments both sides: total AC electric loss, and I think battery/static inverter too? Given four generators and four buses, either massive electrical failure (swimming pool in E&E bay) or engines have failed. Note failure of an individual contactor that can tie two buses together should not cause a quad-bus outage. Loss of all four electric motor pumps: total AC failure, see above. Subjects: Electrical Failure Engine Failure (All) Engine Shutdown Generators/Alternators Hydraulic Failure (All) Hydraulic Pumps 3 users liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T04:18:00 permalink Post: 11906574 |
Just so I have this clear, are you saying that the implementation of the TCMA functionality involved
no
new components being added to the pre-existing FADEC? Are you saying, in effect, that the two switch relays described in the TCMA patent application, which relays and their configuration achieves the described two channel redundancy, were already there as components or are mere depictions of what the software does itself?
I am not suggesting you are wrong and, as I've said before, the descriptions and schematic in the patent application are just 'big hands / small maps' concepts. However, if TCMA functionality "is simply a bit of software in the FADECs", merely sending a 1 or 0 or other signal into a point in the pre-existing FADEC that already had control over fuel cutoff (with the TCMA software merely monitoring data busses, rather than direct sensor outputs, to work out thrust lever position and whether or not the aircraft is 'on the ground' for TCMA purposes) I for one would really like to know that for sure and get my head around the implications. It uses existing thrust-lever-angle inputs, existing N1 inputs, and (presumably) existing WoW inputs, does software stuff inside the ECU, and if necessary uses the existing overspeed cutout outputs to stop the engine. Subjects: FADEC Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff TCMA (All) 3 users liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T08:41:00 permalink Post: 11906722 |
Engine failure due to water contamination is surely a different investigation to biocide contamination? I expect they're looking into both, but they're not that closely linked.
Surprising that you can do nearly a minute of takeoff+climbout then fail cleanly and silently within seconds of each other. Subjects: Biocide Engine Failure (All) 4 users liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T09:07:00 permalink Post: 11906746 |
In general, we can classify computer errors into 3 categories:
I am slightly surprised that they went for a contour-type design rather than more of a "thrust lever below 5% for >2 seconds, N1 above 50%" type check, if the concern is solely around RTO/landing. Subjects: TCMA (All) 1 user liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T09:14:00 permalink Post: 11906758 |
I would, of course, presume, that take-off roll performance was within expected limits, otherwise they would have aborted by V1. They reached VR before running totally out of runway, and achieved a short-lasting climb. What one single point of failure occurred very shortly after aircraft went nose-up and would it be possible that the fuel feed in some way affected by virtue of that angle in the context of some failure?
Runway performance seems to be still under some speculation but I thought it was fairly solidly shown that they rotated in about the normal position. Two events that I see are rotate (g-forces/deck angle causing fuel sloshing) and weight-on-wheels going false due to lift-off. The engines would be fed separately by the left and right pumps in the centre tank as there's >34t of fuel onboard; one pump per engine. I am not sure how physically separated they are in the tank. Subjects: Centre Tank Takeoff Roll V1 |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T09:17:00 permalink Post: 11906760 |
Circuit breakers tripping on a fault without causing a brownout to other services becomes much more questionable once you start talking about higher-impedance batteries. Every extra circuit is another opportunity for failure. Do we have a source for one/both EAFRs operating on standby power? Subjects: None 1 user liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-20T09:48:00 permalink Post: 11906783 |
On that point, the gear, as far as I can establish (not openly published according to Google), weighs around 8-odd to 10 tonnes. Typically, retracts in about 10 seconds. I estimate it's no more than a 2 metre lift. As far as I can work out (using 3m to make the value higher), that requires about 30kW (rough estimate, budgetary figure, not accounting for it being a curved path, so it's probably higher closer to fully up), but whether wind pressure affects it, I have no idea. Anyway, 30kW isn't a huge (additional) load on a 225kVA alternator. Less than I'd imagined.
Now I'm wondering how big (power ratings) the hydraulic pump and motor are? No doubt, they're driven by a VSD. Can anyone comment, please? 37GPM at 4750PSI is ~76kW before considering pump, motor, and converter losses. Ouch. Very surprised they kept the demand pumps for left/right systems the same size given they only do flight control and perhaps reverser loads - and reverser operation off an EMP is presumably rare as it implies the EDP failed (or was MELed) without the corresponding engine. 777 centre EMPs were apparently only 6GPM 3000PSI with gear/flaps using the air-driven demand pumps. (we may be re-approaching 'hamster wheel' territory) Subjects: Generators/Alternators Hydraulic Failure (All) Hydraulic Pumps 1 user liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-21T23:39:00 permalink Post: 11908153 |
Re the
SAFRAN FADEC Gen 3
: It was used on the CFM56-5B and -7B and some CF6s amongst others. Unless those engines were re-FADECed later (seems unlikely), the FADEC dates to at least the early 90s.
Safran has some pictures that looks suitably early-90s high tech: ![]() ![]() (I wouldn't be too certain that the second image shown is this generation FADEC, as it's also shown on the Gen 4 (LEAP) FADEC page). (I recognise that soldering iron... Metcal makes good stuff). There is some limited detail on the air/ground system here . It shows two truck tilt and two strut compression sensors on each of the two MLGs, 8 sensors total. Truck tilt sensors give 'fast' A/G detection; truck tilt + struts gives 'slow' A/G detection. Two systems but no mention of exactly how voting works. No mention of radalt but that could be handled separately before being provided to the FADECs. I am also now thoroughly satisfied that the FADECs have their own alternators, and that these are separate to the flight control alternators integrated into each VFSG. Subjects: FADEC Generators/Alternators MLG Tilt 3 users liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-22T11:01:00 permalink Post: 11908441 |
Always possible, however since a pilot made a radio call there was some
emergency leve
l power available, which suggests the EAFR would be powered.
The Jeju recorders were okay if I recall correctly, they just had no input, was that the case? Somoeone made a good point above about the German Wings FDR/CVR being available the next day after the aircraft was aimed at the ground like a missile. These things are built tough, as you know, this may be type specific but…. ![]() (from the online 2010 FCOM) ![]() (from the maintenance training ) The 787 battery fire report says the two recorders are on the left and right 28VDC buses. I don't think those get powered on RAT by the looks of it. I would wager you get whatever is on the 235VAC 'backup bus', plus the captain's and F/O's instrument buses via C1/C2 TRUs. You won't get all of that (like the F/O's screens) because the 787 energises/de-energises specific bits of equipment, not just whole buses. Losing recorder power looks entirely expected.
SLF Engineer (electrical - not aerospace) so no special knowledge
Perceived wisdom may be applicable in normal circumstances but not when all the holes line up. For example I've seen it quoted many times that the engine FADECs are self powered by the engines, the TCMAs-whether part of the FADEC or a separate unit, similarly self contained within the engine. The perceived wisdom seems to be that there is no common single fault which can take out both engines. And yet we're also told that the TCMA function can only function in ground mode and receives ground-air signals from a combination of inputs from Rad Alts and WOW sensors. There is therefore a connection from the central EE bay to the engine. Yes I'm sure the Rad/Alt and WOW sensor processing will use different sensors for each side and powered from different low voltage buses. However as an analogy, in your house your toaster in the kitchen may be on a separate circuit from the water heater in the bathroom, each protected by a fuse at the main switchboard. In normal operation a fault in one cannot affect the other. However a lightning strike outside the house can send much higher voltages than normal operation throughout the entire system and trash every electrical appliance not physically disconnected at the time. Now I'm not suggesting the aircraft was hit by lightning but FDR has proposed a single event, buildup from a water leak entering one of the EE bays at rotate. It would be possible for one or more of the HV electrical buses to short so that all the low voltage buses go high voltage. I have no knowledge of how the FADEC / TCMA systems connect to or process the Ground-Air signals but there is a single fault mechanism whereby high voltage could be simultaneously and inappropriately applied to both engine control systems. It would be unfortunate if this failure mechanism did cause power to be applied to drive the fuel shut off valve closed. Since the likelihood is that we're looking at a low probability event then perceived wisdom about normal operations and fault modes might not be applicable. Weight on wheels appears to go into data concentrators that go into the common core system (i.e. data network). Presumably there is a set of comms buses between the FADECs and the CCS to allow all the pretty indicators and EICAS alerts in the cockpit to work. The WoW sensors might flow back via that, or via dedicated digital inputs from whatever the reverse of a data concentrator is called (surely they have need for field actuators other than big motors?). Either way, left and right engine data should come from completely different computers, that are in the fwd e/e bay (or concentrators/repeaters in the wings, maybe) rather than in with the big power stuff in the aft e/e bay. Subjects: EAFR Electrical Busses FADEC FCOM FDR Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Mayday RAT (All) TCMA (Activation) TCMA (All) Water Ingress Weight on Wheels 8 users liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-22T22:03:00 permalink Post: 11908842 |
That\x92s the nature of a common mode bug. If the software was vulnerable to Mars being in the house of Uranus, the scent of lilacs and the DOW being less than 42,000 then you\x92d expect the failure to occur everywhere when these conjoined. Same when an aeroplane\x92s systems and/or the environment present data that triggers an unplanned/unforeseen response in something like an EEC/FADEC. The experts still appear to think that this is unlikely but we have been presented with an unlikely occurrence...
Subjects: None 3 users liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-27T08:11:00 permalink Post: 11911760 |
Thanks for doing this.
Someone else created an external page a few days ago that indexed and sorted all the topical posts in this thread and the original one under major headings. I can no longer find it. Did that get deleted by mods for non compliance or is it still around somewhere? Subjects: None 1 user liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-28T05:36:00 permalink Post: 11912338 |
The FAA is saying it's a
problem
. Any suggestion that it's related to
this incident
is pure speculation. Possibly brought on by that slop 'report', which may have itself been somewhat inspired by the ADs.
The engines controllers are powered internally, and the control signals appear to be redundant wiring to the thrust lever module. Perhaps there are joints in the E/E bays (probably to be avoided) but asserting liquid intrusion would cause simultaneous loss of all four signals seems laughable. Flight controls are primarily in the fwd E/E bay but there is a set of actuator control electronics in the aft E/E bay. So even if one bay gets a deluge, it shouldn't take out all flight controls. And the flight path isn't consistent with uncontrolled flight, much less uncommanded flight with high thrust. Consider that there's standby instruments with independent sensors and computing and mostly independent power. Thrust and flight control is subject to greater scrutiny and requirements. Subjects: FAA Water Ingress 1 user liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-28T13:08:00 permalink Post: 11912484 |
I suspect both recorders will contain the same data. Given the radio transmission after the loss of thrust the aircraft still had at least the emergency electrical bus powered. This should have kept both recorders online. It is however possible given the 10 minute battery backup that Boeing chose to put the the recorders on another bus but that\x92s not the norm.
![]() This shows the centre TRUs can only power the instrument buses not the L/R DC buses, the RAT can't really power the right TRU without powering both R1/R2 buses, and powering the left TRU would require powering the left 235/115 ATU which would probably be a lot of magnetising current even if not much actual load. The contactor naming supports that. My money is on the L/R DC buses being unpowered in RAT operation; only the CA/FO instrument buses and the 235VAC backup bus. Subjects: Electrical Busses NTSB RAT (All) TRU 5 users liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-29T13:33:00 permalink Post: 11913035 |
I note that the A350 has four similar lithium-ion main batteries and has not had high-profile events, nor has the 787 had high-profile battery failures since the initial ones. The battery issues appear effectively solved.
Subjects: None 8 users liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-30T12:37:00 permalink Post: 11913598 |
I was puzzled by the total absence of replies to Godfrey's talking heads post way back in a main thread. He talked with clarity and implied authority but I was left wondering if people discounted him because of his research into encoded data in radio waves and its connection to the 370 search.
One thing he claimed, in a log of several 171 flights, was that the runway used was greater on the crash flight. Not huge, but significant since the other 6? listed were all about the same. On PPRuNe threads it has been repeatedly stated that the runway used was not unusual. This implies perhaps a 180-140kt deceleration (90-70m/s) over the same ~18 seconds. That's about 1m/s^2 or 0.1g. To decelerate a 200t object by that much, you need an extra ~20t or 44000lbf of drag, outstripping his assumed 4000lbf of 'missing' thrust by an order of magnitude. Last edited by Someone Somewhere; 30th Jun 2025 at 13:02 . Subjects: None 2 users liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-07-01T06:48:00 permalink Post: 11914048 |
Hold your horses there
Bloggs
, I didn't say they did, I said centre tanks were typically turned on at that altitude (using a certain 737 operator as a guide). As the check list that you posted shows the centre pumps will automatically turn off because of load shedding once an engine is started.
Once both engines are running and the four VFSGs are online, I would not expect any load shedding and certainly not of flight loads like fuel pumps. The Airbus manuals imply or clearly state that centre pumps are inhibited when the flaps are extended, so both engines draw from the wing/main tanks. I haven't seen anything clearly matching in the Boeing manuals. Subjects: APU Fuel (All) Fuel Pumps Generators/Alternators |