August 24, 2010, 21:49:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5890348
ChristiaanJ
aaah yes, Max Climb/Max Cruise modes. I'd not forgotten this my friend, I was going to say a few words about that in a future post, but maybe we can do that now. (And I'd love to hear more of your comments on this here too, ChristiaanJ). The intake and autopilot modifications were in a way complimentary it's true, but really dealt with separate problems, at least in my view:
The intake control unit software change (a change to the control law that limited engine N1 as a function of intake local Mach number, Mo, and inlet total temperature, T1) was able to put an absolute limit on aircraft achievable Mach number during Mmo overshoots, but it would not PREVENT Mmo overshoots occurring altogether, it was more of a safety brake. This particular overspeed problem manifested itself well before route proving, and in fact the intake system 'fix' resulted in the Thrust Auto Reduce System being deleted, electronic control boxes and all. The TAR system was fitted on all development aircraft equiped with the digital intake system, and it tried (in vain) to limit extreme Mach overshoots. The production aircraft retained the TAR wiring and locked out circuit breakers, as well as two vacant spaces on the electronic racks. The prime reason for all these efforts were that some of the rapid excessive Mach overshoots quite often drove the intake into surge; the modification to this N1 limiter control enabled engine mass flow to be controlled in such a way that these surges could be prevented during temperature shears. The aircraft Mach limit was an extremely useful fringe benefit.
The AFCS mode change from what was Max Op and Max Op Soft (always loved that name) to Max Climb/Max Cruise was at a stroke able to deal with the regular Mmo overspeeds that kept on occuring during, as you say, the route proving trials of 1975, when British aircraft G-BOAC and the French aircrfraft F-BTSD carried out pre entry into service evaluation flights, SD sadly was the aircraft that was tragically lost at Gonez in July 2000). The Max Climb/Max Cruise AFCS mode combo is a mode like no other that I've personally seen before or since anywhere, (it for instance resulted an elsewhere taboo; an autopilot and an autothrotte working together IN A SPEED MODE).
This problem encountered primarily at lower lattitudes, (for example, G-BOAC doing route proving flights out of Singapore), occurring initially as the aircraft reached Mach 2. It was termed 'the insurmountable problem', but the AFCS designers (such as ChristiaanJ) fortunately did not have 'insurmountable problems' in their vocabulary. The issue was that the aircraft would have been climbing rapidly at Vmo of 530 KTS, with throttles at the gate as usual, At exactly 50,189' we hit what was known as 'the corner point' in the flight envelope, where 530 KTS IAS equated to Mach 2 exactly. Max Op mode would then 'let go' of the Vmo segment, and try and control the aircraft to Mach 2. (As the aircraft climbed, Vmo itself would progreesively decrease in order to equate to Mmo, or 2.04 Mach). But in very cold conditions, the aircraft still 'wanting' to accelerate, and the simple Max Op/Max Op Soft modes just could not cope with gentle pitch changes alone. The problem became even bigger during the cruise/climb when severe temperature shears occured, and routinely regular Mmo exceedences occured. Something had to be done, and something WAS done and how; enter Max Climb/Max Cruise. It was really a classic piece of design, where the aircraft would do the initial supersonic climb in Max Climb mode. This mode itself was relatively simple, in that it was more or less a Vmo -Vc hold mode. That meant that the difference at selection between indicated airspeed, Vc and Vmo would be maintained, with a vernier datum adjust to this being available. In practice this mode was selected pretty much at Vmo, so datum adjusting was not always required. Now comes the clever part; the autothrottle, this would operate in standy mode at this point, just waiting there doing nothing, with the throttles at maximum as before. So the aircraft would now climb as Vmo increased to 530 KTS, and then following a now constant Vmo of 530 KTS until the magic 'corner point' (51, 189' remember). Now all hell would break loose; the mode would automatically change to Max Cruise, the autothrottle would also be automaically selected to Mach Hold mode (initially datumed here to Mach 2) and the throttles would retard, attempting to hold this Mach 2 datum, and the autopilot is commands a 'fly up' signal, over a 20 second lag period to 600'/minute. Now comes an even cleverer (?) part; the autothrottle Mach Hold datum is gradually increased over a 100 second period towards Mach 2.02, and so in stable conditions the throttles would now gradually increase again until they once more reach the maximum limit. At this point, the autothrottles now come out of Mach Hold mode and back into the waiting in the wings standby mode. The autopilot would now cancel it's 600' fly up, demand, returning to a datum of Mach 2. There was a little more complexity built in also, where the difference between the 'commanded' and actual vertical speeds offset the autoplilot Mach 2 datum. This would apply whether the autothrottle had cut in (+600'/min demand) or with the throttles back at maximum (0'/minute demand. A positive climb error tweaked the cruise Mach up slightly, a negative error (eg. in a turn) the converse was true. The effect of all of this complexity was that the aircraft itself could 'scan' until it settled at a point where the throttles could be at maximum, and the speed between Mach 2 and 2.02. On the North Atlantic, with warmer ISA temperatures, there was usually just the initial routine with the autothrottle as you hit the corner point. However at lower lattitudes (eg. LHR BGI) there could be a few initial autothrottle intercepts before things settled down. This whole incredible routine completely took care of the insurmountable problem, a problem that was shown not only to be insurmountable, but was put to bed forever, by people like ChristiaanJ.
I hope that my explanation here does not sound too much like gibberish.
EXWOK
I think you've guessed right as far as my identity goes; it's great that it's not just Concorde pilots I can bore the socks off now
PS. I bet the ex-SEOs LOVED your comments
Dude
aaah yes, Max Climb/Max Cruise modes. I'd not forgotten this my friend, I was going to say a few words about that in a future post, but maybe we can do that now. (And I'd love to hear more of your comments on this here too, ChristiaanJ). The intake and autopilot modifications were in a way complimentary it's true, but really dealt with separate problems, at least in my view:
The intake control unit software change (a change to the control law that limited engine N1 as a function of intake local Mach number, Mo, and inlet total temperature, T1) was able to put an absolute limit on aircraft achievable Mach number during Mmo overshoots, but it would not PREVENT Mmo overshoots occurring altogether, it was more of a safety brake. This particular overspeed problem manifested itself well before route proving, and in fact the intake system 'fix' resulted in the Thrust Auto Reduce System being deleted, electronic control boxes and all. The TAR system was fitted on all development aircraft equiped with the digital intake system, and it tried (in vain) to limit extreme Mach overshoots. The production aircraft retained the TAR wiring and locked out circuit breakers, as well as two vacant spaces on the electronic racks. The prime reason for all these efforts were that some of the rapid excessive Mach overshoots quite often drove the intake into surge; the modification to this N1 limiter control enabled engine mass flow to be controlled in such a way that these surges could be prevented during temperature shears. The aircraft Mach limit was an extremely useful fringe benefit.
The AFCS mode change from what was Max Op and Max Op Soft (always loved that name) to Max Climb/Max Cruise was at a stroke able to deal with the regular Mmo overspeeds that kept on occuring during, as you say, the route proving trials of 1975, when British aircraft G-BOAC and the French aircrfraft F-BTSD carried out pre entry into service evaluation flights, SD sadly was the aircraft that was tragically lost at Gonez in July 2000). The Max Climb/Max Cruise AFCS mode combo is a mode like no other that I've personally seen before or since anywhere, (it for instance resulted an elsewhere taboo; an autopilot and an autothrotte working together IN A SPEED MODE).
This problem encountered primarily at lower lattitudes, (for example, G-BOAC doing route proving flights out of Singapore), occurring initially as the aircraft reached Mach 2. It was termed 'the insurmountable problem', but the AFCS designers (such as ChristiaanJ) fortunately did not have 'insurmountable problems' in their vocabulary. The issue was that the aircraft would have been climbing rapidly at Vmo of 530 KTS, with throttles at the gate as usual, At exactly 50,189' we hit what was known as 'the corner point' in the flight envelope, where 530 KTS IAS equated to Mach 2 exactly. Max Op mode would then 'let go' of the Vmo segment, and try and control the aircraft to Mach 2. (As the aircraft climbed, Vmo itself would progreesively decrease in order to equate to Mmo, or 2.04 Mach). But in very cold conditions, the aircraft still 'wanting' to accelerate, and the simple Max Op/Max Op Soft modes just could not cope with gentle pitch changes alone. The problem became even bigger during the cruise/climb when severe temperature shears occured, and routinely regular Mmo exceedences occured. Something had to be done, and something WAS done and how; enter Max Climb/Max Cruise. It was really a classic piece of design, where the aircraft would do the initial supersonic climb in Max Climb mode. This mode itself was relatively simple, in that it was more or less a Vmo -Vc hold mode. That meant that the difference at selection between indicated airspeed, Vc and Vmo would be maintained, with a vernier datum adjust to this being available. In practice this mode was selected pretty much at Vmo, so datum adjusting was not always required. Now comes the clever part; the autothrottle, this would operate in standy mode at this point, just waiting there doing nothing, with the throttles at maximum as before. So the aircraft would now climb as Vmo increased to 530 KTS, and then following a now constant Vmo of 530 KTS until the magic 'corner point' (51, 189' remember). Now all hell would break loose; the mode would automatically change to Max Cruise, the autothrottle would also be automaically selected to Mach Hold mode (initially datumed here to Mach 2) and the throttles would retard, attempting to hold this Mach 2 datum, and the autopilot is commands a 'fly up' signal, over a 20 second lag period to 600'/minute. Now comes an even cleverer (?) part; the autothrottle Mach Hold datum is gradually increased over a 100 second period towards Mach 2.02, and so in stable conditions the throttles would now gradually increase again until they once more reach the maximum limit. At this point, the autothrottles now come out of Mach Hold mode and back into the waiting in the wings standby mode. The autopilot would now cancel it's 600' fly up, demand, returning to a datum of Mach 2. There was a little more complexity built in also, where the difference between the 'commanded' and actual vertical speeds offset the autoplilot Mach 2 datum. This would apply whether the autothrottle had cut in (+600'/min demand) or with the throttles back at maximum (0'/minute demand. A positive climb error tweaked the cruise Mach up slightly, a negative error (eg. in a turn) the converse was true. The effect of all of this complexity was that the aircraft itself could 'scan' until it settled at a point where the throttles could be at maximum, and the speed between Mach 2 and 2.02. On the North Atlantic, with warmer ISA temperatures, there was usually just the initial routine with the autothrottle as you hit the corner point. However at lower lattitudes (eg. LHR BGI) there could be a few initial autothrottle intercepts before things settled down. This whole incredible routine completely took care of the insurmountable problem, a problem that was shown not only to be insurmountable, but was put to bed forever, by people like ChristiaanJ.
I hope that my explanation here does not sound too much like gibberish.
EXWOK
I think you've guessed right as far as my identity goes; it's great that it's not just Concorde pilots I can bore the socks off now
PS. I bet the ex-SEOs LOVED your comments
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 25th August 2010 at 00:14 . Reason: missed out some info' (sorry)
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AFCS (Automtic Flight Control System) Auto-pilot Auto-throttle Engine surge F-BTSD Flight Envelope G-BOAC IAS (Indicated Air Speed) Intakes LHR Mmo N1 (revolutions) Temperature Shear Vmo
August 24, 2010, 22:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5890423
Landroger
Wow, that's a very interesting question, do you mind if I give it a tiny slant of my own, namely system distribution?
Concorde had an ENORMOUS number of electronic control boxes, for example the powerplant alone used TWENTY SIX rather heavy computers and control units, all of which used conventional 1970's manufacturing technology. (Although the intake box was a work of art; rows and rows of double sided PCBs completely crammed with TTL chips). This whole entourage literally weighed a ton, and could be easily replaced by four modern relatively light units with multiple redundancy built in). Even the AFCS used a total of sixteen heavy boxes, again these could be reduced to three, for a modern triple channel system. The three INUs and two ADCs (Very heavy units all) could be replaced with a single ADIRU and SAARU. To complete the package two FMCs (which would also furnish autothrottle functions) could be added. A massive weight saving could be made on the FBW system, by removing the bulky mechanical components (the feel and relay jacks as well as all the mechanical control runs and the massive mixing unit under the rear floor). Careful design could easily provide a full authority triplex or quadraplex FBW system. The current controls could be replaced with either an Airbus or Boeing type system, using either a sidestick (Airbus) or retain a conventional control column system (B777/787) using electric backdrive. The pilots can decide this one. A modern databus system would also be required for providing communication and redundancy; ARINC 629 would be MY preferred choice). The wholesale replacement of the various control units and computers, not to forget miles of wiring, as well as some bulky mechanical hardware would in my view save around 3 tonnes or more in weight alone. A now far more accurate control of aircraft systems would also bring major efficiency savings. As far as saving space, that possibly free up a couple of seat rows, if it were all done properly.
We can all dream I suppose
Dude
My question, which is a bit of a tilt at windmills, is this; If you had to build Concorde all over again with the same airframe and engines, how much more room, how much lighter and how much more capable would the electronics be if they were made using the latest surface mount, Extremely High Density integrated circuits and microprocessors?
Concorde had an ENORMOUS number of electronic control boxes, for example the powerplant alone used TWENTY SIX rather heavy computers and control units, all of which used conventional 1970's manufacturing technology. (Although the intake box was a work of art; rows and rows of double sided PCBs completely crammed with TTL chips). This whole entourage literally weighed a ton, and could be easily replaced by four modern relatively light units with multiple redundancy built in). Even the AFCS used a total of sixteen heavy boxes, again these could be reduced to three, for a modern triple channel system. The three INUs and two ADCs (Very heavy units all) could be replaced with a single ADIRU and SAARU. To complete the package two FMCs (which would also furnish autothrottle functions) could be added. A massive weight saving could be made on the FBW system, by removing the bulky mechanical components (the feel and relay jacks as well as all the mechanical control runs and the massive mixing unit under the rear floor). Careful design could easily provide a full authority triplex or quadraplex FBW system. The current controls could be replaced with either an Airbus or Boeing type system, using either a sidestick (Airbus) or retain a conventional control column system (B777/787) using electric backdrive. The pilots can decide this one. A modern databus system would also be required for providing communication and redundancy; ARINC 629 would be MY preferred choice). The wholesale replacement of the various control units and computers, not to forget miles of wiring, as well as some bulky mechanical hardware would in my view save around 3 tonnes or more in weight alone. A now far more accurate control of aircraft systems would also bring major efficiency savings. As far as saving space, that possibly free up a couple of seat rows, if it were all done properly.
We can all dream I suppose
Dude
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AFCS (Automtic Flight Control System) Airbus Auto-throttle Boeing FBW (Fly By Wire) Sidestick
August 24, 2010, 22:43:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5890440
ChristiaanJ
Loved your AICU stuff. Here's an extract from 'The Concorde Air Intake Control System':
The Control Highway
This highway is a uni-directional databus that carries binary data transmitted by the AISU to it's pair of AICU's. The Control Highway effectively comprises of a single wire, that has transmitted along it multiplexed digital data, clock and address. (In reality this is a twisted wire pair). The AICS Control Highway data word comprises of 64 bits, transmitted at a PRF of (at least by modern standards) an extremely pedestrian 35 Kbits/second.
Sounded mouthwatering in the 1970's though, 35 Kbits/sec' is almost NINE KB/sec'!!!!.
Dude
Loved your AICU stuff. Here's an extract from 'The Concorde Air Intake Control System':
The Control Highway
This highway is a uni-directional databus that carries binary data transmitted by the AISU to it's pair of AICU's. The Control Highway effectively comprises of a single wire, that has transmitted along it multiplexed digital data, clock and address. (In reality this is a twisted wire pair). The AICS Control Highway data word comprises of 64 bits, transmitted at a PRF of (at least by modern standards) an extremely pedestrian 35 Kbits/second.
Sounded mouthwatering in the 1970's though, 35 Kbits/sec' is almost NINE KB/sec'!!!!.
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 24th August 2010 at 23:11 .
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AICS (Air Intake Control System) AICU (Air Intake Control Computer)
August 25, 2010, 16:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5891869
Nick Thomas
You are right on the button first time, the white paint finish is for heat reflection purposes. (When I worked at Filton/Fairford I remember reading a document showing the difference in 'hot soak' supersonic skin temperatures for white and black paint finishes. I'm afraid I can't remember any figures (it was a couple of million years ago ) but there was quite a surprising difference.
G SXTY
A hearty welcome to this thread, and thank you for your very kind comments; I'm sure I speak for all the Concorde people here when I say that it is quite amazing that so many people, both aviation professionals as well as more 'normal' people are so fascinated by what most of us still regard as the finest aircraft ever to grace the skies. Your comment about 'men with slide rules' is so totally correct; I still remember the No7 & No8 design offices at Filton, these were huge rooms filled with draughtsmen's boards, a horde of designers, all without a single computer in sight.
Dave Rowland is a total gentleman as well as being an extremely knowledgeable flyer too, and I know he (like most of us) would be happy to talk about Concorde until the cows come home.
ChristiaanJ
Aghhhh The dreaded AICU. I'd almost forgotten the innards, as you say the motherboard wiring was a total nightmare (good piece of knitting I seem to remember). As far as the 'secret' bit of the AICU, I think we all know that is a little bit of Concorde mythology, more science museum than secret really. Around ten years ago we had some fairly substantial modifications done to the units, due to component obsolescence. (I seem to remember that some of the components concerned were not only out of production, but only a few hundred examples existed worldwide}. I do remember that the power supply board, resolver demodulator boards as well as a couple of others were replaced with new ones using modern components. The modification did do wonders for component reliability.
The PROM board that you have the photo of reminds me of a really amusing anecdote, told to me by Dr Ted Talbot a while ago. Now Ted is one of the true fathers of the Concorde air intake, an absolute genius as well as being a really pleasant gentleman indeed. I'm pleased to say that when I met him a few months ago, he was still as sharp as ever in his advancing years.
The story goes like this: Much of the Concorde intake development trials were flown out of Tangiers and Casablanca, where cold stratospheric temperatures would be guaranteed. Software changes as a result of the flight trials had to be done in there and 'the field'. The way that you made programmed the PROMS was by 'burning' each individual logic gate with a 9v battery. It was highly specialised, as well as extremely tedious work indeed, as we can all well imagine. Anyway, in while he was in Tangiers with aircraft G-AXDN, Ted had arranged for a rather lovely looking lady to be flown out to do his ROM programming. The HS 125 from Filton landed at Tangiers and taxied in and parked next to Concorde, and all the flight test people were waiting on the tarmac. The door of the 125 opened and out stepped this really leggy lady. 'who's the bint then ?' pipes up a really gritty airframe fitter, in a really broad Bristol accent. Without giving it a thought, Ted chirps 'she's come to blow my proms'. The little fitter grunts, glares at Ted and comes out with 'typical office staff, you get all the ***ing perks'.
You are right on the button first time, the white paint finish is for heat reflection purposes. (When I worked at Filton/Fairford I remember reading a document showing the difference in 'hot soak' supersonic skin temperatures for white and black paint finishes. I'm afraid I can't remember any figures (it was a couple of million years ago ) but there was quite a surprising difference.
G SXTY
A hearty welcome to this thread, and thank you for your very kind comments; I'm sure I speak for all the Concorde people here when I say that it is quite amazing that so many people, both aviation professionals as well as more 'normal' people are so fascinated by what most of us still regard as the finest aircraft ever to grace the skies. Your comment about 'men with slide rules' is so totally correct; I still remember the No7 & No8 design offices at Filton, these were huge rooms filled with draughtsmen's boards, a horde of designers, all without a single computer in sight.
Dave Rowland is a total gentleman as well as being an extremely knowledgeable flyer too, and I know he (like most of us) would be happy to talk about Concorde until the cows come home.
ChristiaanJ
Aghhhh The dreaded AICU. I'd almost forgotten the innards, as you say the motherboard wiring was a total nightmare (good piece of knitting I seem to remember). As far as the 'secret' bit of the AICU, I think we all know that is a little bit of Concorde mythology, more science museum than secret really. Around ten years ago we had some fairly substantial modifications done to the units, due to component obsolescence. (I seem to remember that some of the components concerned were not only out of production, but only a few hundred examples existed worldwide}. I do remember that the power supply board, resolver demodulator boards as well as a couple of others were replaced with new ones using modern components. The modification did do wonders for component reliability.
The PROM board that you have the photo of reminds me of a really amusing anecdote, told to me by Dr Ted Talbot a while ago. Now Ted is one of the true fathers of the Concorde air intake, an absolute genius as well as being a really pleasant gentleman indeed. I'm pleased to say that when I met him a few months ago, he was still as sharp as ever in his advancing years.
The story goes like this: Much of the Concorde intake development trials were flown out of Tangiers and Casablanca, where cold stratospheric temperatures would be guaranteed. Software changes as a result of the flight trials had to be done in there and 'the field'. The way that you made programmed the PROMS was by 'burning' each individual logic gate with a 9v battery. It was highly specialised, as well as extremely tedious work indeed, as we can all well imagine. Anyway, in while he was in Tangiers with aircraft G-AXDN, Ted had arranged for a rather lovely looking lady to be flown out to do his ROM programming. The HS 125 from Filton landed at Tangiers and taxied in and parked next to Concorde, and all the flight test people were waiting on the tarmac. The door of the 125 opened and out stepped this really leggy lady. 'who's the bint then ?' pipes up a really gritty airframe fitter, in a really broad Bristol accent. Without giving it a thought, Ted chirps 'she's come to blow my proms'. The little fitter grunts, glares at Ted and comes out with 'typical office staff, you get all the ***ing perks'.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AICU (Air Intake Control Computer) Filton G-AXDN
August 25, 2010, 23:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5892703
Brit312
It's so great to have a Flight Engineer's input into this fascinating thread. Your write up on the complexities of managing the fuel system was something else; the best such description I've ever read. I'm still wetting myself with your story about the E/O coming out of the loo with his trolleys around his ankles after a surge. (Not you I hope
).
The original air intake that was in use for the first few years of airline operation was as you know far more prone to surging than the later modified intake with the thinned and lowered bottom lip, which was far more stable and forgiving. Not only was the 'new' intake more stable, a new leading edge fitted to the rear ramp as part of the same modification, at a stroke cured the very serious ramp vibration issue, that was causing intake structural problems at lower supersonic Mach numbers. The most impressive change of all was a fuel saving of around 1.5 Tonnes per Atlantic crossing, with even bigger improvements in cooler temperatures. A major software change obviously accompanied this modification.
ChristiaanJ
YEP! I remember now, the ADC/DAC board definitely WAS one of the candidates that were modified.
I think you will find the tale about AICUs being removed after museum delivery flights was more urban myth. The only units that I can remember being removed or relocated were the ground power protection unit, the TCAS processors and the radar transceivers. (BA had retrofitted their aircraft with a superb Bendix system a few years earlier, and the same units (with windshear detection re-enabled) are used on other aircraft types).
As far as ferrite cores are concerned, asked by DozyWannabe , the original Delco C1VAC INS fitted to the BA Concorde aircraft did utilise ferrite cores. These were replaced with CMOS EPROMs when a modification was carried out in the early 90's, in which a navigation database was fitted to the units. The fuel consumed and total fuel remaining indicators definitely used a ferrite core memory. These electronic displays used an internal memory in case of power interrupts. As far as AFCS goes, can you check your records? Although, as you say, a completely analog system (with the exception of the ITEM test computers) I seem to remember that the Safety Flight Control Computer used a ferrite core for the flying control strain gauge null memory. I could be wrong here, but I can't remember any other NVM in use at the time.
Galaxy Flyer
I'll leave it to one of my pilot (or F/E) friends to answer this one it that's OK.
Dude
It's so great to have a Flight Engineer's input into this fascinating thread. Your write up on the complexities of managing the fuel system was something else; the best such description I've ever read. I'm still wetting myself with your story about the E/O coming out of the loo with his trolleys around his ankles after a surge. (Not you I hope
).
The original air intake that was in use for the first few years of airline operation was as you know far more prone to surging than the later modified intake with the thinned and lowered bottom lip, which was far more stable and forgiving. Not only was the 'new' intake more stable, a new leading edge fitted to the rear ramp as part of the same modification, at a stroke cured the very serious ramp vibration issue, that was causing intake structural problems at lower supersonic Mach numbers. The most impressive change of all was a fuel saving of around 1.5 Tonnes per Atlantic crossing, with even bigger improvements in cooler temperatures. A major software change obviously accompanied this modification.
ChristiaanJ
The one I know about is the ADC/DAC board (analog-digital and digital-analog converter board). The supply of either ADCs or DACs ran out literaly worldwide, and the board
had
to be redesigned, requalified and recertified with more recent components, and a new batch manufactured. The cost, for the replacement of that board alone, came to about 3 million euros
YEP! I remember now, the ADC/DAC board definitely WAS one of the candidates that were modified.
I think you will find the tale about AICUs being removed after museum delivery flights was more urban myth. The only units that I can remember being removed or relocated were the ground power protection unit, the TCAS processors and the radar transceivers. (BA had retrofitted their aircraft with a superb Bendix system a few years earlier, and the same units (with windshear detection re-enabled) are used on other aircraft types).
As far as ferrite cores are concerned, asked by DozyWannabe , the original Delco C1VAC INS fitted to the BA Concorde aircraft did utilise ferrite cores. These were replaced with CMOS EPROMs when a modification was carried out in the early 90's, in which a navigation database was fitted to the units. The fuel consumed and total fuel remaining indicators definitely used a ferrite core memory. These electronic displays used an internal memory in case of power interrupts. As far as AFCS goes, can you check your records? Although, as you say, a completely analog system (with the exception of the ITEM test computers) I seem to remember that the Safety Flight Control Computer used a ferrite core for the flying control strain gauge null memory. I could be wrong here, but I can't remember any other NVM in use at the time.
Galaxy Flyer
I'll leave it to one of my pilot (or F/E) friends to answer this one it that's OK.
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 25th August 2010 at 23:20 .
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AFCS (Automtic Flight Control System) British Airways Engine surge INS (Inertial Navigation System)
August 27, 2010, 03:59:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5895262
Nick Thomas
[QUOTE]Going back to expansion and paint. With the aircraft expanding approx 6 inches and a temp change up to 127`c, I guess a special kind of paint; able to withstand such adverse conditions; must have been used? When deciding on the paint specification was any consideration given to the overall weight of the paint?[/QUOTE
Can't remember much about paint spec's, but a lot of experimentation/trial and error was carried out with different paints until the right one was found. I remember when G-BOAD was delivered, that copiuous sheets of paint had peeled off in flight. Finally a superb polyurithane paint was found that did the trick perfectly.
Yes Nick, the life of the airframe was limited by the number of supersonic cycles, however modifications carried out extended the life of the airframe significantly. (and more were planned).
And the 'hat in the gap' stories are quite true.
ChristiaanJ
This was the real beauty of the autostab' on all 3 axis; you could just safely take it all for granted. The Mach 2 engine out case was a classic, as not only would the aircraft yaw towards the dead engine but there was an adverse roll input, where the wing on the same side would LIFT due to the excess intake air for the failed automatically being 'dumped' through the now open spill door. If for any reason the aircraft HAD been under manual rather than autopilot control, then life without autostab would be rather uncomfortable to say the least. And putting further Concorde's achievements in terms of stability; the world's only previous large delta winged Mach 2 aircraft, the B58 Hustler, had the slightly awkward feature in the case of an outer engine failure at Mach 2, in that the yaw forces were sufficient to tear the fin off. This happened on more than one occasion during service life of the Hustler, but engine failure (or far more likely a deliberate precautionary shut-down) although hardly a non-event in the case of Concorde, it was routinely dealt with without drama or danger.
Dude
[QUOTE]Going back to expansion and paint. With the aircraft expanding approx 6 inches and a temp change up to 127`c, I guess a special kind of paint; able to withstand such adverse conditions; must have been used? When deciding on the paint specification was any consideration given to the overall weight of the paint?[/QUOTE
Can't remember much about paint spec's, but a lot of experimentation/trial and error was carried out with different paints until the right one was found. I remember when G-BOAD was delivered, that copiuous sheets of paint had peeled off in flight. Finally a superb polyurithane paint was found that did the trick perfectly.
Did the repeated expansion and contraction cycle have a detremental effect on the ulitamate life of the airframe?
And the 'hat in the gap' stories are quite true.
ChristiaanJ
Many years later, I discovered that several airline Concorde pilots did not even know the function existed....
This was the real beauty of the autostab' on all 3 axis; you could just safely take it all for granted. The Mach 2 engine out case was a classic, as not only would the aircraft yaw towards the dead engine but there was an adverse roll input, where the wing on the same side would LIFT due to the excess intake air for the failed automatically being 'dumped' through the now open spill door. If for any reason the aircraft HAD been under manual rather than autopilot control, then life without autostab would be rather uncomfortable to say the least. And putting further Concorde's achievements in terms of stability; the world's only previous large delta winged Mach 2 aircraft, the B58 Hustler, had the slightly awkward feature in the case of an outer engine failure at Mach 2, in that the yaw forces were sufficient to tear the fin off. This happened on more than one occasion during service life of the Hustler, but engine failure (or far more likely a deliberate precautionary shut-down) although hardly a non-event in the case of Concorde, it was routinely dealt with without drama or danger.
Dude
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Auto-pilot Auto-stabilisation Engine Failure Engine Shutdown G-BOAD
August 27, 2010, 14:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5896324
stilton
Really a question for my pilot friends, BUT.. I do recall that several years ago an RAF Tornado F3 requested permission to try a practice intercept on a JFK bound aircraft coming up to the accel' point... ATC relayed the request to the crew who had no objections, provided tha the rules of the air were obeyed, the ATC conversation went something like this.... 'OK, the Tornado is 15 miles astern of you.'. (at this point the burners are lit for the transonic acceleration).. ' he's 14 miles astern of you... 15..16....17...20... you can gues the rest, the F3 gave up in embarassment.
Dude
During the early years of Concorde testing and Airline service I had read it was used as a 'target' for practice interceptions by the RAF.
Dude
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): JFK Transonic Acceleration
August 27, 2010, 21:12:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5896924
Notfred
Love the lightning story, hadn't heard that one before.
That would have been production series test aircraft G-BBDG, A/C 202 before a purpose built hangar (more shed really) was built to house her, with fin and U/C removed. This aircraft has now been beautifully restored at Brooklands museum.
You are quite correct about the pushback, not having an APU (THAT story again
) meant that a one engine in each nacelle pair had to be started on the gate, and the other in each nacelle started after push. Having a symetrical pair started enabled all 3 hydraulic systems, and hence most of the critical systems to be checked puring pushback.
Brake temperatures always had to be monitored; they really could get very hot. If a wheel was still too warm after T/O, then the gear would be left down just a little longer to aid cooling. (Each brake also had an electric cooling fan).
Idle thrust was always a problem in that it was too high; there was a 'lo idle' setting, but depending on the temperature of the day the difference was not that big. You could not just reduce idle some more because of a malady known as rotating stall. This can plague any engine, but the Olympus 593 was particularly susceptible. At very low idle speeds, pockets of air 'rotate' around the first few compressor stages and can completely alter the airflows through the engine. It is important that the engine is always accelerated quickly through this zone on start-up, because serious damage can occur if the engine runs for any period of time in the rotating stall region. If the engine DOES operate in this zone, then the combustion process can even occur in the last few stages of the HP compressor, causing extreme damage. This damage, although malignant, can result in blade failure and the subsequent damage to the combustion chamber and turbine areas. This can occur within a few flights of the event, so just cranking down the idle was never an option.
Love the lightning story, hadn't heard that one before.
I was in the Air Training Corps in Bristol in the late 80s and flew in the Chipmunks based at Filton. Used to see the spare Concorde sitting there outside the hangar.
And a question of my own - I've heard that the engines were pretty powerful even at ground idle, so powerful that if all 4 were running then a tug would not be able to push her back. Any truth to this? Were just 2 started, pushback and then start the remainder? Also heard that the pilots had to watch the brake temps whilst taxiing out to takeoff - was this also due to the power?
) meant that a one engine in each nacelle pair had to be started on the gate, and the other in each nacelle started after push. Having a symetrical pair started enabled all 3 hydraulic systems, and hence most of the critical systems to be checked puring pushback.
Brake temperatures always had to be monitored; they really could get very hot. If a wheel was still too warm after T/O, then the gear would be left down just a little longer to aid cooling. (Each brake also had an electric cooling fan).
Idle thrust was always a problem in that it was too high; there was a 'lo idle' setting, but depending on the temperature of the day the difference was not that big. You could not just reduce idle some more because of a malady known as rotating stall. This can plague any engine, but the Olympus 593 was particularly susceptible. At very low idle speeds, pockets of air 'rotate' around the first few compressor stages and can completely alter the airflows through the engine. It is important that the engine is always accelerated quickly through this zone on start-up, because serious damage can occur if the engine runs for any period of time in the rotating stall region. If the engine DOES operate in this zone, then the combustion process can even occur in the last few stages of the HP compressor, causing extreme damage. This damage, although malignant, can result in blade failure and the subsequent damage to the combustion chamber and turbine areas. This can occur within a few flights of the event, so just cranking down the idle was never an option.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) Brooklands Filton G-BBDG HP Compressor Hydraulic Olympus 593 Rotating (engine) Stall
August 27, 2010, 21:25:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5896946
Brit312
Your memory is not fading; the ONLY disadvantage with carbon brakes is their susceptabilty to over-torque damage. For this reason 'max power on brakes wasalways verboten. I seem to remember that the development A/C with steel brakes could be 'wound up' on the brakes. But the improved braking performance, not to mention a 1,200lb weight saving of carbon made this a small price to pay.
The 3/4 tab; that takes me back, it was officially called the 'Reheat Capability Indicator', definately not the most sophisticated part of the Concorde flight deck. (I seem to remember that before the 'RCI
' was fitted, an INS CDU Waypoint thumbwheel was used as a 3 or 4 reminder).
Oh and ChristiaanJ; I always loved that clip.
Dude
Your memory is not fading; the ONLY disadvantage with carbon brakes is their susceptabilty to over-torque damage. For this reason 'max power on brakes wasalways verboten. I seem to remember that the development A/C with steel brakes could be 'wound up' on the brakes. But the improved braking performance, not to mention a 1,200lb weight saving of carbon made this a small price to pay.
The 3/4 tab; that takes me back, it was officially called the 'Reheat Capability Indicator', definately not the most sophisticated part of the Concorde flight deck. (I seem to remember that before the 'RCI
' was fitted, an INS CDU Waypoint thumbwheel was used as a 3 or 4 reminder).
Oh and ChristiaanJ; I always loved that clip.
Dude
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Afterburner/Re-heat Braking INS (Inertial Navigation System)
August 29, 2010, 20:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5900536
twochai
It is wonderful that you have such fond flying memories of Concorde;in the pre-911 days there was a fairly liberal open door policy for flight deck visits (Although all passengers were made to feel really special, it is so great that the guys had you up front for so long on that flight. You just never lose those sort of memories, I know).
The Radiation Meter was an interesting addition to Concorde's collection of avionics kit. It was primarily designed to detect solar proton, as well as neutron radiation, (the detector element lived behind the fwd r/h wardrobe as I remember and was a total pain in the 'you know where' to get at). The indicator displayed the dose rate in millirems/hour, with amber and red triggers, triggering a master alarm. (The amber was a mere caution, whereas the red was a warning. I can't quite remember any figures, but a descent was required with a genuine red warning. I think I'm correct in saying that no such descent was ever required, at least in the UK). There was a huge amount of concern initially about crews long term exposure to radiation, after all there is a fairly linear relationship between solar radiation and altitude. In reality however Concorde crews received far less radiation than subsonic crews; although the dose rates may have been higher, the sector times were a fraction of a lot of the subsonic routes. (Even a subsonic LHR-JFK is WELL over twice the sector length). Nuisance ambers were not uncommon, a certain 'facility' in Berkshire would often register as the aircraft over-flew, as well as MANY years ago, Three Mile Island itself. I remember that there were long term plans to replace the radiation meter with a portable 'carry on' device that was being trialled. (Spares for the detector were becoming very difficult to obtain).
Dude
It is wonderful that you have such fond flying memories of Concorde;in the pre-911 days there was a fairly liberal open door policy for flight deck visits (Although all passengers were made to feel really special, it is so great that the guys had you up front for so long on that flight. You just never lose those sort of memories, I know).
On descent over the U.K. and passing through 10K' abeam Southampton, as I remember it we got a yellow 'Radiation' caution
Dude
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): LHR-JFK Route
August 29, 2010, 21:26:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5900605
Nick Thomas
You really do have a great selection of queries Nick
.
Although Concorde was wired for full area navigation, with autotuning nav radio selectors, this was never fully implemented, and the autotuning selectors replaced with fairly conventional units at entry into service. (Although on route proving trials, G-BOAC did fly with the autotuning selectors).
HOWEVER, a really neat 'next best thing' system evolved: Originally the INS's had an optical card reader for inputting waypoints etc. (when 'island dodging' flying supersonic over the Mediterranean, to avoid booming the populous, it was said to be almost impossible to add waypoints quick enough manually). This card reader was really quite poor; when you inserted the card it was a lottery whether it came out of the reader in one piece, or even at all. Eventually a fairly sophisticated system was developed, and the card readers done away with altogether, and a navigation database was added to the INS units. This database would be updated a couple of times a year, and had to be loaded into each of the three units separately, USING A CASSETTE TAPE!!! All the 'normal' collection Concorde of routes were stored in the database, although the INS core memory could still only handle 9 waypoints at a time. (A light flashed when it was time to 'turn the page' and with a simple push of a button the next bank of waypoints were automatically uploaded into INS core memory. DME co-ordinates were also stored, along with the co-sited VOR frequency that had to be manually dialled for that station; ideally the left and right INSs would use two differing DMEs for best accuracy, and INS3 would use the mean. (Another simple button push would nominate and select the DME to be used by the INS). So, when flying within range of a VOR, the INS position would be refined with the co-sited DME slant range, but when flying oceanic, the 3 INSs would 'triple mix' their inertial positions to give a mean position. A 'rogue' INSs position would be rejected by the other two however, so as not to be sent to the moon because of a bad unit.
Rudderrudderrat
Nowhere near as sophisticated as the FMS system on the Tristar as you can see, but it seemed to work absolutely beautifully. (And when the system was DME updating, we even got an indication from an RNAV light, originally fitted for Area Navigation.
Actally there was a problem of sorts, above 900 KTS G/S, the original DELCO INS would generate an error (after all, WHO would ever want to travell at more than 900 KTS; something must be wrong here
?). A special 'supersonic mode' had to be enabled by the way of pin programming in the INS rack, which inhibited this warning.
Really glad you are enjoying the ravings of us supersonic nutters.
Dude
You really do have a great selection of queries Nick
.
With the radio navigation update was the lat and long of appropiate radio beacons hard wired into the system and then based on the assumed position the nearest beacons would automatically be tuned or did the pilots enter the lat and long of the beacons that they would then manually tune?
HOWEVER, a really neat 'next best thing' system evolved: Originally the INS's had an optical card reader for inputting waypoints etc. (when 'island dodging' flying supersonic over the Mediterranean, to avoid booming the populous, it was said to be almost impossible to add waypoints quick enough manually). This card reader was really quite poor; when you inserted the card it was a lottery whether it came out of the reader in one piece, or even at all. Eventually a fairly sophisticated system was developed, and the card readers done away with altogether, and a navigation database was added to the INS units. This database would be updated a couple of times a year, and had to be loaded into each of the three units separately, USING A CASSETTE TAPE!!! All the 'normal' collection Concorde of routes were stored in the database, although the INS core memory could still only handle 9 waypoints at a time. (A light flashed when it was time to 'turn the page' and with a simple push of a button the next bank of waypoints were automatically uploaded into INS core memory. DME co-ordinates were also stored, along with the co-sited VOR frequency that had to be manually dialled for that station; ideally the left and right INSs would use two differing DMEs for best accuracy, and INS3 would use the mean. (Another simple button push would nominate and select the DME to be used by the INS). So, when flying within range of a VOR, the INS position would be refined with the co-sited DME slant range, but when flying oceanic, the 3 INSs would 'triple mix' their inertial positions to give a mean position. A 'rogue' INSs position would be rejected by the other two however, so as not to be sent to the moon because of a bad unit.
Rudderrudderrat
Nowhere near as sophisticated as the FMS system on the Tristar as you can see, but it seemed to work absolutely beautifully. (And when the system was DME updating, we even got an indication from an RNAV light, originally fitted for Area Navigation.
Since INS was developed initially for Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Guidance and the Apollo Space programme, I don't think Mach 2 or less was a problem.
?). A special 'supersonic mode' had to be enabled by the way of pin programming in the INS rack, which inhibited this warning.
Really glad you are enjoying the ravings of us supersonic nutters.
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 30th August 2010 at 04:12 .
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): G-BOAC INS (Inertial Navigation System)
August 30, 2010, 03:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5900965
Nick Thomas
SLF keep the rest of us in business, your input is so very welcome here. Nick, the 'French Bike Bell' is exactly what it was, as the electric pitch trim wheen ran up or down a striker would impact this tiny bell and make the sound that you describe. 'Pitch Trim' sounds like a strange term, after all the aircraft had no trim tabs or tailplane as we all know. What varying the pitch trim used to do was to alter the neutral setting of the artificial feel unit, the control column following this neautral datum.
ZX81, takes me back here. The tape loading that was used on the INS took around 45 minutes per navigation unit, that's two and a quarter hours total for the system. (There was no cross-loading). If Concorde had remained in service, new legislation meant that a more accurate primary navigation system would have been required. One of the systems under consideration was a Litton 82 laser INS with GPS refinement. (As well as DME updating also).
Dude
SLF keep the rest of us in business, your input is so very welcome here. Nick, the 'French Bike Bell' is exactly what it was, as the electric pitch trim wheen ran up or down a striker would impact this tiny bell and make the sound that you describe. 'Pitch Trim' sounds like a strange term, after all the aircraft had no trim tabs or tailplane as we all know. What varying the pitch trim used to do was to alter the neutral setting of the artificial feel unit, the control column following this neautral datum.
ZX81, takes me back here. The tape loading that was used on the INS took around 45 minutes per navigation unit, that's two and a quarter hours total for the system. (There was no cross-loading). If Concorde had remained in service, new legislation meant that a more accurate primary navigation system would have been required. One of the systems under consideration was a Litton 82 laser INS with GPS refinement. (As well as DME updating also).
Dude
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): INS (Inertial Navigation System)
August 30, 2010, 22:05:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5902668
Lurking SLF
An interesting post Darragh, but with the greatest respect I think that you may have missed the whole point of this thread. As wonderful as the Boeing 747 is (personally I think that the 744 is one of the finest commercial aircraft ever built), I think anyone would agree that there is no comparison at all, as far as technical achievement goes, between the 747 and Concorde. So many boundaries had to be crossed with the Concorde design, and technical problems were overcome that had defeated many of the world's leading designers. I do have a vague idea what I am talking about here; although I was directly involved with Concorde for 30 years, I am also licensed on both the 744 AND the 777, and although I hold Boeings with the greatest respecect and admiration, nothing so far in the realms of commercial aviation can really compare with the technological marvel that was Concorde.
I think that most of the posters here will be sorrry that you felt you wasted 2 hours reading through these pages, I feel most of us have thoroughly enjoyed reading each others posts.
The YouTube links were great though.
atakacs
To the best of my knowledge no. The original TU144 was an extremely crude attempt by the Soviets at commercial supersonic aviation, and the political climate at the time would not have permitted such a thing. The TU144D used in the 1990's as a joint NASA/Russian experiment was a different beast altogether however, with far better engines and systems, but as far as I am aware the only western pilots to fly it were American chaps.
Dude
An interesting post Darragh, but with the greatest respect I think that you may have missed the whole point of this thread. As wonderful as the Boeing 747 is (personally I think that the 744 is one of the finest commercial aircraft ever built), I think anyone would agree that there is no comparison at all, as far as technical achievement goes, between the 747 and Concorde. So many boundaries had to be crossed with the Concorde design, and technical problems were overcome that had defeated many of the world's leading designers. I do have a vague idea what I am talking about here; although I was directly involved with Concorde for 30 years, I am also licensed on both the 744 AND the 777, and although I hold Boeings with the greatest respecect and admiration, nothing so far in the realms of commercial aviation can really compare with the technological marvel that was Concorde.
I think that most of the posters here will be sorrry that you felt you wasted 2 hours reading through these pages, I feel most of us have thoroughly enjoyed reading each others posts.
The YouTube links were great though.
atakacs
To the best of my knowledge no. The original TU144 was an extremely crude attempt by the Soviets at commercial supersonic aviation, and the political climate at the time would not have permitted such a thing. The TU144D used in the 1990's as a joint NASA/Russian experiment was a different beast altogether however, with far better engines and systems, but as far as I am aware the only western pilots to fly it were American chaps.
Dude
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Boeing Tu-144
August 31, 2010, 17:04:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5904352
DozyWannabe
Good point I suppose, but you could say that the six Concorde prototypes, Pre-Production and Production Series Test aircraft were also development aircraft, and yet more or less worked just as it said on the tin', where the TU144, in spite of all the facilities of Andrei Tupolev's design bureaux, not to mention more or less unlimited Soviet state funds produced a machine that in my opinion really BELONGED in a tin can. (I know this is all off topic, honest guys, I won't mention this stuff again
).
In reality the Soviets really lacked both propulsion technology as well as the systems expertise required to build an aircraft with even a remote hope of Mach 2 cruise, let alone safe and comfortable enough for fare paying passengers. The original aircraft had all for engines in one giant nacelle, and the landing gear retracted into the engine inlet duct itself, great for an undistorted flow path to the engines
. The variable inlets were manually operated by the flight engineer as well, no automatics here. In the mid 1970's the Russians even approached PLESSEY to build a digital engine control unit for the TU144. A similar PLESSEY unit had been VERY successfully flight trialled on production series aircraft 202 (G-BBDG) and only lack of funds prevented it being used on the production aircraft. As this unit could obviously be used for Soviet military applications, there was objection from the UK government, and more than just a little trans-Atlantic pressure applied, and so this venture never happened.
Until the advent of the Mig-29 and Sukhoi SU-27 this really was not the case. I'm afraid I'm with galaxy flyer on this; If you look at the air war over Vietnam, when an F4 met a MIG 19 or MIG 21 in an even air-to-air combat, the MIG was going down. (OK this could be partially down to superior US pilot traing etc, but if you look at the handful of skirmishes where the 1960's/1970's Soviet aircraft were engaged in Combat against US or French built fighters, the MIGs never really did very well at all). However, the aircraft that the Russians have been producing from the Mig 29 onwards seem to be in a completely different class now; hope they really are the good guys now.
ANYWAY, back on topic
Lurking SLF
No problem at all Darragh, please keep visiting us and post here also anytime.
Nick Thomas
I'm not sure that I can describe the DEBOW process remotely as eloquently as my friend Bellerophon did, I particularly loved the 'out of balance tumble-drier' bit, but starting a hot or even warm engine, even at DEBOW, you could certainly 'feel' the noise on the flight deck, until the shaft distortions evened out.
Now for the PFM bit, equally eloquently alluded to by Bellerophon:
DEBOW itself was maintained by a special sub-idle datum in the electronic Engine Control Unit, and once the engine was accelerated towards normal idle (61-65% N2, depending on the temperature of the day) even if the switch described by Bellerophon was accidently re-selected, an electronic inhibit gate in the ECU prevented this sub-idle datum from being used again that engine cycle.
You're welcome Nick, actually the roll and yaw trims operated in a similar manner to the pitch, although of course these was applied by a manual trim wheel only. (No French bike bell either
). Rotation of either wheel (more a giant knob actually) merely shifted the neutral datum of the relevant artificial feel unit, which in turn shifted the rudder pedals or control yoke; the resolvers for the FBW system would in consequence demand this 'trimmed' control surface movement.
Dude
Well, it was essentially a development airframe pressed into premature service for the sake of beating a western project into the air. One wonders whether the story would have been different if the designers had been allowed to take their time and develop it properly.
).
In reality the Soviets really lacked both propulsion technology as well as the systems expertise required to build an aircraft with even a remote hope of Mach 2 cruise, let alone safe and comfortable enough for fare paying passengers. The original aircraft had all for engines in one giant nacelle, and the landing gear retracted into the engine inlet duct itself, great for an undistorted flow path to the engines
. The variable inlets were manually operated by the flight engineer as well, no automatics here. In the mid 1970's the Russians even approached PLESSEY to build a digital engine control unit for the TU144. A similar PLESSEY unit had been VERY successfully flight trialled on production series aircraft 202 (G-BBDG) and only lack of funds prevented it being used on the production aircraft. As this unit could obviously be used for Soviet military applications, there was objection from the UK government, and more than just a little trans-Atlantic pressure applied, and so this venture never happened.
Those "agricultural" fighters can mix it up with the best the west has to offer (until - or if - the F22 comes online) in terms of manoeuvering ability, if not in terms of weapons.
ANYWAY, back on topic
Lurking SLF
No problem at all Darragh, please keep visiting us and post here also anytime.
Nick Thomas
M2dude I have another question concerning "debow" You very clearly answered my original question on another thread. I just wondered how the engine was kept at a sub idle 30% N2? Was it done by careful metering of the fuel? and if not how was it done? I ask because the throttles would be closed during start up.
Now for the PFM bit, equally eloquently alluded to by Bellerophon:
DEBOW itself was maintained by a special sub-idle datum in the electronic Engine Control Unit, and once the engine was accelerated towards normal idle (61-65% N2, depending on the temperature of the day) even if the switch described by Bellerophon was accidently re-selected, an electronic inhibit gate in the ECU prevented this sub-idle datum from being used again that engine cycle.
Thanks for the explanation of how the pitch was "trimmed" Due to Concorde having elevrons instead of ailerons; was the aileron trim dealt with in a similar way? I guess the rudder trim could be applied normally.
). Rotation of either wheel (more a giant knob actually) merely shifted the neutral datum of the relevant artificial feel unit, which in turn shifted the rudder pedals or control yoke; the resolvers for the FBW system would in consequence demand this 'trimmed' control surface movement.
Dude
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FBW (Fly By Wire) G-BBDG Intakes Landing Gear Rudder Tu-144
September 01, 2010, 03:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5905441
Nick Thomas
I think you are refering to the Handley Page HP115 Nick. The Fairey design was the FD2, the first conventional aicraft in the world to exceed 1,000 MPH in level flight. A re-winged version, designted the BAC 221, was used also to evaluate the handling characteristics of an ogival delta wing for the Concorde pragramme.
Dude
Please correct me if am wrong but was there not a slender delta wing prototype built by Fairley in the middle fifties. As I understand it, the plane was built to study a delta wing performance at low speeds. Therefore it had a fixed undercarriage.
Dude
Subjects: None
September 02, 2010, 03:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5907857
I can only echo ChristiaanJ, we all are quite humbled to be able to share our experiences with you guys. Please keep on posting everybody. (There's no such thing as a stupid question here, but as to some of my answers.....
).
And Stlton.. our thanks all go out to YOU, for starting this thread in the first place.
TURIN
Glad to hear that you enjoyed your 'Rocket' time in TBB. As far as plugging the leaks, well things did improve quite a bit. but a fully laden aircraft could sometimes still be a little 'wet' on the ramp.
CRON
The nose leg had to retract forward, purely because the fuselage section of fuel tank 9 was immediately behind. (The nose wheel also had a single steel disk brake, based on an automotive design. (I'm 90% sure it was a Ford Cortina)
Dude
).
And Stlton.. our thanks all go out to YOU, for starting this thread in the first place.
TURIN
Glad to hear that you enjoyed your 'Rocket' time in TBB. As far as plugging the leaks, well things did improve quite a bit. but a fully laden aircraft could sometimes still be a little 'wet' on the ramp.
CRON
The nose leg had to retract forward, purely because the fuselage section of fuel tank 9 was immediately behind. (The nose wheel also had a single steel disk brake, based on an automotive design. (I'm 90% sure it was a Ford Cortina)
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 2nd September 2010 at 05:04 .
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Landing Gear
September 02, 2010, 22:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5909785
Hi canuck slf, Your incident was not the hydraulic contamination one, I'll describe that one in a minute or so below.
As far as your adventure goes, in the early days of Concorde operation there was an on-going issue of hydraulic seal failures. This led to the sort of thing that you described, where a major seal failure would occur, resulting in the loss of a main system. The standby Yellow system would be switched in to replace the failed one, and depending on the nature of the initial failure, could leak out of the same failed seal. (There were a couple of 'common areas', they were the intake spill door jack, and the Powered Flying Control Units; failures here could result in a double system fail). Your incident was almost certainly due to one of these cases. In the early 1990's the original Neoprene hydraulic seals were replaced with a new Viton GLT seal; this material had far superior age shrinking characteristics to Neoprene, and more or less cured the problem overnight. Eventually all the seals in each aircraft were replaced, and apart from a very few isolated cases, dual system losses were eliminated forever. Air France suffered a similar proportion of failures, however as their flying hours were a fraction of BA's, the effects were not as immediately apparent.
As far as far as the hydraulic contamination story goes, this happened in 1980 but involved one aircraft only, G-BOAG, but in it's original registration of G-BFKW. (having previously been on loan from British Aerospace, where it flew originally as a 'white tail' under this registration). The fragile nature of Concorde hydraulic fluid was not fully understood at this time, and as you say, a hydraulic drum dispenser had inadvertently been left exposed to the atmosphere, and had subsequently suffered water contamination, and this contaminated fluid had found it's way into G-BOAG. Now this hydraulic fluid, CHEVRON M2V has only two vices: One is that is extremely expensive, and the second is that it is highly susceptible to water contamination, EXTEMELY SO. If my memory serves me correctly, the maximum allowable level of water in the fluid is about 8ppm. (parts per million) and the fluid that was analysed after G-BOAG's problems was at about 30 ppm. The water deposits in the fluid gave the equivalent effect of 'rusting up' of critical hydraulic components. I was investigating an air intake control defect the previous day to the incident, but like everybody else had no idea that the real issue here was one of major systems contamination. We were all convinced that we had nailed the problem, only to find that the aircraft turned back on it's subsequent LHR-JFK sector with more serious problems, not only affecting the air intakes, but the artificial feel system also. It was now that we realised that there had to be a hydraulics problem here, and after fluid analysis, the awful truth was discovered. After this event, and the fragilities of M2V fluid were better understood, a strict regime of housekeeping was put in place in terms of fluid storage, and no such incidents with BA ever occurring again. The aircraft itself did not fly again for nine months, all components that were affected were removed from the aircraft and completely stripped and overhauled. Also all of the system hydraulic lines had to be completely purged, until there were no further traces of any contamination. After the aircraft was finally rectified, she successfully again returned to service with her new 'BA' registration of G-BOAG. However the following year, during a C Check, it was decided that due to spares shortages, and the closure of the LHR-BAH-SIN route, there just was not being enough work for seven aircraft, and therefore G-BOAG would be withdrawn from service. (In terms of spares, BA at the time for instance only had six sets of aircraft galleys, as aircraft went in for C checks the galley was 'robbed' to service the aircraft coming out of it's own C check). The aircraft was parked in a remote hangar, and was only visited when a component had to be 'robbed' for another Concorde, and the aircraft soon fell into disrepair, was filthy externally and became a really sad sight. Many people (not myself I might add) were adamant that G-BOAG would never fly again. However, in 1984 things had really started to improve for Concorde, with the charter business increasing and the LHR-JFK route in particular becoming a staggering success. It was decided that OAG would be returned to an airworthy condition. In 1985, with a fresh new interior, and with the new BA colour scheme, she was finally returned to service; and remained as one of the mainstays of the fleet right up to the end of Concorde services in October 2003. She now resides at the Boeing Museum of Flight in Seattle. (I have particularly fond memories of G-BOAG; in a previous post I mentioned flying through an electrical storm in late 1991 over Saudi Arabia, while returning from BKK-BAH to LHR. What I forgot to mention was the spectacle of DOZENS of fierce fires burning on the ground, towards our starboard horizon. These were Sadams oil fires, still burning in Kuwait. It made a sombre contrast to the amazing electrical spectacle right in front of us).
As far as low speed flying control activity was concerned, this was a combination of the fairly flexible outer wing sections, being buffeted by low speed turbulence (the wing tip tanks 5A & 7A also being empty), as well as some autostab inputs. This was perfectly normal, and part of the design our aircraft. However the development aircraft had even more flexible outer wing sections, which used to almost straighten up in high speed flight. However due to fatigue concerns, external lateral stiffeners were added to the underside of the wings during production of the airline aircraft. (these can be easily seen from underneath the wings, just outboard of the nacelles). Unfortunately these external stiffeners also resulted in over a one tonne fuel penalty to the production aircraft, due to increased weight, as well as higher drag in a critical part of the wing aerodynamic surface.
Dude
As far as your adventure goes, in the early days of Concorde operation there was an on-going issue of hydraulic seal failures. This led to the sort of thing that you described, where a major seal failure would occur, resulting in the loss of a main system. The standby Yellow system would be switched in to replace the failed one, and depending on the nature of the initial failure, could leak out of the same failed seal. (There were a couple of 'common areas', they were the intake spill door jack, and the Powered Flying Control Units; failures here could result in a double system fail). Your incident was almost certainly due to one of these cases. In the early 1990's the original Neoprene hydraulic seals were replaced with a new Viton GLT seal; this material had far superior age shrinking characteristics to Neoprene, and more or less cured the problem overnight. Eventually all the seals in each aircraft were replaced, and apart from a very few isolated cases, dual system losses were eliminated forever. Air France suffered a similar proportion of failures, however as their flying hours were a fraction of BA's, the effects were not as immediately apparent.
As far as far as the hydraulic contamination story goes, this happened in 1980 but involved one aircraft only, G-BOAG, but in it's original registration of G-BFKW. (having previously been on loan from British Aerospace, where it flew originally as a 'white tail' under this registration). The fragile nature of Concorde hydraulic fluid was not fully understood at this time, and as you say, a hydraulic drum dispenser had inadvertently been left exposed to the atmosphere, and had subsequently suffered water contamination, and this contaminated fluid had found it's way into G-BOAG. Now this hydraulic fluid, CHEVRON M2V has only two vices: One is that is extremely expensive, and the second is that it is highly susceptible to water contamination, EXTEMELY SO. If my memory serves me correctly, the maximum allowable level of water in the fluid is about 8ppm. (parts per million) and the fluid that was analysed after G-BOAG's problems was at about 30 ppm. The water deposits in the fluid gave the equivalent effect of 'rusting up' of critical hydraulic components. I was investigating an air intake control defect the previous day to the incident, but like everybody else had no idea that the real issue here was one of major systems contamination. We were all convinced that we had nailed the problem, only to find that the aircraft turned back on it's subsequent LHR-JFK sector with more serious problems, not only affecting the air intakes, but the artificial feel system also. It was now that we realised that there had to be a hydraulics problem here, and after fluid analysis, the awful truth was discovered. After this event, and the fragilities of M2V fluid were better understood, a strict regime of housekeeping was put in place in terms of fluid storage, and no such incidents with BA ever occurring again. The aircraft itself did not fly again for nine months, all components that were affected were removed from the aircraft and completely stripped and overhauled. Also all of the system hydraulic lines had to be completely purged, until there were no further traces of any contamination. After the aircraft was finally rectified, she successfully again returned to service with her new 'BA' registration of G-BOAG. However the following year, during a C Check, it was decided that due to spares shortages, and the closure of the LHR-BAH-SIN route, there just was not being enough work for seven aircraft, and therefore G-BOAG would be withdrawn from service. (In terms of spares, BA at the time for instance only had six sets of aircraft galleys, as aircraft went in for C checks the galley was 'robbed' to service the aircraft coming out of it's own C check). The aircraft was parked in a remote hangar, and was only visited when a component had to be 'robbed' for another Concorde, and the aircraft soon fell into disrepair, was filthy externally and became a really sad sight. Many people (not myself I might add) were adamant that G-BOAG would never fly again. However, in 1984 things had really started to improve for Concorde, with the charter business increasing and the LHR-JFK route in particular becoming a staggering success. It was decided that OAG would be returned to an airworthy condition. In 1985, with a fresh new interior, and with the new BA colour scheme, she was finally returned to service; and remained as one of the mainstays of the fleet right up to the end of Concorde services in October 2003. She now resides at the Boeing Museum of Flight in Seattle. (I have particularly fond memories of G-BOAG; in a previous post I mentioned flying through an electrical storm in late 1991 over Saudi Arabia, while returning from BKK-BAH to LHR. What I forgot to mention was the spectacle of DOZENS of fierce fires burning on the ground, towards our starboard horizon. These were Sadams oil fires, still burning in Kuwait. It made a sombre contrast to the amazing electrical spectacle right in front of us).
As far as low speed flying control activity was concerned, this was a combination of the fairly flexible outer wing sections, being buffeted by low speed turbulence (the wing tip tanks 5A & 7A also being empty), as well as some autostab inputs. This was perfectly normal, and part of the design our aircraft. However the development aircraft had even more flexible outer wing sections, which used to almost straighten up in high speed flight. However due to fatigue concerns, external lateral stiffeners were added to the underside of the wings during production of the airline aircraft. (these can be easily seen from underneath the wings, just outboard of the nacelles). Unfortunately these external stiffeners also resulted in over a one tonne fuel penalty to the production aircraft, due to increased weight, as well as higher drag in a critical part of the wing aerodynamic surface.
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 2nd September 2010 at 23:07 .
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Auto-stabilisation Boeing British Airways Fatigue G-BFKW G-BOAG Galley Hydraulic Hydraulic Failure/Contamination Intakes LHR LHR-JFK Route
September 03, 2010, 07:43:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5910383
Nick Thomas
This of course is one for one of my pilot friends to answer properly again, but as galaxy flyer says, it's an 'eye to wheel' issue here when compared to other aircraft.
galaxy flyer
Again best answered by learned gentlemen such as my friends EXWOK or Bellerophon, but to the best of my feeble knowledge a resounding NO, at least as far as CRUISE flying was concerned. As the majority of the flight was carried out between FL500 and FL600 there was really no weather as such to avoid during supercruise. (As has been previously posted, at Mach 2 you would invariably be above FL500). Only at extremely low latitudes where the tropopause could theoretically extend up to around 70,000' was there ever any chance of seeing any cloud anywhere near your cruise altitudes. The only turbulence as such you would ever encounter was as the result of a temperature shear, but these never felt to be too much in the way of 'bumps' to me. And again, only at very low latitudes did you encounter severe shears anyway; anything encountered on the North Atlantic was generally very mild and civilised.
A CONCORDE PARADOX
The tropopause issue here is an interesting one, in that the coldest stratospheric temperatures we ever encountered were close to the equator, whereas the WARMEST temperatures possible are over the POLES
, where the tropopause can be as low as 22,000'. This is just one of the many paradoxes involving Concorde, and the reason why the aircraft would never be routed over the poles, BECAUSE THE DARNED TEMPERATURES ARE TOO HIGH, in terms of the stratosphere. The result here would be that the aircraft is temperature (Tmo) limited all the time to 127 deg's C. (I previously mentioned in another post in this thread that only 5 deg's C above ISA, -51.5 deg's C, would mean Tmo being reached at Mach 2; any warmer and we HAD to slow down) The relatively high polar temperatures mean that we are unable to fly anywhere near Mach 2. Another paradox would then come into play, the slower your cruise speed, the HIGHER your fuel burn. It was originally proposed in the early 1970's that Concorde would fly from London to Tokyo, and the routing for that needed two things: It could not be polar, and possibly just as important , you required a refuel stop. The Soviet Union amazingly proposed granting a supersonic corridor over Siberia, refuelling at the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. This was hardly an ideal routing (definitely far from a great circle) but was arguably one of the very few that was possible at all. This by the way was not some early iteration of glasnost, but the Soviets fully expected that flying thoroughbred, the TU-144 (bad dude
) to be a success, and could compete side by side with Concorde.
ANOTHER CONCORDE PARADOX
If anyone wonders why when you flew faster you burned less fuel, it was primarily down to drag, actually a thing frighteningly termed as 'pre-entry spill drag'. As most people (???) are aware, the Concorde engine inlet utilised a series of carefully controlled and focused shockwaves to slow the air down entering the engine; in 14 feet of engine intake you lost in the order of 1,000 mph of airspeed! Now most of these different shocks varied with a combination of intake variable surface angle, intake local Mach number and also engine mass flow demand. However the oblique shock coming off the top lip of the intake produced a shock that varied with Mach alone, and would project downwards, just forward of the intake bottom lip. Due to the air downstream of this fairly weak shock still being supersonic, a measured amount of this air spills downwards, away from the intake. If you can possibly picture it, we have this wall of air spilling downwards over the lower lip of all four intakes, the combined effect of this supersonic forespill is a fair amount of drag. The faster we go, the more accute the angle of the shock and therefore the less air is spilled, and in consequence the lower the spill drag. Remembering that cool temperatures could produce a higher Mach number, temperature really could either be our friend or enemy, but cool was COOL
I hope this explanation does not sound like too much gibberish, but it really was a fact that 'More Mach = Less Fuel'. Hope it makes some sense.
Dude
This of course is one for one of my pilot friends to answer properly again, but as galaxy flyer says, it's an 'eye to wheel' issue here when compared to other aircraft.
galaxy flyer
Again best answered by learned gentlemen such as my friends EXWOK or Bellerophon, but to the best of my feeble knowledge a resounding NO, at least as far as CRUISE flying was concerned. As the majority of the flight was carried out between FL500 and FL600 there was really no weather as such to avoid during supercruise. (As has been previously posted, at Mach 2 you would invariably be above FL500). Only at extremely low latitudes where the tropopause could theoretically extend up to around 70,000' was there ever any chance of seeing any cloud anywhere near your cruise altitudes. The only turbulence as such you would ever encounter was as the result of a temperature shear, but these never felt to be too much in the way of 'bumps' to me. And again, only at very low latitudes did you encounter severe shears anyway; anything encountered on the North Atlantic was generally very mild and civilised.
A CONCORDE PARADOX
The tropopause issue here is an interesting one, in that the coldest stratospheric temperatures we ever encountered were close to the equator, whereas the WARMEST temperatures possible are over the POLES
, where the tropopause can be as low as 22,000'. This is just one of the many paradoxes involving Concorde, and the reason why the aircraft would never be routed over the poles, BECAUSE THE DARNED TEMPERATURES ARE TOO HIGH, in terms of the stratosphere. The result here would be that the aircraft is temperature (Tmo) limited all the time to 127 deg's C. (I previously mentioned in another post in this thread that only 5 deg's C above ISA, -51.5 deg's C, would mean Tmo being reached at Mach 2; any warmer and we HAD to slow down) The relatively high polar temperatures mean that we are unable to fly anywhere near Mach 2. Another paradox would then come into play, the slower your cruise speed, the HIGHER your fuel burn. It was originally proposed in the early 1970's that Concorde would fly from London to Tokyo, and the routing for that needed two things: It could not be polar, and possibly just as important , you required a refuel stop. The Soviet Union amazingly proposed granting a supersonic corridor over Siberia, refuelling at the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. This was hardly an ideal routing (definitely far from a great circle) but was arguably one of the very few that was possible at all. This by the way was not some early iteration of glasnost, but the Soviets fully expected that flying thoroughbred, the TU-144 (bad dude
) to be a success, and could compete side by side with Concorde.
ANOTHER CONCORDE PARADOX
If anyone wonders why when you flew faster you burned less fuel, it was primarily down to drag, actually a thing frighteningly termed as 'pre-entry spill drag'. As most people (???) are aware, the Concorde engine inlet utilised a series of carefully controlled and focused shockwaves to slow the air down entering the engine; in 14 feet of engine intake you lost in the order of 1,000 mph of airspeed! Now most of these different shocks varied with a combination of intake variable surface angle, intake local Mach number and also engine mass flow demand. However the oblique shock coming off the top lip of the intake produced a shock that varied with Mach alone, and would project downwards, just forward of the intake bottom lip. Due to the air downstream of this fairly weak shock still being supersonic, a measured amount of this air spills downwards, away from the intake. If you can possibly picture it, we have this wall of air spilling downwards over the lower lip of all four intakes, the combined effect of this supersonic forespill is a fair amount of drag. The faster we go, the more accute the angle of the shock and therefore the less air is spilled, and in consequence the lower the spill drag. Remembering that cool temperatures could produce a higher Mach number, temperature really could either be our friend or enemy, but cool was COOL
I hope this explanation does not sound like too much gibberish, but it really was a fact that 'More Mach = Less Fuel'. Hope it makes some sense.
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 3rd September 2010 at 10:08 . Reason: clearing up some gibberish
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Intakes Shockwave Super-cruise TMO (Temprature Max Operating) Temperature Shear Tu-144
September 03, 2010, 18:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5911882
ChristiaanJ
During AUTOLAND a flare manoeuvre was instigated by the Pitch Computer at 50' radio, where a fairly simple flare law was invoked. I seem to remember that the law , which used a combination of radio rate (from the RadAlt) and vertical acceleration (from the INS) gave you a commanded height rate of 10'/second at 50', exponentially reducing to 1.7'/second at point of main wheel touch down.
The autoland on Concorde was both extremely accurate and reliable, and an awful lot of guys said they hated using it 'because it can land the aircraft
better than I can'; their words NOT mine. (Personally I never bought that one, the guys were just modest as far as I was concerned
). This in my opinion is an absolute testament to the AFCS designers; ChristiaanJ and his colleagues at SFENA and GEC Marconi.
To give the complete final approach story; as the aircraft tracked the glideslope in LAND mode, the autopilot G/S deviation, like most aircraft, was geared as an inverse function of radio altitude, and at 75' radio this deviation was flushed down the loo altogether, leaving the A/P to hold radio rate for just a few feet. At 50' the flare was instigated, and at around 35' DECRAB was commanded, where the yaw channel would use a rudder input alone to 'kick off drift' and align the aircraft with the runway centreline. (Concorde did not employ a fwd slip manoeuvre in crosswind conditions, being a slender delta). The 'final' command was at 15' radio, when the autothrottle smartly retarded the throttles. (The Pitch Computer flare law of course continuing to control decent rate all the way down). On touchdown the autopilot would be manually disengaged and the nose gently (usually
) lowered to the ground. (Concorde was only designed and certified as a CAT 3A system, so there was no automatic rollout guidance. However there was a runway guidance symbol on the ADI, which used a combination of Localiser deviation and lateral acceleration, to give you runway rollout track).
Now the flare law was tested every autoland, at G/S capture, and failure of this test resulted in the loss of LAND 3 status on the landing display panel. The most common defect of all with the Concorde autoland was in fact failure of the flare test, when at G/S capture, the previously illuminated LAND 3 indication would drop all of it's own to LAND 2. A simple changeover of autopilot paddle switches would nail the offending Pitch Computer, which would then be replaced before the next trip.
Dude
During landing, Concorde isn't flared at all, it is flown onto the ground at a constant pitch attitude.
The autoland on Concorde was both extremely accurate and reliable, and an awful lot of guys said they hated using it 'because it can land the aircraft
better than I can'; their words NOT mine. (Personally I never bought that one, the guys were just modest as far as I was concerned
). This in my opinion is an absolute testament to the AFCS designers; ChristiaanJ and his colleagues at SFENA and GEC Marconi.
To give the complete final approach story; as the aircraft tracked the glideslope in LAND mode, the autopilot G/S deviation, like most aircraft, was geared as an inverse function of radio altitude, and at 75' radio this deviation was flushed down the loo altogether, leaving the A/P to hold radio rate for just a few feet. At 50' the flare was instigated, and at around 35' DECRAB was commanded, where the yaw channel would use a rudder input alone to 'kick off drift' and align the aircraft with the runway centreline. (Concorde did not employ a fwd slip manoeuvre in crosswind conditions, being a slender delta). The 'final' command was at 15' radio, when the autothrottle smartly retarded the throttles. (The Pitch Computer flare law of course continuing to control decent rate all the way down). On touchdown the autopilot would be manually disengaged and the nose gently (usually
) lowered to the ground. (Concorde was only designed and certified as a CAT 3A system, so there was no automatic rollout guidance. However there was a runway guidance symbol on the ADI, which used a combination of Localiser deviation and lateral acceleration, to give you runway rollout track).
Now the flare law was tested every autoland, at G/S capture, and failure of this test resulted in the loss of LAND 3 status on the landing display panel. The most common defect of all with the Concorde autoland was in fact failure of the flare test, when at G/S capture, the previously illuminated LAND 3 indication would drop all of it's own to LAND 2. A simple changeover of autopilot paddle switches would nail the offending Pitch Computer, which would then be replaced before the next trip.
Dude
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AFCS (Automtic Flight Control System) Auto-land Auto-pilot Auto-throttle INS (Inertial Navigation System) Rudder
September 03, 2010, 19:17:00 GMT
permalink Post: 5911928
Bigggles78
Brit312 has certainly answered your query about the Braniff crew issue; I remember being told that one of their captains, a Texan who allegedly wore big cowboy boots while flying, had an ambition at '3,2,1, NOW..' to KICK the throttles open with the sole of his right boot. Never did find out if this ever happened.
The Braniff operation does seem a little crazy now, I must admit. They were supposed to have had long term ideas of serving the Pacific Rim with Concorde, it's a pity that we never got the chance to find out if that could have worked.
Dude
Brit312 has certainly answered your query about the Braniff crew issue; I remember being told that one of their captains, a Texan who allegedly wore big cowboy boots while flying, had an ambition at '3,2,1, NOW..' to KICK the throttles open with the sole of his right boot. Never did find out if this ever happened.
The Braniff operation does seem a little crazy now, I must admit. They were supposed to have had long term ideas of serving the Pacific Rim with Concorde, it's a pity that we never got the chance to find out if that could have worked.
Dude
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Braniff Captains