Posts by user "WillowRun 6-3" [Posts: 26 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 2]

CNN reporting (quoting Reuters as its source) that death toll is at least 290, including people who were in the medical building. Terrible - RIP

You're referring to Pakistan Int'l Airlines 8303, accident date May 22, 2020, presumably; in which 97 of 99 persons on board the aircraft were killed, with one additional fatality of a person on the ground.

Nothing about "legal" whatsoever in what follows.

In the 12 years during which I have followed, and posted on, threads on this forum occasional objections to excessive uninformed posts and posters have been lodged. Recently the reasons for these objections have increased, and without question are acute on this thread (and maybe unprecedented).

People in the aircraft piloting profession speak in a language in which laypeople generally do poorly, even when they sincerely try. The terminology or lexicons are one thing, and the bigger problem is that being a professional pilot means that the person has mastered (at any particular experience level of the profession) the process of thinking and reasoning . . . as a professional pilot. The useless and at times ridiculously incorrect stuff posted by laypeople often seems to have been written performatively. "Keyboard warriors" might be an outdated phrase but it lives on. But as one layperson who has learned a great deal here I hope the pro's will stay engaged.

As fdr said just a few posts ago, this accident and investigation has "international importance" and the 787 is a "globally important aircraft type." Big aviation accidents do indeed capture the public's imagination, because they provoke [insert title of risque novel by Erica Jong, circa 1974], because they negatively affect a cross-section of people in the places connected by the flight in question, and because governments generally take them quite seriously. The junk-posters would be wise (though when hell freezes over) to recall that the people who care the most about getting the right answers through the investigation are the . . . . professional pilots.

WSJ reporting black boxes recovered
....
mods please delete if redundant

At this time I think whether or not the 787 fleet will be subjected to a grounding order is indeterminate. The recorder units have been available for enough time so that it is reasonable to believe the fundamental "what" of the accident has been identified, even though the "how" and "why" will require more information than will be found in the recorders. I don't think the status of this component of the investigation points one way or the other to a grounding order.

However, the fact that the very highly authoritative poster fdr has anticipated a grounding order, and if I understood the very succinct (adjacent) post by another such authoritative person, PJ2 also anticipates it .... while I do not claim to understand their reasoning or the aeronautical or systems information on which it is based, but despite anything else I'm not going to disagree.

Several prior instances have been referenced. The deferral of a grounding order following Lion Air 610 strikes me as part of the overall MCAS debacle; regulatory capture, "narrative management" by the OEM. This accident has happened in a considerably different context. The previous grounding order that gives some concern is the one issued after American 191.

Not the order itself. Rather, after the non-U.S. operators had inspected their fleets and were able to report whether or not any engine-attachment structures (I don't want to get it wrong so I'm not specifically referring to "pylon" or "bolt" etc.) were damaged, they sought lifting of the order. The FAA Administrator kept it in place. The non-U.S. operators sued in federal court, arguing (at hopefully only slight over-simplification) that the U.S. was obligated by international convention to accept the airworthiness certificates of the other States in which those operators were legally organized. They won their case, too. . . . .

But at the time British Caledonian among other non-U.S. operators challenged the FAA Admin. to lift the grounding order, were any of those non-U.S. operators aware only of the proper maintenance condition of their engines' attachments, or were they also aware of the change in the aerodynamic qualities of the aircraft resulting from the asymmetric slats caused, in turn, by the severance of the hydraulics? If they did not yet know about the fact that the asymmetric slats caused the stall speed to increase, then their airworthiness certificates should not have been given legal deference. (If anyone knows the state of knowledge of the non-U.S. operators when they first challenged the FAA's grounding order, any information (or reprimand either for my lack of knowledge or thread drift) via PM will be greatly appreciated.)

So if the 787 fleet is in fact subjected to a grounding order, one hopes that the conditions for lifting it will be determined with great clarity. Not to drift over the edge, but the MAX order and its lifting might not give great confidence on this point.

Related to all this is the suggestion, way upthread, that Annex 13 is no longer fit for purpose. Respectfully stated, but I disagree. What would be proposed to update it? Until this tragic accident is resolved, what prospect is there to engage Member States (of ICAO) plus all the credentialed observer organizations in the process to rewrite it? Also, since Sully changed retirement careers the U.S. has not had a Permanent Rep to ICAO (let alone one confirmed by the Senate for Ambassador rank).

What about keeping the investigation process and results insulated from the pressures for drawing into the litigation process? Early disclosures of partial information would tend to erode that insulation - and for what gain?

The phrase by Icarus (post at 09:25) is one I would like to borrow - though giving attribution to an anonymous callsign could get tricky . . . . "narrative management, damage control, and pass the liability parcel."

The contrast to the previous inspection order is noteworthy.

SLF/attorney here, and staying in (what I hope will be seen as) very narrow limits for posting here.

Disclosures of information by unofficial sources during on-going Annex 13 investigations would not seem to be unusual - not to excuse the occurence. If I'm reading OldnGrounded's post (at 10:04) correctly, it isn't really unexpected.

I went back and reread the AvH report from which gear lever's post (at 4:27; AvH link at 4:43) was taken. Yes, AvH misidentifies an ELT. But consider: the content of the unofficially-sourced statement about the CVR-type portion of the forward recorder does not appear to have indicia of unreliability. To the contrary, as other posters have pointed out, by now the CVR-type portion of the recorder would have been read in all likelihood. Further, the rest of the June 17th unofficially-sourced statement aligns with the absence of any emergency ADs, or at least most all of that statement aligns that way. As for how the unofficial source was described, well of course that description would be vague or ambiguous - for one thing, the AvH wants to keep its source inside the flow of events and information.

As long as this post already is risking intrusion on the serious aviation-community discussion going on, I'll just add that the mods are to be greatly appreciated for many more forum hours into the future, for their incessant attention to the threads. Thank you!

Nothing has been officially reported. Perhaps down the timeline it will emerge that AvH made a bet about publishing unofficial statements which later are revealed falsified or even just erroneous.

On the closed thread, someone posted that soon the investigation will become immersed in "narrative management, damage control and pass the liability parcel." That's a good way to think about it, but maybe too good. And this post won't use the word that rhymes with shmolitics.

In a major aircraft accident such as this, several different hard-hitting law firms and attorneys who specialize in representing families of people who lose their lives in such accidents will be out in force. This will happen, even without knowing the outcome of the investigation and its analysis. But two factors (among possibly others) make the potential significance of the "games being played" now less than we might initially surmise.

The first is that regardless of the outcome, every significant potential defendant will become an actual defendant. I'm not saying to expect the ANSP in India to become a defendant, but certainly the three corporate entities will (and I mean no offense by stating this obvious point, but any unseen manuevering will turn out pointless if the object is to avoid being sued).

The second is that the results of the investigation will not be allowed as evidence in court, at least in the United States; I have to admit I'm not positive about whether the principle in International Air Law that accident investigation reports do not constitute evidence in court proceedings is actually observed in other countries. I believe it is observed, but I stand to be corrected.

I have tried to organize and phrase this post in such a manner as not to offend the grief and dignity of those in shocked mourning over the loss of loved ones. The post merely seeks to offer comment on the possible impacts of the delay, or apparent delay, in officially sourced updates and information about the tragic fate of Air India Flight 171, Ahmedabad.

Additionally, the lithium-ion batteries in the 787 design required compliance with "Special Conditions" in order to gain type certification. The addition of the Special Conditions at least strongly suggests that FAA's certification process brain-trust had maintained some vigilance with regard to the batteries once the type started operating, i.e., given their newness.

At this time, the fault or flaw at the root of this accident and how that fault or flaw worked through aircraft components and systems has not been identified publicly. It might not even have been identified .... I'm not convinced that separating "what" from "how and why" as a semantics exercise is enough to conclude the Annex 13 officials know the root cause yet. Maybe they do, maybe not.

And if they do not, then the contrast with the situation where FAA was, it seemed, keeping a close eye on battery issues in particular, is relevant.

The June 30, 2025 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology (reviewed from an email with "Editors' Picks" sent to subscribers) includes an article dated June 27 by Sean Broderick, about the investigation of Air India 171. It relates some new facts or factual infomration (as well as coverage of many facts in the public domain for some time already).

One theme of the article is that the timing of release of information, in general about the investigation and specifically about data discovered in the recorder(s), appears inconsistent with other facts about the investigation. In support of this theme, the AW&ST article quotes a former NTSB investigator (with specific aircraft accident investigation experience).

The article also refers to the progress of work at the accident site (including an estimate of the number of workers involved) and the presence of aircraft accident investigation professionals from highly experienced authorities and entities (U.S. NTSB, U.K. AIB, Boieng, GE). It is pointed out - certainly with respect and diplomatic tone - that the aircraft accident investigation authority of India has relatively less experience in such matters. And that the presence of more experienced participants in the investigation (as accredited representatives, if I hopefully recall study of Annex 13 correctly) would suggest that guidance to the India authority has been available.

As the foregoing suggests the article asserts, in a thematic sense, that the timing of information release is not consistent with factual information about the investigation. (It also generally suggests that information typically is released by investigation authorities earlier within the initial 30-day time period provided for by Annex 13 .... but that generalization, while true in some cases, isn't backed up with anything specific of a factual nature.)

Mods, I hope this adds to the thread and if not please don't miss the bin when it gets tossed.

Regarding benefit of the doubt being warranted: While I agree, the more important point is the AW&ST writer probably would also agree. The message the article centers upon is that the relevance of, or need for, giving benefit of the doubt appears substantial. In that sense, the writer makes the same point as "This is probably the first 'really big' accident investigation they have done that has achieved so much international attention" - and citing that there have been three "fatal airline accident[s] in the country since 2000".

Among other facts supporting both the theme of article and the propriety of allowing benefit of the doubt, as the article notes, "Unlike their counterparts from Europe and the U.S., AAIB experts are not regularly dispatched as technical advisors in foreign investigations involving products built and certified at home."

Considering the difficulties so far in determining cause(s) of this accident and the relatively scant infromation released by the investigating authorities, this news item about actions by the DGCA, which could turn out to be relevant, caught my eye. It was published in Aviation Daily, June 25, with a by-line of a senior air transport editor at AW&ST.

​​​​​​​[End of quotation, w/o any alterations]

With apologies if this drifts too far from the current exchanges on the thread.

Annex 13 is held in high regard among attorneys practicing in international civil aviation legal matters. And by other types of professionals as well. So it was in a sense validating to read, in a number of posts way upthread, about the strict confidentiality obligations imposed on the individuals conducting or otherwise participating in the investigation. Also validating (in the same sense) to read the quoted post by za9ra22.

Without so much as hinting at approving of unauthorized leaks of information or statements purporting to be information from or about the investigation, the context which this accident has yielded is important. The first accident involving this type, and the different design fundamentals of the type (heavier use of electrical systems), would make any investigation authority especially careful not to issue incorrect statements. Perhaps the AAIB in India could be credited with understanding the high regard in which Annex 13 is held, and wanting, ..... perhaps desperately wanting, not to screw this up, not only in general terms but especially given the context. And add in the seemingly mystifying answers to what happened to Flight 171. If Annex 13 had a sentient presence, I'm convinced (mere SLF and attorney as I am) that it would concur with a "be careful, be very careful" approach to anything outside the tight circle of confidentiality within which the investigation occurs.

When I saw the article in The Air Current, on one hand I hoped for the sake of the reputation of the publisher that the unnamed sources were legitimately informed, but at the same time, would not anyone legitimately informed have been subject to rather strict confidentiality and nondisclosure obligations?

There are indeed, in the United States, rather strict prohibitions and limitations on the availability of CVR transcripts as well as recordings under federal statutory law.

First, the NTSB is subject to strict statutory limits (See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1114 - "Disclosure, availability and use of information"; 1114(c) "Cockpit recordings and transcripts":

1114(c)(1) Confidentiality of recordings.\x97
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Board may not disclose publicly any part of a cockpit voice or video recorder recording or transcript of oral communications by and between flight crew members and ground stations related to an accident or incident investigated by the Board.

(2) Exception.\x97Subject to [certain exceptions] the Board shall make public any part of a transcript, any written depiction of visual information obtained from a video recorder, or any still image obtained from a video recorder the Board decides is relevant to the accident or incident\x97
(A)if the Board holds a public hearing on the accident or incident, at the time of the hearing; or
(B)if the Board does not hold a public hearing, at the time a majority of the other factual reports on the accident or incident are placed in the public docket.

So there are strict limits, although NTSB may exercise discretion - but I would argue that the default setting is non-disclosure, given the policy imperatives both stated and implied by this section:

1114(b)(3) Protection of Voluntary Submission of Information.\x97
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the Board, nor any agency receiving information from the Board, shall disclose voluntarily provided safety-related information if that information is not related to the exercise of the Board\x92s accident or incident investigation authority under this chapter and if the Board finds that the disclosure of the information would inhibit the voluntary provision of that type of information . (emphasis supplied)

And by experience, Board has been quite discreet about disclosures of recordings... I hope I recall this correctly and await any necessary corrections.

What about in court?

49 U.S.C. Sec.1154 - "Discovery and use" of recordings and transcripts

(a)(1) Except as provided by this subsection, a party in a judicial proceeding may not use discovery to obtain\x97
(A) any still image that the National Transportation Safety Board has not made available to the public under section 1114(c) or 1114(d) of this title;
(B) any part of a cockpit or surface vehicle recorder transcript that the National Transportation Safety Board has not made available to the public under section 1114(c) or 1114(d) of this title; and
(C) a cockpit or surface vehicle recorder recording . (emphasis supplied)

The exceptions (crunching down to the essence of their application) require in camera review - i.e., by the judge in chambers rather than open court - and a judicial determination that further disclosure is required to assure a fair trial. (Pretty standard, stock-in-trade for federal district court judges, imho.) (Edit: note " in camera " is a Latin term and legal term of art, and does not refer to or mean actual cameras whatsoever.)

And, any permitted use of subject recordings must be subject to a Protective Order of confidentiality and maintained under seal to prevent use "for purposes other than the proceeding".

[ [i]The foregoing is not legal advice or counsel whatsoever and is not permitted to be construed or interpreted in any manner by any person or entity as legal advice or counsel - not least because there is no such thing as anonymously sourced legal advice or counsel in the United States (or any other such place as may comprehend the written English word)..... and for all the other reasons the sophisticated and good-spirited PPRuNe community will already have realized. . . . hopefully with the proper and expected smirk. ]

Now, editorially: I argue emphatically that free dissemination of recordings would be very, very unfortunate because it would produce - and I'm not trying to exaggerate - disastrous effects. The prior posters have articulated the reasons this would occur, and I won't repeat, mostly to avoid short-changing any of the previously - and convincingly and validly - stated points.

I do, however, disagree pretty strongly with the assertion that such unfortunate bad results already are occuring despite non-disclosure rules. First, although advocates, activists and would-be experts can run with partial information and fill in the blanks freely, everyone under the Sun knows that such persons have agendas. Maybe they're lawyers and maybe they're flaks or lobbyists - it isn't important what hat they wear, everyone knows they have an agenda. And so the goal or purpose of their attempts to fill in the omitted information is readily dismissed by anyone taking 15 seconds to give the matter some thought. And for those who can't or don't want to work, I mean can't or don't want to think for 15 seconds, well, the impact upon them of the agenda-driven information matters to the public interest about as much as whether any one of such individuals who can't or won't be bothered to think happens to like strawberries.

Second, is not the point about releasing the entire recording based upon being able to hear the nuance, the inflection, maybe the "transmission" of raw, and in what we're talking about, profound human emotion? (I actually anticipate hearing such CVR recordings could be quite traumatic for John or Jayne Q. Public, but not to digress.) And without that raw, unfiltered content, how much impact does the agenda-driven interpolated information have, in comparison? I suggest, it does not have nearly the same type of impact at all, and it very definitely does not have the same level, the same (if you will) quantity of impact, even if it is similar in nature to some degree. It would be pretty quickly shrugged off or forgotten ..... unlike the real recording were it to be heard.

In other words, the argument that bad things already are happening when omitted information is supplied in the public domain is wrong, first, because "consider the source" - everyone knows the agenda-driven information is for that purpose (and usually financial, at least insofar as trial and defense counsel are concerned), and second, the made-up or interpolated information lacks significant impact in and of itself, in comparison.

If this SLF/attorney had anything to say about changing these legal and policy rules, . . . . . . . well, I don't, so.
(I would have posted sooner but I made the mistake of trying to read the thread's progess since last night first.... with probably 12 pages now still to go, I hope this post hasn't been entirely superfluous or otherwise obnoxious.)
_______________________________________________________

Reuters, July 14 2025
Amid Air India probe, US FAA, Boeing notify fuel switch locks are safe, document, sources say

WASHINGTON/NEW DELHI/MONTREAL, July 13 (Reuters) - The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing (BA.N), have privately issued notifications that the fuel switch locks on Boeing planes are safe, a document seen by Reuters showed and four sources with knowledge of the matter said.

The FAA's Continued Airworthiness Notification on July 11 came after a preliminary report into Air India's Boeing 787-8 crash, which killed 260 people last month, raised questions over engine fuel cutoff switches.

The FAA's notification to Civil Aviation Authorities, seen by Reuters, said: "although the fuel control switch design, including the locking feature, is similar on various Boeing airplane models, the FAA does not consider this issue to be an unsafe condition that would warrant an Airworthiness Directive on any Boeing airplane models, including the Model 787."

When asked for comment, the FAA said it did not have anything to add beyond the notification.

Boeing also referred to the FAA notification in a Multi-Operator-Message sent to the airlines in the past few days, which said the planemaker is not recommending any action, two of the sources with direct knowledge said.

When asked for comment, Boeing referred Reuters' questions to the FAA.

The preliminary investigation report into the crash by India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), referred to a 2018 FAA advisory, which recommended, but did not mandate, operators of several Boeing models, including the 787, to inspect the locking feature of the fuel cutoff switches to ensure it could not be moved accidentally.

The report said Air India had said it had not carried out the FAA's suggested inspections as the FAA 2018 advisory was not a mandate. But it also said maintenance records showed that the throttle control module, which includes the fuel switches, was replaced in 2019 and 2023 on the plane involved in the crash.

The report noted "all applicable airworthiness directives and alert service bulletins were complied on the aircraft as well as engines."

ALPA India, which represents Indian pilots at the Montreal-based International Federation of Air Line Pilots\x92 Associations, in a statement on Saturday rejected the presumption of pilot error and called for a "fair, fact-based inquiry."

"The pilots body must now be made part of the probe, at least as observers," ALPA India President Sam Thomas told Reuters on Sunday.

ALPA India, in a letter posted on X, said the preliminary investigation report referred to the 2018 FAA advisory "concerning the fuel control switch gates, which indicates a potential equipment malfunction."

In the flights final moments, one pilot was heard on the cockpit voice recorder asking the other why he cut off the fuel. "The other pilot responded that he did not do so," the report said.

It said fuel switches had almost simultaneously flipped from run to cutoff just after takeoff. The report did not say how the switches could have flipped during the flight.

Two U.S. safety experts said on Saturday they backed ALPA India's request to be observers in the probe, but said the investigation report did not suggest a bias toward pilot error.

John Cox, a pilot and former ALPA U.S. representative, said AAIB's report seemed objective and fair.

I believe it is highly unlikely that anything will occur in any of the legal - or investigatory - processes happening now or which will occur, that will meet the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.

It also is both possible without imagining things, and consistent with - shall we call it "best practices" under Annex 13 - for the person or persons who wrote and approved the preliminary report to have taken into consideration the attention their report would receive from many audiences, not only aviation professionals.

The prevalence of the 787 type. The quite recent travails of Boeing and the pace of its recovery (and some doubters that it can or will recover). The orders of magnitude increase in information, as well as misinformation or even disinformation, about this accident compared to .... well, compared to the UPS accident in Birmingham in 2013 (Flight 1354), cited as it was the first "current" accident occuring as of my stumbling across this forum and its threads. Sure, not a dramatic passenger aircraft accident but still valid for comparing the information environment then, and now.

The persons responsible for this report, I think, did not act improperly if they included information not strictly necessary for the purpose of keeping aviation cognescenti updated about what is known with some (imprecisely defined) level of certainty and clarity. Such other information items could be intended to make some effort at mitigating ("minimizing" would be hoping for too much) the volumes of noise emanating from all over.

Then there's the point about the report source knowing who did what, and when, but not providing specifics. Perhaps forensic analysis of the voice recording is ongoing, perhaps an analysis was completed but with reason to examine more closely. Regardless, I do not find it an affront either to solid, long-established principles of the Chicago Convention and Annex 13, or to the general ideas about advancing aviation safety, for the report sources to not treat the 30-day rule for preliminary reports as some "complete download demand function." Given what is reported about the fuel cutoff switches moving and the summarized cockpit statements, either way the final facts resolve will be tremendously impactful for the airline, the CAA of India, and the country (including but not only in its role as a major aviation Member State).

I wouldn't hold this view if it was a question of deception. I see it instead as a matter of reasonable discretion, about both ..."what to leave in, what to leave out" (with apologies to Bob Seeger, "Against the Wind", 1980).

The ultimate assessment of the contents of the preliminary report is some time off in the future (contents, here meaning what is included and what is not). That being said, the comparison to the several briefings by NTSB in the wake of the 29 January 2025 midair collision at DCA is less valid than might at first seem to be the case.

First, the DCA collision occurred against the backdrop of significant weaknesses in the United States ATC system. The accident itself may have involved acts or omissions by the Army helicopter pilot or pilots, so there is that similarity in a general sense. But although a non-aviator, I did understand the many statements on the threads and in the general media about the difficulty of "visual separation" at night, particularly in the D.C. area and in the approach corridors to DCA. This is quite unlike the surpirse and/or disbelief that an experienced airline aviator would move fuel control switches to cutout at or nearly at the time of rotation. So the nature of the acts or omissions in question is quite different.

Second, it obviously occurred at Washington, D.C.'s close-in airport, which has been such a focal point of Congressional "air commuters".

There also is a difference in the likely litigation courses the two accidents will follow. On the premise that the WSJ report aligns with what appears to be the consensus on this thread - namely that the PM moved the switches although no one now knows why - and then reasoning further from that premise, the litigation to be faced by Air India will be considerable. I do not know the Law of India whatsoever, but under the Montreal Convention system for liability determinations and damages, I think it is a very easy straightforward assessment to say that the airline is going to face intense litigation challenges. In that light, the families will have their day in court (I mean, even without knowing Law of India, I think that's safe to say). Going beyond what - if I am reading and understanding the posters with actual significant investigation experience correctly - is the formal or nominal charge of the AAIB in this matter is not required in order to help the families. (And how bad would it be for them if the AAIB had to retract or materially change some information released ahead of determinations with certainty?)

Not least, in the DCA accident the legal landscape is quite diffrerent. Without rehashing the (perhaps tedious) posts I put on the DCA thread, the scope of available legal relief is quite limited under applicable federal law (just for reference, the "discretionary function exception" to the allowance to sue federal entities will almost certainly limit the scope of recoveries available from the Army or FAA/Dept of Transportation; the airline can be sued but it will be, in my not-so-hmo, ridiculous and mercenary to do so, as the CRJ and its tragically ill-fated crew had done nothing wrong).

Somewhat relatedly, on the WSJ article, while its sources are unnamed, I'm trying to recall a single article published in that newspaper (including online) about a major aviation incident which later was shown to have been inaccurate. Maybe there are one or more examples. Generally The Air Current's publisher got a very good start.

I'm sensing that the Journal, while not immune whatsoever to commercial pressures, is well-sourced.

From the article: "The preliminary details have fueled the belief among some U.S. officials that criminal authorities should review the matter, as would likely be the case if the crash had occurred on American soil, people familiar with the matter said." This assertion, stated without attribution, is fairly viewed as having unknown credibility.

But it also might be understood differently when read in a context of the entire reporting which includes these two quite specifically attributed statements:
From the article: "An NTSB spokesman said that [NTSB Chair Jennifer] Homendy has been fully briefed on all aspects of the Air India investigation, including the cockpit voice recording and details from the flight data recorder. Homendy said her goal in working with Indian authorities was 'to quickly determine whether the crash presented any immediate safety concerns to the traveling public.'\x94 (internal quotation as in article)
........
From the article: "The Indian authorities\x92 preliminary report finding that the fuel control switches were flipped in succession, one second apart, suggested a deliberate act, according to Ben Berman, a former senior NTSB official who helped oversee the U.S.-led investigation into the crash of EgyptAir Flight 990 in 1999.

Berman said that, prior to the engines\x92 fuel being cut, the report didn\x92t suggest anything out of the ordinary for what should have been a routine takeoff and climb-out. 'There was nothing to prompt the crew to perform emergency procedures, become stressed, or do anything except rotate the nose up and retract the landing gear, like they had done so many times before,' Berman said." (internal quotation as in article)

The Air Current's reporting just prior to release of the preliminary report - based on unnamed sources possibly with close access to the AAIB - turned out to have been correct. Would NTSB have offered the comments it did, if it believed the Journal was about to publish stuff it was just making up?

Edit: the WSJ also, on Wednesday, published a column by one of its regular staff columnists who thinks pilotless airliners are inevitable and would be a much better system architecture. Perhaps in publishing this reporting about the Air India accident the Journal is hoping to preserve credibility among the industry and regulators, despite the nonsense (imho) of that part of the column (most of it concerns the apparent cause of the accident, which - as some post many many pages ago predicted would occur - becomes supposed justification for Captain HAL).

Previously, I posted the content of a Reuters article about FAA (as well as Boeing) having issued notices to operators prompted by the reference in the AAIB Prelim Rpt w/r/t the SAIB about fuel switches in certain 737 aircraft (Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin No. NM-18-33, December 17, 2018).

Through a LinkedIn timeline I happened to discover the actual document the Reuters report was based on. It is entitled "Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community", issued by the FAA Aircraft Certification Service, Compliance and Airworthiness Division, dated July 11, 2025. As reported by Reuters, the FAA Notification document specifically references the fact that the AAIB Prelim Rpt made reference to the 2018 SAIB w/r/t the fuel switches.

The social media platform makes it difficult to transfer content off of it. Interested people may access the document in a LinkedIn post by former NTSB Chair Robert L. Sumwalt, NTSB Chair 2017-2014. (A search of the thread did not turn up the document; apologies if it's already here and I slipped up and missed it.)