Posts about: "V1" [Posts: 91 Pages: 5]

Investigators will try to establish a single source or truth. For them, that\x92s an ideal outcome. But due to the nature of investigations, the aim gets derailed as established facts versus possible/potential scenarios based on missing links of the chain are pieced together. But for sure, commercial considerations and liability wont enter into a proper investigation. The task of the investigators is to determine the how and why.

Theres a saying, and it may even have been the title of a book\x85 Lift is a gift but Thrust is a must. In this case, certainly one or both were absent.

For 2 (maybe 3 if it was a training flight) professional people, the day started with waking up, getting ready, saying goodbye to loved ones, who they believed they would see again soon in 2-3 days. Sadly, that won\x92t happen, and it\x92s the job of the investigators to find out why and liability isn\x92t a hindrance to them.

They will look at every piece of evidence and recreate the events. But it will take time.

information worthy of note is:

A) The gear was still down.
B) It would appear (due to some work by amazing members) that the RAT was indeed deployed.

Other observances:

1. Bits flying off the aircraft. (From experience of operating in this area, they like to fly kites, and waste thermals and floats around, notably plastic bags) I have no idea if that la what we see or not.

2. Generally in India, they love using their horns. So whilst you can compare the frequencies of a potential RAT to a motorbike, appreciate there would be a million horns going off too.

3. Some posters have spoken of the \x93startle effect\x94 like they know what they are talking about. The most startling effect of a professional flight deck during an emergency is how calm it is. There aren\x92t hands flying around everywhere. In fact:

V1 > Rotate > Positive Rate > Gear Up > Confirm FD/AP Modes is adjusted to:
V1 > Rotate > Positive Rate > Gear Up > Silence the bell (Or your SOP Variation) FD/AP modes and the PF flies the aircraft.

the next step is to identify the problem, agree on it and then perform the actions. That won\x92t happen below 400\x92.

4. There\x92s no company in the world where Pilots are being fed and watered between V1 and 1000\x92 so spilling drinks on run switches isn\x92t a thing on this departure.

5. Temperature inversion. Yes it\x92s possible and it degrades performance. However, if it\x92s present, it\x92s usually announced on the ATIS. IF other aircraft have reported it.

6. Fuel contamination. Without knowing the systems, yes it\x92s potentially possible, but it would appear no other aircraft have reported being affected by it.

I think, this accident is especially interesting to Professional Aviators and Engineers because I think none of us would ever believe that it could happen. The aircraft is highly automated, the crew have been properly trained and the operation was a regular or possibly training flight.

A query I have is, do later Gen aircraft like the 777/787/747 A330/A350/A380 constantly send Airframe/Engine data home to ops/engineering/oem\x92s. Is it likely the data is out there?

Anyway, I just wanted to post this to reassure the travelling public that Pilots don\x92t try to shut down engines before they raise the gear.

That is one conclusion (which I now suggest is unlikely), because you are assuming:

1. The hydraulic failure happened exactly when the truck had tilted forward but the split-second before the gear doors could open. That exact timing seems too coincidental.
2. The crew selected Gear Up. We have no proof of this. I speculate the crew never got as far as "Positive Rate...Gear Up" because they were already engrossed in flying the aircraft and processing their thrust problem. If an electrical problem had developed (as evidenced by the RAT deployment) the flight instrumentation would have been flickering and a flurry of silent master caution alerts would be very distracting.

I suggest it's more likely that the truck remained in a forward tilt from the takeoff run because the hydraulic failure happened prior to rotation, therefore keeping it in this unusual position. This answer does not rely on the gear lever position either. It also insinuates that their hydraulic problems occurred probably between V1 and VR. See my earlier post .

Without a doubt one is looking at a very, very rare event, most likely the result of an unlikely/unlucky combination of issues, the grim gravity realised by the F/C (mayday) immediately after T/O. As a very, very FF/retired EU bureaucrat/economist/lawyer with an as ever staunch penchant for data/facts, I'm therefore wondering whether VT-ANB engines had already their EEC MN4 microprocessors replaced as mandated within 11000 cycles or 12 years per AD 2021-21-05 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/...2021-25491.pdf . This AD was prompted by in-service occurrences of loss of GEnX engines thrust control resulting in uncommanded high thrust. Uncommanded high trust on (at least one of) the engines during the TO-roll, in particular past V1, resulting in a discrepancy with the actual (likely derated)thrust settings, could have triggered TMCA on or just before lift-off.

How would the thrust lever idle condition have been satisfied?

That is not what the TCMA logic is supposed to do. Only high thrust with the thrust lever idle should trigger the TCMA.

I agree with this. For all the SLF reading and not posting ( good work!) there is a delay between the end of the takeoff run and the gear being selected up. I fly 737’s so any 78 folk feel free to correct me but it looks like this;
PM: “ V1 ….Rotate”
The PF then begins to rotate the aircraft up to a pre determined attitude which is normally between 13 and 15 degrees. They do this at a rate of between 2 and 3 degrees per second so about 5 or 6 seconds later the aircraft is at its climb out attitude. The PM is then looking at their instruments to confirm that the aircraft has a positive rate of climb, this takes a moment, maybe 1 to 3 seconds then;
PM “ positive rate”
PF: “ gear up”.
So minimum 8 seconds but probably longer between the PM calling “rotate” and the gear being selected up.
The relevance of all that is to say that if you suspect that the gear up cycle has been interrupted by a dual engine failure, then the engines may well have been producing thrust up to an altitude of 50-100ft or so, which ties in nicely with the max height reached, distance travelled etc.
Mods this is clearly not a theory, just info for those who don’t fly airliners to aid understanding.

I won\x92t debate if having hands on or off the trust levers is best practice. I will however point out that many airlines train to remove hands from the throttles at V1. This is supposed to reduce the chances of an inappropriate high speed abort.

Absolutely. I'm sorry if I implied that one should actually do the takeoff, between V1 and gear up, with your hands on the throttles. Definitely not.

Yep numerous times in the sim over the years. Typically when overly exuberantly trying to get AP in after a V1 cut. RA is right in your face on the HUD & if you don't wait til 200' RA, AP will not not engage.

That is even more interesting. On the triple, quite a bit is referenced to the altitude at the start of the takeoff run and uses barometric (which is effectively QFE), such as AA, Thrust reduction and EO. If the runway sloped down and/or the ground fell away at the end of the runway, as it does at many airports, you could engage the AP well below 200AAL on the 787?

An FCOM available in the net says that the FMC doesn\x92t accept Vr entry lower than Vr min or V1 min.

amazing thanks for the help !

I think this has been answered for 76 and 77 on the first thread but I can\x92t recall an answer for 78.
Can anyone confirm if you have inputed F15 in the FMC but selected F5 you would have some sort of FMC message displayed ?

I need to correct one of my previous posts, I was going down the path of a mismanaged engine failure after V1, however it's been demonstrated to me that this aircraft will fly away on one engine even with the gear down with better than minimum climb gradient requirement. Quite astonishing actually.
That just leaves deliberate act not necessarily intentional, fuel vapour lock and automatically commanded engine shutdown.
I hope the rat is found soon so we know for sure if both engines were in fact lost.

Except that the PF does not immediately get the cue that the power is backing off, because he removed his hand from the power levers at V1. If he sees the Flight Directors indicating down after take off.... of course he will ignore that command and maintain the normal 14deg NU +/- for the expected all-engines climb. However when the speed starts to decay he starts to get the message all is not well and tries to salvage the situation. If the FD goes into altitude capture then the autothrottle becomes speed-on-throttle. Unfortunately the AT logic presumes you are following the FD. If you are now NOT following FD commands then the results become unpredictable. On correct speed but above FCU selected altitude = throttles close.

Just after rotate is a very busy time for your scan. The FMA modes are in the HUD for both pilots to see, however did they have time to read and digest rapidly changing autoflight modes? I have way more experience flying the B744 than the B788 but I can see this happening on either type. How many times were you reminded to RTF FMA!

The EK 777 (EK231) low level altitude capture incident did not include ignoring the FD command with a sensible pitch-up. They exceeded 200kts while still on the runway and exceeded 250kts before climbing above a couple of hundred feet (the reports say 262kts at 175' but I don't know if that's adjusted for QNH). Apparently they had 00000' set and there was no FD pitch up command. No thrust issue in this case.

EK231 had thrust but no pitch. AI171 had pitch but no thrust.

There's less information about the Air NZ low level altitude capture, I don't know how it compares.

To be clear, I don't presume that AI171 had a low level ALT capture. It appears to have had a loss of thrust for an undetermined reason.

Does a Boeing 787 go from HOLD TO/GA to THR REF/VNAV SPD at 400' AGL/AAE, like older versions of the Boeing?

If so, what if the WoW stayed in ground mode, for whatever reason, how would that affect

1) Retraction of the landing gear (it didn't retract, as obvious in videos released)

2) The transition from HOLD to THR/REF at 400' (they reached just barely over 400' AGL before leveling, then descending)

I am also thinking that Air India would follow Boeing procedures in that the left seat pilot will move their right hand away from the thrust levers at V1, and thus, at 400', the thrust levers are not guarded or monitored?

Even if thrust levers were pushed forward, is there some kind of logic related to FMC and-or FADEC or other involved systems, which regardless of thrust lever position commands IDLE thrust to the engine?

Remember that Airbus accident where the aircraft thought it was landing, while the pilots wanted full thrust, and they crashed into a small forest because some kind of idle is all they were afforded by the system?

If the engines of this 787 thought it was in the rollout or final part of the flare, it might also command thrust levers to idle?

This does not explain the RAT, though, unless there is some weird combination of software working against each others logic.

Had the engines failed by some really random, odd reason, like birds, fuel contamination-vapor-starvation or such, wouldn't there be at least a slight bit of roll or yaw visible? Even with TAC or whatever they have on the 787, I would think even a 1 second difference in thrust reduction between the engines, a hint of yaw or roll should be visible ...

Thoughts, especially by someone who flies the 787?

Here we go again.
They are not "ground-only" levers, Why do you and MagPlug have this idea that the PF would not place their hand back on the thrust levers after the gear up call, or at least be guarding the throttles just in case, heaven forbid, they started to roll back?

That would be a stupid design. FYI, the old 787 FCOM I have says "Maximum rated thrust is available in any phase of flight by moving the thrust levers to the full forward positions".
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Irrelevant. They were doing a single-engine test and completely messed it up; nothing like what this crew would have been faced with. They were ta Idle because the captain pulled the TL back in an attempt to regain control. Nothing like you say.

I'd suggest not but the elephant in the room as far as you and Magplug goes... what are the pilots doing all this time? Just sitting there watching?

SLF but: I still really don't understand how this is supposed to happen, not merely hypothetically, but congruently with how short and low the flight we can actually see is.

My understanding (and others have corroborated this) is that in a standard departure the autothrottle is armed and starts the takeoff roll in THR REF mode. It goes into HOLD mode when the IAS passes 80 knots (obviously still on the ground). While it is in HOLD mode, the autothrottle is physically inhibited from moving the thrust levers. It then automatically re-engages at 400ft AGL (though I am not sure how the altitude is measured), and begins to operate as requested by various human and computer systems.

If something about my explanation is wrong, please let me know - but if it is correct, then how would the autothrottle roll back thrust drastically in what looks like the first few seconds of the flight? I do understand that what you describe is how the autothrottle would behave when it is active, but it sounds to me like it is by design not supposed to actually be active during the critical time that we are looking at no matter what automations are armed to be activated once the aircraft is safely away from the ground. Unless the crew did something to cause it to engage - and I'm not sure what that would even be. What would they plausibly be doing before even retracting the landing gear?

My only guess was that depending on how the altitude is measured to determine whether the 400ft gate has been passed (radio altimeter? pressure altitude?), the autothrottle might have come out of HOLD mode (along with VNAV if armed) at a lower altitude than it was supposed to due to some mechanical fault or crew error. But that's already a bigger kettle of fish than just altitude capture...

I think it's not a coincidence that tdracer's post was chosen to be the thread starter of part 2. I'll wait for the preliminary report to see it confirmed or disproved.

I would, of course, presume, that take-off roll performance was within expected limits, otherwise they would have aborted by V1. They reached VR before running totally out of runway, and achieved a short-lasting climb. What one single point of failure occurred very shortly after aircraft went nose-up and would it be possible that the fuel feed in some way affected by virtue of that angle in the context of some failure?