Posts about: "Depressurisation" [Posts: 17 Page: 1 of 1]¶

Biggles78
Stupid, you? no way!! (Besides, I'm Mr Stupid of the aviation world, that's my title ). The thing is, out here in the world of flying machines, there are almost an infinite number of questions (and hopefully answers too). This applies to just about all aircraft from the Wright Flyer up!!.
Keep asking away, there are so many of us Concorde 'nuts' out here who are more than happy to help out/bore the socks off you.
Fuel burns: The problem was that when flying slow/taxying, Concorde was an extreme gas guzzler, even when idling each engine burnt around 1.1 tonnes/hour (so every 15 minutes after push back meant over a tonne gone). A typical taxi fuel would be around 1.4/1.5 tonnes, depending on the runway in use on the day. I'd have to leave it to some of my pilot/F/E friends to remember some of the specific fuel burns after take off etc, but I can at least give you some interesting consumption figures:
At the beginning of the take off roll, each engine would be burning around 21 tonnes/hour. (Made up of around 12 T/Hr dry fuel (Fe) and 9T/Hr afterburner (reheat to us Brits) fuel (Fr). As Fr was scheduled against Fe, as a function of inlet total temp (T1) by the time V2 was reached (around 220 KTS) the rising T1 has pushed the total fuel flow (Ft) up to a staggering 25 tonnes/hour/engine. As i've pointed out before in previous topics, although the afterburner only gave us a 17% improvement in take off thrust, it was responsible for around an 80% hike in fuel burn. (Hence that is whay it was only used sparingly). However when reheat was used for transonic acceleration, it used a dramatically reduced schedule (roughly a 60% rise in fuel flow) , so it was not quite as scary. The afterburner would be lit at the commencement of the acceleration (0.96 Mach) and cancelled completely at 1.7 Mach. After this time the aircraft would accelerate on dry power only up to mach 2 and beyond. (The cooler the temperature the quicker the time to Mach 2). On an ISA+ day, it sometimes felt that the aircraft was flying through cold porridge, and could take quite a while to get to Mach 2 after reaheat cancellation, where as on a nice ISA - day, she would go like a bat out of hell, and the AFCS would have to jump in to prevent overspeeds.
Before I hit some more numbers, let me say that with Concorde, TOC = TOD!! After reheat cancellation at Mach 1.7, the aircraft would be at FL 430. The aircraft would climb at an IAS of 530 KTS until Mach 2 was reached at fractionally over FL500. From then on the aircraft would cruise/climb as fuel was burnt, up to a maximum of FL600. On warmish days (eg. the North Atlantic) TOD would typically be around FL570-580. On a cool day (the lowes temperatures would of course be reached in the more tropical regions; the LGR-BGI sector encountered this), FL 600 would be reached easily and she would love to climb some more. BUT, the aircaft was only certificated to 60,000' with passengers onboard, for decompression emergency descent time reasons, and so we were stuck with it. The pity is of course, the fuel burn would have been improved, but we never were able to take advantage of this. On test flights however, the aircraft would routinely zoom climb to FL 630. On her maiden flight, aircaft 208 (G-BOAB) reached an altitude of 65000'; the highest recorded Concorde altitude was on one of the French development aircraft, which achieved 68,000'. On a technical point, the analog ADC's were 'only' calibrated to 65,000'.
Anyway, back to some figues; at Mach 2, 50,000', the typical fuel burn per engine would be around 5 tonnes/hour, falling to around 4.2 tonnes/hour at 60,000'.

THE NOSE You are quite correct in your assumption, there were two positions of droop: 5 deg's for taxi/take-off and low speed flight and 12.5 deg's for landing. The glazed visor retracted into the nose and could ONLY be raised once the nose was fully up, and had to be stowed before the nose could move down. There were 2 emergency nose lowering sysyems; one using stby (Yellow) hydraulics and a free-fall system. Free-fall would drop the nose all the way to 12.5 deg's, the visor free falling into the nose also.

Re the questions about depressurisation, this may be useful.



It shows the emergency descent profile (solid line, 'Avion'), and the resulting effect on the cabin altitude (dotted lines) in the cases of one window ('hublot') blowing out with either three or four air conditioning packs ('groupes') operating.

As the graph shows, in the worst case the cabin altitude rises to about 40,000ft for about two minutes before starting to drop again, which is survivable when breathing oxygen.

It was studies like this, that lead to the small windows on Concorde. Keen spotters may actually notice that the windows on the prototypes are bigger than on all the other aircraft

The diagram is taken from "The Concorde Story" by Chris Orlebar, but the original was so pale that it was uncopyable, so I did redraw it, in answer to a question by a French friend (hence the legends in French).

As promised here are the answers to our trivia quiz.
Actually there were 14 (but if you are not necessarily a Concorde person, 13 is acceptable). There were '13 fuel tanks, numbered 1 - 11' as we used to tell all the visitors to the aircraft, (The wingtip tanks 5A & 7A making up the extra 2) PLUS a single small scavenge tank at the rear of the aircraft that was used to remove fuel from the vent lines and return this fuel via a transfer pump back to tank 3. (A fuel level sensor would trigger the pump with only 1 US Gallon of fuel in the tank). If the trim gallery became over-pressurised (ie tank 3 already full to the brim) an overflow relief valve (ORV) underneath the rear of the aircraft would open and dump the contents of the tank overboard. There was a flight deck indication if the scavenge pump was running in flight to give the crew an indication that a tank somewhere was probably over-filling and to take the appropriate action. There was one added goody about the ORV; If you were on the ground with the refuel door open and due to a refuelling overfill anywhere, fuel entered the scavenge tank, at 7 gallons the ORV would open and rapidly dump the fuel on the floor. For this reason a vent pipe and fuel drum was often placed underneath the ORV during high load refuels. If this was not fitted and you just happened to walk underneath the aircraft at the wrong moment during fuelling........
As a total aside to all this (or me going off on a tangent yet again) the fuel tanks themselves were gently air pressurised above 44,000' to around 2.2 PSIA. This was to prevent the beginnings of any boiling of the fuel in the tanks, due to the low ambient pressure/high fuel temperatures, causing pump cavitation. (Boiling itself could not occur much below 65,000'). A small NACA duct at the right side of the fin was used to supply the ram air for tank pressurisation, the two vent valves in the tail cone, one per trim gallery, closing off automatically at around 44,000', the pressure being controlled by a pneumatic valve, with full automatic over-pressure protection. OK sorry guys and gals, back to the answers:
This is the stinker.... there were 114 (although at entry into service there were 115!!). 100 passenger seats + 6 cabin crew seats + 5 flight deck seats (including the fold up seat in the aisle at the rear) PLUS 3 LOO SEATS (Originally 4 loos, the fourth loo being removed in the early 1980's).
50,189' and 530 KEAS, but we'll settle for anything around FL500 being correct.
Aircraft 216, G-BOAF, the last Concorde ever built. When 216 first flew in 1979 she was a variant 192 'British Unsold Aircraft' and was registered as G-BFKX. In late 1979, BA purchased the aircraft and it was subsequently converted to a Type 102 British Airways variant, and after modifications were complete, test flights were carried out from Filton under the registration of G-N94AF. This registration was to enable the aircraft to participate in the Braniff interchange between IAD and DFW, but when the Braniff Concorde adventure unfortunately ended in 1980, she was again re-registered to G-BOAF, this is how she was delivered to BA later that year.
Easy one this I hope; 60.000'. (As we've said before this limitation was imposed because of the dual window failure / emergency descent time consideration, not as a performance issue. On test flights 63,000' was routinely attained, and altitudes of up to 68,000' were achieved during development flying. (On her maiden flight, G-BOAB achieved 65,000' and Mach 2.04; the first British constructed Concorde to achieve Mach 2 on her maiden flight, and the ONLY one of the original five BA aircraft to achieve this).
Hopefully an easy one... there were TWELVE: 2 nose wheels, 8 main wheels and 2 tail wheels. (No, even I'm not nasty enough to include the wheels on the bar trolleys ). Oh, and there were 9 wheel brakes, one for each main wheel and as was mentioned in a previous post, a single steel disc brake for the nose wheels (the nose having a live axle), for automatic use during gear retraction only.
Three modes; Blue electronic signalling, green electronic signalling and mechanical signalling. I suppose we COULD be pedantic here and include the Emergency Flight Control mode where even with a jammed control column/control wheel, strain gauges (and Safety Flight Control Computers of course) would still enable you to control the elevons.
OK, three basically. Up (Duh!), 5 degrees for taxi/take off and low speed flight and 12.5 degrees for landing. As ChristiaanJ quite rightly pointed out in an earlier post, the prototype (and pre-production) aircraft landing position was 17.5 degrees of droop. (In my view the nose of the aircraft looked a little like an armadillo in this extreme configuration).
In 1977 the new digital Plessey PVS 1580 Aircraft Integrated Data System was progressively fitted to the BA fleet, this being the first microprocessor application on Concorde, this application being followed in several other systems during the life of the aircraft. The 'final' applications being TCAS and the superb retrofitted Bendix RDR-4A weather radar system.
No we are not including torch batteries and emergency lights etc. There were a total of seven main power sources: 4 x 60KVA AC generators, one per engine, a single 40KVA hydraulically powered emergency generator and 2 lead acid (or ni-cad in the case of G-BOAG) main aircraft batteries. (Not a terribly Re-Volting question I hope).

I hope this quiz was fun and not too perplexing to any of you guys.

Dude

Hi everyone
Earlier in this thread there was an interesting discussion on emergency depressurisation. During the rapid descent I would guess that the FE would be very busy find out "what was what" etc.

So I have been wondering if there were any special procedures for managing the CofG in a rapid descent especially as there could also be many other factors needing the crews attention?

BTW it only seems like yesterday when I was sat in front of my parents TV watching Concorde take off for the first time from Filton and in fact it's now nearly 42 years ago. I like most people watched the event in black and white which just goes to prove how far ahead of her time she was.
Regards
Nick

Well never having done this set of drills for real, I can only give the experience from the sim, which is never the same as the real aircraft, however with this set of problems there is a big difference between sim and aircraft and that is if for real on the aircraft you might have to cope with pressure breathing, whereas on the sim the mask was just on demand.

Pressure breathing we had to practise on a special little rig at the training base at Heathrow under medical supervision every two years {I think}. Even on this rig we did not get full pressure breathing but sufficient for us to experience what it would be like. Whilst we were on this rig they would ask us to read from a checklist, and it was then you realised how hard it would be in real life.

Normal breathing means you have to use muscle power to inhale and you relaxe to exhale, and luckily for most of us we do not have to think about doing it. However on pressure breathing you are blown up by the pressure and you have to concentrate to stop the pressure air coming in. To exhale you had to use muscle power to push the air out and whilst you were doing this you could speak. Normally a couple of you did it at a time so you could see the affect it had on your buddy who normally went red in the face and the veins started to show up.

All in all I found it quite a tiring experience

So, if the crew were in an emergency descent due to pressurization failure there would be the Depressurization drill, the emergency descent drill and the normal checklist to fit in, while trying to control your breathing and speak as you were trying to force the air out of your lungs. Along with this trying despaeratly to keep switching your intercom off so the pilots could use the R/T otherwise the sound of your breathing deafened everything

As checklist work was carried out by the F/E he could initially be quite busy so the pilots would start the fuel fwd transfer with a switch on the over head panel. However this was quite a rough and ready system so as soon as the F/E could find time he would use his panel switches to transfer the fuel. These switches allowed more flexibility as to where the fuel would go.

That is why it was mandatory for F/E to have two legs as if he only had one there would have been no where to rest all the checklist he might be running at the same time

Sorry about the length, and her in doors is now demanding my attention ,
{just to do some work or other } so I will come back to the subject of the course later

As an ATCO we had very specific instructions about how to deal with a Concord(e) radiation overdose. We were told that it would have to make an emergency descent and how to integrate it with other traffic as it descended and what the priorities were.

Has any Concord crew ever had to do this?

I dealt extensively with the London sector (S23) most likely to be involved in this procedure but fortunately it never happened to me.

Dave

Dave ,
I was looking to confirm my own memory on the matter and found this quote, from a personal friend, on another aviation forum. Knowing him, and knowing where he worked, I would trust that statement implicitly!
The "blips" on the radiation meter over certain "hot spots", in the UK, the US and the Middle East, are well-known bits of Concorde folklore.

CJ

arearadar

...As an ATCO we had very specific instructions about how to deal with a Concord(e) radiation overdose. We were told that it would have to make an emergency descent and how to integrate it with other traffic as it descended and what the priorities were...

The display, on the radiation meter, was divided into three, coloured, sections.
If the "Red" level on the radiation meter was reached, this would also trigger the central M aster W arning S ystem to display a Red MWS RADN light, and also to sound the MWS gong.


The procedure to be followed was simply an Abnormal Procedure rather than an Emergency Drill .
So, even with an instantaneous radiation level in excess of 50 millrems/hour indicating, this was not thought to justify the risk of an emergency, uncleared, descent through flights levels possibly occupied by underflying aircraft, and, in fact, if the warning remained RED below 47,000 ft, the warning was deemed suspect, and the descent could be stopped.

It was of some concern that the sort of radiation levels that would trigger the radiation alarm might very well also be playing havoc with radio communications, particularly HF communications. The possibility of being unable to communicate with ATC was one that had to be considered, and so it was only under these circumstances, with both a Red MWS RADN warning and an ATC communications failure, that the Captain was permitted, at his discretion, to perform an uncleared descent.

It's comforting to know that you were prepared to deal with us if required, but unlikely, I would have thought, that your services would have been called upon in practice.


...Has any Concord crew ever had to do this?...

I not aware of any such descent incident, although obviously I can\x92t state definitely that one never occurred.

It wasn't unknown for the radiation alarm to go off, I\x92ve had it, briefly, twice, both times at lowish level over the sea on departure from JFK. On one occasion there was nothing at all to indicate what might have caused it, on the other, we had just overflown a rather large waste barge being towed somewhere!


Best Regards

Bellerophon

Dave ,
From all the disparate reports I've seen over the years from "usually reliable sources", it does seem indeed nobody ever experienced it.
The suspicious "blips" on the indicator over "suspicious sites" were never long enough to initiate an emergency descent.
And that radiation always came from below, not from outer space....

CJ

For convenience, I repeat Bellerophon's diagram of the flight envelope here.



Mike's earlier question had me scratching my head too, hence my question.
What are the fundamental reasons for each of the limitations, and what were the consequences of going outside them?

Going clockwise from the left, we have :

VLA (lowest admissible speed)
One would expect a curve for constant alpha max against IAS and altitude, not the staircase in the diagram.
Was this for simplicity of use of the diagram?

Max altitude (60,000ft)
This is the 'simplest' one: it was the highest 'safe' altitude from which an emergency descent could be made, in the case of a window blowing out, without having the blood of the pax boil....
Test flights (without pax, and with the crew pressure-breathing oxygen) did go as high as 69,000ft.

Mmo (max operating Mach number)
Mach 2.04 is usually quoted as having been chosen to assure an adequate life of the airframe.
But what effect does a higher Mach number as such have?
Or are Mmo and Tmo (127\xb0C) directly related?

Vmo (max operating speed) = 530kts until 43,000ft
I suppose this is related to structural limits (qmax)?

Vmo reducing to 380/400kts at about 33,000ft
What is the limiting factor here (other than qmax)?

Vmo constant at 380/400kts down to 5,000ft
What is the limiting factor here? The answer will no doubt also explain why this is slightly weight-dependent.

Vmo reducing to 300kts between 5,000ft and 0 ft
Why the sudden change below 5,000ft?

CJ

[quote=ChristiaanJ] VLA (lowest admissible speed)
One would expect a curve for constant alpha max against IAS and altitude, not the staircase in the diagram.
Was this for simplicity of use of the diagram?[quote]

I don't have a complete explanation for all the regions - it was a long time ago and I'll need to dig, but:

Below 16000 ft Vla obviously needs to go as low as Vref to cover landing at elevated airfield altitudes. At present I don't have a satisfactory explanation for 250 kts between 16000 ft and about 45000 ft (250kts/Mach 1.0) A constant value in IAS is what you would get for a constant CLmax (the alphamax is not really the driver). Vla should give a margin above stall, and a quick sum suggests that 250 kts would be consistent with a 1.3Vs condition and a CLmax of about 0.8 up to Mach 1.0, which is not unreasonable, but I am not saying that is the correct interpretation.

From 45000 ft to 60,000 ft I think Vla may be set by manoeuvre requirements. Certainly the forward CG envelope boundary between 1.0M and 1.5M discussed in earlier posts is very close to the requirement to be able to pull 1.2g with half hinge moment available at Vla and heavy weights. Again not certain, but best guess at the moment.

Yes

[quote ]Mmo (max operating Mach number)
Mach 2.04 is usually quoted as having been chosen to assure an adequate life of the airframe.
But what effect does a higher Mach number as such have?
Or are Mmo and Tmo (127\xb0C) directly related?[quote]

I have always been puzzled by this statement as one does not normally associate Mach Number with a life limit. Going through my collection of lectures I found another, more plausible explanation:

quote" The scheduled cruise mach Number was 2.0. associated with a structural total temperature of 400 degK. Above ISA +5 Mc was cut back to maintain 400 degK.
To cope with variations of flight mach Number about Mc associated with often rapid and significant changes in wind and temperature which occur particularly in the vicinity of the tropopause (which can of course be as high as 60,000 ft in the tropics) a maximum operating Mach Number (Mmo) of 2.04 is selected" unquote [Leynaert, Collard and Brown, AGARD Flight Mechanics Symposium October 1983]

This is much more in line with my memory on this subject.

Yes in principle, but it is a bit chicken and egg, since 530 kts also represents a very good choice for best performance, and I am sure that the stucture would have been built to cope if a higher speed was needed for performance reasons. To the best of my knowledge there is no structural design case that would be critical in this flight regime (other than flutter of course)

Same as earlier - transonic manoeuvre requirements with failed hydraulics, matched to aircraft weight and CG envelope possibilities.

Same again.

I'm not entirely sure, but:
a) there is absolutely no advantage is having a high Vmo at low altitudes as it could not be exploited even if one wanted to because of ATC limitations to 250 kts below 10,000 ft (in the USA at least)
b) there are a lot of things that get rapidly worse if you encounter them at high speed and which are anyway more likely at low altitude - hail, birds etc.
So why store up trouble for yourself!

CliveL

Just wondering was that the maximum speed "in" the design ? I understand that "the higher & the colder = the faster" was the key to the performance and that the Mach +/- 2.0 cruise was implied by limiting altitude to FL 600 in order to mitigate cabin depressurization consequences. I guess there where also thermal issues but was, say, Mach 2.2 @ FL700 "warmer" than Mach 2.0 @ FL600 ?

Also wondering what was the max altitude ? Was high altitude stall (for the lack of a better word) ever experimented during tests or training ?

atakacs

Quote:

Just wondering was that the maximum speed "in" the design ? I understand that "the higher & the colder = the faster" was the key to the performance and that the Mach +/- 2.0 cruise was implied by limiting altitude to FL 600 in order to mitigate cabin depressurization consequences. I guess there where also thermal issues but was, say, Mach 2.2 @ FL700 "warmer" than Mach 2.0 @ FL600 ?

Really an answer for CliveL, but I'll have a go. The short answer to your question is 'oh yeah, big time'. Total temperature varies with the SQUARE of Mach number and static temperature. Depending on the height of the tropopause itself as well as other local factors, there can be little or no significant variation of static temperature between FL600 and FL700. The 400\xb0K (127\xb0C) Tmo limit was imposed for reasons of thermal fatigue life, and equates to Mach 2.0 at ISA +5. (Most of the time the lower than ISA +5 static air temperatures kept us well away from Tmo). In a nutshell, flying higher in the stratosphere gains you very little as far as temperature goes. (Even taking into account the very small positive lapse above FL 650 in a standard atmosphere). As far as the MAX SPEED bit goes, Concorde was as we know flown to a maximum of Mach 2.23 on A/C 101, but with the production intake and 'final' AICU N1 limiter law, the maximum achievable Mach number in level flight is about Mach 2.13. (Also theoretically, somewhere between Mach 2.2 and 2.3, the front few intake shocks would be 'pushed' back beyond the lower lip, the resulting flow distortion causing multiple severe and surges).
On C of A renewal test flights (what I always called the 'fun flights') we DID used to do a 'flat' acceleration to Mach 2.1 quite regularly, as part of the test regime, and the aircraft used to take things in her stride beautifully. (And the intakes themselves were totally un-phased by the zero G pushover that we did at FL630). This to me was an absolute TESTAMENT to the designers achievement with this totally astounding aeroplane , and always made me feel quite in awe of chaps such as CliveL.

Quote:

Also wondering what was the max altitude ? Was high altitude stall (for the lack of a better word) ever experimented during tests or training ?

Well the maximum altitude EVER achieved in testing was I believe by aircraft 102 which achieved 68,000'. As far as the second part of your question goes, not to my knowledge (gulp!!) but perhaps CliveL can confirm.

Shaggy Sheep Driver
So glad you are enjoying the thread, and absolutely loved the description of your flight in OAD and your photo is superb. I don't think it is possible to name a single other arcraft in the world that could be happily flown hands off like this, in a turn with 20\xb0 of bank at Mach 2. (One for you ChristiaanJ; The more observant will notice that we are in MAX CLIMB/MAX CRUISE with the autothrottle cutting in in MACH HOLD. Oh, we are in HDG HOLD too ).
Now for your question A very good question. The anti-skid system used a fixed simulated nose wheel rolling speed Vo signal as soon as the undercarriage was down and locked, this was confirmed by the illumination of the 8 'R' lights on the anti-skid panel. The illumination of these lights confirmed that there was full ant-skid release from the relevant wheel, due to there being of course zero output initially from the main gear tachos but this simulated Vo output from the nose gear tacho. The Vo signal therefore ensured that the aircraft could not be landed 'brakes on' (all the main wheels think they are on full skid) and that there was anti-skid control pending lowering of the nose-wheel. As the main wheels spin up on landing, their tacho outputs now start to back off the Vo signal, and braking can commence. As the nose leg compresses, the Vo signal is removed and the Nose-wheel tachos(their were 2 wired in parallel) spin up, their output will now replace the Vo signal, and full precise anti skid operates.
As far as your air conditioning question goes, you needed an external air conditioning truck to supply cabin air on the ground. Not needed in the hangars of course, but come departure time if these trucks were not working, then the cabin could become very warm/hot place indeed (depending on the time of year). Oh for an APU
Best regards

Dude

It\xb4s a privilege to read so much knowledge. Thanks for taking the time to post it all.

Am just curious about the Emergency Descent/Rapid Depressurization profile that was used by Concorde.

TUC is so small at 60,000ft...I reckon that masks were not used at all times during cruise, so, what procedure was used?

How fast could the descent be completed to a safe altitude?

I don\xb4t think that any explosive decompression really puts the cabin altitude at 60,000ft instantaneously, but am just curious about this aspect of the Concorde.

Thanks for your time.

SEQU

Curious to know what drills were followed with a rapid depressurization at it's normal cruising levels between FL500-600.



Was it possible to go to idle power prior to starting a descent, and with no spoilers would reverse have been used to achieve a higher rate ?

Thanks Exwk, is it accurate that FL600 was the Concorde's regulated ceiling due to the time required to descend in the event of a depressurization or were there other factors involved ?


It sounds like you could get down pretty quickly when needed. I believe it was capable of higher altitudes and sometimes reached FL600 in cruise, I forget the highest achieved during flight test although that is probably in this thread !


Incidentally what was the envelope for using reverse ? Your description of it's operation makes it sound less than practical ?


Why was that ?


Best wishes.

Short answer is no. The advances in material technologies and manufacturing methods since the Concorde was designed would make a clean sheet design a much better and easier (read cheaper) to build aircraft.
Further, changes in the regulations/cert requirements would make it very difficult (if not impossible) to certify not just a Concorde clone but any future SST. I honestly don't know how any aircraft can meet the existing Part 25 depressurization requirements when operating at SST altitudes.