Posts about: "C of G" [Posts: 77 Page: 4 of 4]¶

Don't need no contacts Dude. The drag reduction came simply from flying at a lower AoA when trimmed at an aft CG. Less 'up' elevon, which is similar but not the same as 'down elevon' in an absolute sense, so less adverse elevon lift and work the wing to a lower AoA in consequence. Just an extension of the basic Concorde certification with a 'point' TO CG really.

They were certainly looking to study control laws that allowed flight at very aft CGs to increase aircraft performance, so yes, this was a CCV exercise, but they were also seeking experience with digital control and system architectures that could be transferred to other active control applications.

The 'sidestick' arrangement was virtually a complete A320 style arrangement using two computers and digital signalling throughout. For just 10 hrs they wouldn't need anything more complicated than a 'panic switch' to return control to the standard Concorde green system that was still there and available.

Clive

Shirley the aft CG research for lower cruise drag could equally be done with conventional Concorde controls? Why is it associated only with sidestick control?

<< I'm guessing you mean rate of climb rather than IAS? >>
<<No, I meant the airspeed you'd be flying at while climbing (post takeoff)>>

OK, then the answer to your Q's:
Also what was the typical climb speed
- At lift-off? About 200kts
- Once 240 kts is achieved? 240kts
- At minimum maneuvering speed at typical takeoff weight? Vla after takeoff was V2 until 15,000'. I.E. about 220kts
- At MTOGW? V2 didn't vary much by weight

Out of JFK we flew at Vmo once further than 12nms from the coast. Vmo=400kts IAS at low level.

Out of LHR overland the IAS restriction was 300kts until past the speed limit point early in the SID - much less draggy than 250kts and hence better climb rates. But you'd quickly be released to get to 400kts (barder's pole) where it was designed to be flown.

<<Why higher speed? That have to do with shockwaves and the resulting pressure distribution differences?>>
The flight envelope was bigger and more complex than subsonic types: it was developed in flight test and probably had many considerations involved. I think someone posted it earlier in this thread in graphical form (from the flight manual) if you want to see it. In practice, you had to be aware of three basic parameters - IAS, Mach and CG position (the CG "corridor"). Once understood, it wasn't that difficult to keep up with it...and the IAS and Machmeters had barber's poles handily programmed to show the limiting values (including, cleverly, max temp on the nose Tmo=127 degrees celcius).

Regarding climb rates - best ROC was at 400kts (MTOW) or 380kts (MLW). As speed reduced below that, drag increased and ROC reduced. At MTOW and 400kts you'd get about 4000fpm max dry power. At 250kts it was all noise and very few feet per minute - after noise abate procedures you had to lower the nose, just barely climb, and get IAS up toward min drag as soon as possible. With an engine failed go for 300kts minimum - Vmo as soon as you can.

<<shockwaves and the resulting pressure distribution differences>>
You had to avoid the "transonic" region due to these effects: maximum subsonic cruise was 0.95M due to the auto-stabilised flying controls become over-active as shockwaves started to "dance" around the airframe (usually asymmetrically). This calmed down by about 1.3M in the acceleration (when the intake ramps started to do their thing). To accelerate to 2.0M you needed reheat until 1.7M so you didn't hang around between 0.95M and 1.7M. FL260 was best for subsonic cruise because at that level 400kts IAS = 0.95M...

Re : 9min to mach 2.

Not sure you can get CG back that quickly.

In the (restored) Sim with a lightweight fuel load that will not get you anywhere and not bothering about the CG, the absolute minimum time to Mach 2 at 50,000ft on a pretty constant VMO chase is just over 15mins, so really unlikely that this was possible in real life....but will stand corrected if someone says other wise.

The A/C had diverted to cardiff as they had suffered a engine surge due to a double intake lane failure and had to slow to subsonic early. That coupled with additional time with engines running at JFK meant they were just not comfortable about coming to London and possibly declaring a fuel emergency.

Last time I logged in someone was asking why the Vmo/Mmo was the way it was, but it seems to have disappeared along with Bellerophon's suggestion that someone else might be able to throw some light on it. This might help.

SORRY - senior moment - this should have been posted on another thread!


To be honest I can't remember exactly why 530 kts was chosen for the supersonic Vmo, but it was probably the best climb speed.
Mmo/Tmo was limited by a combination of intake and structural temperature.
The 'cut-off' in the sloping/530 kts boundary was, if I remember correctly, to avoid a minor aeroelastic problem at the Vd/Md condition one arrived at from that corner.
The variation of Vmo with weight was a device which, when associated with the CG corridor, allowed the aircraft to meet the manoeuvre requirements when flying on half hydraulics.
400 kts CAS gave 0.93M at around 28000 ft if I recall correctly, which was just below drag rise and gave optimum subsonic cruise performance

Hah.

I'm pretty sure my memory isn't betraying me too far when I say I seem to remember a case, in the dim and distant past, of a management pilot (no less) taking a Concorde sector and... mismanaging things... badly. In fact they came so close to a four engine flameout (with no volcanic cloud in sight) that the thing was unable to be disembarked after landing for... CoG reasons... if you take my meaning!

Someone confirm?

R1

It must make a fair difference: On average, much of the 'interior' is ahead of the CG and remember AB has no cockpit, which is a fair chunk of weight a long way forward,

I vaguely recall that AB was filled up with old 'High Life' magazines initially.

Casper, I'm not aware of any fuel tank protection by either BA or AF prior to the accident.

Overweight & aft GC was due too much fuel as well as captain authorising baggage to be loaded (in the rear baggage cabin) when the aeroplane was already about 5 tons overweight.

Something else germane to the accident was that the fuel tanks were overfilled leaving no airspace to absorb any shock waves on the basis this extra fuel would be burned off during taxi, but the change of runway (to a downwind one) meant a much shorter taxy so it wasn't burned off and the FE didn't ask for a delay while it got burned off. They just 'went'.

Worse - realising they had a rearward CG, fuel was being transferred from tank 11 (in the tail) to the wing tanks DURING THE TAKE OFF ROLL. an absolute no-no in Conc ops. The idea being as fuel was burned off from the wing tanks and replaced by fuel from tank 11, the CG would move foreward.

The result was the wing tanks were always overfull even though they were supplying fuel to the engines, so when one tank was hit by a big piece of tyre the shock waves travelled up through the fuel, bounced off the top surface of the tank, having found no gap of compressible air to absorb the overpressure, and travelled back down and burst the tank floor from inside.

@Lancman

There a a lot of misinformation sculling around on this.
The final report states that the overfill was 300 litres (237kg) put into the engine feeder tanks 1 to 4. These tanks are grouped to have approximately equal moment about the CG so if it was, as seems likely, 75 kg in each there would have been negligible effect on the CG.

There was no overfill into tank 5.

It is all a long time ago, but as SSDriver says the overfill capability was probably there to cater for extended taxi or waiting time operations.

In this particular case the dispatcher ordered 2000kg rather than the standard AF allowance of 1000 kg to be loaded for taxiing presumably because he/she believed a more distant runway would be used because of maintenance work, but in the event the pilot asked for and was given the usual runway which meant that the aircraft was overweight for take off because only 1000 kg of taxi fuel was used. [Plus of course the additional baggage]

So Hutch is wrong when he says in the interview that tank 5 was being continuously topped up from tank 11 as fuel was burned off during the T/O? I've had a quick look at a simplified fuel system diagram and while it shows no direct transfer route from tank 11 to tank 5, would there be an indirect one via the forward trim tanks?

And as the extra baggage was in the rear hold, and Tank 11 was full, that would explain the rearward CG and the desire of the crew to get fuel out of tank 11 ASAP and into the wings, Did it all go to tanks 1 to 4 via the forward trim tanks, with none going to tank 5 ( the 'accident' tank)?

If the intent was to get the CG forward, what would be the point in transferring fuel to anything other than the forward trim tank? In particular why to the engine feed tanks which are arranged to be CG neutral?

However, the BEA report says:
I can't make that compatible with tank 5 being continually topped up no matter how I try

Because the forward trim tanks were already full so not an option to put it there, unless there is a route from there to tank 5, in which case it might be being transferred to the trim tanks from tank 11, and on to tank 5? The only place to put fuel (if all tanks are brimmed) is into a tank(s) which are being emptied by feeding the engines. If there is no route from the forward trim tanks to tank 5, then perhaps in normal ops tank 5 would be topping up the feeder tanks as the engines drain them, but topping up the feeders from tank 11 meant tank 5 remained full?

The objective is to get it out of tank 11 ASAP to try to get the CG further forward.

Hutch says they should be 'off' for T/O roll, but on this occasion, to shift CG forward, they were 'on'.

@SSDriver

You are quite right; I should have checked that
A simple check of BEA's figures shows that they were assuming transfer into the feeder tanks.
Their sums say one needs to transfer about 700kg to make a CG shift from 54.2% to 54% (starting with a ZFCG of 52.4%). However, the engineer's panel after the crash showed that he had dialled in the loadsheet ZFCG at 52.3% so the fuel system would have transferred only 350 kg.
I can't see anything to suggest otherwise than that fuel transfer was stopped when TO began and that tank 5 remained at 94% total capacity throughout

We crossed in post, but where did you get the information that transfer was continued through take off? I didn't find anything in the official report

@SSDriver

Yes, I had seen the video, but although he states things with apparent confidence his view is not supported by the formal report.
Consider the final report wording quoted in my post 2025:
The French (definitive) version uses "a effectu\xe9" rather than "carried out" which suggests they completed that task. If so, why abandon the standard Concorde procedure?

The BEA went to some trouble to establish the amount of fuel in tank 5 at the time of rupture. The process they describe makes no mention of any transfer from tank 11 into tank 5, or indeed any transfer of fuel into that tank during the take off run. In fact they concluded that there was a reduction of 21 kg as a result of normal transfer from tank 5 to tank 1 when that tank became depleted.

OAC was the first off the Filton line, and therefore the heaviest (they learned to add lightness as production progressed!). That would have had an effect on range and possibly CG for that aeroplane. It also had a wing repair (following an engine fire I believe) which added even more weight.

It's the only way they would have available to control the effects of the movement of the wings lift centre of pressure rearwards when supersonic.