May 01, 2011, 06:48:00 GMT
permalink Post: 6422324
Fuel Burn
I have been reading these all night, and find all this information really helpful in learning more about this wonderful aircraft.. I do have a question, what was the fuel burn in Mach 2 cruise?? I did not find anything specific about that, and I was just curious..
Thanks
Mark M
Thanks
Mark M
Subjects
Fuel Burn
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May 03, 2011, 12:28:00 GMT
permalink Post: 6426754
I don't know the fuel flow figures but from the type certificate data the max fuel load was 210,000 lbs and the max take off weight was 410,000 lbs. More than half its weight at take off was fuel.
The figure of 18 tons per hour or about 40,000 lbs per hour in the cruise would be about right as the max duration of flight was about 4 hours.
The figure of 18 tons per hour or about 40,000 lbs per hour in the cruise would be about right as the max duration of flight was about 4 hours.
Subjects
Fuel Burn
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May 03, 2011, 12:37:00 GMT
permalink Post: 6426775
For a mid-cruise weight of say 300,000 lb and a lift/drag ratio of 7.5 the thrust required would have been 40,000 lbf and the powerplant sfc was around 1 lb/hr/lbf, so 40,000 lb/hr is just about right.
CliveL
CliveL
Subjects
Fuel Burn
Lift Drag Ratio
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May 04, 2011, 15:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 6429122
Out of interest with any successor to concorde, what lift/drag ratio is now technically possible, and likewise from more advanced powerplants that could be available now what lb/hr/lbf numbers could be achieved?
One other question if I may - how much of a compromise was concorde's wing with respect to the balance of supersonic vs sub-sonic efficiency? What I'm trying to ask is if the wing could be a variable geometry with no weight cost (impossible I know) how much more efficient could the supersonic wing have become - or was the compromise very much on the sub-sonic performance and not much to gain in terms of supersonic efficiency?
One other question if I may - how much of a compromise was concorde's wing with respect to the balance of supersonic vs sub-sonic efficiency? What I'm trying to ask is if the wing could be a variable geometry with no weight cost (impossible I know) how much more efficient could the supersonic wing have become - or was the compromise very much on the sub-sonic performance and not much to gain in terms of supersonic efficiency?
The last time I had anything to do with it people were talking about L/Ds around 10.5 in cruise (up from 7.5).
There are technical issues why one cannot use high bypass engines for supersonic cruise, so the thermodynamic cycle would be much the same as the Olympus. That being so the only real gain would come from higher TETs today so the benefits would be limited - two or three percent sfc perhaps?
[Yes I know the USAF are flying supersonic cruise aircraft, but look at how much bypass their engines actually have and the supersonic cruise Mach Numbers]
Obviously the MOST IMPORTANT condition was supersonic cruise, so this dominated the compromise. OTOH, the reserve fuel was largely driven by subsonic performance, so one couldn't give too much away. It might surprise people, but the 0.93M specific range is much the same as the 2.0M value.
As for variable geometry wings (1970s style), the best I can offer is that Boeing started with a variable geometry design (with which they won the design competition), but as the design process progressed the amount of wing that varied got less and less until the Boeing aircraft looked very much like the Lockheed design that lost the original competition.
What do you think?
CiveL
Subjects
Boeing
Fuel Burn
Lift Drag Ratio
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May 04, 2011, 23:06:00 GMT
permalink Post: 6429967
Concorde Take-Off
. MTOW, LHR, Calm, ISA day, Fuel SG 0.80
Concorde Cruise/Climb . 140,000 kgs, ISA, Still Air, Optimum altitude for her weight, speed and number of operating engines:
Concorde fuel usage .
Concorde Range reduction .
It was this last figure, the circa 30% loss of range following an engine shutdown and subsequent deceleration to subsonic cruise, that perhaps most occupied the minds of her operating crews.
Coupled with the change from a generally benign environment of low winds and low temperatures at FL550+, to the more hostile environment of high temperatures and much stronger (head)winds to be expected around FL290, this meant that on routes such as LHR-BGI, the greater challenge was often keeping the 3-engined diversion airfield (usually ANU) in range, rather than the destination airfield (BGI).
Fortunately the fuel planning and monitoring on this route was eased greatly with the publication of some pilot-friendly "How-Goes-It" types of graphs and charts by one particularly bright Flight Engineer.
LHR-BGI, always a challenge, always enjoyable!
Best Regards
Bellerophon
Fuel Flow at Take Off, Reheat ON:
- [*]
- [*]
- [*]
- [*]
- [*]
- [*]
- [*]
Concorde Cruise/Climb . 140,000 kgs, ISA, Still Air, Optimum altitude for her weight, speed and number of operating engines:
Fuel Flow in Cruise/Climb, Reheat OFF:
- [*]
- [*]
- [*]
Concorde fuel usage .
- [*]
- [*]
- [*]
- [*]
- [*]
Concorde Range reduction .
When we factor in the decel, descent, approach and landing (all of which had obviously been originally flight planned at subsonic speed anyway) and the actual decrease in range, following a speed reduction, was roughly:
-
M2.00 to M0.95 (four engines) a range reduction of 20%
- M2.00 to M0.95 (three engines) a range reduction of 30%
It was this last figure, the circa 30% loss of range following an engine shutdown and subsequent deceleration to subsonic cruise, that perhaps most occupied the minds of her operating crews.
Coupled with the change from a generally benign environment of low winds and low temperatures at FL550+, to the more hostile environment of high temperatures and much stronger (head)winds to be expected around FL290, this meant that on routes such as LHR-BGI, the greater challenge was often keeping the 3-engined diversion airfield (usually ANU) in range, rather than the destination airfield (BGI).
Fortunately the fuel planning and monitoring on this route was eased greatly with the publication of some pilot-friendly "How-Goes-It" types of graphs and charts by one particularly bright Flight Engineer.
LHR-BGI, always a challenge, always enjoyable!
Best Regards
Bellerophon
Subjects
Afterburner/Re-heat
Engine Shutdown
Fuel Burn
LHR
LHR-BGI Route
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May 06, 2011, 23:29:00 GMT
permalink Post: 6433883
CliveL
You got me a little worried there, so I've just checked the figures I quoted in case I'd slipped up! They were extracted from the Cruise Control Manual (rather than from observation on an actual flight) for a lecture some years ago.
I'm relieved to say they appear to be correct. By way of contrast, to show the variation in fuel flow there could be, the following is perhaps typical of Concorde approaching her decel/descent point into BGI.
Concorde Cruise/Climb . 110,000 kgs, FL600, ISA -15\xb0C:
Best Regards
Bellerophon
You got me a little worried there, so I've just checked the figures I quoted in case I'd slipped up! They were extracted from the Cruise Control Manual (rather than from observation on an actual flight) for a lecture some years ago.
I'm relieved to say they appear to be correct. By way of contrast, to show the variation in fuel flow there could be, the following is perhaps typical of Concorde approaching her decel/descent point into BGI.
Concorde Cruise/Climb . 110,000 kgs, FL600, ISA -15\xb0C:
Fuel Flow in Cruise/Climb, Reheat OFF:
- 4e...FL600...M2.00...1,107 kts...4,308 kg/eng/hr...17,232 kg/hr
Best Regards
Bellerophon
Subjects
Afterburner/Re-heat
FL600
Fuel Burn
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May 07, 2011, 07:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 6434231
Bellerephon
Digging a little I see that your numbers correspond to an sfc of 1.23 where I was remembering a value around 1.0.
I forgot the installation losses
Best Regards
Clive
Digging a little I see that your numbers correspond to an sfc of 1.23 where I was remembering a value around 1.0.
I forgot the installation losses
Best Regards
Clive
Subjects
Fuel Burn
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May 08, 2013, 16:05:00 GMT
permalink Post: 7832495
For the french speaking (or reading) people here, I just found a mine of very interesting informations about Concorde on this website:
Accueil
This site has a database of thousand of concorde flights with the following datas: Date and time of the flight, airframe used, technical and commercial crews, guests, departure/arrival airports and flight type (regular, charter world tour...).
On top of that, many infos and stories around Concorde can also be found there.
I can't resist to translate one of those stories (I'm far from being a native english speaker or a professional translator; so forgive me for the misspellings and other translation mistakes). It is a report about one of the biggest incident that happened to the prototype 001 during the flight tests:
Shock of shockwaves
We were flying with Concorde at Mach 2 since 3 month already on both side of the Channel. The prototype 001 did outstrip 002 which was supposed to be the first to reach Mach 2.
Unfortunately, a technical issue delayed 002 and Brian Trubshaw fairly let Andr\xe9 Turcat be the first to reach Mach 2 with the 001 which was ready to go.
The flight tests were progressing fast and we were discovering a part of the atmosphere that military aircrafts hardly reached before. With Concorde, we were able to stay there for hours although limited by the huge fuel consumption of the prototypes.
The Olympus engines did not reached their nominal performance yet and, most of the time, we had to turn on the reheat in supersonic cruise to maintain Mach 2.
The reheat is what we call afterburner on military aircrafts. Fuel is injected between the last compressor stage of the low pressure turbine and the first exhaust nozzle. This increases the thrust for the whole engine and its nozzle.
The 4 reheats, one for each engine, are controlled by the piano switches behind the thrust leavers on the center pedestal between the two pilots. Air was fed into the engines through 4 air intakes, one for each engine, attached 2 by 2 to the 2 engine nacelle, one under each wing. The advantage in terms of drag reduction was obvious.
However, tests in wind tunnel showed that, at supersonic speed, if a problem happens on one engine, there was a great chance for the adjacent engine to be affected as well by the shockwave interference from one air intake to the other despite the presence the dividing wall between the two intakes. So we knew that an engine failure at mach 2 would result in the loss of 2 engines on the same side, resulting in a lateral movement leading to a strong sideslip that would likely impact the 2 remaining engines and transform the aircraft into the fastest glider in the world.
This is why an automatic anti sideslip device was developed and installed on the aircrafts.
The air intakes are very sophisticated. At mach 2, it creates a system of shockwaves that slows down the air from 600 m/sec in front of the aircraft to 200 m/sec in front of the engine while maintaining a very good thermodynamic performance. In supersonic cruise, the engines, operating at full capacity all the time, were sensitive to any perturbation and reacted violently with engine surge: the engine refusing the incoming air.
Stopping suddenly a flow of almost 200kg of air per second traveling at 600m/sec causes a few problems. As a result, a spill door was installed under the air intake and automatically opened in such event.
To control the system of shockwaves and obtain an efficiency of 0,96 in compression in the air intake, 2 articulated ramps, controlled by hydraulic jacks, are installed on the top of the air intakes in front of the engines. Each ramp is roughly the size of a big dining room table, and the 2 ramps, mechanically synchronized, move up or down following the instruction of an highly sophisticated computer that adapts the ramp position according to the mach number, the engine rating and other parameters such as skidding.
At that time, it was the less known part of the aircraft, almost only designed through calculation since no simulator, no wind tunnel, did allow a full scale test of the system.
The control of the system was analog and very complex but it was not easy to tune and we were moving ahead with a lot of caution in our test at mach 2.
On the 26th of January 1971, we were doing a nearly routine flight to measure the effect of a new engine setting supposed to enhance the engine efficiency at mach 2. It was a small increase of the rotation speed of the low pressure turbine increasing the air flow and, as a result, the thrust.
The flight test crews now regularly alternate their participation and their position in the cockpit for the pilots.
Today, Gilbert Defer is on the left side, myself on the right side, Michel R\xe9tif is the flight engineer, Claude Durand is the main flight engineer and Jean Conche is the engine flight engineer. With them is an official representative of the flight test centre, Hubert Guyonnet, seated in the cockpit's jump seat, he is in charge of radio testing.
We took off from Toulouse, accelerated to supersonic speed over the Atlantic near Arcachon continuing up to the north west of Ireland.
Two reheats, the 1 and the 3, are left on because the air temperature does not allow to maintain mach 2 without them.
Everything goes fine. During the previous flight, the crew experienced some strong turbulence, quite rare in the stratosphere and warned us about this. No problem was found on the aircraft.
We are on our way back to Toulouse off the coast of Ireland. Our program includes subsonic tests and we have to decelerate.
Gilbert is piloting the aircraft. Michel and the engineers notify us that everything is normal and ready for the deceleration and the descent.
We are at FL500 at mach 2 with an IAS of 530 kt, the maximum dynamic pressure in normal use.
On Concorde, the right hand seat is the place offering the less possibility to operate the systems. But here, we get busy by helping the others to follow the program and the checklists and by manipulating the secondary commands such as the landing gear, the droop nose, the radio navigation, comms, and some essential engine settings apart from the thrust leavers such as the reheat switches.
The normal procedure consists in stopping the reheat before lowering the throttle.
Gilbert asks me to do it. After, he will slowly reduce the throttle to avoid temporary heckler. Note that he did advise us during the training on the air intake to avoid to move the thrust leaver in case of engine surge.
As a safety measure, I shut down the reheat one by one, checking that everything goes fine for each one. Thus I switch off the reheat 1 with the light shock marking the thrust reduction. Then the 3\x85
Instantly, we are thrown in a crazy situation.
Deafening noise like a canon firing 300 times a minute next to us. Terrible shake. The cockpit, that looked like a submarine with the metallic and totally opaque visor obviously in the upper position, is shaken at a frequency of 5 oscillation a second and a crazy amplitude of about 4 to 5 G. To the point that we cannot see anymore, our eyes not being able to follow the movements.
Gilbert has a test pilot reaction, we have to get out of the maximum kinetic energy zone as fast as possible and to reduce speed immediately. He then moves the throttle to idle without any useless care.
During that time, I try, we all try to answer the question: what is going on? What is the cause of this and what can we do to stop it?
Suspecting an issue with the engines, I try to read the indicators on the centre control panel through the mist of my disturbed vision and in the middle of a rain of electric indicators falling from the roof. We cannot speak to each other through the intercom.
I vaguely see that the engines 3 and 4 seem to run slower than the 2 others, especially the 4. We have to do something. Gilbert is piloting the plane and is already busy. I have a stupid reaction dictated by the idea that I have to do something to stop that, while I can only reach a few commands that may be linked to the problem.
I first try to increase the thrust on number 4 engine. No effect so I reduce frankly and definitively. I desperately look for something to do from my right hand seat with a terrible feeling of being helpless and useless.
Then everything stops as suddenly as it started. How long did it last, 30 seconds, one minute?
By looking at the flight data records afterward, we saw that it only last\x85 12 seconds!
However, I have the feeling that I had time to think about tons of things, to do a lot of reasoning, assumption and to have searched and searched and searched\x85! It looked like my brain suddenly switched to a fastest mod of thinking. But, above all, it's the feeling of failure, the fact that I was not able to do anything and that I did not understand anything that remains stuck in my mind forever.
To comfort me, I have to say that nobody among the crew did understand anything either and was able to do anything, apart from Gilbert.
The aircraft slows down and the engine 3 that seemed to have shut down restart thanks to the auto ignition system. But the 4 is off indeed.
Michel makes a check of his instruments. He also notes that the engine 4 has shut down but the 4 air intakes work normally, which makes us feel better. After discussing together, we start to think that we probably faced some stratospheric turbulence of very high intensity, our experience in this altitude range being quite limited at that time. But nobody really believes in this explanation. Finally, at subsonic speed, mach 0.9, with all instruments looking normal, we try to restart engine 4 since we still have a long way to go to fly back to Toulouse.
Michel launches the process to restart the engine. It restarts, remains at a medium rotation speed and shuts down after 20 seconds, leaving us puzzled and a bit worried despite the fact that the instrument indicators are normal.
Gilbert then decide to give up and won't try to restart this engine anymore and Claude leaves his engineer station to have a look in a device installed on the prototype to inspect the landing gear and the engines when needed: an hypo-scope, a kind of periscope going out through the floor and not through the roof.
After a few seconds, we can hear him on the intercom:
"!!!!! (stuttering) we have lost the intake number 4."
He then describes a wide opening in the air intake, the ramp seems to be missing and he can see some structural damages on the nacelle.
Gilbert reacts rapidly by further reducing the speed to limit even more the dynamic pressure.
But we don't know exactly the extent of the damage. Are the wing and the control surfaces damaged? What about engine 3?
We decide to fly back at a speed of 250 kts at a lower altitude and to divert toward Fairford where our british colleagues and the 002 are based. I inform everybody about the problem on the radio and tell them our intentions. However, I add that if no other problems occur, we will try to reach Toulouse since we still have enough fuel.
Flying off Fairford, since nothing unusual happened, we decide to go on toward Toulouse. All the possible diversion airport on the way have been informed by the flight test centre who follows us on their radar.
At low speed, knowing what happened to us and having nothing else to do but to wait for us, time passes slowly, very slowly and we don't talk much, each one of us thinking and trying to understand what happened. However, we keep watching closely after engine 3.
Personally, I remember the funny story of the poor guy who sees his house collapse when he flushes his toilets. I feel in the same situation.
Gilbert makes a precautionary landing since we don't rely much on engine 3 anymore. But everything goes fine.
At the parking, there is a lot of people waiting for us and, as soon as the engines stop, we can see a big rush toward the nacelles of the right hand side engines.
Gilbert and myself are the first to get off the plane and we are welcomed down the stairs by Andr\xe9 Turcat and Jean Franchi who came out from the crowd watching at the right hand side nacelle.
They both behave the same way, with a slow pace attitude, the same look, a mix of disbelief and frustration.
Andr\xe9 is the first to speak: "I can't believe we were not on this flight, really unlucky\x85". Yes, this flight was supposed to be just a routine flight\x85!
The condition of the nacelle is impressive. We come closer and everybody move aside for us with a look of disbelief and respect as if we were hell survivors.
The ramps of the intake 4, those 2 "dining tables", have completely disappeared leaving a hole where we can see the hydraulic jacks and the stub rod where the ramps were attached.
Indeed, only the ramps were missing, apparently ejected forward which was unbelievable knowing how fast we were flying. The ramp slipped under the nacelle causing some damages on it and on the hood of one of the elevon's servo control. Fortunately, the control did not suffer any damage.
What is left of the rear ramp seems to be blocked down inside the intake in front of the engine and we can see behind it the first blades of the compressor, or what is left of it, not much.
The engine swallowed a huge amount of metal but no vital parts of the aircraft has been damaged, no hydraulic leaks, no fuel leaks. I remembered at that time the stories of some B58 Hustler accident where the loss of an engine at mach 2 almost certainly ended with the complete loss of the aircraft. Our Concorde has only been shaken. This incident strengthened the trust I had in this plane. And I was not unhappy to have experienced this ordeal, especially when I saw the frustration on the face of Andr\xe9 Turcat and Jean Franchi.
But we had to understand what happened and how; and also why the ramp's fixing broke.
It didn't take much time to get the answers.
I unintentionally triggered the problem when shutting down the reheat of engine 3. The sudden stop of the fuel flow did of course stop the combustion and the back pressure behind the low pressure turbine. But, probably because of the modification made on the engine before the flight, the stop of the reheat has not been followed by the normal closing movement of the primary nozzle to compensate the pressure drop. So the low pressure turbine ran out of control, dragging down the low pressure compressor which reacts by surging.
Despite the opening of the spill door, the engine surge led to a sudden movement of the shockwaves in the air intake creating a surge in the intake itself. A similar surge happened in the adjacent intake 4 followed by a surge of the corresponding engine. This caused an excessive pressure above the ramps and the fixings of the intake 4 did not hold.
Since it was the first time we experienced a surge in the air intake, we had little knowledge of the stress it would create on the ramps. This led to miscalculation of the strength of the ramps's frames and they did brake.
Another mistake: instead of installing the motion detectors on the ramp itself, to make the production easier, they have been placed on the arms of the hydraulic jacks. This is why Michel R\xe9tif thought that the position of the ramps were correct. The hydraulic jacks did not suffer any damage and were still working normally even if the ramps were missing.
All the data recorded during this event helped us in redesigning the air intakes and the flight test program resumed three month later.
After this, we deliberately created dozen and dozen of air intake surge to fine tune the way to regulate them with digital calculator this time.
From now on, even if it was still very impressive, it was safe and their intensity was not comparable with what we experienced with the missing ramps.
However, a french president may kept a lasting memory of this, much later, during a flight back from Saudi Arabia. This time, I was on the left side, Gilbert on the right and Michel was still in the third seat\x85 But that's another story.
For me, the lasting impression of failing and being helpless during this incident made me wonder what a commercial pilot would have done in this situation. This plane was designed to be handled by standard commercial pilots and not only by the flight test pilots.
At that time, I was interested in taking in charge the management of a training center for the pilots of the future Airbus's clients. This event pushed me that way and I made it clear that I wanted to add the flight training on Concorde in this project. This has been agreed and I did it.
And the Concorde training program now covers the air intake surges and how to deal with them.
Jean PINET
Former test pilot
Member and former president of the Air and Space Academy
Accueil
This site has a database of thousand of concorde flights with the following datas: Date and time of the flight, airframe used, technical and commercial crews, guests, departure/arrival airports and flight type (regular, charter world tour...).
On top of that, many infos and stories around Concorde can also be found there.
I can't resist to translate one of those stories (I'm far from being a native english speaker or a professional translator; so forgive me for the misspellings and other translation mistakes). It is a report about one of the biggest incident that happened to the prototype 001 during the flight tests:
Shock of shockwaves
We were flying with Concorde at Mach 2 since 3 month already on both side of the Channel. The prototype 001 did outstrip 002 which was supposed to be the first to reach Mach 2.
Unfortunately, a technical issue delayed 002 and Brian Trubshaw fairly let Andr\xe9 Turcat be the first to reach Mach 2 with the 001 which was ready to go.
The flight tests were progressing fast and we were discovering a part of the atmosphere that military aircrafts hardly reached before. With Concorde, we were able to stay there for hours although limited by the huge fuel consumption of the prototypes.
The Olympus engines did not reached their nominal performance yet and, most of the time, we had to turn on the reheat in supersonic cruise to maintain Mach 2.
The reheat is what we call afterburner on military aircrafts. Fuel is injected between the last compressor stage of the low pressure turbine and the first exhaust nozzle. This increases the thrust for the whole engine and its nozzle.
The 4 reheats, one for each engine, are controlled by the piano switches behind the thrust leavers on the center pedestal between the two pilots. Air was fed into the engines through 4 air intakes, one for each engine, attached 2 by 2 to the 2 engine nacelle, one under each wing. The advantage in terms of drag reduction was obvious.
However, tests in wind tunnel showed that, at supersonic speed, if a problem happens on one engine, there was a great chance for the adjacent engine to be affected as well by the shockwave interference from one air intake to the other despite the presence the dividing wall between the two intakes. So we knew that an engine failure at mach 2 would result in the loss of 2 engines on the same side, resulting in a lateral movement leading to a strong sideslip that would likely impact the 2 remaining engines and transform the aircraft into the fastest glider in the world.
This is why an automatic anti sideslip device was developed and installed on the aircrafts.
The air intakes are very sophisticated. At mach 2, it creates a system of shockwaves that slows down the air from 600 m/sec in front of the aircraft to 200 m/sec in front of the engine while maintaining a very good thermodynamic performance. In supersonic cruise, the engines, operating at full capacity all the time, were sensitive to any perturbation and reacted violently with engine surge: the engine refusing the incoming air.
Stopping suddenly a flow of almost 200kg of air per second traveling at 600m/sec causes a few problems. As a result, a spill door was installed under the air intake and automatically opened in such event.
To control the system of shockwaves and obtain an efficiency of 0,96 in compression in the air intake, 2 articulated ramps, controlled by hydraulic jacks, are installed on the top of the air intakes in front of the engines. Each ramp is roughly the size of a big dining room table, and the 2 ramps, mechanically synchronized, move up or down following the instruction of an highly sophisticated computer that adapts the ramp position according to the mach number, the engine rating and other parameters such as skidding.
At that time, it was the less known part of the aircraft, almost only designed through calculation since no simulator, no wind tunnel, did allow a full scale test of the system.
The control of the system was analog and very complex but it was not easy to tune and we were moving ahead with a lot of caution in our test at mach 2.
On the 26th of January 1971, we were doing a nearly routine flight to measure the effect of a new engine setting supposed to enhance the engine efficiency at mach 2. It was a small increase of the rotation speed of the low pressure turbine increasing the air flow and, as a result, the thrust.
The flight test crews now regularly alternate their participation and their position in the cockpit for the pilots.
Today, Gilbert Defer is on the left side, myself on the right side, Michel R\xe9tif is the flight engineer, Claude Durand is the main flight engineer and Jean Conche is the engine flight engineer. With them is an official representative of the flight test centre, Hubert Guyonnet, seated in the cockpit's jump seat, he is in charge of radio testing.
We took off from Toulouse, accelerated to supersonic speed over the Atlantic near Arcachon continuing up to the north west of Ireland.
Two reheats, the 1 and the 3, are left on because the air temperature does not allow to maintain mach 2 without them.
Everything goes fine. During the previous flight, the crew experienced some strong turbulence, quite rare in the stratosphere and warned us about this. No problem was found on the aircraft.
We are on our way back to Toulouse off the coast of Ireland. Our program includes subsonic tests and we have to decelerate.
Gilbert is piloting the aircraft. Michel and the engineers notify us that everything is normal and ready for the deceleration and the descent.
We are at FL500 at mach 2 with an IAS of 530 kt, the maximum dynamic pressure in normal use.
On Concorde, the right hand seat is the place offering the less possibility to operate the systems. But here, we get busy by helping the others to follow the program and the checklists and by manipulating the secondary commands such as the landing gear, the droop nose, the radio navigation, comms, and some essential engine settings apart from the thrust leavers such as the reheat switches.
The normal procedure consists in stopping the reheat before lowering the throttle.
Gilbert asks me to do it. After, he will slowly reduce the throttle to avoid temporary heckler. Note that he did advise us during the training on the air intake to avoid to move the thrust leaver in case of engine surge.
As a safety measure, I shut down the reheat one by one, checking that everything goes fine for each one. Thus I switch off the reheat 1 with the light shock marking the thrust reduction. Then the 3\x85
Instantly, we are thrown in a crazy situation.
Deafening noise like a canon firing 300 times a minute next to us. Terrible shake. The cockpit, that looked like a submarine with the metallic and totally opaque visor obviously in the upper position, is shaken at a frequency of 5 oscillation a second and a crazy amplitude of about 4 to 5 G. To the point that we cannot see anymore, our eyes not being able to follow the movements.
Gilbert has a test pilot reaction, we have to get out of the maximum kinetic energy zone as fast as possible and to reduce speed immediately. He then moves the throttle to idle without any useless care.
During that time, I try, we all try to answer the question: what is going on? What is the cause of this and what can we do to stop it?
Suspecting an issue with the engines, I try to read the indicators on the centre control panel through the mist of my disturbed vision and in the middle of a rain of electric indicators falling from the roof. We cannot speak to each other through the intercom.
I vaguely see that the engines 3 and 4 seem to run slower than the 2 others, especially the 4. We have to do something. Gilbert is piloting the plane and is already busy. I have a stupid reaction dictated by the idea that I have to do something to stop that, while I can only reach a few commands that may be linked to the problem.
I first try to increase the thrust on number 4 engine. No effect so I reduce frankly and definitively. I desperately look for something to do from my right hand seat with a terrible feeling of being helpless and useless.
Then everything stops as suddenly as it started. How long did it last, 30 seconds, one minute?
By looking at the flight data records afterward, we saw that it only last\x85 12 seconds!
However, I have the feeling that I had time to think about tons of things, to do a lot of reasoning, assumption and to have searched and searched and searched\x85! It looked like my brain suddenly switched to a fastest mod of thinking. But, above all, it's the feeling of failure, the fact that I was not able to do anything and that I did not understand anything that remains stuck in my mind forever.
To comfort me, I have to say that nobody among the crew did understand anything either and was able to do anything, apart from Gilbert.
The aircraft slows down and the engine 3 that seemed to have shut down restart thanks to the auto ignition system. But the 4 is off indeed.
Michel makes a check of his instruments. He also notes that the engine 4 has shut down but the 4 air intakes work normally, which makes us feel better. After discussing together, we start to think that we probably faced some stratospheric turbulence of very high intensity, our experience in this altitude range being quite limited at that time. But nobody really believes in this explanation. Finally, at subsonic speed, mach 0.9, with all instruments looking normal, we try to restart engine 4 since we still have a long way to go to fly back to Toulouse.
Michel launches the process to restart the engine. It restarts, remains at a medium rotation speed and shuts down after 20 seconds, leaving us puzzled and a bit worried despite the fact that the instrument indicators are normal.
Gilbert then decide to give up and won't try to restart this engine anymore and Claude leaves his engineer station to have a look in a device installed on the prototype to inspect the landing gear and the engines when needed: an hypo-scope, a kind of periscope going out through the floor and not through the roof.
After a few seconds, we can hear him on the intercom:
"!!!!! (stuttering) we have lost the intake number 4."
He then describes a wide opening in the air intake, the ramp seems to be missing and he can see some structural damages on the nacelle.
Gilbert reacts rapidly by further reducing the speed to limit even more the dynamic pressure.
But we don't know exactly the extent of the damage. Are the wing and the control surfaces damaged? What about engine 3?
We decide to fly back at a speed of 250 kts at a lower altitude and to divert toward Fairford where our british colleagues and the 002 are based. I inform everybody about the problem on the radio and tell them our intentions. However, I add that if no other problems occur, we will try to reach Toulouse since we still have enough fuel.
Flying off Fairford, since nothing unusual happened, we decide to go on toward Toulouse. All the possible diversion airport on the way have been informed by the flight test centre who follows us on their radar.
At low speed, knowing what happened to us and having nothing else to do but to wait for us, time passes slowly, very slowly and we don't talk much, each one of us thinking and trying to understand what happened. However, we keep watching closely after engine 3.
Personally, I remember the funny story of the poor guy who sees his house collapse when he flushes his toilets. I feel in the same situation.
Gilbert makes a precautionary landing since we don't rely much on engine 3 anymore. But everything goes fine.
At the parking, there is a lot of people waiting for us and, as soon as the engines stop, we can see a big rush toward the nacelles of the right hand side engines.
Gilbert and myself are the first to get off the plane and we are welcomed down the stairs by Andr\xe9 Turcat and Jean Franchi who came out from the crowd watching at the right hand side nacelle.
They both behave the same way, with a slow pace attitude, the same look, a mix of disbelief and frustration.
Andr\xe9 is the first to speak: "I can't believe we were not on this flight, really unlucky\x85". Yes, this flight was supposed to be just a routine flight\x85!
The condition of the nacelle is impressive. We come closer and everybody move aside for us with a look of disbelief and respect as if we were hell survivors.
The ramps of the intake 4, those 2 "dining tables", have completely disappeared leaving a hole where we can see the hydraulic jacks and the stub rod where the ramps were attached.
Indeed, only the ramps were missing, apparently ejected forward which was unbelievable knowing how fast we were flying. The ramp slipped under the nacelle causing some damages on it and on the hood of one of the elevon's servo control. Fortunately, the control did not suffer any damage.
What is left of the rear ramp seems to be blocked down inside the intake in front of the engine and we can see behind it the first blades of the compressor, or what is left of it, not much.
The engine swallowed a huge amount of metal but no vital parts of the aircraft has been damaged, no hydraulic leaks, no fuel leaks. I remembered at that time the stories of some B58 Hustler accident where the loss of an engine at mach 2 almost certainly ended with the complete loss of the aircraft. Our Concorde has only been shaken. This incident strengthened the trust I had in this plane. And I was not unhappy to have experienced this ordeal, especially when I saw the frustration on the face of Andr\xe9 Turcat and Jean Franchi.
But we had to understand what happened and how; and also why the ramp's fixing broke.
It didn't take much time to get the answers.
I unintentionally triggered the problem when shutting down the reheat of engine 3. The sudden stop of the fuel flow did of course stop the combustion and the back pressure behind the low pressure turbine. But, probably because of the modification made on the engine before the flight, the stop of the reheat has not been followed by the normal closing movement of the primary nozzle to compensate the pressure drop. So the low pressure turbine ran out of control, dragging down the low pressure compressor which reacts by surging.
Despite the opening of the spill door, the engine surge led to a sudden movement of the shockwaves in the air intake creating a surge in the intake itself. A similar surge happened in the adjacent intake 4 followed by a surge of the corresponding engine. This caused an excessive pressure above the ramps and the fixings of the intake 4 did not hold.
Since it was the first time we experienced a surge in the air intake, we had little knowledge of the stress it would create on the ramps. This led to miscalculation of the strength of the ramps's frames and they did brake.
Another mistake: instead of installing the motion detectors on the ramp itself, to make the production easier, they have been placed on the arms of the hydraulic jacks. This is why Michel R\xe9tif thought that the position of the ramps were correct. The hydraulic jacks did not suffer any damage and were still working normally even if the ramps were missing.
All the data recorded during this event helped us in redesigning the air intakes and the flight test program resumed three month later.
After this, we deliberately created dozen and dozen of air intake surge to fine tune the way to regulate them with digital calculator this time.
From now on, even if it was still very impressive, it was safe and their intensity was not comparable with what we experienced with the missing ramps.
However, a french president may kept a lasting memory of this, much later, during a flight back from Saudi Arabia. This time, I was on the left side, Gilbert on the right and Michel was still in the third seat\x85 But that's another story.
For me, the lasting impression of failing and being helpless during this incident made me wonder what a commercial pilot would have done in this situation. This plane was designed to be handled by standard commercial pilots and not only by the flight test pilots.
At that time, I was interested in taking in charge the management of a training center for the pilots of the future Airbus's clients. This event pushed me that way and I made it clear that I wanted to add the flight training on Concorde in this project. This has been agreed and I did it.
And the Concorde training program now covers the air intake surges and how to deal with them.
Jean PINET
Former test pilot
Member and former president of the Air and Space Academy
Last edited by NHerby; 9th May 2013 at 17:24 .
Subjects
Afterburner/Re-heat
Air France 4590
Andre Turcat
Brian Trubshaw
Checklists
Elevons
Engine Failure
Engine surge
Fairford
Fuel Burn
Hydraulic
IAS (Indicated Air Speed)
Intakes
Landing Gear
Nozzles
Shockwave
Sideslip
Simulator
Toulouse
Visor
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October 19, 2013, 01:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 8106489
The Concorde and Boeing SST business cases were built on a couple flawed assumptions.
First, jet fuel would remain dirt cheap and the higher fuel burn of supersonic travel not contribute significantly to cost of operation - which was blown out of the water by the first Arab oil embargo.
Second, that the majority of demand for air travel would remain for the 'premium' product - basically that the majority of people would happily pay a premium to get there faster. This assumption applied to most people who flew on jets in the 1960's - either business travelers or well to do people that weren't that worried about what it cost.
Reality was it went the opposite direction - a shift that started with the 747 and other widebodies. The economies of the wide body aircraft lowered the cost of air travel to the 'everybody' level. Suddenly there was a whole new class of air traveler - people for whom an extra $100 airfare meant they just wouldn't go, never mind that they'd get there in half the time. In short, they didn't foresee air travel becoming just another commodity - the low cost trend that continues today.
The reality was, both the Concorde and the SST needed to sell hundreds of copies to even begin to justify the development costs. The evolution of air travel into a low cost commodity, combined with the rising costs of jet fuel, insured that would never happen.
First, jet fuel would remain dirt cheap and the higher fuel burn of supersonic travel not contribute significantly to cost of operation - which was blown out of the water by the first Arab oil embargo.
Second, that the majority of demand for air travel would remain for the 'premium' product - basically that the majority of people would happily pay a premium to get there faster. This assumption applied to most people who flew on jets in the 1960's - either business travelers or well to do people that weren't that worried about what it cost.
Reality was it went the opposite direction - a shift that started with the 747 and other widebodies. The economies of the wide body aircraft lowered the cost of air travel to the 'everybody' level. Suddenly there was a whole new class of air traveler - people for whom an extra $100 airfare meant they just wouldn't go, never mind that they'd get there in half the time. In short, they didn't foresee air travel becoming just another commodity - the low cost trend that continues today.
The reality was, both the Concorde and the SST needed to sell hundreds of copies to even begin to justify the development costs. The evolution of air travel into a low cost commodity, combined with the rising costs of jet fuel, insured that would never happen.
Last edited by tdracer; 19th October 2013 at 01:18 . Reason: edited to fix typos
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Boeing
Boeing 747
Boeing SST
Fuel Burn
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October 19, 2013, 01:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 8106519
The Concorde and Boeing SST business cases were built on a couple flawed assumptions.
First, jet fuel would remain dirt cheap and the higher fuel burn of supersonic travel not contribute significantly to cost of operation - which was blown out of the water by the first Arab oil embargo.
First, jet fuel would remain dirt cheap and the higher fuel burn of supersonic travel not contribute significantly to cost of operation - which was blown out of the water by the first Arab oil embargo.
Second, that the majority of demand for air travel would remain for the 'premium' product - basically that the majority of people would happily pay a premium to get there faster. This assumption applied to most people who flew on jets in the 1960's - either business travelers or well to do people that weren't that worried about what it cost.
Reality was it went the opposite direction - a shift that started with the 747 and other widebodies. The economies of the wide body aircraft lowered the cost of air travel to the 'everybody' level. Suddenly there was a whole new class of air traveler - people for whom an extra $100 airfare meant they just wouldn't go, never mind that they'd get there in half the time. In short, they didn't foresee air travel becoming just another commodity - the low cost trend that continues today.
The reality was, both the Concorde and the SST needed to sell hundreds of copies to even begin to justify the development costs. The evolution of air travel into a low cost commodity, combined with the rising costs of jet fuel, insured that would never happen.
Subjects
Afterburner/Re-heat
Airbus
Boeing
Boeing 747
Boeing SST
Fuel Burn
Sidestick
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January 05, 2018, 21:02:00 GMT
permalink Post: 10011731
Favourite: OAF for fuel burn and subjective personal preference.
OAC second for the reg!.
OAD was indeed the schedulers' favourite for long charters although I have to say that I didn't have fewer or greater tech issues with it c.w. the others. Def. not a favourite on BGI because it burnt a bit more fuel than some others (e.g. Fox and Golf).
OAC second for the reg!.
OAD was indeed the schedulers' favourite for long charters although I have to say that I didn't have fewer or greater tech issues with it c.w. the others. Def. not a favourite on BGI because it burnt a bit more fuel than some others (e.g. Fox and Golf).
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Fuel Burn
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January 06, 2018, 20:22:00 GMT
permalink Post: 10012583
Regarding the fuel burn differences would you have a ballpark number to quote?
.1%? 1%? More?
.1%? 1%? More?
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Fuel Burn
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October 12, 2019, 23:49:00 GMT
permalink Post: 10593003
Pattern, I didn't bother to address the viability question, but unless there is a massive technological breakthrough we're not going to see another commercial SST. The costs and fuel burn of an SST compared to a conventional subsonic airliner make the potential number of paying passengers too small for it to be economically viable. There simply are not that many people who are willing
and
able to pay a massive price premium to save a couple hours of flight time. No matter how efficient the engines and the airframe, fuel burn is always going to be much higher going supersonic (as one of my college professors put it, 'it takes a lot of energy to break windows ten miles below'), and the stresses of supersonic flight mean high maintenance costs.
The one possibility for a future supersonic passenger aircraft is for a (relatively) small biz jet. Something targeted for the super rich who are willing and able to pay a huge premium to save a few hours (I'm talking about the sort of people who have a 747 as their private jet). The business case would have to assume a small production run (less than 100 aircraft) meaning the massive nonrecurring development and certification costs would need to be spread over a correspondingly small number of sales. On the plus side, the biz jet regulations are somewhat more forgiving than those for large commercial aircraft (i.e. Part 25).
The one possibility for a future supersonic passenger aircraft is for a (relatively) small biz jet. Something targeted for the super rich who are willing and able to pay a huge premium to save a few hours (I'm talking about the sort of people who have a 747 as their private jet). The business case would have to assume a small production run (less than 100 aircraft) meaning the massive nonrecurring development and certification costs would need to be spread over a correspondingly small number of sales. On the plus side, the biz jet regulations are somewhat more forgiving than those for large commercial aircraft (i.e. Part 25).
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Boeing 747
Fuel Burn
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January 26, 2023, 04:44:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11373978
There are folks here who can correct me, but in the meantime, what I think I know is....
The DC-Dallas route, entirely over populated land, could not be flown at supersonic speeds (regulations, noise pollution, sonic booms), but Concorde could do it in high- sub sonic cruise at around Mach 0.95, somewhat faster than the norm for regular subsonic transports.
I believe the DC-MIA route was flown mostly supersonically, by climbing subsonically at Mach 0.95 straight down the Potomac to the Atlantic at Norfolk, Va., and then, 20+ miles offshore, turning SW towards Miami and making the supersonic acceleration-climb out over the water. Remained offshore (dodging the coastal bulge of the Outer Banks) until about 250nm from Miami. where the descent/deceleration phase would slow it to subsonic speed before getting too close to the shoreline.
Once at ~28,000 feet at Mach .95 - and over the water - it only took a few moments, after turning on the reheat/afterburners, to punch through Mach 1, and maybe 20 minutes (depending on weight) to reach 51000 feet* and Mach 2.02 (air termperature permitting.) And maybe 20 minutes for the deceleration/descent to Mach 0.95 at ~34000 feet.
(*I believe the afterburners were switched off at Mach 1.7 - usually about 42000 feet? - at which point the dry thrust of the engines and fancy shockwave-pressurized nacelle design could maintain the IAS and (reduced rate) climb (and increase the Mach) all by themselves.)
Across the Pond, short "experience flights" from both Paris and London were made from time to time - get out over the Atlantic, light up the afterburners, and tool around at supersonic speeds for some part of an hour before returning to base.
I'm pretty sure subsonic flight was never really efficient at any speed. Concorde was dependent on Mach 1.7 or so (and high altitudes) to maintain the efficiency of nacelle thrust modulated by supersonic intake shockwaves, without very thirsty afterburners. I think that over the Atlantic, losing just one engine (25% of thrust) was enough to make it instantly a fuel emergency situation - you were going to come down into thicker air and fuel burn would skyrocket.
The DC-Dallas route, entirely over populated land, could not be flown at supersonic speeds (regulations, noise pollution, sonic booms), but Concorde could do it in high- sub sonic cruise at around Mach 0.95, somewhat faster than the norm for regular subsonic transports.
I believe the DC-MIA route was flown mostly supersonically, by climbing subsonically at Mach 0.95 straight down the Potomac to the Atlantic at Norfolk, Va., and then, 20+ miles offshore, turning SW towards Miami and making the supersonic acceleration-climb out over the water. Remained offshore (dodging the coastal bulge of the Outer Banks) until about 250nm from Miami. where the descent/deceleration phase would slow it to subsonic speed before getting too close to the shoreline.
Once at ~28,000 feet at Mach .95 - and over the water - it only took a few moments, after turning on the reheat/afterburners, to punch through Mach 1, and maybe 20 minutes (depending on weight) to reach 51000 feet* and Mach 2.02 (air termperature permitting.) And maybe 20 minutes for the deceleration/descent to Mach 0.95 at ~34000 feet.
(*I believe the afterburners were switched off at Mach 1.7 - usually about 42000 feet? - at which point the dry thrust of the engines and fancy shockwave-pressurized nacelle design could maintain the IAS and (reduced rate) climb (and increase the Mach) all by themselves.)
Across the Pond, short "experience flights" from both Paris and London were made from time to time - get out over the Atlantic, light up the afterburners, and tool around at supersonic speeds for some part of an hour before returning to base.
I'm pretty sure subsonic flight was never really efficient at any speed. Concorde was dependent on Mach 1.7 or so (and high altitudes) to maintain the efficiency of nacelle thrust modulated by supersonic intake shockwaves, without very thirsty afterburners. I think that over the Atlantic, losing just one engine (25% of thrust) was enough to make it instantly a fuel emergency situation - you were going to come down into thicker air and fuel burn would skyrocket.
Last edited by pattern_is_full; 26th January 2023 at 04:55 .
Subjects
Fuel Burn
IAS (Indicated Air Speed)
Intakes
Shockwave
Sonic Boom
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