Posts by user "pug" [Posts: 9 Total up-votes: 6 Pages: 1]

That was my first thought, I don\x92t like to speculate but it\x92s hard not to isn\x92t it. Perhaps time for Boeing to take a leaf out of Airbus book with regards to incorrect flap settings prior to take off and the config warning? The 738 will only provide a config warning if the flaps are in a non-standard take-off position but will not trigger in the event that the flap setting used does not match that of the performance solution for the given departure (intersection etc). Surely a fairly simple solution of FMC vs flap position. Do any of the 787 pilots on here know if that\x92s a thing? I know it\x92s not on the 738.

*obviously this may be wide of the mark on this occasion, but it\x92s an inherent risk that SOPs will trap 99.999% of the time*

Theres a horn for if flaps aren\x92t set to a valid takeoff position, but nothing to tell you if you\x92ve set, for instance, Flap 5 for a Flap 15 departure (738). Anyway, as the aircraft appears to have gained height initially, this is probably not the cause of this horrid event and I\x92m going against my own principles of not speculating. So apologies but I\x92ll watch with interest and hoping for many survivors.

Thank you for the confirmation, this is something that is missing on the 738 and obviously therefore if the flap is in a normal take-off configuration it won\x92t warn you if it doesn\x92t agree with that entered into the FMC. Clearly not the issue here if there is such a warning system on the 787.

Is there not an ECAM if flap set does not match that which is entered into the MCDU? I\x92m not Airbus so pardon my ignorance but thanks to those who have responded. I\x92m also less than 1000 hours so I bow to the greater experience levels of those more enlightened on this thread. I regret posting earlier against my better judgement in lieu of the findings from the investigation. Was merely an unintended derailment of the topic due to someone mentioning flap settings, of course in this event there is no evidence to show any issue with the configuration of the aircraft. So apologies for this to whom it may have offended. Thoughts with the families of those involved, the speculation is all well intended no matter how premature because we all want to learn from these things don\x92t we.

Most likely anything between 256 and 1024wps, individual parameters will vary with regards sample rate. Not au-fait with 787 but other Boeing aircraft may have dataframes relative to the original owner requirements (though this is unlikely to vary much given my experience with Boeing aircraft). I\x92m not sure if GE have a real time EHM feed like RR? Anyhow, and not wanting to speculate too much, if there was anything engine related it would certainly show up on the DFDR and GE could possibly even know that by now if they are equipped with real time health monitoring. In my opinion, for what it\x92s worth, the CCTV footage is consistent with flap retraction instead of gear, something that would also be easily identifiable upon review of the FDR which will be reported upon in due course.

Ive seen it happen in a previous (ground based) life fairly frequently (in relative terms) but exclusively during descent/approach. Usually the context would be expecting a flap call but when the gear call is made the flap handle is moved and quickly returned to the previous gated position followed immediately by gear selection, confirmed upon review of the data. To happen on takeoff would be most unusual, and although the CCTV footage is indicative of it being highly plausible, neither pieces of footage really show anything to draw any conclusions on. Certainly there may be numerous aspects to this, perhaps there was some catastrophic electrical failure that wasn\x92t of itself an immediate threat to the flight but the startle effect in the flight deck prompted other reactions. It\x92s impossible to know based off the information available. The human element will form a significant part of the investigation regardless of root cause(s).

Regarding the comments about who should be allowed to comment on such threads. I like the fact the mods have taken a pragmatic view of this. Theres a reason many in the accident investigation field come from an engineering background. Whilst highly experienced pilots are clearly crucial on an SME level, there can be a tendency for iwouldnthavedoneitthatway-itis. This can at times hinder investigations where an open mind free from confirmation bias is essential.

With respect I can\x92t see that the two videos we have available to us as primary evidence are sufficient to draw any conclusions, they certainly don\x92t provide overwhelming evidence of anything other than the aircraft crashed with the inevitable horrendous consequences. Although I stand by my unsubstantiated theory that this was a flap/config issue of some sort, I\x92m only basing this on the scant evidence available publicly and I certainly aren\x92t resting my hat on it. Very much expect that there may be a root cause that nobody expects or there may be many factors at play here that have allowed the holes to match up.

One thing is for certain though and that is that, due to the number of 787 aircraft in service and the ominous nature of the event, we may see preliminary findings released fairly swiftly.

This I believe is an option to retrofit. Can\x92t recall the supplier, Honeywell perhaps, not sure on the 737-MAX and whether it has anything fitted as standard.. Anyway the more cost effective option (for NG operators) is to amend SOPs where appropriate. However the U.K. CAA do apparently intend on creating a working group regarding such events. See also the TUI event at BRS.

https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/388602

https://simpleflying.com/aaib-report...f-runway-10ft/

It\x92s worth noting that the acceleration rate was exceptionally low in the TUI event based on the average for that airport. I refer you to my initial post on this thread, it\x92s a risk that there is no config warning horn (to my knowledge) on the B737-800 that will alert the crew, upon selection of TOGA, that the performance solution entered into the FMC does not agree with the actual config. In the case of flap setting, it will only alert if a non standard take-off flap setting is selected. If in the unlikely event TOGA is not pressed at all then\x85..

Airbus have added something of an FWC to their 321NEO aircraft that will alert crew to this - something I\x92d heard from bus mates but wasn\x92t 100% certain on so thanks to those on here that confirmed.

Sorry for further thread derailment, however felt it might be of interest. 787 rated crew on this thread suggest this would form part of the electronic checklist on the aircraft so in the case of the event at hand a red herring.

Out of interest, are you using ground speed or airspeed?

Even if airspeed increased in the event that flap was inadvertently retracted, the critical angle of attack would decrease. To counteract this, unless airspeed increased (I.e with sufficient thrust perhaps, like in a windshear escape manoeuvre) relevant to the pitch attitude, the only way to generate sufficient lift would be to create enough airflow over the wings, or more simply in this scenario to lower the nose, but this doesn\x92t appear to have occurred in this event*

Or am I missing something?

*accepting the poor evidence available to us, there is no evidence of flap retraction leading to this event. Having since seen Magplug assessment I\x92m tending towards that theory in the absence of official findings.