Posts about: "Checklists" [Posts: 15 Page: 1 of 1]¶

Hi M2Dude - keep it coming! I missed all this stuff from the early days......

Tim00 - good question, and very relevant.

It takes a lot to incapacitate a Flight Engineer - beer, cigars and scary women were no issue - they were definitely the most relaible part of the operation. (And arguably the least attractive.....)

If the unthinkable happened the First Officer would find himself on the FE's seat. We practised it less often than you might think, but thought about it a great deal. Especially the fuel system management.

Which brings me to your second point - yes, there was a preset for the 'automatic' fuel transfer system, although that wasn't the mechanism used for the pilots to 'take control' of the CG. The critical thing was to be able to get the CG forward if a rapid decel had to be made - for this reason there was an override switch above the First Officer which used various pumps and valves to txfr fwds - primarily by txfring from tank 11. It would be used in various recall checklists (supersonic 4-engine flameout and Continuous Ssurge at M>1.3 seem to register from the dim past) until the FE was able to take over the txfr system himself.

I didn't ever need it - in the surges I encountered the FE was always ready to manage the txfr before we needed the override.

Oooooooh!!!! There's a new topic for someone: Surges.

Theoretically the correct checklist to call for was the "Continuous Engine surge above M 1.3 Conditional Procedure, please". In reality the call was always much more succinct.

Monosyllabic, in fact................

I'm off to the pub, but I bet Bellerophon can speak with erudition on the operational aspects, and if M2Dude is who I suspect he is, I KNOW he'll be able to cover the technical aspects in great depth!

WOK

The deceleration would be like very hard braking after landing, so - yes.

The drag incurred flying supersonic was once described to me as like flying through wood, not air. The only times I ever closed all 4 throttles at M2 was dealing with surges (see earlier posts on the subject). While not quite like flying into teak, the decel was very impressive - it more than once resulted in a member of cabin crew appearing in the flt deck in a semi-seated position, grimly trying to stop a fully loaded galley cart.......

As for four-engine flameouts - perish the thought. The checklists, like many, depended on flight phase;

Above M1.2 it was expected that windmilling would provide adequate eletric and hydraulic power so the c/list aimed to start a fuel txfr forward, use the spare hydraulic system to drive half the PFCUs, ensure a fuel supply to the engs and ensure cooling to equipment.

Below M1.2 the RAT would be deployed, it was less likely that the standard means of fuel txfr would work so valves were overridden and the hydraulic fuel pumps brought into use, and the Mach fell further the PFCUs were put on half-body use only, using the stby hydraulic system.

You weren't far from the ground, in time, at this stage so it was a good time to get an engine relit!

Given the Olympus' auto-relight capability a four engine loss was going to be caused by something fairly drastic.

See post #328 for the rest of the story.
In "Concorde - The Inside Story" by Brian Trubshaw there is actually a photo of what is almost certainly the same incident.

But there is another story....

After the first-ever landing at Bahrain, a crowd of Very Important Persons was allowed to visit the aircraft.
Of course they had to see it all, including the rear cabin.
Since the aircraft hadn't been refuelled yet, the inevitable happened... the aircraft started slowly but inexorably tilting backwards.
A very undignified stampede towards the front resulted, just in time, so the aircraft did not actually sit on its tail.

But there was a sequel. The incident had been watched by the airport manager, who promptly decreed that from then on a tractor would have to be chained to the nose gear whenever the aircraft was on the ramp.

Urban legend has it, that from then on there was a new item in the pre-taxy checklist for Bahrain.

CHAIN REMOVED FROM NOSEWHEEL - CHECK

CJ

Well never having done this set of drills for real, I can only give the experience from the sim, which is never the same as the real aircraft, however with this set of problems there is a big difference between sim and aircraft and that is if for real on the aircraft you might have to cope with pressure breathing, whereas on the sim the mask was just on demand.

Pressure breathing we had to practise on a special little rig at the training base at Heathrow under medical supervision every two years {I think}. Even on this rig we did not get full pressure breathing but sufficient for us to experience what it would be like. Whilst we were on this rig they would ask us to read from a checklist, and it was then you realised how hard it would be in real life.

Normal breathing means you have to use muscle power to inhale and you relaxe to exhale, and luckily for most of us we do not have to think about doing it. However on pressure breathing you are blown up by the pressure and you have to concentrate to stop the pressure air coming in. To exhale you had to use muscle power to push the air out and whilst you were doing this you could speak. Normally a couple of you did it at a time so you could see the affect it had on your buddy who normally went red in the face and the veins started to show up.

All in all I found it quite a tiring experience

So, if the crew were in an emergency descent due to pressurization failure there would be the Depressurization drill, the emergency descent drill and the normal checklist to fit in, while trying to control your breathing and speak as you were trying to force the air out of your lungs. Along with this trying despaeratly to keep switching your intercom off so the pilots could use the R/T otherwise the sound of your breathing deafened everything

As checklist work was carried out by the F/E he could initially be quite busy so the pilots would start the fuel fwd transfer with a switch on the over head panel. However this was quite a rough and ready system so as soon as the F/E could find time he would use his panel switches to transfer the fuel. These switches allowed more flexibility as to where the fuel would go.

That is why it was mandatory for F/E to have two legs as if he only had one there would have been no where to rest all the checklist he might be running at the same time

Sorry about the length, and her in doors is now demanding my attention ,
{just to do some work or other } so I will come back to the subject of the course later

I'll leave it to M2dude to answer this fully and properly..
But... yes and no....
Whether you could actually continue the take-off, if one reheat didn't light, depended on several factors, such as t/o weight, runway length, ambient temperature, and suchlike. This was all calculated before take-off, and there was a little tab on the forward panel (I'll have to find a photo), which you would flip to either "3" or "4" as an instant reminder.
If the little tab said "4" and you got only three reheats coming on, you didn't have to think or go through a checklist... you rejected the takeoff.
M2dude probably can quote the speed.... but it was still well below V1, so such a RTO was not nearly as spectacular as a really nasty one around V1.

CJ

I have to admit I had to look up my old manuals to ensure I was correct , and I can now confirm that in Concorde's Precautionary Engine Shut Down Checklist there is no item requiring the crew to shut the LP fuel cock, so they did not forget they stuck to the checklist

Now I do not know what event happened to require the engine to be shut down, and if it was for fuel loss then yes the crew should have been moitoring the difference between fuel on board and fuel used figures and I am sure they were. However if they were also slowing and descending then the fuel system would be quite active and the difference between fuel on board and intergrated fuel left could vary very much during this phase of flight as the fuel cooled and you found that the gauges were still showing a few hundred Kgs each, even though the pump low pressure lights were on

It would not have been until they had settled down at Mach 0.95 with fuel transfer still that a proper appraisal could be made of the difference between the two fuel remaining indication and now the loss of fuel in the appropriate collector tank.

Not sure where they were when they started their subsonic diversion but believe me even with everything going for you there would not have been huge amounts of fuel left, by the time the aircraft got to Halifax

Perhaps if there is any blame it should lie with the people who wrote the checklist, by not putting an item in to cover such a case as this

It seems to me thet poor old Air France are blamed when

1] They deviate from the checklist as was suggested in the crash

OR

2] Stick to the checklist as in this case

Now you might say what about airmanship, well they did use it, perhaps a bit earlier would have been better, but easy to say without knowing all the facts.

Brit312
mm I guess they were not to blame for flying for over one hour with a red throttle light on (the engine is under no electronic control), resulting in the severe engine overspeed (N1 overspeed protection amplifier already disabled) and the subsequent scrapping (on the orders of Rolls Royce) of the entire rotating assembly of the engine. Or for omitting TWO intake trunnion blocks during a ramp actuator replacement, and then the E/O continually and cyclically operating the intake lane selector switch, following a spill door runaway, until he manages a double engine surge and near destruction of the 'forgotton parts' intake and engine also. I suppose they are not to blame for the experimental tripping of the LPOG circuit breaker by the E/O, during an engine power mismatch, resulting in serious damage to the engine and intake due to the resulting massive over-fueling surge. I suppose again, that they were not to blame for ignoring for over 6 months a simple electrical load defect, eventually resulting in a not too minor fire in the electronics racks that had to be extinguished by the crew with extinguishers. And yet again, I suppose they are not to blame for putting skydrol into Concorde hydraulics systems, almost resulting in the loss of the aircraft, as well as a 9 month grounding while all of the hydraulic components were replaced. And it was not Air France that hammered Fox Delta twice into the runway at Dacca, resulting in so much airframe distortion that the aircraft performance was seriously compromised (and eventually broken up). And of course they were not responsible for the technical and operational failures, including the (forgotton AGAIN ) missing spacer and overweight take-off etc.) on 25th July 2000. Silly me.
And although I might have said 'precautionary engine shut-down', we are talking about a quite an eventful episode here indeed, you can NOT excuse the further mistakes made on that day, 'just because they are poor old Air France. With the greatest of respect Brit, there are 3 crew members on that flight deck, do you not think that the loss of over over 5 tonnes of fuel over a period of time might just be noticed????? The subsonic 3 engined leg was carried out for quite a time before it computed to them that they were still losing fuel. There is no excuse for flying with your eyes closed, I'm sorry.
For goodness sake, this is probably the biggest single episode that was behind the demise of Concorde, poor Air France my eye!!!

Dude

QUOTE]I'm wonder if all 4 Olympus 593 all died in flight and unable to restart. Is it
possible to be able to land at the nearest airport[/QUOTE]

As CristiaanJ says , it depends on how far the nearest airfield was away, but given that there was one close enough then yes in theory it was possible.

On Concorde there were two checklist to cater for a four engine failure that assumes the engine have flamed out but not seized thus the system can be fed by windmilling engines. The two drills are

4 ENGINE FAILURE ABOVE MACH 1.2

4 ENGINE FAILURE BELOW MACH 1.2

When above M1.2 the windmilling speed of the engines should keep the engine generators on line and you should have good hyd pressure also.
Therefore the main point of the drill at this speed is to try and relight the engines, by selecting relight on all 4 engines at the same time. You normally got the chance to go through 2 and some times 3 relight sequences before the speed dropped to Mach 1.2

At mach 1.2 with no engines then the windmilling speed is reaching a point where it is not sufficent to hold the generators on line so the drill concentrates on switching as much of the systems onto essential electrics which will be supplied by the hydraulically driven emergency generator.
To help support the yellow and green hyd system below M1.2 the ram air turbine is lowered. Engine relights will continue to be attempted but as you are on essential electrics now they can only be attempted individually.

If no relights and below 10,000ft then the c/list tells you to prepare the aircraft for landing by lowering nose/visor and gear by emergency systems with speed reduced now to 270 kts. To conserve hyd pressure being mainly derived now from the RAT for the flying controls the emerg gen is switched off during the approach and approch speed is 250 kts with min landing speed
of 200kts

During this all this descent the aircraft had to be flown and navigated, radio calls made along with PA and cabin briefing and all the normall descent checklist complied with so you can imagine it was quite a busy time

This drill used to be practised on the sim ,but the crew would normally find the engines started to relight before 10,000ft so as to give the crew confidence that the drill worked.

However after many years of operation there was some talk about doing away eith the drill as no one could envisage it ever happening. then the BA 747 lost all 4 engines in the volcanic ash cloud and all such talk stopped

Reading this thread has encouraged me to rewatch my Concorde ITVV DVD. During one of the checklists the term TLA is read out as part of the checklist and the reply was something like "13 degrees set"

Am I right in assuming that TLA stands for throttle lever angle? and if so did setting the throttles to a certain angle then give a known thrust setting?
Regards
Nick

Nick Thomas

... Am I right in assuming that TLA stands for throttle lever angle? ...

Yes. TLA was a TLA for throttle lever angle.


... did setting the throttles to a certain angle then give a known thrust setting? ...

Yes, the calculated thrust required at the noise abatement point. The TLA was calculated by the NHP (as part of the take-off performance calculations) and later cross-checked by the Captain and F/E.

I don\x92t know whether it is audible on the DVD, but the checklist question was \x93Clock and TLA bugs\x94 .

If not already set, the Captain and F/O would set the noise abatement time on their respective (countdown) clocks and the F/E would cross-checked them, and, if not already set, the F/E would set the TLA bugs (on an engraved scale on either side of the throttle quadrant) to the noise abatement setting and the Captain and F/O would cross-check him.

The checklist response was \x94Set\x94 .


Best Regards

Bellerophon

Thanks all for your answers. Bellerophon when I typed my TLA question I could not remember the exact checklist phrase but on reading your answer I am certain that "Clocks and TLA bugs" is clearly said.

It never crossed my mind that there was a connection between Clocks and TLA. Of course if I had given it a little more thought I would have realised that they must be connected on the checklist for a good reason.

The other thing I noticed on the DVD was that the FE said that the brake pressure gauge didn't provide a reading untill about FL 450. I just wondered why that was?

Regards
Nick

JFK 31L, Kennedy 9 Departure, Canarsie transition, Concorde climb


Speedbird 2, cleared take-off 31L.

You call 3-2-1 Now , start your stopwatch, pre-set to countdown from 58 seconds, and slam the throttles fully forward till they hit the stops. Four RR Olympus engines start to spool up to full power and four reheats kick in, together producing 156,000 lbs of thrust, but at a total fuel flow of 27,000 US gallons per hour. A touch of left rudder initially to keep straight, as the #4 engine limiter is limiting the engine to 88% until 60 kts when it will release it to full power. The F/O calls Airspeed building, 100 kts, V 1 , and then, at 195 kts, Rotate . You smoothly rotate the aircraft, lift-off occurs at around 10\xb0 and 215 kts. You hear a call of V 2 but you keep rotating to 13.5\xb0 and then hold that attitude, letting the aircraft accelerate.

The F/O calls Positive Climb and you call for the Gear Up . On passing 20 feet radio height, and having checked the aircraft attitude, airspeed and rate of climb are all satisfactory, the F/O calls Turn and you slowly and smoothly roll on 25\xb0 left bank to commence the turn out over Jamaica bay. Some knowledgeable passengers will have requested window seats on the left side of the aircraft at check-in, and are now being rewarded with a very close look at the waters of Jamaica Bay going by very fast! As you accelerate through 240 kts, the F/O calls 240 and you pitch up to 19\xb0 to maintain 250 kts and keep the left turn going to pass East of CRI.

54 seconds from the start of the take off roll you hear the F/O counting down 3-2-1 Noise whereupon the F/E cancel the re-heats and simultaneously throttles back to noise abatement power, around 96% as you pitch the nose down to 12\xb0 to maintain 250 kts. It is less than a minute from start of roll and already 435 US gallons of fuel have been used.


Speedbird 2, contact departure, so long.

Turning through heading 235\xb0M, the F/E quickly re-applies full dry power as you pitch up to 17\xb0 to maintain 250 kts, but simultaneously reduce the left bank to 7.5\xb0, in order to increase both the radius of turn (to stay on the optimum noise abatement track) and the rate of climb (less bank, higher RoC).

On climbing through 2,500 ft you increase the bank angle back to 25\xb0 left bank and as you approach the 253\xb0 radial JFK, you hear 3-2-1 Noise from the F/O for the second time. The F/E actions the second noise-abatement power cut back, you pitch down to 12\xb0 and, if not in cloud, sneak a quick peek out of your left hand window, looking for the car park by the Marine Parkway bridge, as you would ideally like to pass right over the car park, if possible, as we tip-toe quietly across the Rockaway Beaches, in order to minimise the noise impact on the residents.

Keep the left turn going and intercept the 176\xb0 radial outbound from CRI, and at 5 miles DME from CRI, call for the F/E to slowly re-apply full climb power as you pitch up to maintain 250 kts. We are still in US territorial airspace, below 10,000 ft, and subject to statutory speed control.


Speedbird 2, present position direct to SHIPP, climb FL230, no speed control.

The F/O selects direct SHIPP in the INS and tells you that she has selected that information into your Flight Director. Having checked that the gear lever is at neutral, you call for the Nose Up , and then the Visor Up . Flight deck noise levels drop dramatically as the Visor locks up. Now more than 12 miles away from the coast, we are clear of US speed control requirements so lower the attitude to 9\xb0, accelerate to V MO , currently 400 kts, and ask for the After Take Off Checks.


Speedbird 2, present position direct to LINND, climb in the block FL550-600, accelerate Mach 2.0

Call for the Climb Checklist at Mach 0.7, which will trigger the F/E to start pumping fuel rearwards to move the CG aft, then when he's done that, straight into the Transonic Checklist . Maintain 400 kts IAS, and around 24,500 ft, at M0.93, ask for the re-heats back on, in pairs, and raise the nose by 3\xb0 to maintain 400 kts as they kick in.

Precise, smooth flying is required through the high drag transonic region, as the mach meter creeps up towards Mach 1. A sudden flicker on the VSI and Altimeter confirms that the shock wave has just passed over the static ports, and the aircraft is now supersonic. A quick glance at the elapsed time indicator shows that you\x92ve been hand flying for just over 9 minutes since the start of the take off roll.

Another fun start to a day in the office, and to think we got paid for doing it!


Best Regards

Bellerophon

Since I am a fan of checklist, can anybody make a copy of the checklists available?

SFO Les calls out "Flight Control Inverters On" in his C/L. What are these?

Thanks much in advance.

For the french speaking (or reading) people here, I just found a mine of very interesting informations about Concorde on this website:
Accueil
This site has a database of thousand of concorde flights with the following datas: Date and time of the flight, airframe used, technical and commercial crews, guests, departure/arrival airports and flight type (regular, charter world tour...).
On top of that, many infos and stories around Concorde can also be found there.
I can't resist to translate one of those stories (I'm far from being a native english speaker or a professional translator; so forgive me for the misspellings and other translation mistakes). It is a report about one of the biggest incident that happened to the prototype 001 during the flight tests:

Shock of shockwaves
We were flying with Concorde at Mach 2 since 3 month already on both side of the Channel. The prototype 001 did outstrip 002 which was supposed to be the first to reach Mach 2.
Unfortunately, a technical issue delayed 002 and Brian Trubshaw fairly let Andr\xe9 Turcat be the first to reach Mach 2 with the 001 which was ready to go.
The flight tests were progressing fast and we were discovering a part of the atmosphere that military aircrafts hardly reached before. With Concorde, we were able to stay there for hours although limited by the huge fuel consumption of the prototypes.
The Olympus engines did not reached their nominal performance yet and, most of the time, we had to turn on the reheat in supersonic cruise to maintain Mach 2.
The reheat is what we call afterburner on military aircrafts. Fuel is injected between the last compressor stage of the low pressure turbine and the first exhaust nozzle. This increases the thrust for the whole engine and its nozzle.
The 4 reheats, one for each engine, are controlled by the piano switches behind the thrust leavers on the center pedestal between the two pilots. Air was fed into the engines through 4 air intakes, one for each engine, attached 2 by 2 to the 2 engine nacelle, one under each wing. The advantage in terms of drag reduction was obvious.
However, tests in wind tunnel showed that, at supersonic speed, if a problem happens on one engine, there was a great chance for the adjacent engine to be affected as well by the shockwave interference from one air intake to the other despite the presence the dividing wall between the two intakes. So we knew that an engine failure at mach 2 would result in the loss of 2 engines on the same side, resulting in a lateral movement leading to a strong sideslip that would likely impact the 2 remaining engines and transform the aircraft into the fastest glider in the world.
This is why an automatic anti sideslip device was developed and installed on the aircrafts.
The air intakes are very sophisticated. At mach 2, it creates a system of shockwaves that slows down the air from 600 m/sec in front of the aircraft to 200 m/sec in front of the engine while maintaining a very good thermodynamic performance. In supersonic cruise, the engines, operating at full capacity all the time, were sensitive to any perturbation and reacted violently with engine surge: the engine refusing the incoming air.
Stopping suddenly a flow of almost 200kg of air per second traveling at 600m/sec causes a few problems. As a result, a spill door was installed under the air intake and automatically opened in such event.
To control the system of shockwaves and obtain an efficiency of 0,96 in compression in the air intake, 2 articulated ramps, controlled by hydraulic jacks, are installed on the top of the air intakes in front of the engines. Each ramp is roughly the size of a big dining room table, and the 2 ramps, mechanically synchronized, move up or down following the instruction of an highly sophisticated computer that adapts the ramp position according to the mach number, the engine rating and other parameters such as skidding.
At that time, it was the less known part of the aircraft, almost only designed through calculation since no simulator, no wind tunnel, did allow a full scale test of the system.
The control of the system was analog and very complex but it was not easy to tune and we were moving ahead with a lot of caution in our test at mach 2.
On the 26th of January 1971, we were doing a nearly routine flight to measure the effect of a new engine setting supposed to enhance the engine efficiency at mach 2. It was a small increase of the rotation speed of the low pressure turbine increasing the air flow and, as a result, the thrust.
The flight test crews now regularly alternate their participation and their position in the cockpit for the pilots.
Today, Gilbert Defer is on the left side, myself on the right side, Michel R\xe9tif is the flight engineer, Claude Durand is the main flight engineer and Jean Conche is the engine flight engineer. With them is an official representative of the flight test centre, Hubert Guyonnet, seated in the cockpit's jump seat, he is in charge of radio testing.
We took off from Toulouse, accelerated to supersonic speed over the Atlantic near Arcachon continuing up to the north west of Ireland.
Two reheats, the 1 and the 3, are left on because the air temperature does not allow to maintain mach 2 without them.
Everything goes fine. During the previous flight, the crew experienced some strong turbulence, quite rare in the stratosphere and warned us about this. No problem was found on the aircraft.
We are on our way back to Toulouse off the coast of Ireland. Our program includes subsonic tests and we have to decelerate.
Gilbert is piloting the aircraft. Michel and the engineers notify us that everything is normal and ready for the deceleration and the descent.
We are at FL500 at mach 2 with an IAS of 530 kt, the maximum dynamic pressure in normal use.
On Concorde, the right hand seat is the place offering the less possibility to operate the systems. But here, we get busy by helping the others to follow the program and the checklists and by manipulating the secondary commands such as the landing gear, the droop nose, the radio navigation, comms, and some essential engine settings apart from the thrust leavers such as the reheat switches.
The normal procedure consists in stopping the reheat before lowering the throttle.
Gilbert asks me to do it. After, he will slowly reduce the throttle to avoid temporary heckler. Note that he did advise us during the training on the air intake to avoid to move the thrust leaver in case of engine surge.
As a safety measure, I shut down the reheat one by one, checking that everything goes fine for each one. Thus I switch off the reheat 1 with the light shock marking the thrust reduction. Then the 3\x85
Instantly, we are thrown in a crazy situation.
Deafening noise like a canon firing 300 times a minute next to us. Terrible shake. The cockpit, that looked like a submarine with the metallic and totally opaque visor obviously in the upper position, is shaken at a frequency of 5 oscillation a second and a crazy amplitude of about 4 to 5 G. To the point that we cannot see anymore, our eyes not being able to follow the movements.
Gilbert has a test pilot reaction, we have to get out of the maximum kinetic energy zone as fast as possible and to reduce speed immediately. He then moves the throttle to idle without any useless care.
During that time, I try, we all try to answer the question: what is going on? What is the cause of this and what can we do to stop it?
Suspecting an issue with the engines, I try to read the indicators on the centre control panel through the mist of my disturbed vision and in the middle of a rain of electric indicators falling from the roof. We cannot speak to each other through the intercom.
I vaguely see that the engines 3 and 4 seem to run slower than the 2 others, especially the 4. We have to do something. Gilbert is piloting the plane and is already busy. I have a stupid reaction dictated by the idea that I have to do something to stop that, while I can only reach a few commands that may be linked to the problem.
I first try to increase the thrust on number 4 engine. No effect so I reduce frankly and definitively. I desperately look for something to do from my right hand seat with a terrible feeling of being helpless and useless.
Then everything stops as suddenly as it started. How long did it last, 30 seconds, one minute?
By looking at the flight data records afterward, we saw that it only last\x85 12 seconds!
However, I have the feeling that I had time to think about tons of things, to do a lot of reasoning, assumption and to have searched and searched and searched\x85! It looked like my brain suddenly switched to a fastest mod of thinking. But, above all, it's the feeling of failure, the fact that I was not able to do anything and that I did not understand anything that remains stuck in my mind forever.
To comfort me, I have to say that nobody among the crew did understand anything either and was able to do anything, apart from Gilbert.
The aircraft slows down and the engine 3 that seemed to have shut down restart thanks to the auto ignition system. But the 4 is off indeed.
Michel makes a check of his instruments. He also notes that the engine 4 has shut down but the 4 air intakes work normally, which makes us feel better. After discussing together, we start to think that we probably faced some stratospheric turbulence of very high intensity, our experience in this altitude range being quite limited at that time. But nobody really believes in this explanation. Finally, at subsonic speed, mach 0.9, with all instruments looking normal, we try to restart engine 4 since we still have a long way to go to fly back to Toulouse.
Michel launches the process to restart the engine. It restarts, remains at a medium rotation speed and shuts down after 20 seconds, leaving us puzzled and a bit worried despite the fact that the instrument indicators are normal.
Gilbert then decide to give up and won't try to restart this engine anymore and Claude leaves his engineer station to have a look in a device installed on the prototype to inspect the landing gear and the engines when needed: an hypo-scope, a kind of periscope going out through the floor and not through the roof.
After a few seconds, we can hear him on the intercom:
"!!!!! (stuttering) we have lost the intake number 4."
He then describes a wide opening in the air intake, the ramp seems to be missing and he can see some structural damages on the nacelle.
Gilbert reacts rapidly by further reducing the speed to limit even more the dynamic pressure.
But we don't know exactly the extent of the damage. Are the wing and the control surfaces damaged? What about engine 3?
We decide to fly back at a speed of 250 kts at a lower altitude and to divert toward Fairford where our british colleagues and the 002 are based. I inform everybody about the problem on the radio and tell them our intentions. However, I add that if no other problems occur, we will try to reach Toulouse since we still have enough fuel.
Flying off Fairford, since nothing unusual happened, we decide to go on toward Toulouse. All the possible diversion airport on the way have been informed by the flight test centre who follows us on their radar.
At low speed, knowing what happened to us and having nothing else to do but to wait for us, time passes slowly, very slowly and we don't talk much, each one of us thinking and trying to understand what happened. However, we keep watching closely after engine 3.
Personally, I remember the funny story of the poor guy who sees his house collapse when he flushes his toilets. I feel in the same situation.
Gilbert makes a precautionary landing since we don't rely much on engine 3 anymore. But everything goes fine.
At the parking, there is a lot of people waiting for us and, as soon as the engines stop, we can see a big rush toward the nacelles of the right hand side engines.
Gilbert and myself are the first to get off the plane and we are welcomed down the stairs by Andr\xe9 Turcat and Jean Franchi who came out from the crowd watching at the right hand side nacelle.
They both behave the same way, with a slow pace attitude, the same look, a mix of disbelief and frustration.
Andr\xe9 is the first to speak: "I can't believe we were not on this flight, really unlucky\x85". Yes, this flight was supposed to be just a routine flight\x85!
The condition of the nacelle is impressive. We come closer and everybody move aside for us with a look of disbelief and respect as if we were hell survivors.
The ramps of the intake 4, those 2 "dining tables", have completely disappeared leaving a hole where we can see the hydraulic jacks and the stub rod where the ramps were attached.
Indeed, only the ramps were missing, apparently ejected forward which was unbelievable knowing how fast we were flying. The ramp slipped under the nacelle causing some damages on it and on the hood of one of the elevon's servo control. Fortunately, the control did not suffer any damage.
What is left of the rear ramp seems to be blocked down inside the intake in front of the engine and we can see behind it the first blades of the compressor, or what is left of it, not much.
The engine swallowed a huge amount of metal but no vital parts of the aircraft has been damaged, no hydraulic leaks, no fuel leaks. I remembered at that time the stories of some B58 Hustler accident where the loss of an engine at mach 2 almost certainly ended with the complete loss of the aircraft. Our Concorde has only been shaken. This incident strengthened the trust I had in this plane. And I was not unhappy to have experienced this ordeal, especially when I saw the frustration on the face of Andr\xe9 Turcat and Jean Franchi.
But we had to understand what happened and how; and also why the ramp's fixing broke.
It didn't take much time to get the answers.
I unintentionally triggered the problem when shutting down the reheat of engine 3. The sudden stop of the fuel flow did of course stop the combustion and the back pressure behind the low pressure turbine. But, probably because of the modification made on the engine before the flight, the stop of the reheat has not been followed by the normal closing movement of the primary nozzle to compensate the pressure drop. So the low pressure turbine ran out of control, dragging down the low pressure compressor which reacts by surging.
Despite the opening of the spill door, the engine surge led to a sudden movement of the shockwaves in the air intake creating a surge in the intake itself. A similar surge happened in the adjacent intake 4 followed by a surge of the corresponding engine. This caused an excessive pressure above the ramps and the fixings of the intake 4 did not hold.
Since it was the first time we experienced a surge in the air intake, we had little knowledge of the stress it would create on the ramps. This led to miscalculation of the strength of the ramps's frames and they did brake.
Another mistake: instead of installing the motion detectors on the ramp itself, to make the production easier, they have been placed on the arms of the hydraulic jacks. This is why Michel R\xe9tif thought that the position of the ramps were correct. The hydraulic jacks did not suffer any damage and were still working normally even if the ramps were missing.
All the data recorded during this event helped us in redesigning the air intakes and the flight test program resumed three month later.
After this, we deliberately created dozen and dozen of air intake surge to fine tune the way to regulate them with digital calculator this time.
From now on, even if it was still very impressive, it was safe and their intensity was not comparable with what we experienced with the missing ramps.
However, a french president may kept a lasting memory of this, much later, during a flight back from Saudi Arabia. This time, I was on the left side, Gilbert on the right and Michel was still in the third seat\x85 But that's another story.
For me, the lasting impression of failing and being helpless during this incident made me wonder what a commercial pilot would have done in this situation. This plane was designed to be handled by standard commercial pilots and not only by the flight test pilots.
At that time, I was interested in taking in charge the management of a training center for the pilots of the future Airbus's clients. This event pushed me that way and I made it clear that I wanted to add the flight training on Concorde in this project. This has been agreed and I did it.
And the Concorde training program now covers the air intake surges and how to deal with them.
Jean PINET
Former test pilot
Member and former president of the Air and Space Academy

ruddman


...Being that the Concorde looks like a slippery sob, how were the descents planned?...

The distance required to decel/descend from M2.0 in cruise/climb down to 3,000 at 250 kts was obtained from a checklist chart. Entering with the (expected) FL at Top of Descent and then correcting for the average wind component expected in the descent and also for the temperature deviation from ISA gave the required track miles. It wasn\x92t used a lot, because generally the more critical descent requirement was to decelerate so as to be (just) below M1.0 at a specified point on the arrival route, for noise reasons, to avoid booming land.

There was a second chart, utilised in the same way as the first, which provided this information. Sometimes this distance might need to be increased a little, as, if a subsonic cruise was expected before continuing the approach, the engines were \x93warmed\x94 up at M0.97 and after passing FL410, by the application of power, for one minute, by the Flight Engineer.



...Did you just pull the throttles back to flight idle?...

Only if you were willing to run the risk four pop surges from the engines and the near certainty of a clip round the ear from your Flight Engineer.

Usually the pilots handled the throttles from \x93Power Up to Gear Up\x94 and from \x93Gear Down to Shut Down\x94. The Flight Engineer generally did all the rest, which, thankfully, left all the tricky drills and procedures as his responsibility.



...Or was there a little more engine management and more gradual handling of the engines and descent?...

On a normal decel/descent, the handling pilot would select ALT HOLD and then ask the Flight Engineer to reduce power to 18\xba TLA (Throttle Lever Angle). The speed would decay to 350 kts IAS (Indicated Air Speed) IAS HOLD was engaged and the descent flown at 350 kts IAS. The next power reduction (32\xba TLA) came when, still flying at 350 kts IAS, the Mach number reduced through M1.50.


...And I'm guessing the approach speeds were fairly high so hitting the touchdown zone was pretty important?...

In terms of not running off the end of the runway, touching down in the correct spot was as important on Concorde as on other aircraft types.

However, due to the geometry of Concorde on landing, the tail, engine pods and reverser buckets were already fairly close to the runway. Add in a \x93firm\x94 touchdown, or if the wings are not completely level, and ground clearance becomes marginal, so a prolonged flare and floated landing, with an increasing aircraft attitude, was not acceptable. The risk of a pod, tail or a reverser bucket scrape on Concorde was greater than on most conventional jet aircraft.



... So if things got out of shape a little, and a G/A was required, how do you handle what looks like 4 rockets on the wings and applying the right amount of power?...

• Disconnect the autothrottles.
• Apply FULL power without reheat.
• Rotate to 15\xba and level the wings.
• Check for Positive Climb then call for the Gear Up.
• Maintain 15\xba and accelerate (you will accelerate!)
• Passing around 210 kts, reduce power to 95% N2.
• Approaching 250 kts, engage Autothrottles for 250 kts
• Reduce Pitch Attitude, aiming to achieve 2,000 fpm RoC.
• Do not miss the level off altitude for the GA profile.