Posts about: "Hydraulic System - YELLOW" [Posts: 7 Page: 1 of 1]¶

Biggles78,
To complement M2dude's notes re nose and visor:

There were basically four 'positions':
Nose and visor up (supersonic),
Nose up, visor down only (subsonic climd and descent),
Nose down 5\xb0, visor down (take-off and initial climb),
Nose down 12.5\xb0, visor down (approach and landing).

Normally nose and visor are raised and lowered by the green hydraulic system (as is done until today on F-BTSD at Le Bourget).

In 'standby' mode, the visor was lowered by the yellow hydraulic system.
Then the nose uplocks were released by the yellow system, and the nose would free-fall to the 5\xb0 position.
Another switch allowed to hydraulically release the 5\xb0 downlocks, and the nose would free-fall again, now to the 12.5\xb0 psition.
In this 'standby' mode, the nose and visor could not be raised again.

In the best "belt, braces AND a piece of string" tradition of Concorde, if both the 'normal' and 'standby' system failed, there was a big handle on the F/O side of the central pedestal.
This released the nose uplocks manually, the nose would start to free-fall, automatically unlocking the visor, and both would then free-fall down: the nose only to the 5\xb0 position.

To complete the story... there is a 5th position: nose 17.5\xb0 down!
This was the 'nose fully down' position as designed originally and installed on 001 and 002.
It met with sharp criticism from the test pilots, because of the lack of a forward visual reference with the nose fully down. "It's like looking over the edge of a cliff", was the unanimous comment of the pilots.
So a couple of mechanical stops were added that limited the 'nose down' angle to 12.5\xb0.
But the basic design of the nose was not changed otherwise, so even on the production aircraft the nose could be lowered to 17.5\xb0, but only in the hangar, by removing the mechanical stops. It may have been done a few times, for better access to the visor and nose mechanism.

Minor anecdote... the nose and visor were up during supersonic flight, of course, but also when the aircraft were on the ground and parked outside, simply to keep the rain and dirt out.
But... the prototypes had a metal visor, with two tiny windows, and it was inconveniently dark on the ground in the cockpit with the visor up . So on the ground we always kept the visor down, unless the aircraft was parked outside for any length of time.

Hi canuck slf, Your incident was not the hydraulic contamination one, I'll describe that one in a minute or so below.
As far as your adventure goes, in the early days of Concorde operation there was an on-going issue of hydraulic seal failures. This led to the sort of thing that you described, where a major seal failure would occur, resulting in the loss of a main system. The standby Yellow system would be switched in to replace the failed one, and depending on the nature of the initial failure, could leak out of the same failed seal. (There were a couple of 'common areas', they were the intake spill door jack, and the Powered Flying Control Units; failures here could result in a double system fail). Your incident was almost certainly due to one of these cases. In the early 1990's the original Neoprene hydraulic seals were replaced with a new Viton GLT seal; this material had far superior age shrinking characteristics to Neoprene, and more or less cured the problem overnight. Eventually all the seals in each aircraft were replaced, and apart from a very few isolated cases, dual system losses were eliminated forever. Air France suffered a similar proportion of failures, however as their flying hours were a fraction of BA's, the effects were not as immediately apparent.
As far as far as the hydraulic contamination story goes, this happened in 1980 but involved one aircraft only, G-BOAG, but in it's original registration of G-BFKW. (having previously been on loan from British Aerospace, where it flew originally as a 'white tail' under this registration). The fragile nature of Concorde hydraulic fluid was not fully understood at this time, and as you say, a hydraulic drum dispenser had inadvertently been left exposed to the atmosphere, and had subsequently suffered water contamination, and this contaminated fluid had found it's way into G-BOAG. Now this hydraulic fluid, CHEVRON M2V has only two vices: One is that is extremely expensive, and the second is that it is highly susceptible to water contamination, EXTEMELY SO. If my memory serves me correctly, the maximum allowable level of water in the fluid is about 8ppm. (parts per million) and the fluid that was analysed after G-BOAG's problems was at about 30 ppm. The water deposits in the fluid gave the equivalent effect of 'rusting up' of critical hydraulic components. I was investigating an air intake control defect the previous day to the incident, but like everybody else had no idea that the real issue here was one of major systems contamination. We were all convinced that we had nailed the problem, only to find that the aircraft turned back on it's subsequent LHR-JFK sector with more serious problems, not only affecting the air intakes, but the artificial feel system also. It was now that we realised that there had to be a hydraulics problem here, and after fluid analysis, the awful truth was discovered. After this event, and the fragilities of M2V fluid were better understood, a strict regime of housekeeping was put in place in terms of fluid storage, and no such incidents with BA ever occurring again. The aircraft itself did not fly again for nine months, all components that were affected were removed from the aircraft and completely stripped and overhauled. Also all of the system hydraulic lines had to be completely purged, until there were no further traces of any contamination. After the aircraft was finally rectified, she successfully again returned to service with her new 'BA' registration of G-BOAG. However the following year, during a C Check, it was decided that due to spares shortages, and the closure of the LHR-BAH-SIN route, there just was not being enough work for seven aircraft, and therefore G-BOAG would be withdrawn from service. (In terms of spares, BA at the time for instance only had six sets of aircraft galleys, as aircraft went in for C checks the galley was 'robbed' to service the aircraft coming out of it's own C check). The aircraft was parked in a remote hangar, and was only visited when a component had to be 'robbed' for another Concorde, and the aircraft soon fell into disrepair, was filthy externally and became a really sad sight. Many people (not myself I might add) were adamant that G-BOAG would never fly again. However, in 1984 things had really started to improve for Concorde, with the charter business increasing and the LHR-JFK route in particular becoming a staggering success. It was decided that OAG would be returned to an airworthy condition. In 1985, with a fresh new interior, and with the new BA colour scheme, she was finally returned to service; and remained as one of the mainstays of the fleet right up to the end of Concorde services in October 2003. She now resides at the Boeing Museum of Flight in Seattle. (I have particularly fond memories of G-BOAG; in a previous post I mentioned flying through an electrical storm in late 1991 over Saudi Arabia, while returning from BKK-BAH to LHR. What I forgot to mention was the spectacle of DOZENS of fierce fires burning on the ground, towards our starboard horizon. These were Sadams oil fires, still burning in Kuwait. It made a sombre contrast to the amazing electrical spectacle right in front of us).

As far as low speed flying control activity was concerned, this was a combination of the fairly flexible outer wing sections, being buffeted by low speed turbulence (the wing tip tanks 5A & 7A also being empty), as well as some autostab inputs. This was perfectly normal, and part of the design our aircraft. However the development aircraft had even more flexible outer wing sections, which used to almost straighten up in high speed flight. However due to fatigue concerns, external lateral stiffeners were added to the underside of the wings during production of the airline aircraft. (these can be easily seen from underneath the wings, just outboard of the nacelles). Unfortunately these external stiffeners also resulted in over a one tonne fuel penalty to the production aircraft, due to increased weight, as well as higher drag in a critical part of the wing aerodynamic surface.

Dude

BRIT312
This story is totally hilarious, can't quite get this visual out of my head. ('100 KTS, POWER SET' sounds so boring in comparison). I never had the good fortune to meet any of the Braniff guys; sounds like there was certainly a character or two there. It really is a pity that their operation never really got a chance to expand into the proposed Pacific Rim service, who knows, it might really have done something.
It's generally known that the BA aircraft were temporarily re-registered to facilitate Braniff's operation out of IAD to DFW; G-BOAA, B, D & E were re-registered from G-BOAA and so on, to G-N94AA etc. Being an older registration, G-BOAC was re-registered as G-N81AC. At IAD, the 'G' part of the registration was covered over, leaving a now perfect 'American' tail number. Only five aircraft were involved in the operation (at the time BA operated just six aircraft, G-BOAF was still at the manufacturers at Filton, and G-BFKW (later to become G-BOAG) was on loan from British Aerospace. In order for the necessary FAA certification, required for operation by a US airline, a modification package were required by the FAA. Some of these modifications seemed a little 'picky' and irrelevant at the time (they still do). However some modifications were certainly not in this category, and quite honestly should have been 'picked up' by the CAA & DGAC during original certification of the aircraft. As an example, if the flying controls had been operating on GREEN or BLUE hydraulics only (due to an indicated spool valve jam) and that particular hydraulic system was subsequently lost, there was originally no automatic switching to select the standby YELLOW system into the flying controls; the controls would have been completely unpowered until a manual selection was made by the pilot. . One of the 'FAA Mods' was to facilitate just that, so if this (extremely unlikely I grant you) scenario had occurred, then YELLOW would automatically been selected into the controls, and at no time would the controls have been in an unpowered state.
The Braniff operation ended in May 1980, due to heavy losses on the subsonic only route, and it's a rather sad irony that aircraft G-BOAF had been modified and reregistered at Filton, from it's original registration of G-BFKX to G-N94AF. Unfortunately the aircraft was delivered to BA in June 1980, one month too late to participate, and prior to delivery it's registration was converted to it's 'normal' British registration; all other aircraft also reverted to original registrations also.
ChristiaanJ
Not really, being the sad b****d that I am, I still remember the Concorde flare law of: h+5h. = 0, so it was fairly easy to work out the programmed descent rates. (I did have to check the final 1.7'/second figure though). The rest I'm afraid is straight out of this sad old memory of mine.
Bellerophon
A brilliant description of the mechanics of final approach. It's so easy for us mere mortals to forget just what an involved and skilled process it was, to fly, and in particular land our totally amazing aircraft.

Dude

Landroger
Actually it was a great and moving experience Roger. All the people at the function were BA 'Concorde family', so the noise we made that evening was certainly sufficient. It sounds weird I know, but it was almost as if OAC was entering the spirit of the occasion. (And the aircraft was open for us to take photos, reminisce and quite honestly to help remind us all that something really wonderful was now missing from our lives). The aircraft is in such good general condition that she never really seems 'dead' at all
howiehowie93
Nothing missing here Howie. On the RIGHT HAND engines, ie. 2 & 4, Concorde had 2 hydraulic pumps, but on 1 & 3 engines there was only a single pump. What you can see is the spare gearbox provision for the extra YELLOW pump, right next to the IDG. (You can see the pipes coming from the GREEN hydraulic pump in the forward face of the gearbox, immediately forward of the 'blank').

Best regards
Dude

My favorite moment in that vid, too. I've seen two different 'edits' of it as well. One version ends "taking our service still higher and higher", the other "she's just a bird in the sky, and that is where she belongs", and there are other differences as well. But both contain those (supposed) take off shots with the nose at 12.5 degrees droop!

I was also told by an ex-Concorde pilot that they lost the 'yellow' system just as they pulled up from the Red Arrows formation and powered away!

Shaggy Sheep Driver

...told by an ex-Concorde pilot that they lost the 'yellow' system just as they pulled up from the Red Arrows formation...

I don't quite understand why the Yellow system would have been in use at that point - and thus how they came to notice they had lost it!

I suppose the obvious inference is that they may have already experienced one of the several various problems or failures that caused Yellow system to auto-onload.

Best Regards

Bellerophon

Quax .95
The trick was to get as many hydraulic systems online ASAP during engine start/pushback, and that's where the sequence was defined. Now my tired/worn out/time-expired brain recollects that number TWO engine was started first, this gave us GREEN and YELLOW systems, followed by number THREE engine, which now gave us BLUE system. Once these engines were successfully started the 2 air start trucks (oh for that darned APU) could be disconnected and preliminary system checks, including full and free flying controls, could be carried out. After push-back the outboard engines were started by using adjacent engine cross-bleed (as BRIT312 quite correctly stated years ago, there was no 'cross the ship' cross-bleed duct), the remaining system checks would be carried out. After this the tow-bar would be disconnected, the nose lowered to 5 \xb0 and our Concorde would taxi away ready to leap up into the heavens; the place that she truly belonged.

Best Regards
Dude