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fdr
2025-06-12T13:37:00 permalink Post: 11899220 |
The noise certainly matches
![]() Hard to say and the noise could be a fake. It's hard to tell what's real these days.
Just for the record, there is no system on modern Boeing aircraft to prevent the accidental retraction of flaps when too low or slow when airborne. You wouldn't even get a warning on Boeing aircraft that is related to Flaps, you'd eventually get one related to Low Speed or Stall. The Airbus has a safety feature called "Alpha-Lock" which physically stops the Flaps from moving when the AoA or speed? is deemed too low. But that's not a safety net for all flap settings, just the lowest for takeoff. It will save the day in 95% of situations though Mr Boeing (hint hint)
Takeoff config warnings and checklists may not have helped if the flap setting was not enough given the weight and conditions. A good handling pilot could recover from an incorrect flap setting (providing there's no obstacles to deal with), by gently lowering the nose allowing the airspeed to build up before resuming the climb. However, various human factors such as startle and over reliance on automation (my thrust setting must be good) will not help the situation. In order of likelihood: 1.) Flaps moved instead of gear 2.) Incorrect Flap settings and inability of crew to recover from that 3.) Double engine failure 4.) Some electrical event that distracted them TE Flaps are extended, flap gaps between the wing and the flap element are observable. This is not an aberration of the spoiler position, you can see the nacelles through the gap, and that means the flap can not be in the retracted position. An error of the TE flap deployed position, say between flaps 5 or 15 is not going to cause a stall event. The flap has not been retracted instead of the gear. Double engine failure... India. birds, always a latent threat. No rudder deflection, no aileron deflection, so it's not a SE problem, any engine issue is affecting both engines. Pitch control and roll is not compromised in the video. The crew put out a mayday, not sounding like an electrical fault or distraction. any funerals near by? Incorrect TO thrust setting would not present in the video as recorded. Low thrust results in low acceleration, and extended distance to rotate. after rotate, low thrust results in low climb rate, and can result in the crew over pitching where the aircraft has obstructions that the crew have to avoid. the video appears to show the pitch increasing at a point where the aircraft is already unable to climb, not the other way round. An outside possibility. For survivors, any from the aircraft will be a miracle, and mainly from the rear of the plane near door 3 area, if any. Plane is still striking tank traps at 70m/sec +, high ANU, it's not a high survivability event. Occupants in the buildings along the flight path will have a high fatality rate as well. This is going to be a high toll event in the aircraft and on the ground. Bad day at VAAH. RIP. Last edited by fdr; 12th Jun 2025 at 17:24 . Subjects: Dual Engine Failure Electrical Failure Engine Failure (All) Flap Retraction Flap Setting Flaps (All) Mayday RAT (All) 20 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-12T17:07:00 permalink Post: 11899492 |
The video take from the south end of the airport appears to show the RAT deployed. The flight VAAH-EGLL is not a particularly heavy departure, the takeoff distance is not unreasonable for a twin jet, at under 7,000' from brakes release. I have limited developmental time only on the 787 before EIS, and I cannot recall any surprising latent threat in the performance of the aircraft for a premature flap retraction, and that certainly would not result in a RAT deployment. An accidental ATR low level off capture might get exciting for a few seconds, but it would not result in a RAT either. The seat 11A pax survivor is remarkable. Subjects: ADSB Flap Retraction Flaps (All) RAT (All) RAT (Deployment) 6 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-13T01:14:00 permalink Post: 11899895 |
Firstly, condolences to all those involved.
Secondly the above is a load of rubbish, as someone who also 'trains and checks' pilots and also has many years of Safety Investigation within large airlines it is a semi regular occurrence to depart with incorrect or no data. Tiger took off in Sydney with NO data in the FMGC, Singapore had a tail strike in AKL after inserting the ZFW as the TOW Emirates almost crashed in MEL for similar reasons. Not saying that this happened here Air NZ a few years ago almost put a 787 in the water out of Rarotonga as they had 100' in the FCU, took off, engaged autopilot and the aircraft pitched down and thrust came off, pilots recovered it at 60agl. Emirates has done similar, so these things happen. Clearly we don't know what happened here but I think it fair to assume it went wrong at rotate given the gear stayed down which would suggest a distraction at that point.
PPRuNe, mate, and that gating has long since ended - since about when Danny sold the site.
I empathize with your frustration, and you have no idea how much has already been scrubbed. There are some wise engineers, ATC pros, and GE/RR experts who are not pilots but who do post here, and whom we'll not bar from discussion. Do you understand why? (Yes, we also have examples of Sturgeon's Law in action as well). A low altitude in the MCP can become pretty interesting, as will a TAT probe failure to the ATR thrust limit. Both cases will have the thrust levers moving back rapidly. There is no obvious failure of the engines at this point save the question that the RAT may be deployed. A transient electrical fault tripping the logic for the RAT is hard to imagine, but that would possibly end up with an ATR fault and power coming back to idle. Fuel contamination is not impossible, but it is improbable, the engines would have been on their TO configuration from the engine start, and the taxi and turnaround takes enough time to flush the fuel lines, being longer than the selected tank sampling time that sits behind the SOPs. Boeing aircraft are easier for the crew to detect anomalous thrust commands compared to the Airbus, however, if the RAT is out... then more was happening. The flaps are in the correct position, we are looking at a time critical failure for the crew, they appear to have around 10 seconds between onset and impact, and they have rotated the aircraft in the later stages, as any reasonable pilot would do, and that certainly does not indicate a crew initiated problem on the available information. Unlawful interference is unlikely, given the RT calls that have been made. The IDGA AAIB is not known for rapid response, this event is of international importance, it appears that it is being treated as such by the authorities involved. The EAFRs on the 787 will tell all soon, and we need that information, this is a globally important aircraft type.
Spoiler
Subjects: AAIB (All) AAIB (IDGA) Condolences Electrical Failure Fuel (All) Fuel Contamination MEL RAT (All) RAT (Deployment) 18 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-13T21:54:00 permalink Post: 11900950 |
The Daily Telegraph has apparently put out a photo that is of the rear view of the aircraft, showing the TE flaps have a visible gap between the flap element and the wing, that is, the flaps are extended. If they were not, you get to see nothing. Int he gap, you can clearly see the fan exit of both engines.... ergo, the TE flaps are deployed. This same article then highlights this and exclaims that the flaps were retracted.
Is it safe to assume that the education standard of writers and editors of UK papers has been depleted somewhat? Such comments are inflammatory to those that have lost family in this tragedy, and directly impugn the flight crew, and are factually, grossly wrong. This isn't just sloppy journalism, it is defamatory to those that cannot speak in their own defence. Sorry Mods, but someone needs to stand up for those that cannot against offensive drivel that passes for informed media commentary. Here is a photo of the aircraft at the point that some numpties have stated the flaps are not employed. Apparently the authors should visit spec savers, or get a guide dog at least. At least, they get great blue coloured parking. In the same image, the RAT is observable. The comments that are floated that some experts suggest that the crew may have not been able to get the gear up and may have retracted the flaps shows an utter lack of understanding of the certification basis of our aircraft. The flaps are out at a relevant TO flap extension setting for the conditions. The same bastion of British broadsheets shows an image that is already on this thread, of a takeoff from mid field, while at the same time showing a still of the NE corner video near the RVR gauge east of the PAPI at the N end of the runway. One can only conclude that there is a dearth of good loo paper in the UK, and this standard of rigorous investigative reporting can be best applied to ones soft spots for personal hygiene. take 5 minutes out and do an triangulation from the point of observation, and surprise, the aircraft lifts off abeam the closed high speed taxiway. Not at the end of the runway, 1250 meters north of the DER. Taking ADSB data and not running a validation of it is mentally lazy and leads to hurtful assumptions that taking a slight amount of reasonable due care would have avoided. rude letter follows... ![]() https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/202...a-plane-crash/ This is interesting enough without dealing with the media who show once again the mental acuity and sharp insight of a bowling ball. 17 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-13T22:13:00 permalink Post: 11900962 |
At this stage, at least two scenarios seem highly plausible:
1. Technical issue Airliners rely on air/ground logic , which is fundamental to how systems operate. There have been numerous crashes and serious incidents linked to this logic functioning incorrectly. Some engineering tests require the air/ground switch to be set in a particular mode. If it's inadvertently left in engineering mode—or if the system misinterprets the mode—this can cause significant problems.
2. Pilot misselection of fuel control switches to cutoff This is still a very real possibility. If it occurred, the pilot responsible may not have done it consciously—his mindset could have been in a different mode. There’s precedent: an A320 pilot once inadvertently shut down both engines over Paris. Fortunately, the crew managed to restart them. Afterward, the pilot reportedly couldn’t explain his actions. If something similar happened here, then when the pilots realized the engines had stopped producing thrust, pushing the levers forward would have had no effect. It’s easy to overlook that the fuel switches are in the wrong position—they're far from the normal scan pattern. And with the ground rushing up, the view outside would’ve been far more commanding. Speaking personally, when I shut down engines at the end of a flight, I consciously force myself to operate each fuel switch independently and with full attention. I avoid building muscle memory that might lead to switching off both engines in a fast, well-practiced habit. If this is a technical issue, I assume we’ll know soon enough. On item 2, the video shows no asymmetry at any time, so there is only a symmetric failure of the engines possible. Back on a B747 classic, you could chop all 4 engines at the same time with one hand, on a B737, also, not so much on a B777 or B787. I would doubt that anyone used two hands to cut the fuel at screen height. Note, there was a B744 that lost one engine in cruise when a clip board fell off the coaming. Didn't happen twice, and it only happened to one engine.
Yes indeed, the moment they pulled the gear lever, as we see the gear begin the retraction process, and then suddenly stop. Almost as if they suddenly lost power.
We can see the landing gear retraction process begin. We see the bogies tilted in the second video. We can hear the RAT. We can see the RAT. We can see the flaps extended in the video and at the crash site. There isn't actually a single piece of evidence the flaps were raised, it's just a conclusion people jumped too before evidence began to emerge. The crazy thing is, when the report comes out and there is no mention of flaps none of the people who have been pushing the flap theory will self reflect or learn anything. They'll think those of us who didn't buy into it were just lucky, rather than it being down to use of fairly simple critical thinking. Neila83 is correct, the gear tilt pre retraction is rear wheels low, and at the commencement of the selection of the retraction cycle (generally), There is enough in the way of anomalies here to end up with regulatory action, and airlines themselves should/will be starting to pore over their systems and decide if they are comfortable with the airworthiness of the aircraft at this moment. A latent single point of failure is not a comfortable place to be. Inhibiting TCMA might be a good interim option, that system could have been negated by having the ATR ARM switches....(Both)... ARM deferred to the before takeoff checks. The EAFR recovery should result in action within the next 24-48 hours. Boeing needs to be getting their tiger teams warmed up, they can ill afford to have a latent system fault discovered that is not immediately responded to, and the general corporate response of "blame the pilots" is not likely to win any future orders. I think we are about to have some really busy days for the OEM. Not sure that Neila83 is that far off the mark at all. Last edited by fdr; 14th Jun 2025 at 01:21 . Reason: corrected for B788 by Capt Bloggs! Subjects: EAFR Engine Failure (All) Engine Shutdown Flap Retraction Flaps (All) Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Gear Retraction MLG (All) MLG Tilt RAT (All) TCMA (Air-ground Logic) TCMA (All) 8 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-14T00:39:00 permalink Post: 11901033 |
Discounting the impossible, two hypotheses remain: 1. Invalid derate set through incorrect cross-checking. Trundling down the runway takes very little power to reach Vr. It is only when you rotate that you create more drag and discover that you do not have sufficient thrust vs. drag to sustain a climb. Or.... 2. Put 200' as the altitude target in the FCU. Immediate ALT capture and all the power comes off. PF is still hand flying trying to increase pitch but is already way behind the aircraft. It could be after this that Boeing are forced to review the B787 practice of exploring the very edges of the performance envelope. 2. An altitude capture at the engagement of VNAV will result in the thrust coming back very rapidly. It has happened and will happen again. It doesn't need crew error in all cases, a failure of the MCP digitiser used to cause the same problem, despite the desired target being shown above the alt strip. It was one of the oddball cases where what is displayed is not necessarily what is being targeted. In such a case however, the ATR unless it has been turned off will still wake up again if it has been disconnected by the throttle instinctive disconnects, when a low airspeed has been detected. The WDMs will be getting scrutinised up in Seattle at the very least. |
fdr
2025-06-14T01:17:00 permalink Post: 11901056 |
@FDR,
you made a comment earlier re the gear sequencing. It appears that you were referring to the 787-9 (doors then tilt). The 787-8 is different, according to
this post
and this YT video:
https://youtu.be/9R-Netu9m8A In it, the -8 tilts the bogies then opens the doors. 2 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-14T18:52:00 permalink Post: 11901729 |
I hesitate to chip in in these accident threads. Keep them clean. However, as as a few comments above brushes my audio expertise, I will comment.
A very simple audio analysis give me this: The 3 segments horisontally, are of different videos of B787s passing overhead/landing. The vertical drop you see is the doppler effect. In other words, these are spectrograms over time which makes these distinctions easier than a simple static spectrogram. 1. B787 landing with RAT extended. 2.Air india crash 3. B787 landing without RAT It's a 5 minute laptop job, and it would look much prettier and clearer if I spent some time with it, (Gain to color match, and spectrally match to compensate for microphone placement and type), but it is 85% conclusive even when done as simple as this IMO. (I do have legal forensic audio experience) The RAT was out judging from the audio evidence. You can see the the equally spaced overtones of the propelller match when passing overhead resulting in the Doppler effect, the difference in length of the doppler is caused by distance and the slightly varying frequencies shown in the starting point is caused by a difference in speed. But the harmonic content match. In the 3rd segment you see none of these overtones at all.
That leads to the next question.. Is there any system on the 787 that CAN shutdown the engines. We know there is at least one... But the A/C needs to be ground mode. However, if would not be the 1st time a system that should not deploy when the A/C is airborne, does! LaudaAir out from BKK is one example...
Lauda Air B767 Accident Report Lauda 004 taught that the flight test of reverse had some assumptions that were not accurate. The reduction in lift from the flow interaction with the wing was not recognised before Lauda 004, and before that was discovered, there were a lot of flight departments that were rather judgemental of the event due to their own ignorance. Just because our sims say it is so doesn't mean that the aircraft agrees.
Investigation of the accident disclosed that certain "hot-short" conditions involving the electrical system occurring during an auto-restow command, could potentially cause the DCV to momentarily move to the deploy position. However, no specific wire or component malfunction was physically identified that caused an uncommanded thrust reverser deployment on the accident airplane.
Testing identified hypothetical hydraulic system failures that could cause the thrust reverser to deploy. However, no specific component malfunction was identified that caused an uncommanded thrust reverser deployment on the accident airplane. No specific Lauda Air maintenance action was identified that caused uncommanded thrust reverser deployment on the accident airplane. The design changes recommended by Boeing and thereafter mandated by U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Airworthiness Directive 91-22-09 for the B767/PW4000 thrust reverser system should effectively prevent in-flight deployment even after multiple failures. Subjects: Audio Analysis RAT (All) RAT (Deployment) |
fdr
2025-06-14T22:58:00 permalink Post: 11901931 |
Are you thinking of a B787 which does not have FBW? Admittedly C* is not quite as tidy as C*U when it is working normally, but B777 and B787 systems do a darn good job of removing thrust-pitch couples (well, adequate).
Subjects: FBW 2 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-14T23:04:00 permalink Post: 11901940 |
If you are referring to loss of all boost pumps, am not aware of any engine that will not continue to run with a suction feed to the main boost pumps at low altitudes. At high altitudes, there is a chance of cavitation of the main pumps but only at very high powers, and generally not at sea level.
Subjects: Fuel (All) Fuel Pumps 3 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-14T23:20:00 permalink Post: 11901949 |
... The TCMA logic is designed and scrubbed so as to be quite robust - flight test data of the engine response to throttle slams is reviewed to insure there is adequate margin between the TCMA limits and the actual engine responses to prevent improper TCMA activation. Again, never say never, but a whole lot would have had to go wrong in the TCMA logic for it to have activated on this flight. Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident: 1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines or 2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated. I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios. In all due respect to all the pilots on this forum, I really hope it wasn't TCMA. It wouldn't be the first time a mandated 'safety system' has caused an accident (it wouldn't just be Boeing and GE - TCMA was forced by the FAA and EASA to prevent a scenario that had never caused a fatal accident) ... Subjects: FAA Fuel (All) Fuel Cut Off Switches Fuel Cutoff RAT (All) RAT (Deployment) TCMA (Activation) TCMA (All) TCMA (Improper Activation) TCMA (Logic) TCMA (Shutdown) 5 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-15T01:39:00 permalink Post: 11902037 |
Question: regardless of the intricacies of various aircraft-specific systems, is it possible to establish from sheer aerodynamics what can/cannot have happened here? Or to put it another way - leaving aside any and all rumours, theories, plausible sights/sounds, and other extraneous details, and focusing solely on the flight path, can loss of thrust be conclusively ruled in or out? Several times now I've seen someone put forth the argument that it's impossible for the flight path to have been as short as it is if the flaps were retracted but the engines were still producing (even derated) takeoff thrust. It might be helpful to reach a consensus on whether this is true or not - if it's inconclusive then we're back to where we already are, but if a conclusion
can
be reached it would probably save everyone a lot of breath going down various theoretical rabbit holes.
PM on way. Subjects: None |
fdr
2025-06-15T02:24:00 permalink Post: 11902058 |
Consider losing one engine on the Dream. If it is a generator that's failed let's say #2 . Do the electric fuel pumps lose power? Only in #2? Does the mechanical pump start feeding right away? If so, is there a lull? Are both engines fuel pumps supplied off one Gen?
See I think there was no simultaneous loss of both 1, 2. The odds give me a migraine. I still wonder if TCMA knows the difference between parked, rolling, rotated brakes and stowed. Only parenthetically, it didn't do this The Thrust Control Malfunction Accommodation TCMA shuts down an engine when an idle asymmetry is detected . On the ground . With thrust levers at idle . The engine in question triggers the condition when it is above idle and not decelerating normally . That is multiple failure conditions that need to have occurred in the system to allow that to occur. It is nearly as wild a circumstance as the QFA 072 suspected cosmic bit flip, except that these are supposed to be independent systems. This does have the authority when the conditions exist to turn off the noise. That is the only reason it is a subject of interest. The Thrust Asymmetry Protection gives a limited authority to reduce thrust on the surviving engine to maintain control. It would not trigger the conditions that the engines have gone silent, and hydraulics/electrics have been mussed up. That puts a spotlight on what has to go wrong on TCMA to get it to trigger outside of the conditions that it is intended to. No yaw input, no roll input, no asymmetry. That leaves either both engines running at normal TO thrust or both having a simultaneous bad day out. Giving car keys to HAL 9000 can have some issues, and cosmic radiation is around a lot. Subjects: FBW Fuel (All) Fuel Pumps Generators/Alternators TCMA (All) 9 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-15T17:58:00 permalink Post: 11902673 |
That is exactly what I am saying - that the only cause that can be
positively
identified at this point is pilot action whether accidental or deliberate. It's the only thing that can be conclusively ruled either in or out by now. However the tone of several of the messages here is that everything else has conclusively been ruled out because it has been three days, which makes no logical sense to me.
... From the comfort of my couch, I would contend that this crew have had a condition that was extraordinary (in the full meaning of the word) and have acted in a timely and correct manner. There is nothing in the flight path other than the fact the aircraft isn't at a gate in London that indicates otherwise. The fact the aircraft is not sitting in London does not have any characteristic event in the available information to conclude other than through the general assumption that pilots always cause problems, and having done nearly half a century in flight safety investigation in the military and airlines, I would contend that on balance flight crew save aircraft far more often than they cause losses. "It takes a computer to really stuff up something..."
That is exactly what I am saying - that the only cause that can be
positively
identified at this point is pilot action whether accidental or deliberate. It's the only thing that can be conclusively ruled either in or out by now. However the tone of several of the messages here is that everything else has conclusively been ruled out because it has been three days, which makes no logical sense to me.
There is no evidence to support an assumption of unlawful interference, it can, and has happened in the past, other than that it is cognitively apathetic to assume that the event is due to such action. The EAFR data will clear that up without question, but at this stage, the RT call indicates otherwise. The flight path also indicates that the crew were commanding the aircraft in a manner consistent with any competent pilot attempting to deal with a catastrophic event. ... To put it another way: if pilot action isn't the root cause, then what exactly is the investigation supposed to say right now other than the utterly redundant "well this is a headscratcher, and we're going to take a while to figure it out"? Are they supposed to turn into Chicken Little screaming that the sky is falling with no evidence-based justification? To be fair, you could perhaps argue that they should come out and "clear" the pilots' names, but that implies an obligation to social media hucksters and mobs that I don't think should exist. ... Also we should be wary of treating it like an either/or; poor crew response to a manageable fault stemming from a design weakness or maintenance issue is also an option. See e.g. the Swirijaya crash that was initiated by a faulty autothrottle, but the resulting upset was quite preventable and also recoverable even after it had developed. The untidy truth related to this event is that either causation will have ramifications to the industry for the foreseeable future; there is nothing trivial about this event from a systems viewpoint, apart from the devastating loss to every person concerned in the tragedy. Not than many accidents are so consequential in their impact, this will be one of those. 5 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-15T18:13:00 permalink Post: 11902678 |
Would anyone know whether this AD is relevant?
FAA Orders Boeing 787 Inspections to Fix Water Leak Issues I add this note: the background on this AD is here: https://www.federalregister.gov/docu...pany-airplanes T28B Water ingress into the E/E bay is a serious issue. The B744 had this issue in the past causing serious problems, one of which was fortunate to not lead to a loss of the aircraft, on a B744F. The B744 pax aircraft had a number of water problems related to the toilets and the galley. The forward galley on the B742/3s had many issues. Any large aircraft going through maintenance is interesting to observe the extent of corrosion that occurs near toilets and galleys, and from water lines. The B777 was not immune to this either. The potable water tank failing caused one of our aircraft to have 6.5 tons of ice accumulating in the underfloor area of the aft cargo hold, which we detected on a preflight walk around as a series of water streams from the drain holes in one area of the aircraft. This was an interesting item for CG, a note on weight, but only affected the electrical services related to the aft cargo systems. Water accumulations on the B744 came to light at rotate, and took out a lot of electrical services. My suspicion is some cause such as this will come to light shortly. The water leak issues with the B787 go back to in service reports in 2014 and before, considered an unsafe condition in 2016, and were covered by AD 2016-14-04. This latest AD is curious as it stems from an administrative oversight in the drawings of the aircraft, that arose on aircraft manufactured from 2018 onwards. 2025-09-12 stands alone related to missing sealant, following the drawing oversight in production. It did not affect all aircraft. The earlier AD, 2016-14-04 was related to water line coupling issues, and is in Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB380009-00 WATER/WASTE - Water System- Potable Water System - Couplings Replacement. It notes on page 21 of 229 the reason for the work
This service bulletin gives instructions to replace the existing potable water line couplings below the pas- senger compartment floor above the FORWARD (FWD) Electrical Electronic (EE) bay in Section 41 and above the AFT EE bay in Section 46. The new coupling has a strap that will ensure its latches are secure, facilitate a more rapid visual inspection of the strap engaged over the pawl and reduce the potential to in- advertently unlatch the coupling after the installation of shrouds over the tubes. If this service bulletin is not incorporated, water leaking onto equipment in the EE bays could result in an electrical short and potential loss of system functions.
There have been in-service reports of water leakage in the potable water system due to potable water line couplings not being installed properly, resulting in delays and replacement of equipment in the EE bays. In six cases, the cause of the water leakage was due to improper installation of the potable waterline cou- plings. Incorporation of this service bulletin will ensure the coupling latches are secure and that after inspection, reinstallation of the shroud does not accidentally loosen the coupling. NOTE: Due to common access requirements, operators should consider incorporation of B787-81205- SB530029 and B787-81205-SB530031 at the same time as this service bulletin is incorporated. Boeing Service Related Problem (SRP) 787 SRP-38-0065 is related to this service bulletin. Boeing Fleet Team Digest (FTD) 787-FTD-38-13006 is related to this service bulletin. The ADs are not necessarily directly related to the specific cause, they highlight the potential for water damage and that bad stuff happens. In two cases I investigated, the event occurred at rotate. Both were B744's one pax, one F. Compound, unrelated system failures at rotate? Single cause? Water in the E/E bay. The amount of flooding that occurs in the toilet cubicles is unfortunate, apparently towels still fit well into toilet bowls, signs are disregarded etc. Coffee grounds block galley drains with monotonous regularity, the planes are only as good as we care for them, and passengers seem to have odd ways of treating the conveniences. Last edited by fdr; 15th Jun 2025 at 18:49 . Subjects: Air Worthiness Directives FAA Water Ingress 20 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-15T18:58:00 permalink Post: 11902721 |
The biggest news site in Greece claims to have the results of a kind of preliminary report from India AAIB which say that as the plane rotated, the pilot's seat malfunctioned (broken pin) and went suddenly far back forcing the captain to accidentally lower the thrust lever as he already had his hand on it and despite the co-pilots effort to help increase the thrust it was already to late to avoid the stall. I dont believe they would have posted something as serious as this without any credible source cause they are supposed to be a serious news outlet but you never know when stupidity takes over validity. Source is the protothema dot gr site
The proposition that is floated is that the pilot does not pull back on the control column, which he is holding onto with both hands as his seat slides backwards like a caricature of a bad Cessna 180 seat rail, that is plainly obvious from the pitch attitude of the aircraft, yet grabs lustily a double handful of thrust levers and holds onto those until meeting Ganesh in the next life? Greek papers appear to be as rigorous and incisive in their cognition as the Daily Telegraph. Golly. Seats: electric. RAT deployment... presumably the hapless pilot doesn't grab the control column, or the thrust levers, just grabs both fuel control switches instead???? Do any reporters bother to read what they write? Subjects: AAIB (All) Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Preliminary Report RAT (All) RAT (Deployment) 9 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-16T00:57:00 permalink Post: 11903018 |
Inlet compliance is tested at max takeoff power settings, at AOA up to stall. This is done by performing something called a 'wind-up turn' - with the engine at max TO power and constant altitude, they keep pulling the turn tighter until the wing stalls and the aircraft falls out of the turn.
If the engine doesn't continue normal operation, that's considered a 'fail'. Plus, the engine reaction of an over-rotated inlet (inlet separation) is a surge - accompanied by big bang and a ball of flame out the back. Nothing we know about this accident supports an over-rotation and related engine stall/surge. Going back to your prior comments on FADEC and TCMA; these are independent systems to each engine, however the event indicates a symmetric loss, and the potential of water ingress from a failed E/E sealing from the main cabin services remains a single causation that could result in multiple failures at the same moment. The last time I assessed issues in the E/E bay related to unauthorised inflight access to the fwd E/E of a B777 it was sobering how many irreversible conditions could arise. The B744 water inundation cases I was involved in were both on TO, the QF event was during deceleration. We are looking at vectors that come from outside of the normal assumptions in the SSA's, water fits that bill. Subjects: FADEC TCMA (All) Water Ingress 6 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-16T06:34:00 permalink Post: 11903138 |
Insufficient data. There is cooling in the bay and that can be affected by aircon problems. High humidity and temp can lead to moisture in the area, however, the events I had involvement with were massive amounts of water from various sources. One was a failure from the toilet system, and the other was related to cargo loaded on the main deck via the NCD, and that had pallets that had turned into swimming pools that made a fashion statement when rotated. The QF event was similar, water accumulated in a damaged barrier.
Subjects: None 1 user liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-16T06:44:00 permalink Post: 11903147 |
Based on the video taken from the left of the flight path, can we determine at what point of the runway rotation occurred? Is there positive confirmation that the takeoff roll started at the beginning of the runway ? Are the two indicative of trouble before rotation, as the Times states ?
Source: https://www.thetimes.com/world/asia/...rash-vhqw6b7v3 (paywalled) 1250m from the end of the runway, between high speed C and D, adjacent to the closed high speed. There is nothing unusual with the rate of acceleration that is observable ninth video. You can work that out using google earth and the Indian AIP and/or state airport charts. The weight of the plane can be estimated by the flight time and pax load and an allowance for cargo. The simplified TO performance is in the inflight performance section of the FCOM, which you may find a copy on line. The aircrafts rotation has no obvious issues, until a few seconds after achieving an attitude that is consistent with the V2+15-25 range, at which point the ROC visibly starts to decay. Subjects: FCOM Takeoff Roll 11 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-13T22:13:00 permalink Post: 11903712 |
At this stage, at least two scenarios seem highly plausible:
1. Technical issue Airliners rely on air/ground logic , which is fundamental to how systems operate. There have been numerous crashes and serious incidents linked to this logic functioning incorrectly. Some engineering tests require the air/ground switch to be set in a particular mode. If it's inadvertently left in engineering mode—or if the system misinterprets the mode—this can cause significant problems.
2. Pilot misselection of fuel control switches to cutoff This is still a very real possibility. If it occurred, the pilot responsible may not have done it consciously—his mindset could have been in a different mode. There’s precedent: an A320 pilot once inadvertently shut down both engines over Paris. Fortunately, the crew managed to restart them. Afterward, the pilot reportedly couldn’t explain his actions. If something similar happened here, then when the pilots realized the engines had stopped producing thrust, pushing the levers forward would have had no effect. It’s easy to overlook that the fuel switches are in the wrong position—they're far from the normal scan pattern. And with the ground rushing up, the view outside would’ve been far more commanding. Speaking personally, when I shut down engines at the end of a flight, I consciously force myself to operate each fuel switch independently and with full attention. I avoid building muscle memory that might lead to switching off both engines in a fast, well-practiced habit. If this is a technical issue, I assume we’ll know soon enough. On item 2, the video shows no asymmetry at any time, so there is only a symmetric failure of the engines possible. Back on a B747 classic, you could chop all 4 engines at the same time with one hand, on a B737, also, not so much on a B777 or B787. I would doubt that anyone used two hands to cut the fuel at screen height. Note, there was a B744 that lost one engine in cruise when a clip board fell off the coaming. Didn't happen twice, and it only happened to one engine.
Yes indeed, the moment they pulled the gear lever, as we see the gear begin the retraction process, and then suddenly stop. Almost as if they suddenly lost power.
We can see the landing gear retraction process begin. We see the bogies tilted in the second video. We can hear the RAT. We can see the RAT. We can see the flaps extended in the video and at the crash site. There isn't actually a single piece of evidence the flaps were raised, it's just a conclusion people jumped too before evidence began to emerge. The crazy thing is, when the report comes out and there is no mention of flaps none of the people who have been pushing the flap theory will self reflect or learn anything. They'll think those of us who didn't buy into it were just lucky, rather than it being down to use of fairly simple critical thinking. Neila83 is correct, the gear tilt pre retraction is rear wheels low, and at the commencement of the selection of the retraction cycle (generally), There is enough in the way of anomalies here to end up with regulatory action, and airlines themselves should/will be starting to pore over their systems and decide if they are comfortable with the airworthiness of the aircraft at this moment. A latent single point of failure is not a comfortable place to be. Inhibiting TCMA might be a good interim option, that system could have been negated by having the ATR ARM switches....(Both)... ARM deferred to the before takeoff checks. The EAFR recovery should result in action within the next 24-48 hours. Boeing needs to be getting their tiger teams warmed up, they can ill afford to have a latent system fault discovered that is not immediately responded to, and the general corporate response of "blame the pilots" is not likely to win any future orders. I think we are about to have some really busy days for the OEM. Not sure that Neila83 is that far off the mark at all. Subjects: EAFR Engine Failure (All) Engine Shutdown Flap Retraction Flaps (All) Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Gear Retraction MLG (All) MLG Tilt RAT (All) TCMA (Air-ground Logic) TCMA (All) |