Posts by user "galaxy flyer" [Posts: 44 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 3]

galaxy flyer
June 20, 2025, 01:07:00 GMT
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Post: 11906518
Originally Posted by Tailspin Turtle
Therefore the crew could have manually deployed it... (there's a button for that). If I saw the engines winding down and couldn't be sure that they would stop at idle, I'd be inclined to deploy the RAT instead of waiting for airplane to do it.
In flight time they had, deploying the RAT would have about number 10 on the list of things to do. I doubt the RAT would have been a thought. I\x92ve flown 5 types with RATs, slathers of sim sessions where the RAT eventually deployed, not once think of it. It\x92s automatic for reason\x97pilots aren\x92t normally going to reach for it.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): RAT (All)  RAT (Deployment)

galaxy flyer
June 21, 2025, 01:32:00 GMT
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Post: 11907437
Originally Posted by FrequentSLF
SLF here,

With what might be a stupid question, however let me ask.
Why the ground logic does not incorporate the wheel up command?


Because many normal functions require knowing airborne or on the ground. The most obvious being gear retraction and in-flight braking of the spinning wheels, but there\x92s dozens of actions dependent on WOW.

Subjects: None

galaxy flyer
June 22, 2025, 21:47:00 GMT
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Post: 11908831
Originally Posted by DIBO
No, no, I was thinking about the FDR data being downloadable from the EAFR through the aircraft's network. Be it with the Maintenance Laptop (which I presume) or any kitchen-grade laptop with a physical ethernet port (which I hope is not the case). But I have no clue on what an appropriate device is for such an operation.

Regarding the QAR, the 787 is or can be equipped with a WQAR, but I hate to type the W, as in Wireless, as the moment I hit the 'enter' button, Starlink interfaces will be devised and engineered on the spot....
One note of QAR data\x97it\x92s transmitted to provide flight data monitoring (.Flight Ops Quality Assurance, in FAA land). The QAR data might help, but it\x92s not transmitted in real time only after block in.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): EAFR  FAA  FDR

galaxy flyer
July 09, 2025, 14:11:00 GMT
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Post: 11918419
From the Reuters article,

The sources spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorised to speak to media.
​​​​​​​Then, try shutting up. Lots of accredited parties have been thrown off investigations for this loose lips actions.

Subjects: None

galaxy flyer
July 09, 2025, 21:15:00 GMT
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Post: 11918641
Originally Posted by Del Prado
Is the 400 feet we are talking about an altitude or height? Airfield elevation is 189 feet.
Height above field, it comes from the departure Initial Climb Area (old Zone 1). From DER to 400\x92 at 200\x92/nm.

Subjects: None

galaxy flyer
July 10, 2025, 13:33:00 GMT
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Post: 11919031
Just for emphasis, the fuel control switches control both the spar valve AND the shutoff inside the fuel controller at the engine. It’s not the spar valve the starves the engine of fuel it’s the HP valve. If it were only the spar valve, shut downs at the gate would take awhile.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Spar Valves

galaxy flyer
July 11, 2025, 22:36:00 GMT
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Post: 11919927
The crew in Nepal feathered two engines instead of extending the flaps. Anything\x92s possible.

Subjects: None

galaxy flyer
July 11, 2025, 22:47:00 GMT
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Post: 11919945
Originally Posted by Feathers McGraw
Might there have been something resting in front of the switches that moved backwards on rotation? A phone, small iPad, book, wallet?
it would have to be small enough to fit between the idle throttle position and guards on each side of the switches and weigh enough to push the switches over the detent, unless the SAIB cones into play.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Fuel Cutoff Switches (detent)  Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin  Switch Guards

galaxy flyer
July 12, 2025, 00:47:00 GMT
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Post: 11920044
Originally Posted by RiSq
The most scary thing here is that, on first glance this looks to be a massive balls up again by a flight crew.

I’ll hold judgement till the report is out as stranger things have happened. But what a seismic shift we have seen in the last 30 years.

30 years ago you worried about flying with certain airlines due to their maintenance records and ages of their fleets.

We are now in the time of choosing your airline of choice by having to research their flight routes over questionable airspace or their training schemes of their pilots.


It is rather worrying that the majority of major airline crashes in the last 20 years have been due to the two fleshy ones riding up front, if not questionable flight planning, Military or terrorist input.

I expect thats going to be about as popular as an lead balloon here.

In fact, I cannot remember the last major mechanical failure that led to a mass loss of life.

The Jeju one is still to be determined, but not sure if that can even be counted due to bird strikes.
That’s been true for a lot longer than 20 years—human error has been, still is, responsible for 80% of all accidents in aviation for decades. Mechanical failure has always been a minor component. The last ones was BAW 38 at LHR where design was causal and the two 737MAXs

Subjects: None

galaxy flyer
July 12, 2025, 21:22:00 GMT
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Post: 11920841
Originally Posted by Bristolhighflyer
not cabin crew. Suggestion was for 3 fully trained pilots to monitor one another.
We used to do that, trained the individual, gave them a title\x97Flight Engineer. In the US, mostly pilots, too.

Subjects: None

galaxy flyer
July 13, 2025, 00:48:00 GMT
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Post: 11920968
Originally Posted by ignorantAndroid
No, it was abandoned because the airlines found it inconvenient and EASA caved to their demands. At least one large airline simply ignored the rule while it was in effect.

U.S. airlines have had to follow that rule for decades. How many accidents have been caused by rogue cabin crew?
Alaska had a close call when a jump seater on some illicit drug tried to shut down engines using the fire handles. FDX had the jump seater attack the crew.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Jump Seat

galaxy flyer
July 13, 2025, 13:00:00 GMT
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Post: 11921306
Originally Posted by ignorantAndroid
The Alaska case was a pilot, FDX was a flight engineer.

FDX jump seater was a disgruntled employee, not any kind of crew.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Jump Seat

galaxy flyer
July 13, 2025, 13:13:00 GMT
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Post: 11921314
Originally Posted by AfricanSkies
Exactly. May I add, Multiple simultaneous separate failures, on each switch, 1-2 seconds apart, which adds another level of improbability.
Maybe, but I know of a C-141 case where the pilot shutdown four, count \x91em 4, engines thinking he was securing the cowl anti-ice. Both were similar lever-lock switches. The human brain can be a tricky thing.

Subjects: None

galaxy flyer
July 13, 2025, 15:22:00 GMT
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Post: 11921391
The graph based on the preliminary timeline would indicate 2-3 seconds to establish the RAT power. Having used RATs in the sim and on test flights on two types, that\x92s seems correct. It\x92s very quick and, if the switches were cutoff on the runway, no way would the plane achieved that flight path, probablt overrun the runway.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  RAT (All)

galaxy flyer
July 13, 2025, 20:39:00 GMT
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Post: 11921628
Originally Posted by Musician
The event shows that it's really imperative to relight the engines as quickly as possible.
The preliminary report says it took about 5 seconds for the engines to spool down to idle. 14 CFR \xa7 33.73 - Power or thrust response requires a jet engine to reach 95% thrust from stabilized flight idle in not over 5 seconds. So with a sufficiently quick reaction, flipping the switches back after 5 seconds, they could've been back in business by the time they actually flipped the switches back.

So it's not "flip the switches 3 seconds after liftoff and you're unrecoverable"; to be unrecoverable, there must also be sufficient time for the engines to spool down enough.

Don't ask, "why did you cut the engines", flip them back on. Go for the E in PACE.
The FAR 33 reference is from a stabilized, running state to 95% thrust, not from sub-idle shutting down.

Secondly, once the plane started to sink, just getting useable thrust won’t save the day, there has to be enough lift to arrest the sink rate. That requires some altitude, a lot more than 200’.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Preliminary Report  Relight

galaxy flyer
July 13, 2025, 20:53:00 GMT
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Post: 11921645
Originally Posted by Semreh
Non-pilot here.

For those interested in reading more about 'action slips', including performing one routine function in place of another, the following free-access article goes into more detail:

Wiley Online Library: Oops! I Did it Again: The Psychology of Everyday Action Slips



As other people have perspicaciously pointed out, assuming that it was the Pilot Monitoring that transitioned the Fuel Cut-Off Switches from RUN to CUTOFF, what action would they likely have been attempting to perform at that stage of the flight for an action slip to be a likely possibility?

Alternatively, given that the PM was used to operating simulators, what conditions could have prompted him to do a sequence that was familiar to him of resetting the simulator (including operating the FCS switches), doing things that are inadvisable in a real aircraft?

If these are stupid questions, I apologise for taking up a mod's time processing the comment deletion.
Theyre good questions. I\x92ve only been a sim \x93victim\x94 but many sim scenarios will require resetting things back to normal. Aborted takeoff after engine failure for example or land with an engine failed and a quick start.

I\x92m inclined to give equal wait to intentional shutting down the engines (suicide, if you will) and \x93action-slip\x94. Three seconds after WOW and calling for \x93gear up\x94 is quick but not hugely so. We don\x92t have the transcript, we don\x92t know if the voices were associated with which pilots. It\x92s entirely possible, there was \x93positive rate\x94, \x93gear up\x94 exchange followed by the movement of the switches by the PM, followed by \x93why did you cut off\x94 by the PF who is soon without a PFD.

As to timing, in high stress situations, the mind can run like a computer slowing time or just the opposite, time speeds up and seconds go by trying to comprehend the situation. I was in an ejection, I could spends 15 minutes describing what happened in 500 milliseconds.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Action slip  Engine Failure (All)  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches  RUN/CUTOFF  Thread Moderation

galaxy flyer
July 14, 2025, 00:38:00 GMT
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Post: 11921804
Originally Posted by DavidncRobson
Based on the news coming out of India, it appears that your suspicions regarding malicious intent may well be correct, but it is not the younger FO under suspicion as your post seems to suggest but the older more experienced captain. Other comments in this thread had already made me think that the younger pilot was the PF and that it was he who had challenged the PM because he would have been focused on flying the aircraft and would have had neither the time nor the inclination to adjust the critical fuel cut off switches which you yourself categorically claim would never be mistaken for other switches.
The prelim report very specifically states that the co-pilot ( the FO, younger pilot) was the PF.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Preliminary Report

galaxy flyer
July 14, 2025, 21:22:00 GMT
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Post: 11922511
In his peripheral vision, the PF may have seen the hands move to the switches and seeing the near simultaneous loss of thrust plus an audible click of the switches. The timing of the switches is pretty close to “gear up” by the PF, so keyed into the hand moving to the handle.

Subjects: None

galaxy flyer
July 15, 2025, 13:47:00 GMT
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Post: 11922963
Originally Posted by lucille
Both gear and flap retraction requires upward movements of the lever while the fuel control switch requires a downwards movement to select Cutoff. And in the case of say gear or flap retraction, only one lever movement is required. In this case both switches were commanding cutoff within 1 second of each other.

With this in mind, the muscle memory / fatigue theory is difficult to understand. I would find it easier to accept if only one FCS was accidentally selected to Cutoff.

Isnt the first action on the FCO switch to lift it? Haven\x92t flown the 787 but every other lever-lock switch I\x92ve used worked that way.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Muscle Memory

galaxy flyer
July 15, 2025, 15:57:00 GMT
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Post: 11923044
Originally Posted by B2N2
OODA - loop.

https://oodaloop.com/the-ooda-loop-e...-environments/

Keep in mind the critics of the \x91Miracle on the Hudson\x92. If they would have anticipated a dual engine failure and turned immediately they would have made a runway.
Thats not how things work in reality.

It takes times to analyze and come up with a response and look for a response.
Just keep in mind this was not occurring in an air conditioned simulator under training conditions.
Replicating the accident scenario in a G650 over on a another forum,

We tried this in the G650 sim utilizing the timing from the accident report - both to cutoff 3 seconds after liftoff, then back to run 10 seconds later. The profile was pretty much exactly the same and resulted in a red screen. The next one we waited 10 seconds after liftoff (we left the gear down) and then another 10 seconds before moving them back to run. We actually got relight on one and then the other but full thrust was restored at only 80\x92 off the ground but we were able to fly away.

I know, completely different airplane, but it was certainly a unique scenario to watch and it showed us the behavior of the engines during an auto-relight that we had never seen before

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Dual Engine Failure  Engine Failure (All)  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  G650 Simulation  Relight