Posts by user "Someone Somewhere" [Posts: 76 Total up-votes: 94 Page: 4 of 4]ΒΆ

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Someone Somewhere
July 14, 2025, 10:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922018
Originally Posted by The Brigadier
Originally Posted by SRMman
Actually, we don't know who made the Mayday call.
The mods have previously chosen to delete my post with links to confirmatory sources on this point, so I won't bother here.
Is that the "Captain's friend heard CVR tape" report that came out before the CVR had been read out, or a different source?

The former seems very discredited.
Last edited by Someone Somewhere; 14th July 2025 at 11:17 .

Subjects CVR  MAYDAY  Thread Moderation

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Someone Somewhere
July 15, 2025, 05:45:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922651
Originally Posted by dingy737
1. Where is the Data showing the TIME STAMP of when each engine parameters FIRST indicated an Engine spooling down. ( N1- N2, RPM. FUEL FLOW. EGT)
2. if the time STAMP of any engine spool down data occurred prior to the first movement of the fuel start lever. Then any subsequent movement of the start levers must be seen as an attempt to restart.
3. so that timeline must be established. More data is required.

This seems to quite clearly answer the question: (from the prelim report)
The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42
UTC and immediately thereafter , the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned
from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1
and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut
off .

Originally Posted by LTC8K6
Requiring the throttle lever to be at idle seems like a good idea.
That's the Embraer option.

The other option I can imagine is a mechanical stop with an override button, like the landing gear lever. Can't switch the fuel levers off unless you're slow and on the ground, the engine is failed or on fire, or you push override.

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Gear Lever  Parameters  Preliminary Report  RUN/CUTOFF  Relight  Timeline (Preliminary Report)

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Someone Somewhere
July 15, 2025, 08:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922700
Originally Posted by Musician
The problem with the switches with hinged covers is that they have a single, "safe" position when they're covered. But the fuel switch is safe at CUTOFF when parked, and safe at RUN when the aircraft is operating, so that won't work.
There are ways to have gates that can be closed in either position (and are perhaps spring-closed), but either they are going to be left open, are a PITA to operate a switch single-handedly, or operating the guard will become part of the muscle memory for operating the switch.

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Muscle Memory  RUN/CUTOFF  Switch Guards

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Someone Somewhere
November 07, 2025, 23:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11985044
If that is the lawsuit based on this filing , then you're in for a treat. Same crowd that delivered this 'report' , which seems to be a mash-up of all the various conspiracy theories (aft EAFR fire damaged so must have been a battery fire? Check).

Disappointing for someone with what seem to be remarkable credentials:
The founder of the organization is Captain Amit Singh, he is a senior management
professional with over 17000 hours on Boeing - 777 and Airbus - 320. He has
also been associated with the start-up of two airlines, viz Air Asia and IndiGo,
and has held the posts of: Chief of Safety, AirAsia, Director Flight Operations,
AirAsia, Chief Pilot Training, IndiGo and Fleet Captain Safety/ Technical
Interglobe Aviation Ltd. He is a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society,
London,
It is technically just garbage.

Subjects EAFR

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Someone Somewhere
November 28, 2025, 20:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11997382
Originally Posted by Musician
The Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), a critical post-crash distress beacon, was never activated, as per the AAIB report. It was recovered intact in the wreckage, yet it was silent.A CCS/core network failure would not by itself stop the transmission from an ELT’s automatic g-switch — which is a gravity (g) switch with a sensor that detects sudden changes in acceleration (g-forces) that typically occur during a crash.

That is, unless the ELT’s antenna and wiring had melted in a fire — and one possible pointer to that is a Category A fault logged on AI 171’s Nitrogen Generation System (NGS), a safety feature Boeing added to prevent fuel tank fires in the aftermath of the Trans World Airlines Flight 800’s midair explosion due to a central fuel tank ignition in 1996.

The NGS works by continuously flooding the tail fuel tank’s ullage (the empty space above the fuel) with nitrogen-rich air, displacing oxygen and thereby preventing the build-up of flammable vapours.

If the NGS were not functioning, the oxygen levels around the aft-fuel tank bay may have been dangerously high. In that scenario, even a small spark—possibly from an electric arc or surge—could ignite a localised fuel-air vapour fire. That would have burnt the wiring and antenna of the ELT and wiring, connectors, and housing of tail-section black box or the aft Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder (EAFR). And this scenario would be in line with the AAIB report, which shows the tail section was more structurally intact compared to the nose.
We're back to this rubbish.

There's a good 20m of cabin between the centre fuel tanks (there is no 'aft fuel tank bay' on a 787) and the ELT/aft EAFR which are IIRC more-or-less above the rear doors.

The rest isn't much better.

I also see no mention of the fact that virtually everything in the CCS/CDN/CCRs is at least duplicated.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 29th November 2025 at 03:07 . Reason: Add source of the quote

Subjects AAIB (All)  DFDR  EAFR

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Someone Somewhere
November 29, 2025, 01:17:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11997509
Originally Posted by WillowRun 6-3
[...]

Now, why rehearse these crosss-references here? -- because I'm trying to find out if a comment I read earlier today on the Wall Street Journal website was accurate or not. That commenter, besides assailing the leaks of information from the investigation (and impliedly, the proliferation of screwball "analyses', possibly lofted into the ethersphere by Artificial Typing Pools) asserted that there probably have not been other instances where a properly constituted and convened Annex 13 accident panel was challenged in ligitation in the investigating country. If there are one or more such cases like the one filed in India which have proceeded somewhere else, oh boy would I have a guest lecture to pitch to certain Air and Space Law faculties. And similarly, precedent for a parent or anyone related to an aviator who perished in a civil aviation accident filing a petition seeking to exonerate their family member - has this ever been litigated at all, anywhere?
I assume you're familiar with the events surrounding the Mt Erebus disaster ? (I'm not, really).

Subjects Annex 13  Wall Street Journal

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Someone Somewhere
December 24, 2025, 11:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12010357
I think the critical point is that on the A320 (and effectively on the 777 and other aircraft), in normal conditions pitch is only being controlled by one computer at a time (with a monitoring channel). A pitch control failure only needs that one computer to go senile, and the monitoring channel to fail to detect or adequately intervene (it seems that's what happened on the A320), or be poisoned by false data from the main channel.

The engines don't share any systems in the same way; they're completely separate. Convincing two engines to fail means causing the same fault simultaneously in two different computers, which is not practical for a bit flip theory.

Subjects: None

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Someone Somewhere
January 23, 2026, 08:10:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12025591
I would be embarrassed to submit a document of that quality internally, let alone to Government.

The shown images look like overheating at terminals and that tends to be the cause of electrical fires. Could certainly be workmanship or design/underspecification issues and a concern.

There isn't the slightest chance that either could cause failure of self-powered engines during the takeoff roll, let alone cause the flight recorders to record not just no data, but credible false data.

It's like saying your car crashed into a bridge support at 220km/h because of a recurring slow leak in one tire.





Subjects DFDR  Takeoff Roll

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Someone Somewhere
January 24, 2026, 20:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12026564
Originally Posted by Musician
Non-paywalled version: https://www.aol.com/articles/sabotag...060100148.html
There's the old "the RAT deployed early" (assuming it always takes a full 6 seconds to spool up), the water leak, the "can't move both switches in a second", and new "the aft FDR looks like it burned before the crash". And this, which is as yet unsubstantiated, and is likely not relevant at all:
"The aft EAFR burned before the crash" was I believe originally an attempt to tie it to the aft battery fires the 787 had more than a decade ago, as they're both 'aft'. Never mind that the aft electronics bay (APU battery) is under the floor near the wheel well while the aft EAFR is above the ceiling near the rear doors.

Originally Posted by Ver5pen
whilst intentional action is the most obvious explanation one can’t ignore data and technical grounds if one is also going to dismiss counter theories on technical grounds

I still don’t believe we have got a clear answer on the recording interval of the engine cutoff switch channel, if it’s 1s then the ‘debunking’ by saying it can be done very quickly is moot as (near) instant would record as 1s I believe
It's one second intervals but not necessarily recorded simultaneously. The NTSB has a few FDR reports from previous 787s that should show roughly what you would expect. I don't see any discrepancy.

and the RAT element is obviously very relevant, if RAT deployment is not recorded then one has to infer when it deployed based on when it delivered hydraulic/electric capability. And this will come down to counting seconds, any indication that the RAT may have deployed before the fuel cutoffs were recorded as moved is obviously hugely consequential
RAT out would be recorded on the EAFR I believe, they just haven't explicitly specified when it happened.

The engines ran down after the switches were recorded moving. Even if the RAT deployed, that does not suggest that the crew switched the engines off because of an engine failure.

No crew is going to shut down the engines down simply because a RAT deploys unexpectedly.

it’s easy to dismiss these narratives as vested interests but let’s be honest everyone has a vested interest here and blaming the pilots has been the go to when in doubt for a very very long time- probably as long as aviation has existed

in the absence of explicit evidence (does the CVR have more to tell?) of deliberate action or pre-planning this is a horrifically complicated investigation as there will always be plausible deniability on all sides and different courts/judges will rule on it very differently based on their own biases and views
It is very, very, very hard to argue that the EAFR records valid data for A/B/C/D but generates fake data for X/Y/Z, but the fake data is still externally and internally consistent. Which seems to be where we are now.

I don't think you can or will effectively prove whether it was intentional or some kind of an action slip, and by which pilot.

I think the accident report will be able to very clearly and with no reasonable doubt show that the switches were physically moved.

From the article:
The alternative is too awful for them to contemplate : that one of the pilots murdered hundreds of people as collateral damage in a suicide.
And there you have the answer. If you refuse to consider the scary option, whatever remains must be the 'truth'.

Because the aft flight recorder was destroyed, investigators cannot retrieve the one piece of information that it alone contained – the moment it stopped working, which might have provided a vital clue about a fire or electrical failure in the moments before the crash.
Have we had actual confirmation that the aft EAFR was completely unrecoverable? I don't believe so; the preliminary report said this:
The aft EAFR was substantially damaged and could not be downloaded through conventional means. The CPM was opened to inspect the memory card. The damage was extensive.
The forward EAFR will have shown when each bus lost power and if they don't believe there's any unique data on the aft EAFR, attempting to recover data from it is basically an academic exercise.
Last edited by Someone Somewhere; 24th January 2026 at 20:32 .

Subjects APU  Action slip  CVR  DFDR  EAFR  Electrical Failure  Engine Failure (All)  FDR  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  NTSB  Preliminary Report  RAT (All)  RAT (Deployment)

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Someone Somewhere
January 25, 2026, 06:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12026747
Selecting the fuel system controls (i.e. fuel pumps) off will not work AFAIK , as the engines will gravity/suction feed under most circumstances.

Fire handle will work as the backup shutdown. As the fire handle is not regularly used, I don't think action slips are inadvertently going to operate them.


Option A is to ignore the cutoff switch unless the thrust lever is at idle - Embraer already does this.

Option B is a landing-gear-lever style solenoid interlock on the cutoff switches. Unless the aircraft is on ground and slow, that engine has failed, or that engine has a fire warning, you have to push override.

I think Jeju have fairly conclusively shown that you need to not switch an engine off within ten seconds.

If you want a system to stop the pilot(s) deliberately and competently crashing the plane (as is posited for MH370), it gets much much harder. I posted some thoughts about that in the 'too much automation' (IIRC) thread, but it boiled down to needing a lot of redundancy and a self-flying aircraft. Enforcing 'must have M of N enabled' is the easy part.






Subjects Action slip  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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Someone Somewhere
January 25, 2026, 09:43:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12026797
Originally Posted by Jonty
The responses to the article are very interesting. And pretty much go to reaffirming my point about vested interests.

it was the same with the MH370 accident.

If you’re American or worked/flew Boeing aircraft you’re more likely to blame the pilots. If you’re Indian or Asian you’re more likely to blame the aircraft.

Unless someone produces a smoking gun, which is very unlikely, then the causes will always be up for debate.

Here in the U.K. we had the Chinook crash, where the pilots were instantly blamed. It makes me very uncomfortable to blame one individual for mass murder without a smoking gun as such.
Do you not consider the EAFR showing the cutoff switches switching to cutoff, followed by the engines spooling down, a smoking gun? Especially coupled with the engines restarting once re-enabled?

We had some discussions over in 787 GEnx loss of aircraft data will result in engine shutdown which I won't repeat in full, but there doesn't seem to be any credible way to get that result from a system failure without dealing in one-in-a-quadrillion events. The monitoring channel going to the RDCs and EAFRs is independent from the relay logic that closes the fuel valves.

Most of the "we'll never know" accidents don't have full FDR and CVR data. This one does.

I'm usually not on Boeing's side but the evidence is pretty overwhelming here.

Subjects CVR  EAFR  Engine Failure (All)  Engine Shutdown  FDR  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  GEnx (ALL)

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Someone Somewhere
January 26, 2026, 07:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12027289
I don't think we have any real evidence for intentional vs action slip. From what I've seen, the moderation has been light since the preliminary report came out showing the cutoff switches were used.

From what I've seen here, the consensus is somewhere around 70% intentional 30% action slip.

I agree that we're unlikely to ever know; several of the discussions around cockpit video recorders were kicked off by that.
Last edited by Someone Somewhere; 27th January 2026 at 05:02 .

Subjects Action slip  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Preliminary Report  Thread Moderation

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Someone Somewhere
February 01, 2026, 20:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12030826
The switches IIRC have both 'run' and 'cutoff' contacts monitored. So if the switches are moved to cutoff, the 'run' contacts open, and the 'cutoff' contacts close. If (big if), instead, loss of power resulted in switches appearing open, you would see both 'run' contacts and 'cutoff' contacts as open, which would be a fault.

With no power, the RDCs reading those switch contacts would of course also be unpowered, so you would expect to simply get no data.

If the switches appeared to close when the RAT came online, then how would you explain:
  • The ten-second time with the first engine switches being off being significantly longer than the time needed for the RAT to start supplying power
  • The fact that the switches did not switch simultaneously, especially when being switched back to run (four-second gap)

It's a nonsense theory with ChatGPT written all over it. It's been discussed at some length previously.



Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  RAT (All)

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Someone Somewhere
February 03, 2026, 11:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12031549
A reminder that the original faulty switches were a slightly different part number (same family) on the 737. No faulty switches are so far known to have been on the 787, and there was no actual requirement to replace the 787 switches. Inspection was recommended but not required, until the crash.

This report after a flight is one of those cases where if there was cockpit CCTV, I'd love to see it. And yeah, maintenance, Boeing, and the AAIB will probably all be looking very very carefully at this switch. Might even get the x-ray treatment.

Subjects AAIB (All)  CCTV

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Someone Somewhere
February 04, 2026, 09:31:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12032073
Originally Posted by Abbas Ibn Firnas
With respect, you've not addressed point 1.
That it is possible to cut of fuel at take off thrust and below 400'
2.are you saying a failed switch shutting down an engine isn't an issue, or that the inherent design eliminates that possibility?

1: Intentional misuse by pilots is basically ignored in aviation design. If you want to start changing that, there's a *lot* of things to address. This is very different to the world of industrial safety, where the operator is the enemy.

2: Switch failures leading to engine failure are counted as an in-flight shut down for ETOPS purposes, meaning <1 per 100K engine flight hours. So long as the failures are independent , this shouldn't be an issue.

Subjects Engine Failure (All)

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Someone Somewhere
February 04, 2026, 21:51:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12032457
Originally Posted by Magplug
I am not aware of a spate of pilots purposely (or even accidentally) moving both fuel switches to cut-off at rotate that would require the investment of an interlock to prevent it. In fact, the very presence of such an interlock might introduce it's owns risks.
One could, maybe, argue that Jeju's apparent shutdown of an engine while the other engine was in worse condition is also a case of bad use of the fuel switches, and could be prevented/dissuaded by the same protections depending on design.

It probably wouldn't prevent the Transair 810 option of ditching with the perfectly good engine at idle.

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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