Posts by user "The Brigadier" [Posts: 13 Total up-votes: 20 Pages: 1]

Assuming we're not facing a repeat of the Boeing 737‑800 crash at Muan International Airport when loss of loss of both engines apparently also cut power to Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)

The accident occurred in mid-afternoon, when bird activity around the Sabarmati river is known to peak, increasing strike risk to both engines.

SVPI ranks second in India for wildlife strikes | Ahmedabad News - Times of India

Possible timeline (all timing after brake-release)

Rotation +33s
Mayday call +44s, circa 300 ft altitude (ADS-B)
Peak altitude +49s, 625 ft (Flightradar24)
Impact +58s, crash site 1.6 km from runway

The Dreamliner as two identical “Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorders”, one in the tail section and one beneath the flight deck. Each one contains the CVR + FDR in one module, both have 10 minutes of battery power backup. I see reports that the one in the tail section has been recovered. All to easy to surmise the contents will be tampered with at the request of politicians/investors

Pax shared video of aircraft allegedly showing cabin lights, AC and entertainment system were already broken on flight into Ahmedabad; electrical systems may already have been on the blink (see what I did there?) Shocking video reportedly shows power failures inside Air India plane hours before it crashed

Surely a Dreamliner pilot on Prune has a realistic Flight Sim where they can try taking off with each of the suggested faults/errors and see which one(s) result in the aircraft crashing in the way seen?

I see Times of India is reporting the last call to ATC was "Thrust not achieved… falling… Mayday! Mayday! Mayday!" Ahmedabad Air India crash: Long runway roll hints at thrust failure, black box key to probe; officials reveal final moments in cockpit | Ahmedabad News - Times of India

Given the evidence now in the public domain of RAT auto-deployment and simultaneous roll back, with no bird strikes, the most plausible primary trigger is a simultaneous, fuel-related thrust failure on both GEnx-1B engines. Simultaneous FADEC failure seems less likely, at least without tampering.

There's some possible fuel contamination mechanisms which would only affect one aircraft

- The fuel truck’s water-absorbing “monitor” element breaks up, the first aircraft after the break gets the bead slug; later uplifts may be clear once the hose is flushed. The beads jam metering valves almost immediately.
- After pipe maintenance, the first few hundred litres can carry residual cleaning surfactant that strips protective films and causes filter-monitor “soap lock”.
- Biofilm growth happens inside one aircraft’s wing tanks when it sits in humid conditions or does short hops with warm fuel. On the next flight the biofilm shears off, blocks strainers,

As more days pass without the FAA/EASA issuing an emergency Airworthiness Directive re. the 787 Dreamliner, it does appear more likely the cause of the crash was specific to the Air India aircraft (as per speculation on fuel contamination, bad maintenance, crew error etc. etc.)

I looked at the possibility of a Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) being used to disrupt the onboard systems; India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been developing several types of DEW to counter drones ( ADITYA and KALI projects). However this seems to be a very, very unlikely cause due the extent of shielding on the 787 electronics.

A case in point is the 2013 Boeing 787 battery fires. After two thermal runaways in 52 000 flight-hours, the root cause was still unknown; however, the FAA nevertheless issued Emergency AD 2013-02-51 grounding every 787 until a modification was available. IMHO a risk where the outcome is catastrophic, even very low probability, would trigger the FAA to issue an Emergency Airworthiness Directive as per their policy.

As I said in a previous post, every day that passes without a EAD suggest the cause was was specific to that aircraft (fuel contamination, maintenance failure, crew error - pick you own theory)

We know that the right-hand GEnx-1B was removed for overhaul and re-installed in March 2025 so it was at \x93zero time\x94 and zero cycles, meaning a performance asymmetry that the FADEC would have to manage every time maximum thrust is selected. If the old engine was still on the pre-2021 EEC build while the fresh engine carried the post-Service Bulletin software/hardware, a dual \x93commanded rollback\x94 is plausible. A latent fault on one channel with the mid-life core can prompt the other engine to match thrust to maintain symmetry, leading to dual rollback.

This could be several issues aligning to cause the loss of thrust. If the new engine was installed and the synchronisation step was omitted by maintenance staff and the engines had different CPU/software versions then there could be an emergent failure mode when maximum thrust is applied resulting in a FADEC rollback. Almost impossible to anticipate and create that in a test scenario. Don't overlook that the pilot moving thrust levers to override rollback will be ignored by the software, if the FADEC has flipped into protective mode.

That said, the continued absence of the FAA issuing an Emergency Airworthiness Directive for the Dreamliner suggests to me the fault was something like contaminated fuel which was specific to that flight.