Posts by user "StudentInDebt" [Posts: 8 Total up-votes: 38 Pages: 1]

Originally Posted by radiosutch

Ok, nobody mentioned this or at least I can't see this. If the brakes are very hot due to use during taxying the landing gear is often left down longer than usual to cool the brakes to a safe temperature before retraction (see Swissair 306) It was also very hot on the ground today
Comments ? I'll get my coat...

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

Come on, people. If it went into altitude hold, yes, the power probably would come off, but only to maintain the current airspeed. It would very quickly start powering back up as the aircraft attempted to sink and was countered by the PF. But the power didn't come back up, that being obvious from the increasing AOA during the descent.

In any case, there wouldn't be a sudden level-off because the PF is still l hand flying below 200ft. Do you think he'd blindly just jam the stick forward to follow the FD at such a low altitude?

As stated before, if even only one of those engines was running, there's no way it would have descended, slowing down, as it did.

Originally Posted by LGB

waffle waffle
Remember that Airbus accident where the aircraft thought it was landing, while the pilots wanted full thrust, and they crashed into a small forest because some kind of idle is all they were afforded by the system?

waffle

Thoughts, especially by someone who flies the 787?

Originally Posted by Europa01

I\x92ve had a look at the Honeywell spec sheet for TL type switches. They are a common type with many available configurations and are essentially a normal looking snap action switch. The locking feature is an add-on which can be specified. I have to say that from the diagrams, the locking mechanism doesn\x92t look that robust and I\x92d guess that it is subject to wear which was probably the basis of the SAIB. Given that this is a mechanical locking device seeing frequent use possibly with less than full mechanical sympathy it is possible to see how wear would occur making the lock less effective. This does beg the question of whether a check on the mechanism has made it into maintenance routines. ( Note - the locking mechanism appears to be the same for all TL switch types) . Those familiar with the switches - what do you think?
For the avoidance of doubt, the above is a technical observation on the switch type NOT a causation theory for this accident.

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

That's why Boeing put side guards on the panel.

Originally Posted by Seamless

Don\xb4t get me wrong. But this is exactly the attitude - some might call it arrogance - which will lead to accidents or for bugs to sneak in sooner or later.

Originally Posted by Surlybonds

Yes, we can. The RAT was deployed, which only happens if both engines are fully shutdown, or the crew manually deployed it.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere

It is very, very, very close:

Both engines failed: yup, both engines have failed.
Triple hydraulic pressure low: either you've been hit by a SAM/uncontained engine failure causing massive fluid leaks, or both engine driven pumps have failed (likely because the engines have failed) and all four electric pumps have failed (because the engines have failed).
Loss of all electric power to flight instruments both sides: total AC electric loss, and I think battery/static inverter too? Given four generators and four buses, either massive electrical failure (swimming pool in E&E bay) or engines have failed. Note failure of an individual contactor that can tie two buses together should not cause a quad-bus outage.
Loss of all four electric motor pumps: total AC failure, see above.