Posts by user "remi" [Posts: 7 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 1]

remi
July 11, 2025, 23:22:00 GMT
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Post: 11919986
Originally Posted by KSINGH
to add


In my airline (we don\x92t fly the 787 but our engine masters are in a near identical position on our jet) we have had *multiple* incidents of engine masters being manipulated accidentally in flight. This has involved both flight deck and cabin crew. This has meant a re-emphasis on SOPs regarding the centre pedestal but you still routinely see this broken on the line in minor and major ways from time to time


Thus the lengthy sticky thread on "shutting down wrong/both engines." Brain farts happen.

I don't think it's ridiculous to suggest that perhaps one crew intended to manipulate a different control (stab trim cutout?) and flipped the fuel cutoff instead, maybe not even realizing what has happened. Sure, unlikely, but essentially every aspect of airline accidents is unlikely.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches

remi
July 12, 2025, 21:17:00 GMT
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Post: 11920838
Originally Posted by dsbery
Good question as the report says FAA advisory NM-18-33 (check for potential fuel cut-off switches fault) was not implemented by Air India.
If I understand this correctly--

I believe the *inspection* was not conducted, and whether there was a fault with the configuration of the switch on the accident aircraft is not answered in the report.

If pilots were able to move this aircraft's cutoff toggles without lifting them, it seems that might have been reported at some point during its service. But then again, maybe the difference in operation between a correctly configured switch (requires lift to toggle) and incorrectly configured one (does not require lift, but lifting it still works as expected) is not noticeable.

I'd be curious to know if India Air has (finally) inspected these switches in their fleet since the accident.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FAA  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches  SAIB NM-18-33

remi
July 12, 2025, 21:37:00 GMT
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Post: 11920852
Originally Posted by Feathers McGraw
Earlier today I watched Mentour Pilot's YouTube discussion, one of the things Petter said was "Brain fart of the century" regarding the erroneous selection of cut-off 3 seconds after leaving the ground. Somewhere else I saw this sort of thing described as a "Car keys put in the fridge" event.
I threw my car keys into the outdoor recycling bin once. I looked for them for quite some time (hours). Later on while taking a break from searching, I was about to throw some actual recycling into the bin and noticed them in the bottom of the empty container. I decided later I must have opened the container to throw out some garbage from the car while holding the keys, realized it was the recycling bin, and as I was changing my focus to the garbage container I let go the keys that I was also holding and didn't notice them falling from my hand. At least that's how I explained it to myself, having done it cold sober and fully alert.

I found my cellphone in a fridge once but someone else had put it in there "by mistake."

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

remi
July 12, 2025, 21:43:00 GMT
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Post: 11920860
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
The report explicitly states:
Yes, and it is mute on the actual mechanical status of the switches.

If there had been maintenance done on the switches I'm assuming that would have been noted in the initial report. So as far as I can tell the question of whether the switches were configured as intended and working correctly is so far unanswered in public reporting. Presumably they were exhibiting normal behavior as far as pilots observed.

Subjects: None

remi
July 13, 2025, 00:01:00 GMT
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Post: 11920944
Originally Posted by syseng68k
The first thing that occurred to me, after reading the report was, how human error (if that is the case), could be designed out of the system. Two such critical switches right under the engine controls almost looks like asking for trouble, if, for example, a brain fade activated those, instead of a gear up command. One way around that would be to have 2 factor authentication for safety critical functions, an are you sure ?. For example, two switches at the opposite ends of the panel, or similar.
Well, basically, this would be putting a second factor in front of the pedals you have in your car.

Do you want to brake sharply on the freeway (Y/N)?__

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Human Factors

remi
July 13, 2025, 06:04:00 GMT
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Post: 11921041
Originally Posted by Bergerie1
This leaves the so-called 'muscle memory' and 'brain fart' theories. Those who work in the field of psychology can show quite clearly that we are all liable to seemingly inexplicable mistakes, both in normal life and in the cockpit. MaybeItIs wrote about the cerebellum and the cerebrum in his post 183, his words are very wise.
Again, noting that all commercial aviation accidents involve one in a million, one in a billion events, I don't find it implausible on its face that a crew member flipped the fuel cutoffs while intending to do something else entirely, even given the deliberate and well studied ergonomic differences designed into cockpit controls.

It could have been an intentional, malicious act, but I think, for now, "brain fart" or "extremely inappropriate reaction to perceived anomaly" makes more sense for now.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Action slip  Muscle Memory

remi
July 13, 2025, 06:10:00 GMT
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Post: 11921044
Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere
removing the authority to crash the plane is something that's necessary for single pilot operations.
I think the safety of single pilot operations and no pilot operations are rapidly converging and if I had to choose, a few years in the future, assuming the option of demonstrably competent zero pilot operations, my order of preference would be:
* two pilots
* zero pilots
* one pilot

Subjects: None