Posts by user "EXWOK" [Posts: 111 Total up-votes: 0 Page: 1 of 6]¶

Approach handling was an interesting exercise - being so far down the back of the drag curve (over 100kts below best L/D) very accurate thrust handling was required.

The autothrottle was always used for approach if servicable, except for a two-engined approach, and was absolutely excellent. There were two, operating in parallel, and if the speed was more than a couple of knots out for more than a few seconds it was unusual. In IAS ACQ mode there was an active input from the INS which tracked grounspeed and so enabled anticipatory throttle movements during wind changes - if an autoland runway was available the preferred method of dealing with an approach likely to experience windshear was to carry out an autoland. (I think I speak for everyone, though, if I express a preference for the just going somewhere else option).

In Supercruise one autothrottle only was rearmed if the associated autopilot was engaged - it wasn't active but was available to cater for sudden drops in temperature which could cause unpleasant sudden high rates of climb if the temp shear was sufficient.

The rest of the flight - basically manual thrust, usually with the throttles fully forward.

Maybe one day we'll start making aeroplanes with such sophisticated systems again...........there's still lots that hasn't been hinted at on this thread

Biggles:

Yep, there was feedback. In this respect, the implementation of FBW had a rather different philosophy to FBW Airbus'.

Below 200kts it was basically a spring feedback, above that speed it was achieved throught the feel system, not entirely unlike conventional aircraft.

Of course, the feel was tempered also by the autostab system, which didn't feedback through the yoke, but did make control surface inputs. A basic analogy is to imagine a yaw damper, but on all three axes. (It was of course rather more sophisticated, especially in pitch).

During airtests we would fly portions of the supersonic accel without autostabs and it was then very obvious exactly how much input was being made - great care was needed to remain within sensible bank angles in the low supersonic regime.

Also - watch a video of the control surfaces in the latter stages of the approach and landing - all those rapid deflections are the autostabs overlaid on the pilot's inputs. One has to remember that the aircraft is effectively statically unstable in pitch at approach speeds, so a pilot up-elevator input would soon be followed by a countering autostab elevon-down to contain the tendency to keep pitching up, and vice-versa. Gusts affecting the IAS would also create an input.

All of which means the basic spring feel below 200kts is not as basic as it sounds.....and in normal signalling modes (ie FBW and autostab active) the amazing thing is that the aircraft handled beautifully through an 1100kt speed range.

If you look at a picture of the flightdeck you will see a row of 14 white switches full width of the fwd edge of the overhead panel. These were autostab pitch/roll/yaw, feel pitch/roll/yaw left and right systems and the two pitch trim switches (which played a big part in the low-speed protection).

If any of them dropped out you could be sure that the first thing the nearest pilot would do would be to try to re-engage them, as it made for a vastly more pleasant life.

Also, regarding the 4000psi pressure adopted - the control surfaces most definitely did need powerful actuators; as you now know they were very active, especially on approach and transonic, and as well as IASs of up to 530kts you have all the lever arm changes brought by shifting centres of pressure over the surfaces caused by shockwave movements.

If you want to fly supersonic, frontal area is everything so 4000psi also has the benefit of keeping the PFCU cross-section down.

I'm sure M2Dude will be able to give a better explanation of this aspect - it's nearly seven years since I flew the beast (that's depressing) and it's hard enough to remember detail of the flying bits, let alone the complex engineering aspects.

Oh yeah - finally:

As for my allusion to other interesting areas of this aeroplane, we've all got our favourite examples - but I for one will see how the thread progresses naturally before I start proselytising about my favourite bits.

Hi M2Dude - keep it coming! I missed all this stuff from the early days......

Tim00 - good question, and very relevant.

It takes a lot to incapacitate a Flight Engineer - beer, cigars and scary women were no issue - they were definitely the most relaible part of the operation. (And arguably the least attractive.....)

If the unthinkable happened the First Officer would find himself on the FE's seat. We practised it less often than you might think, but thought about it a great deal. Especially the fuel system management.

Which brings me to your second point - yes, there was a preset for the 'automatic' fuel transfer system, although that wasn't the mechanism used for the pilots to 'take control' of the CG. The critical thing was to be able to get the CG forward if a rapid decel had to be made - for this reason there was an override switch above the First Officer which used various pumps and valves to txfr fwds - primarily by txfring from tank 11. It would be used in various recall checklists (supersonic 4-engine flameout and Continuous Ssurge at M>1.3 seem to register from the dim past) until the FE was able to take over the txfr system himself.

I didn't ever need it - in the surges I encountered the FE was always ready to manage the txfr before we needed the override.

Oooooooh!!!! There's a new topic for someone: Surges.

Theoretically the correct checklist to call for was the "Continuous Engine surge above M 1.3 Conditional Procedure, please". In reality the call was always much more succinct.

Monosyllabic, in fact................

I'm off to the pub, but I bet Bellerophon can speak with erudition on the operational aspects, and if M2Dude is who I suspect he is, I KNOW he'll be able to cover the technical aspects in great depth!

WOK

Always more nose up than a conventional a/c.

As you note, about 4 in the CRZ. About 10.5 degs on approach.

As part of the performance calcs we calculated a 'theta 2' value of pitch. This was bugged on the ADI with a little bug controlled from a thumbwheel on the yoke - at all speeds very accurate pitch control was required, hance this device and the ADI being calibrated in 1 degree increments.

Theta 2 was attitude reqd to obtain V2 in the first segment with one engine out, i.e. the target attitude if an engine failed after V1. Once the gear was up (second segment) one would pitch up a little to hold V2 until 600ft then start initial accel.

On all engines, one held it until 250kts then pitched up to maintain that speed. You'd typically reach it before passing over the M25 departing LHR to the West.

In all cases, as soon as SID altitude or noise abatement limits had been reached you went to the barber's pole asap (400kts initially) as this was where best performance lay.

Galaxy flyer -

TO perf calcs were basically sinilar to a susonic type, which involved a tabulation for each runway in a manual and an A4 proforma.

It was no more complex than a 'Classic' 747, but with a slightly different emphasis - e.g. all take-offs at full, reheated thrust, calculation of fuel transfer or burn off during taxy to achieve TOCG, calculation of timings and thrust setting for runway-specific noise abatement procedures, calculation of theta 2, and planned fuel flow and P7 to set in the take-off monitor (A system designed to aid, but not substitute, the decision of the FE as to whether TO thrust had been achieved, as well as auto selection of contingency power if a failure was detected).

You'd also determine whether a single reheat failure was acceptable that day - the little '3' or '4' bug at the lower left of the engine instruments was set as a visual reminder.

Not sure what you mean by Vzf? No flaps on this machine, so no change. May be a difference of nomenclature. Since there is no defined stalling speed for a delta (by conventional standards we lifted off about 60kts below 'stalling speed') Vzrc was substitued. This is the speed at which full thrust would result in a zero rate of climb. On three engines, this was the basis of the perf calculation, but we also calculated 2-eng Vzrc's gear up and gear down. IIRC they would come out at about 250kts/300kts.

On a transatlantic sector you would do all this and the speeds would invariably be within 5 kts of 160/190/220kts. (V1,Vr,V2)......

In the end we had a little handheld computer which would perform take off calcs, but to be honest it was only a minute more effort to carry out a manual calc.

It was certificated - up to a point. Problematic? Maybe not, but it was a part of the flt envelope to be treated with respect.

Obviously there are no spoilers, and once you translate to 'vortex lift' (stalled in conventional terms) there is definitely no shortage of drag. (This happened at about 250kts at landing weight).

Supersonic - it was certainly no sailplane and an ability to increase drag wasn't required.

So - there is a bit of the flight envelope where you are subsonic, descending at about 350kts IAS, where you may need a bit of drag; e.g. to make the FL140 limit on the OCK 1A SID (as it then was) to LHR.

To facilitate this, engines 2 and 3 could be selected to reverse idle within certain strict limitations (most of which have now left my brain). The mechanism was to ask the SFE to arm the system on his panel and then to select reverse on the inboards. Where the system was slightly unreliable was that you were running the air-driven buckets with the engines at idle thrust - consequently they sometimes didn't make a full reverse selection, in which case you canx reverse on that engine and managed on one.

Clearly the big event would be if they didn't translate into fwd thrust, which is one of the reasons it wasn't done below 10 000'. I'm not aware of this happening.

To be honest it was only really used when ATC threw an alt constraint at you during the descent, because in general if you just pitched down to 380kts (Vmo when subsonic at typical approach weights) you would get the height off comfortably.

Question for engineering types:

I remember being told in my conversion course that the motors driving the secondary nozzles (buckets) were the fastest rotating devices on the aircraft. Is it true? Have you got a number for it? Was it really more than the gyro in the stby horizon?

If anyone has seen the video of AF landing at BZZ after the first post-grounding test flight, you may have noticed that you can hear the buckets translating to reverse even over the noise of the blustery wind and four Olympus 593's at idle.

Nick:

The top of the boundary is FL600, largely an artificial number - the airframe is good for rather higher than this, but I believe air supply and ramp scheduling could become an issue not so far above this level.

Mmo - ditto. As others have said, Mmo was originally going to be higher (M2.2) but was reduced to extend fatigue life as the aircraft design 'grew'.

The significance of the shaded 59% portion of the graph is that it shows the envelope at that CG - in this case the relevant line is the bottom of the shaded area - M1.56. This is the MINIMUM mach number that can be flown with the CG at 59% (normal for supersonic cruise). You will see it represented on the Machmeter (a few pages back) as the "AFT" bug. i.e. you can't fly slower than this without moving the CG forward.

So it can be seen that the decel must be done in concert with CG transfer - and as (mostly) always the designers had made it as straightforward as possible. Transferring forward from Tank 11 using the two electric pumps the rate of txfr pretty well matched the standard decel profile, leaving the FE to make the occasional tweak to keep the flight envelope in concert with the CG envelope through the decel/descent.

In the case of abnormal procedures depriving one of electrical power then some other way had to be found to enable a descent (which required a decel) and that is why there are also two hydraulically driven fuel transfer pumps in tank 11.

It's a bit confusing at first, but there are two overlapping flight envelopes - the speeds/alts drawn on the basic envelope and those determined by the CG postion at the time.

In practice - one had a takeoff CG, a landing CG, a subsonic crz CG, a supersonic cruise CG and the only area one had to keep a close eye on was the transition between the last two. There were several visual and aural warnings to back up the CG and Machmeter bugs.

For the sharp-eyed who may have actually gone back to look at Bellerophon's picture, you may note that the AFT bug is lower than M1.56, contrary to the flt envelope above. Billy ruffian will know for sure, but here's my surmise:

FL600 level flt means he was going to BGI. The length of this sector was, in crude terms, about 200NM more than the quoted max range of the aircraft, so the range envelope was being pushed a little.

Because there was no land you could stay supersonic all the way, so at the end of the cruise you would be supersonic, but with relatively little fuel in the tanks, and most of it in Tank 11 (at the back) to keep the CG aft. Even with a tweak to tanks 1&4 to run them at 50% level, eventually the CG would come forward as you burnt fuel out of tank 11. That's what is probably happening in Bellerophon's photo, hence the 'AFT' Mach bug being at a lower Mach. If the FCPI ('ICOVOL') was in the frame I wager you would see the elevons a somewhat above the optimum 1/2degree down position

The bugger was this; if you were a little tight on fuel, just when you wanted to maximise the time spent supersonic you'd have to start an early decel because there just wasn't enough fuel left to maintain the CG far enough aft to sustain M2.

All part of the fun, and why every sector was interesting and rewarding.

Oooops - thanks for pointing out my AOT logic there. Note to self: don't post after returning from a night flight!

The other reason for the disparity of bugs on the Machmeter vs the flt envelope is whether they relate to the first or second M/CG warning. I can't remember and don't have the manuals to hand. I do recall that it was more accurate/practical to monitor the speed-driven limits on the CG indicator rather than the CG-driven limits on the machmeter.

Stilton, M2dude -

Did the French aircraft not have a slightly different DC system a la OAG?

If so, it primarily related to NiCd batteries and chargers to suit same, and the lack of main DC bus tie split IIRC.

Oh, and I believe the French flt crews' seat cushions were grey, not blue!

The deceleration would be like very hard braking after landing, so - yes.

The drag incurred flying supersonic was once described to me as like flying through wood, not air. The only times I ever closed all 4 throttles at M2 was dealing with surges (see earlier posts on the subject). While not quite like flying into teak, the decel was very impressive - it more than once resulted in a member of cabin crew appearing in the flt deck in a semi-seated position, grimly trying to stop a fully loaded galley cart.......

As for four-engine flameouts - perish the thought. The checklists, like many, depended on flight phase;

Above M1.2 it was expected that windmilling would provide adequate eletric and hydraulic power so the c/list aimed to start a fuel txfr forward, use the spare hydraulic system to drive half the PFCUs, ensure a fuel supply to the engs and ensure cooling to equipment.

Below M1.2 the RAT would be deployed, it was less likely that the standard means of fuel txfr would work so valves were overridden and the hydraulic fuel pumps brought into use, and the Mach fell further the PFCUs were put on half-body use only, using the stby hydraulic system.

You weren't far from the ground, in time, at this stage so it was a good time to get an engine relit!

Given the Olympus' auto-relight capability a four engine loss was going to be caused by something fairly drastic.

Stilton -

Pre-accident I think we did use different tyres than AF. I also recall that BA elected to not use retreaded tyres while AF did, but am not 100% on that.

A pivotal part of the return to service was the Michelin 'NZG' tyre. (Near-Zero-Growth).

The tyres on Conc were incredibly hard-worked, partly because of the speed and partly because they took the full weight of the a/c throughout take-off (a conventional wing is producing a fair bit of lift prior to rotate - concorde produces none of note).

A LOT of energy is stored in a heavy tyre rotating this fast, so a burst can shed debris at great velocity.

The make-up of the NZG meant that it contained the expansion caused by rotation better (so less stored energy in the carcass), and had a far more robust and damage-tolerant structure. The videos of the destructive testing compared with the original tyres is frankly amazing.

The tyre was being developed by Michelin for the A380, I believe, and the principle was adopted for new Concorde tyres. In my opinion, this was the contribution which ensured we got back in the air.

Yep, agreed.

..........which was one reason it was so important to touch down with the wings level - even a very small angle of bank could result in bucket contact as they translated to the reverse position. It was a surprise coming to Concorde to find it was even more restrictive than the 747 in this respect.

And just to round this off.......you will see from the above that the final insult to a Concorde tyre comes at rotate when (owing to the download caused by the up-elevon input) the download on it is actually increased until the rotation passes 7 degrees or so, and vortex lift starts properly.

In response to your query: V1 was typically about 160kts on a transatlantic sector, with a Vr of about 190 and a V2 approx 220.

It wasn't in the flight manual but I seem to recall that the standing signal prior to nosewheel spinup was 100m/s. Presumably this also prevented brake application until the nose was down, being much higher than touchdown speed.

Anyone who travelled in the beast will know that we didn't use the brakes gently - they worked far better if you stood on them firmly and also seemed to wear less; certainly there seemed to be a lot more dust on the wheels if you used them gently.

Taxying out one had to be careful, it was easy to get a brake temp light on (was it 200degs? 220?) which meant waiting ages for it to cool. The watchword was minimum number of brake applications and make them firm, not feathery. And be careful on the lightweight departures as you needed them more.

M2Dude has it all correct here. It only really happened regularly on the LHR-BGI route (low temps at crz alt, and light weight as you've burnt most of the fuel).

In the MAX Cruise mode the aircraft would sniff about vertically, gently climbing and descending to hold M2 (following the temperature changes), but with an overall general climb.

Heading to BGI you were climbing into very cold air, commonly down to less than -70degs, I saw minus 80 on multiple occasions. (Which was all very good news from a fuel point of view). So the climb was more definite and the likelihood of a subsequent descent lower.

It was pretty easy to spot when the aircraft was definitely going to 'stick' at FL600, and to select Alt Hold, with the already armed AT (with Max Crz mode) engagd in Mach Hold. Very occasionally one may have to subsequently make a subsequent return to Max Crz mode if warmer air was encountered, but I don't recall doing this more than once.

If you had very cold air and a lighter than average load, one would find that the throttles (no 'thrust levers' on Concorde!) were quite a long way back at TOD, maybe 10-14 degrees throttle angle. It was worth noticing this early - the decel/descent was initiated by reducing the throttles to 18degrees, normally this would be from full forward so it can be seen that reducing them by 4 or 5 degrees rather than the usual 18 could result in a disappointing rate of decel. At nearly 20NM a minute this could really screw your descent plan! (I think the record-holders went past BGI still just the wrong side of M1......)

I used to enjoy the last few minutes of the flight at FL600 - before the space station was manned and post-MIR there was a fair chance that at that moment we were the human beings furthest from the surface of the planet. In shirtsleeves, with a cup of tea (or something more palatable if one was in one of the comfy seats).