Posts by user "nrunning24" [Posts: 19 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 1]

Page Links: Index Page

nrunning24
June 13, 2025, 14:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11900563
Former Boeing Engineer, actually worked on this specific airplane prior to delivery. To me this all comes down to if the RAT was actually out. If not, lots of different factors people have already debated and likely some sort of pilot error that I'll let the pilots on this forum debate.

If the RAT did come out, then we are looking at simultaneous dual engine failure basically at V2 which is so improbable (without bird strikes or purposeful actions) that it is basically impossible. This is a 330 Min ETOPS aircraft. I saw no rudder deflection or yaw indicating 1 engine failed first and then they shut down the second one on accident.

Only two realistic options for me in that case are:
1. cutoff of the engines by the pilots. Either on purpose or accidental.
2. maintenance actions by the Air India ground team that caused issues with the engine system or power generation system.

2 is the only one I haven't seen mentioned here and I say this as a no longer Boeing employee. We STRUGGLED with AI during the EIS. They were notorious for just parking airplanes and then using them as spare parts and then screaming for help when they had to go back and get the planes ready to fly again.

Still think 1 is much more likely but will just throw out that 2 since there were complaints from previous flights about IFE and AC which to me speaks to issues with the power generation possibly being neglected.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Dual Engine Failure  Engine Failure (All)  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  RAT (All)  V2

nrunning24
June 13, 2025, 16:10:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11900665
Originally Posted by Buster15
Not yet seen a response to my question about which engine parameters are recommended by the FDR and what is the sample rate.
Hopefully you might be able to answer this.
Many thanks.
I am a retired gas turbine engineer who worked on safety systems and assessments and assisted on a number of accident investigations (military fast jets) and would be interested to know this.
I can't tell you off the top of my head. I was an engineer at final assembly (mostly final body join and functional testing) and then did support for airlines post delivery (working with their engineering teams on maintenance and operation) so I wasn't intimately involved in anything data wise on the FDR. My personal belief is that it should end up being glaringly obvious why the engines stopped working with the data they have, just to many coincidences happening at literally the exact same time for it to be some minuscule problem never envisioned before. Pretty sure FDR and CVR will tell all.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR  FDR  Parameters

nrunning24
June 13, 2025, 16:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11900680
Originally Posted by AndyJS
Apologies if already discussed but I'd be interested to know how common/unusual it is for a commercial aircraft to be "Stored for parts to be used on other 787's in the fleet" and then "Returned to Service"? These happened on 2019-01-23 and 2019-05-24 respectively according to this page.
You would never know, since they are just parked for "maintenance" usually happens when the customer doesnt want to pay for new parts for things that break. In the cases of AOG situations many airlines probably rob a part or two from an aircraft currently in a longer check just to not have to wait for shipping or if there are shortages. AI was just one of the worst in taking perfectly good airplanes, robbing them blind for parts and then asking for help months later when they wanted to get them flying again. Maybe its better now but they were very much an outlier among other 787 operators.

Subjects: None
nrunning24
June 13, 2025, 16:59:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11900693
Originally Posted by C2H5OH
Oh, this is an interesting statement.

So what kind of maintenance errors could AI possibly make, that would not cause a Christmas Tree of BIST errors during startup and preflight and crash the electrical system of the aircraft right after wheels off?
I wasn't a power or engine guy so I don't know the systems well enough to make a guess. The fact that previous flights had IFE and AC issues though does speak to general problems in the systems.

What I will say is that we are all so involved with our airlines and engineers definitely come home shaking their heads from airline visits sometimes. I was at my 787 airlines main offices monthly, you can tell what the operation is like quickly. AI was well known for being cheap and not wanting to do have stock of common replacement parts, and basically just used a few airplanes as their stockpiles. No one came back impressed from their visit there. Does that mean they are unsafe? No, not necessarily just that its not the most well run operation from my experience.

Subjects: None
nrunning24
June 13, 2025, 19:24:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11900835
Originally Posted by KSINGH
This guy doesn\x92t sound like a pilot so I\x92d take what he has to say about technical issues with a bucket of salt- cabin crew often get incredibly dumbed down explanations for their level of knowledge

Either way air India hasn\x92t had a terminal technical issue leading to a hull loss that I can seem to find, and it is over 60 years old. Shoddy legacy cabins has almost nothing to do with air safety and all those conflating the interiors of old air India planes with maintenance of critical items are being disingenuous at best
As someone who has worked with numerous airline engineering teams, companies and cultures where the small things are done well are also places where the big things are done well. The problem is AI usually ONLY fixes critical items so they are "legal" but all it takes is once mistake or misstep and their can be a major problem. I can assure you that any company that operates their interiors in the state that AI does also doesn't do all the things they should be doing proactively.

Subjects: None
nrunning24
July 12, 2025, 04:06:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920166
The switches got moved to cutoff, I dont see how anyone can take the audio from the report any other way. There are way to many ECAM warnings in this case for the pilot to know that that's what happened if there was a short or similar software failure. Add to the fact they got put back to run. Why we will find out.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

nrunning24
July 13, 2025, 18:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921526
Former Boeing Engineer on the 787 (prob should put this in my profile at some point but newbie on the forum), but personally flown nothing bigger than a 172.

Longer I think about this the more I lean towards purposeful but not intentional action slip cutoffs by the captain. Some people have commented on sim training captains doing this to reset quicker (i wouldn't know).

We know FO was flying and initial cut offs are 1 then 2, which to me says CAPT did it. But also relights were 1 then 2 which tells me CAPT also did that one most likely.

Also comments around 10 seconds of delay being a long time, that's REALLY fast in my opinion especially considering, 1. this is a situation that is never trained for and 2. All sorts of lights changing, displays flickering, whole right side of the cockpit basically turning off and 3. Your really close to the ground and transitions (from takeoff to climb) lend themselves hard things to break your mind out of. That has to be a very jarring experience that needs likely a few seconds just to re-orient themselves. I'm honestly impressed they got them re-lit that fast, but assuming training with engine out and re-start procedures likely gave them a hint fuel switches from the EICAS messages.

Very confident Boeing FlightOps engineers and training captains have run through this in the sim quite a few times now.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Action slip  EICAS  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Relight

nrunning24
July 14, 2025, 15:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922292
Originally Posted by flt001
Two separate fuel switches set to cut off, at one of the most critical phases of flight where doing so would lead to an unrecoverable situation, followed by one pilot asking the other why he set the switches to cut off.

No AD from Boeing or NTSB.

Come on.
Former Boeing Engineer who was in the room for some 787 AD discussions.... What exactly would you expect Boeing to put in the AD? "Don't put the fuel switches to cutoff unless you really mean to"? Let alone ADs are not in anyway a method for pilot training or actions, they are for the airline engineering and maintenance teams. What would you think Boeing should ask airlines to do in this proposed AD?

I'm sure the current team has already done the systems analysis to see if there was any possible way these weren't completely isolated systems (which I'm pretty confident they are). Let alone the initial report categorically says at this point there are no design issues found with Boeing or GE.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Air Worthiness Directives  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  NTSB

nrunning24
July 14, 2025, 15:40:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922310
Originally Posted by Mrshed
I don't think the intention in your quoted post is to suggest there should be an AD - more a "come on, it's obvious" statement I think.
Guess we need a sarcasm font. ha Reading again I still cant tell if they are serious or not.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Air Worthiness Directives

nrunning24
July 14, 2025, 19:59:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922466
Originally Posted by Dani
If you think everything is said...

Breaking News:
On Jul 14th 2025 India's DGCA instructed airlines to check the fuel switches on the Boeing 787 and Boeing 737 aircraft as used by Air India Group, Indigo and Spicejet for possible disengagement of the fuel control switch locking feature according to the SAIB released by the FAA on Dec 17th 2018. The checks have to be completed by Jul 21st 2025.

Source: Avherald.com
This also could be in the sake of thoroughness from the governing body, and frankly its low intrusiveness to the operation and can at least rule out random theorized possibilities. I would probably advise the same.

Realize this is a pilots forum, and its always easier to blame the engineers (me), but I'm surprised at the amount of people grasping at (at least what I think) straws to try and make this not a case of pilot error (either intentional or unintentional). I get lots of parts frequently break and pilots do frequently see things on MEL etc. I know our partner airline engineering teams would love to see increased reliability of certain components, but the certification scrutiny of flight critical items is very intense including isolation from each other.

The likelihood of two flight critical components which are isolated from each other failing instantaneously is so small its basically impossible. Especially when you consider they also turn back on 10 secs later.
Last edited by T28B; 14th July 2025 at 20:57 . Reason: pulled out the bottom line with formatting

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): DGCA  FAA  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  MEL  Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin

nrunning24
July 14, 2025, 21:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922500
Originally Posted by DutchRoll
I'm not surprised though it gets frustrating when folk start defaulting to the most remote possibilities instead of the more likely ones. The flight data recorder logged the fact that the switches were moved to cutoff, 1 second apart, very soon after airborne, then some seconds later moved back to run. None of that fits with any realistically conceivable mechanical failure nor automated system fault. Both of those are physical actions taken by a pilot. The first action was to shut them down, and the second action was an attempt to start them up again (tragically close to being successful). Nor does it fit with a muscle memory mistake or confusion with another switch.

Which leads to a very unpleasant possibility that many people would rather not consider, and some even refuse to consider, despite there being at least one historical precedent that I can think of (a pilot for a particular airline many years ago who had an undiagnosed mental health condition and admitted to struggling with impulsive thoughts of shutting down all 4 engines on a B747).
Fully agree just seems crazy to me that a non-insignificant number on this forum are chasing a 0.00000000001% chance over the 99.99999999% very obvious answer looking at you square in the face. We might never know if it was intentional or not, only the full CVR may give insight but even then who knows. While its fun to try and dive into the system details, but main problem is no currently employed Boeing engineer who knows the system well enough or could cross check could even comment here without losing their job. All of us who no longer work there can comment but without access to the internal details their is no way any of us can exactly remember the systems 100%.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Mental Health  Muscle Memory

nrunning24
July 14, 2025, 21:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922512
Originally Posted by LTC8K6
I'm still not clear on something, no surprise there.

If you are the PF and you are just after rotation, and for whatever reason, the fuel control switches transition to "CUTOFF", when and how do you notice this?
Presumably your hands are on the yoke and you are looking very intently out the windshield. So, to me it seems unlikely that you saw whatever happened to the switches, however they moved.

Do you get a warning indication that the switches have moved? If so, then that would be what I needed to know. You got a warning and therefore you looked right at the switches.

If not, do you just notice that you have lost power? If that is the case, where do you look first? I presume it would be at the engine info gauges/displays.

What I'm getting at is what priority is given to looking at the fuel cutoff switches in this situation?
How long until you look at those switches as the possible cause of the engine problems?
Well this is probably why it took 10 seconds, whole right side of the flight deck would be blacked out. My guess is that the EICAS messages that you see during sim engine fires/relights training helped. Don't have the post but it exists earlier upthread but there is an fuel cutoff EICAS message that happens when fuel switches move. Obviously can never count out a side vision of the PM, especially if its not a traditional movement in that stage of flight.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): EICAS  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches  RUN/CUTOFF

nrunning24
July 15, 2025, 15:06:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923015
Originally Posted by barrymung
There quite possibly are multiple contacts in use, but it's still a possibility. Statistically, pilot suicide is *very* rare and I would think switch failure or wiring loom failure is more common.

At this stage it's important not to rule anything out.
Come on now, Statistically pilot suicide is many orders of magnitude more common than this instantaneous multiple separated flight critical component fault which then somehow reverses itself 10 seconds later that you have dreamed up in your head.

Let stop with this nonsense.

Subjects: None
nrunning24
July 15, 2025, 15:42:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923035
Originally Posted by za9ra22
If I'm not mistaken, someone thoughtfully up thread somewhere posted an analysis which showed that pilot suicide is really not at all common, statistically. To which I'd add that for reasons also discussed up thread, this method would be totally atypical of previously chosen methods.

That said, I'd agree pretty much entirely that the probability of two, four pole/double throw switches failing within a second of each other is vanishingly remote too.

Of course, that dichotomy is why we are on the hamster wheel.
I'm not saying pilot suicide is common, its exceedingly rare. But the likelihood of this cooked up scenario that you would have to come up with is infinitesimally small (i would say impossible but nothing is impossible). It literally has never in modern day aviation happened, and we would probably have to fly for hundreds more years to even possibly approach a likelihood of a single event happening. Suicides while rare have happened and not just 1.

Again I'm not even saying its suicide, you prob may only know if you heard the CVR and even then their could be a question. What I'm saying is anyone downplaying that as an option because it's "rare" but then goes down the path of concocting some crazy failure scenario has now come up with a situation that is orders of magnitude more improbable, just because its uncomfortable for them to think of the suicide as being a possibility.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR

nrunning24
July 16, 2025, 18:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923900
Originally Posted by Dimitris
SLF here with engineering background.

Regardless of what happened and why regarding the switches going to off, there is now a documented failure mode of the system that needs mitigation (?):
Fuel switches off at less than XXX ft lead to unrecoverable AC.

If fuel cut off during take off leads to unrecoverable at less than XXX ft or risk of error i.e. switching one vs the other, then inhibit them. I'm putting it too simplistically, but if after V1 the AC is GO and there is a range of altitude/speed that engines loss leads to unrecoverable some mitigation is needed.
Boeing's whole differentiation from Airbus in design is they want the pilots to have more control. Also this would never pass certification muster. Adding more automation doesnt always make things safer, lots of unintended consequences. At some point you just have to accept when you fly your life is in the pilots hands for good or bad.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches  V1

nrunning24
July 16, 2025, 18:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923903
Originally Posted by Dani
That's not an overly detailed description. In fact, and this is the only fact, it doesn't say one word about the locking mechanism of the switches.
I don't know why most of the forum contributors cannot see this.
Oh yes the classic, rotation caused these locked switches to transition to cut off but flying into a building wasn't enough force to have them do the same movement.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

nrunning24
July 16, 2025, 18:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923909
Originally Posted by Abbas Ibn Firnas
But how many 787s switches have actually been inspected?
It was stated that Air India didn't bother to do so, as the directive or whatever it's called, was not mandatory.
I'm not trying to point the finger at Air India, or suggest that these switches could be faulty, rather highlight how the industry can be seen to function.
There have been numerous accidents that could have been prevented, if remedial actions had not been allowed to be deferred.
Considering a majority of the fleet is ANA + JAL at this time period I can 100% guarantee that inspections were done. The fact that nothing ever came out of this tells me there was no findings.

Subjects: None
nrunning24
July 16, 2025, 18:31:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923916
Originally Posted by Ant T
The SAIB from Boeing literally states the opposite to what you are stating.



It goes on to list models including 787-8, -9 and -10

https://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/NM-18...SIB_NM-18-33_1
You both are wrong. It was a 737 part that was found to be defective but was "similar" to the parts on other airplane models. There isn't a impossibility that a 787 has one (hence why its included), but there is also no documented cases of the 787 having a faulty switch.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin

nrunning24
July 17, 2025, 18:52:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924570
Originally Posted by syseng68k
Musician:

The lack of technical rigour and curiosity in this thread is disappointing. Long diatribes about switches, as if they were the only thing in the chain that could have cut off the fuel. Rumours and News, fine, but would expect a higher level of hard analysis here, especially considering the limited information presented in the initial report.

It may indeed be that the tragedy was intentional, but there is no hard evidence to show that at this stage. While there are pointers suggesting that in the report, that is how if has been written, intentionally. Here, the crew are blameless until proven at fault, beyond reasonable doubt. Call that naive if you will, but science is about gathering and following the evidence, not jumping to conclusions.
Pilots are blameless??? What are we even doing here. The evidence shows that outside a 10^(crazy number) event happening, the pilots are 100% to blame. How could you read the report and conclude any differently. As far as we can tell they flew a perfectly working airplane into a building.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

Page Links: Index Page