Posts about: "V1" [Posts: 91 Pages: 5]

Mr Optimistic
2025-06-14T21:39:00
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Post: 11901865
Originally Posted by BugBear
TCMA

Which side of V1 does TCMA lurk? If a pilot closes the throttles to abort, does the system allow it? After all, "too low thrust" is outside the contour....

Ya know, when every conceivable possibility (or close) has been de wormed, it"s usually something impossible, or too fearful...(Or dishonest, fraudulent, criminal ....etc ,?
From tdracer
However, TCMA is only active on the ground (unfamiliar with the 787/GEnx TCMA air/ground logic - on the 747-8 we used 5 sources of air/ground - three Radio Altimeters and two Weight on Wheels - at least one of each had to indicate ground to enable TCMA). TCMA will shutdown the engine via the N2 overspeed protection - nearly instantaneous. For this to be TCMA, it would require at least two major failures - improper air ground indication or logic, and improper TCMA activation logic (completely separate software paths in the FADEC). Like I said, very, very unlikely.

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Alty7x7
2025-06-14T22:00:00
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Post: 11901877
TCMA

Originally Posted by BugBear
TCMA

Which side of V1 does TCMA lurk? If a pilot closes the throttles to abort, does the system allow it? After all, "too low thrust" is outside the contour....

Ya know, when every conceivable possibility (or close) has been de wormed, it"s usually something impossible, or too fearful...(Or dishonest, fraudulent, criminal ....etc ,? To include unnecessary, venal, and inappropriate)

Sledgehammer, flyswatter.... MCAS
Philosophically, it is primarily pre-V1. It prevents uncommanded high thrust when you are trying to chop the thrust on a RTO. Overthrust can generally get you off the ground post V1, as can (stating the obvious on a pilot forum) a single-engine loss post V1. So OK to shut down post V1 if still on ground.
BugBear
2025-06-14T22:15:00
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Post: 11901891
Originally Posted by Alty7x7
Philosophically, it is primarily pre-V1. It prevents uncommanded high thrust when you are trying to chop the thrust on a RTO. Overthrust can generally get you off the ground post V1, as can (stating the obvious on a pilot forum) a single-engine loss post V1. So OK to shut down post V1 if still on ground.
might need a rethink ... And a reread.

Last edited by T28B; 14th Jun 2025 at 22:20 . Reason: brackets completed
tdracer
2025-06-14T23:05:00
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Post: 11901941
Originally Posted by FlightDetent
I am curious to learn what power source drives the high-pressure fuel pumps in the engine. If there is such a thing, I suppose there would.

Gearbox? This is at odds with a possible cascading electric failure that (might have) caused a loss of engine fuel feed.

To my understanding on my ancient plane and engine design, the HP pumps that feed the nozzles are driven mechanically, which enables gravity feeding among other scenarios, but also assures the fuel supply is independent of whatever happens upstream of the nacelle. Except for LP/fire shut-off cocks.
The engine driven fuel pump is literally driven off the engine gearbox (driven by a mechanical connection to the N2 shaft) - if the engine's running, the gearbox is turning (baring a major mechanical fault). The engine driven fuel pump is a two-stage pump - a centrifugal pump that draws the fuel into the pump (i.e. 'suction feed'), and a gear pump which provides the high-pressure fuel to the engine and as muscle pressure to drive things like the Stator Vane and Bleed Valve actuators. It takes a minimum of ~300 PSI to run the engine - the HPSOV is spring loaded closed and it takes approximately 300 psi to overcome that spring.
Engine driven fuel pump failures are very rare, but have happened (usually with some 'precursor' symptoms that were ignored or mis-diagnosed by maintenance). It would be unheard of for engine driven fuel pumps to fail on both engines on the same flight.

As I've repeatedly posted, even a 100% aircraft power failure would not explain both engines quitting, at least without several other existing faults. Again, never say never, but you can only combine so many 10-9 events before it becomes ridiculous...

TCMA doesn't know what V1 is - it's active whenever the air/ground logic says the aircraft is on-ground.

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Xeptu
2025-06-15T01:53:00
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Post: 11902043
Originally Posted by SpaceQuality
Also a newcomer here, but an experienced private pilot, Software Engineer with a degree in Aerospace Computer Science and former Head of Quality for Satellites and Interplanetary Missions. We have already seen bad software solutions and the results thereof in the 737 MAX accidents, which makes me wonder, if the TCMA can reach a state, where unintended engine shutdown is possible.

There is one system implemented in the 787, that has the authority to shut down the engines, based on software subsystem decision. Interestingly - according to the description in the patent below - the same TCMA software package determines the shutdown decision, in both redundant subsystems.

Excerpt from the Patent:
"Malfunctions in aircraft power plant thrust control systems can result in uncontrollable high engine power levels that are potentially hazardous or catastrophic for aircraft operation. A particularly hazardous situation is when a thrust control system failure results in one of the aircraft's engines continuing to operate at a high power condition and not responding to a throttle command to reduce power during takeoff, approach or landing. Typically, when this failure mode occurs, the actual thrust either increases to a significantly higher than commanded thrust and/or remains at a high level when the thrust levers are set for low thrust....

In one preferred embodiment the present invention is directed to a system and method for detecting and correcting a thrust control malfunction in an aircraft engine. The system includes an electronic engine control (EEC) unit that includes a first processing subsystem and a second processing subsystem, and a thrust control malfunction accommodation (TCMA) circuit included in the first processing subsystem and the second processing subsystem. Additionally, the system includes a TCMA software package executed by the first processing subsystem and the second processing subsystem, thereby providing redundant execution of the TCMA software package.

The method of the present invention compares the engine's actual power level with a threshold contour defined by the TCMA software package. When the TCMA software package determines that a thrust control malfunction has occurred, based on the engine's power level exceeding the threshold contour, the engine is shut down by the TCMA circuit.
The present invention is still further directed to an electronic engine control (EEC) unit configured to detect and correct an aircraft engine thrust control malfunction using an active-active functionality. The EEC includes a first processing subsystem for unilaterally monitoring engine operation and shutting down the engine when a thrust control malfunction occurs, and a second processing subsystem for unilaterally monitoring engine operation and shutting down the engine when a thrust control malfunction occurs."

Just my 20 cents
It's been troubling a few of us for some time. To translate all that for the layperson, a momentary electrical event triggered at V1 (still on the ground) and restored after rotation before gear up is selected.(in flight)

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grumpyoldgeek
2025-06-15T02:05:00
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Post: 11902051
Originally Posted by Xeptu
It's been troubling a few of us for some time. To translate all that for the layperson, a momentary electrical event triggered at V1 (still on the ground) and restored after rotation before gear up is selected.(in flight)
I've read your cite four times and could not find anything implying that " a momentary electrical event triggered at V1 (still on the ground) and restored after rotation before gear up is selected." I guess you need to explain it to me like I was eight.
Xeptu
2025-06-15T02:57:00
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Post: 11902067
Originally Posted by grumpyoldgeek
I've read your cite four times and could not find anything implying that " a momentary electrical event triggered at V1 (still on the ground) and restored after rotation before gear up is selected." I guess you need to explain it to me like I was eight.
Sorry about that. The reply was aimed at the OP. from a software writers perspective, as you rightly point out it does not imply an electrical event actually occurred. As you raised that query writing software routines (programming) is no different and that's what we're looking for.
Tu.114
2025-06-15T09:46:00
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Post: 11902300
Something rather relevant has not yet been shown on this thread: a performance calculation.

Could somebody with access to a 787 performance calculator please show realistic figures for this type out of Ahmedabads runway 23?

Weather at the time of the accident:

VAAH 120830Z 24003KT 6000 NSC 37/17 Q1000 NOSIG=
VAAH 120800Z 25007KT 6000 NSC 37/16 Q1001 NOSIG=

With 240 souls on board, a payload of 20-22 tons might be a ballpark figure, and a fuel load of about 50 tons was claimed as realistic in earlier posts.

An appropriate flap setting, a flex temperature, V1, Vr, V2, flap retraction and green dot speed (or its Boeing equivalent), a climb gradient after departure, and some distances might be of interest, I\xb4d think.

Last edited by Tu.114; 15th Jun 2025 at 10:50 .

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medod
2025-06-15T11:34:00
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Post: 11902390
Originally Posted by lighttwin2
There are a few comments along the lines of "it is incredibly unlikely that..." this is selection bias in reverse. Something incredibly unlikely has happened, and it's contained in this sample set.

To summarise some known facts about the TCMA system:

1) TCMA will shut down an engine if:
  • It believes via multiple redundant sensors indicate the aircraft is on the ground
  • It detects engine power in excess of that set by the thrust levers - subject to a margin to account for engine performance variation - that is determined to be a runaway condition
2) In 2019 an ANA pilot was able to confuse the TCMA by rapidly moving the thrust levers into reverse, to forward and back into reverse again. This caused both engines to shutdown.

3) Since then the TCMA should have been updated/fixed (and indeed the software will have been updated by SB since the a/c was delivered, to detect a wider range of runaway conditions)

And speculation:

4) It may be possible - given the close timings - that a TCMA activation occurred as the a/c was leaving the ground, with kinetic energy and spool down time getting the a/c from the ground to its peak height

In the recent BA LGW incident the PF reduced thrust to idle at V1, then added thrust back, then committed to a RTO. I wonder if something similar could have occurred:
  • In error, PF reduces power to idle at a speed approaching V1
  • Engines begin reducing power, but n1 reduces more slowly than the TCMA system is expecting (perhaps because the TCMA margin is calculated when the a/c is stationary, but at 170kt a turbofan will spool down more slowly due to the ram air / windmill effect)
  • TCMA detects a runaway condition - while a/c is on the ground - and cuts off fuel via the relay circuit
  • PF decides to commit to takeoff and rotates, not knowing that TCMA has already activated
  • 10-15s after rotation, n1 has now dropped below minimums for electrical generation. Electrics fail, final transponder signal is sent, and RAT is deployed
Obviously this should not be possible, and there are other possibilities.
If TCMA cut fuel flow while still on the runway the aircraft would have been decelerating from the moment it lifted off, which is not what the ADS-B data indicates. The kinetic energy in the rotating parts of the engine wouldn't add much speed to the aircraft as the engines run down with no more energy being added via fuel.

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mechpowi
2025-06-15T12:38:00
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Post: 11902430
Originally Posted by Captain Fishy
What if the PF called stop just before V1 and closed the thrust levers but either changed his mind or was overridden by the other pilot, who rapidly pushed the thrust levers back up. Could this trigger a TCMA intervention and subsequent dual engine shutdown as it was still on the runway at this point? Hopefully not.
This is the best theory of TCMA activation so far, but it\x92s still very remote. In this theory there is no need for a TCMA anomaly, it needs only(!) two simultaneous engine anonalies (and sn improper crew action) that would trigger the TCMA as designed. If there are safeguards preventing this happening, they are not mentioned in this thread.

It also doesn\x92t explaine the ADS-B data showing acceleration after lift off.

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Tu.114
2025-06-15T18:48:00
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Post: 11902708
The biggest news site in Greece claims to have the results of a kind of preliminary report from India AAIB which say that as the plane rotated, the pilot's seat malfunctioned (broken pin) and went suddenly far back forcing the captain to accidentally lower the thrust lever as he already had his hand on it
If there was a loss of power, it happened after V1. Normally, at V1, all hands should be removed from the thrust levers until, type dependent, selection of climb thrust, which normally takes place not below 1000\xb4 above aerodrome level. An altitude the flight never managed to achieve. If some flight crew members seat was to slide back unintentionally, there are handles in the flight deck that one will instinctively reach for, no need to grab the thrust levers of all things.

Even if the levers may have been inadvertently pulled to idle, it would have taken one single energic adjustment to slam them to maximum thrust position (whatever it is called on the 787), for which there was some time during the brief flight. And two idling engines should not result in anything triggering the RAT release or APU auto start.

Of course, stranger things have happened, but I\xb4d consider this scenario not plausible.

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Alty7x7
2025-06-15T20:23:00
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Post: 11902791
Engine failure with electrical power loss

Originally Posted by StuntPilot
We agree that there was a lack of thrust. Possibly caused by a dual engine failure. But the sharpest frames in the video do NOT show the RAT and this is counter evidence to the RAT theory. If there were substantial technical failures who knows what sounds could be generated. I find the evidence weak at best. And we immediately get into a chicken-egg problem: did some power issue of unknown nature cause an engine failure or did a dual engine failure occur, resulting in a power loss? Both are extremely unlikely and need to be backed by quality evidence. The video is not it, in my opinion. I don't know the APU intake mechanism and whether it could open after the impact.
To simplify the chicken/egg:

Tdracer earlier confirmed that an airplane electrical power loss would allow engines to keep running , because 1) engines are fully-capable of suction feed operation in takeoff envelope (if boost pumps lost), and 2) the EECs are powered by their own PMAs when running and to substantially below idle (I recall roughly 10% N2). Airplane powers the EEC for ground starts, prior to PMA coming online, and as backup to the PMA after that.

Related:

Engine igniters are powered by the aircraft. So theoretical full loss of aircraft power would disable Autorelight upon a flameout. Ignitors typically don't make the cut for most-essential battery-only loads because it would also take an engine flameout, and the airplane past V1 in ground roll can fly fine on one engine that can achieve takeoff thrust.

Autorelight is relevant - if there was a single-engine failure post V1, autorelight will attempt to relight the engine, so there is no need for a pilot to try to cycle the fuel switch to reset the EEC (potentially grabbing the wrong one), or to otherwise intervene. In such a circumstance, they need to trust their training. I've heard accounts that the most likely pilot instinct in such a situation would be to push the throttle(s) forward.

Finally - there was talk earlier about accidentally cutting the fuel switches - and it was duly noted that they have to be pulled out over the detent, so very unlikely. The same cutoff effect could be achieved with the engine fire handle(s), right behind the fuel switches on the pedestal - though they are an upward pull, so also not subject to inadvertent or accidental engagement.
GANovice
2025-06-16T00:11:00
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Post: 11902996
Can any 787 drivers confirm if TCMA would/could activate if a pilot were to inadvertently cause unusual and/or asymmetric thrust with the levers after V1 and through VR (before being airborne)?

I.e. if there was some hesitation in aborting TO, could a few seconds at high power with somewhat asymmetric levers have caused TCMA to activate?

tdracer
2025-06-12T22:02:00
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Post: 11903414
Air India Ahmedabad accident 12th June 2025 Part 2

OK, I promised some informed speculation when I got back, so here goes:
Disclaimer: never worked the 787, so my detailed knowledge is a bit lacking.

First off, this is perplexing - especially if the RAT was deployed. There is no 'simple' explanation that I can come up with.

GEnx-1B engines have been exceptionally reliable, and the GE carbon composite fan blades are very robust and resistant to bird strike damage (about 15 years after the GE90 entry into service, I remember a GE boast that no GE90 (carbon composite) fan blades had needed to be scrapped due to damage (birdstrike, FOD, etc. - now that was roughly another 15 years ago, so is probably no longer true, but it shows just how robust the carbon composite blades are - far better than the more conventional titanium fan blades).

Not saying it wasn't somehow birdstrike related, just that is very unlikely (then again, all the other explanations I can come up with are also very unlikely ).

Using improper temp when calculating TO performance - after some near misses, Boeing added logic that cross-compares multiple total temp probes - aircraft TAT (I think the 787 uses a single, dual element probe for aircraft TAT, but stand to be corrected) and the temp measured by the engine inlet probes - and puts up a message if they disagree by more than a few degree tolerance - so very, very unlikely.

N1 power setting is somewhat less prone to measurement and power setting errors than EPR (N1 is a much simpler measurement than Rolls EPR) - although even with EPR, problems on both engines at the same time is almost unheard of.

The Auto Thrust (autothrottle) function 'falls asleep' at 60 knots - and doesn't unlock until one of several things happens - 250 knots, a set altitude AGL is exceeded (I'm thinking 3,000 ft. but the memory is fuzzy), thrust levers are moved more than a couple of degrees, or the mode select is changed (memory says that last one is inhibited below 400 ft. AGL). So an Auto Thrust malfunction is also extremely unlikely. Further, a premature thrust lever retard would not explain a RAT deployment.

TO does seem to be very late in the takeoff role - even with a big derate, you still must accelerate fast enough to reach V1 with enough runway to stop - so there is still considerable margin if both engines are operating normally. That makes me wonder if they had the correct TO power setting - but I'm at a loss to explain how they could have fouled that up with all the protections that the 787 puts on that.

If one engine did fail after V1, it's conceivable that they shut down the wrong engine - but since this happened literally seconds after takeoff, it begs the question why they would be in a big hurry to shut down the engine. Short of an engine fire, there is nothing about an engine failure that requires quick action to shut it down - no evidence of an engine fire, and even with an engine fire, you normally have minutes to take action - not seconds.

The one thing I keep thinking about is someone placing both fuel switches to cutoff immediately after TO. Yes, it's happened before (twice - 767s in the early 1980s), but the root causes of that mistake are understood and have been corrected. Hard to explain how it could happen (unless, God forbid, it was intentional).

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Icarus2001
2025-06-13T05:11:00
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Post: 11903710
An engine failure just off the runway after V1 in a fully loaded 787-8 in high ambient temperatures would assuredly have a crew thinking about a "toute suite" shutdown of a misbehaving donk
No, no, no and again no.

This is a transport category aircraft. It will happily climb on one engine to a safe altitude where procedures are followed.

There is zero evidence of any engine "failures" or shutdowns by the crew.

However the gear is still down at around 500' agl.

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Magplug
2025-06-13T22:13:00
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Post: 11903713
Speaking as a B787 Captain..... There is so much rubbish and stupid suggestion being written here.

This aircraft was airborne for a grand total of 22 seconds, half of which was climbing to no more than 150' aal.

- No Flaps? Due to the setup of the ECL it is physically impossible to go down the runway without some sort of take-off flap set. The T/o config warning would have been singing it's head off. Despite assertions to the contrary I have seen no video clear enough to detect a lack of flaps.

- RAT out? Almost impossible, I have seen no quality footage that definitively witnesses the RAT being out. Those who think they car hear a RAT type noise might be listening to a motorcycle passing or similar. It takes a triple hydraulic failure or a double engine failure to trigger RAT deploment. They happily went through V1 without a hint of rejected take off so as they rotated the aircraft was serviceable. These are big engines, they take a long time to wind down when you shut them down. I have never tried it however engine failure detection takes 30s or for the aircraft to react and they were not even airborne that long.
- Flaps up instead of gear? The B787 flaps are slow both in and out. Given that the 'Positive rate' call is not made the second the wheels leave the ground, a mis-selection of flaps up would not cause any loss of lift for at least 20 seconds, by which time they had already crashed. I believe the gear remained down not because of mis-selection but because of a major distraction on rotate.

Discounting the impossible, two hypotheses remain:

1. Invalid derate set through incorrect cross-checking. Trundling down the runway takes very little power to reach Vr. It is only when you rotate that you create more drag and discover that you do not have sufficient thrust vs. drag to sustain a climb. Or....
2. Put 200' as the altitude target in the FCU. Immediate ALT capture and all the power comes off. PF is still hand flying trying to increase pitch but is already way behind the aircraft.

It could be after this that Boeing are forced to review the B787 practice of exploring the very edges of the performance envelope.

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TURIN
2025-06-13T23:49:00
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Post: 11903714
Originally Posted by Magplug
Speaking as a B787 Captain..... There is so much rubbish and stupid suggestion being written here.

This aircraft was airborne for a grand total of 22 seconds, half of which was climbing to no more than 150' aal.

- No Flaps? Due to the setup of the ECL it is physically impossible to go down the runway without some sort of take-off flap set. The T/o config warning would have been singing it's head off. Despite assertions to the contrary I have seen no video clear enough to detect a lack of flaps.

- RAT out? Almost impossible, I have seen no quality footage that definitively witnesses the RAT being out. Those who think they car hear a RAT type noise might be listening to a motorcycle passing or similar. It takes a triple hydraulic failure or a double engine failure to trigger RAT deploment. They happily went through V1 without a hint of rejected take off so as they rotated the aircraft was serviceable. These are big engines, they take a long time to wind down when you shut them down. I have never tried it however engine failure detection takes 30s or for the aircraft to react and they were not even airborne that long.
- Flaps up instead of gear? The B787 flaps are slow both in and out. Given that the 'Positive rate' call is not made the second the wheels leave the ground, a mis-selection of flaps up would not cause any loss of lift for at least 20 seconds, by which time they had already crashed. I believe the gear remained down not because of mis-selection but because of a major distraction on rotate.

Discounting the impossible, two hypotheses remain:

1. Invalid derate set through incorrect cross-checking. Trundling down the runway takes very little power to reach Vr. It is only when you rotate that you create more drag and discover that you do not have sufficient thrust vs. drag to sustain a climb. Or....
2. Put 200' as the altitude target in the FCU. Immediate ALT capture and all the power comes off. PF is still hand flying trying to increase pitch but is already way behind the aircraft.

It could be after this that Boeing are forced to review the B787 practice of exploring the very edges of the performance envelope.
I have to agree with everything here except your assertion about engine shutdown.
Even though these are big engines with plenty of inertia, when you select engine shut off they spool down very quickly if on load. IE, The generators, two per engine and hydraulic pumps, etc, being driven by the (relatively) small mass of the N2 rotor will drag the speed down very quickly, the gennies will trip offine in seconds, the pumps will quickly reduce flow and pressure.
As for what went wrong.
If the engines have stopped working there has to be a common failure mode, fuel is one but as has been said, no other aircraft has had a problem, as far as we know. FOD? It would have to be something major to shut down two GeNX engines and there would be debris all over the runway, we would know by now.
I have no idea if the RAT has deployed, I can't see it in the video and the noise could be something else.
We shall see.
There is compelling evidence that flaps are set correctly and not retracted inadvertently.
I await further evidence.
Edit to add. LAE 40 years, type rated on 737 to 787 with lots of others in between.

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tdracer
2025-06-14T23:05:00
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Post: 11903421
Originally Posted by FlightDetent
I am curious to learn what power source drives the high-pressure fuel pumps in the engine. If there is such a thing, I suppose there would.

Gearbox? This is at odds with a possible cascading electric failure that (might have) caused a loss of engine fuel feed.

To my understanding on my ancient plane and engine design, the HP pumps that feed the nozzles are driven mechanically, which enables gravity feeding among other scenarios, but also assures the fuel supply is independent of whatever happens upstream of the nacelle. Except for LP/fire shut-off cocks.
The engine driven fuel pump is literally driven off the engine gearbox (driven by a mechanical connection to the N2 shaft) - if the engine's running, the gearbox is turning (baring a major mechanical fault). The engine driven fuel pump is a two-stage pump - a centrifugal pump that draws the fuel into the pump (i.e. 'suction feed'), and a gear pump which provides the high-pressure fuel to the engine and as muscle pressure to drive things like the Stator Vane and Bleed Valve actuators. It takes a minimum of ~300 PSI to run the engine - the HPSOV is spring loaded closed and it takes approximately 300 psi to overcome that spring.
Engine driven fuel pump failures are very rare, but have happened (usually with some 'precursor' symptoms that were ignored or mis-diagnosed by maintenance). It would be unheard of for engine driven fuel pumps to fail on both engines on the same flight.

As I've repeatedly posted, even a 100% aircraft power failure would not explain both engines quitting, at least without several other existing faults. Again, never say never, but you can only combine so many 10-9 events before it becomes ridiculous...

TCMA doesn't know what V1 is - it's active whenever the air/ground logic says the aircraft is on-ground.

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lighttwin2
2025-06-17T15:00:00
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Post: 11904376
Originally Posted by OldnGrounded
... Right, and you won't see a serious attempt to do that until we know, at least, what specific sensor inputs the TCMA function uses to determine the air/ground state of the aircraft and the logic that uses those to make the determination.
I agree with the post above (edited for brevity) - and fear the thread is getting repetitive in the absence of new information.

The only thing I would add is the limited ADS-B data I have seen shows the a/c decelerating rapidly from the first data point onwards. It is possible the shutdown occurred when the a/c was on the ground (e.g. after V1). This may seem unlikely given the distance flown, but you can do the maths - a fast a/c has a lot of stored kinetic energy.

Last edited by lighttwin2; 18th Jun 2025 at 08:51 .
rkenyon
2025-06-17T17:19:00
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Post: 11904487
Originally Posted by Magplug
B787 Skipper.... No longer able to sit on my hands!

The joker that published one or other of the fictional accident reports before the dead are even identified needs stringing up by the thumbs.... Well done mods. OK, some of these theories, just bearing in mind the the flight recorder (there is only one FDR + CVR combined) was in the intact section of the undamaged tail and has been with the authorities for almost five days......

- All you guys who are rushing down the TCMA rabbit hole: If it was established that a software error drove both engines to idle without warning, after rotate.... Don't you think the worldwide fleet of B787s would have been grounded by now? Such a glaring failure would be absolutely inescapable on the FDR.

Whatever was wrong with this aircraft was present at rotate, unbeknown to the crew. The fact that no ADs or notices to operators have been issued usually means that the cause is known and the aircraft was serviceable. The statement from a prominent Indian Captain about the skill and tenacity of the crew, right up to the last minute is absolutely laudable. However, the cynic in me says that the way is being paved for some bad news and by that I mean news that will do Air India reputational damage. Expect more management of expectation in the coming days.

I'm still going with
a) Incorrect derate + low Vspeeds or
b) Low altitude capture
Do you stand by your previous assertion :-

Originally Posted by Magplug
Speaking as a B787 Captain..... There is so much rubbish and stupid suggestion being written here.

- RAT out? Almost impossible, I have seen no quality footage that definitively witnesses the RAT being out. Those who think they car hear a RAT type noise might be listening to a motorcycle passing or similar. It takes a triple hydraulic failure or a double engine failure to trigger RAT deploment. They happily went through V1 without a hint of rejected take off so as they rotated the aircraft was serviceable. These are big engines, they take a long time to wind down when you shut them down. I have never tried it however engine failure detection takes 30s or for the aircraft to react and they were not even airborne that long.

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