Why inspect other 787=8 and declare them safe when you do not know the cause of this crash and therefore what you are looking for,
Air India are doing inspections because the DGCA
mandated them
ASAP. If they
didn't
announce completing the inspections and finding no issues then people would read things into that. They pretty much have to declare them safe if they find nothing of interest.
SubjectsDGCA
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I hope this isn't too far off-topic, but a question raised a few times in the days after the crash was why we only had cell-phone video and foreshortened security camera footage from buildings near the airport. Why didn't the airport save 4K video of every takeoff? (I think this came up for Jeju too.)
The preliminary report includes a hi-res image of the aircraft shortly after takeoff. The airport _had_ good video. I would guess many do, and in this case the investigation team thought it was useful to release a still from it.
SubjectsPreliminary Report
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More click-bait BS
[...]
These people are really clutching at straws in their attempt to make this Boeing's fault.
Don't blame the journalists. They are speaking to experts like the "
the president of the Federation of Indian Pilots union" who is giving them the interpretation of the timings of the RAT deployment. Then there is "the founder of India\x92s Safety Matters Foundation" who says the extensive damage to one of the FDRs could only have been caused by "a lithium-ion battery fire", and not by an extended fuel fire. Therefore the plane must have been on fire at "sometime" before it took off. (I'm surprised nobody noticed that!)
SubjectsRAT (All)RAT (Deployment)
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In amongst those actions could be yet another where the "other pilot" could click something out of reach of the other pilot which prevented the actuation of the second shutdown switch.
My first reaction to that would be to invert it and say that the "other pilot" has to
enable
the second shutdown switch. Would that be rejected on the basis that if a pilot is incapacitated the pilot flying needs control? I guess there is a reason why both cutoffs are in the centre.
Subjects:
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scard08 February 05, 2026, 04:41:00 GMT permalink
Post: 12032570
Originally Posted by
Someone Somewhere
2: Switch failures leading to engine failure are counted as an in-flight shut down for ETOPS purposes, meaning <1 per 100K engine flight hours. So long as the failures are
independent
, this shouldn't be an issue.
So dual failure would be <1 per 10 billion engine flight hours. With ~100 million hours of commercial flight each year that might claim to be "once a century". I hope I got the maths right?
I don't have much confidence in those numbers, but it is certainly a rationale.Colour me skeptical. People are not that good at avoiding profitable trade that sometimes results in disasters.
SubjectsEngine Failure (All)
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