Posts about: "Final Report" [Posts: 18 Page: 1 of 1]¶

absolutely . the altimeter talk is just a distraction or at best contributing factor, Not the cause .. which brings us back to the safety assessment of the procedure , which the NTSB did not mention at all,, but I am sure , or at least I hope they will go into in their final report.
In any case the procedure us currently withdrawn until end of March and I sincerely doubt they will re-install it before the final report is out. ..

A couple of new info points the NTSB clarified : Both aircraft were on VHF , so we can drop this UHF discussion , the Blackhawk had ADS-B equipped but was not transmitting , it was check ride with NVG, and they most probably all had them on .and there was a last second evasive action attempt by the CRJ crew, which go a TA previously . On the TWR, the CAs are displayed in the BRITE even with audio on ..
For the rest we have to wait until the next NTSB briefing

+1 to everything you and Wide Mouth Frog said.

I sincerely hope the NTSB can avoid being distracted by the distractions of altimetry and the missing ATC words on the Blackhawk CVR.

Upthread, Luca Lion calculated the 3 degree PAPI approach path as crossing the eastern riverbank at 270ft. If that's correct, then the CRJ's 313ft radar height 2 seconds before collision puts it at least 43ft above the approach path, so the Blackhawk's radio height deviation of 78ft would have contributed only about 35ft to the erosion of any intended "procedural separation" (*) between the aircraft. Or, to put it another way, the same outcome would have resulted if the Blackhawk had been at 235ft radio and the CRJ on the glide. Height keeping of plus or minus 35ft can only be achieved by instrument flying, which is obviously not compatible with visual separation (or indeed VFR) so cannot be reasonably cited as part of a safety case for the procedure. And of course a landing aircraft could easily be below the glide. Altimetry and height keeping are not the cause of this accident.

Missing the word "circling" wouldn't have influenced the helo crew getting visual with the CRJ at the time of the trasnmission. At best, it would have given them an extra nudge that "runway 33" (which was audible) meant the CRJ would be taking an easterly flight path. Missing "pass behind" with only a few seconds to collision was irrelevant if, as seems likely, the helo crew did not see the CRJ at that point.

(*) The quotes around "procedural separation" are intended to convey a tone of disgust and sarcasm.

After having completed three days of its formal proceedings - which I'll predict will long be remembered for the Board Chair ordering witnesses from FAA to turn off their cellular devices and to relocate because one had been seen elbowing another during the latter's testimony - the Board may be about to enter a new kind of Washington ball game.

Twelve billion dollars here, eighteen billion dollars additional there, pretty soon you're talking real money (with apologies to anyone who recalls the originator, Illinois Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen). With all that federal largesse provided by the American taxpayer destined to be spent on the so-called "new ATC system", I have a question. Isn't it necessary to know what conclusions the Board reaches in this investigatory process before committing to - and I'm going to use my own phrase - the "new National Airspace Architecture"?

The United States needs a new FAA organization, on two fronts at least. One, separate the ANSP from the regulator (as probably hundreds of real-life aviation industry worthies have long advocated). Second, a new organizational structure, ethos, culture, set of career pathways, and everything else that is not fit for purpose for the immient and dramatic changes dead-ahead (such as automation, Advanced Air Mobility, environmental pressures, and oh yeah, increased traffic correlated with increased demands from the traveling public for the precise kind of bag of peanuts to which they believe they're entitled). Is it not the case that FAA has failed in its fundamental mission, because under no ConOps should it have been possible for this accident to take place? (Of course, there will never be a guarantee against one or more persons conducting relevant activities with gross negligence - but if that harsh judgment is levied against the Black Hawk, nonetheless the system should have provided stronger procedural separation.)

And all this is before decisions are made about what technologies to build into the new Nat'l Airspace Arch., what vendors, what geographic arrangement, and what connectivity the entire system will have with ATM in Europe and globally (and European ATM especially is moving rapidly into the future).

But the Board final report is what, 12 months away? 18 months perhaps?

And as the new National Airspace Architecture is supposed to be undergoing definition and development, what assurance is there that the upcoming 42nd Triennial Assembly of ICAO in Montreal will not take action which will seriously impact the U.S. process? Or set ICAO on further intitiatives which would constrain U.S. plans, and not necessarily for the better? Recall that the United States has not had a designated Permanent Representative to ICAO since Capt. Sully abruptly resigned (July 2022), and while the career Foreign Service officials heading up the U.S. Mission undoubtedly are fine and excellent public servants, they are not ( afaik ) aviation industry professionals.

None of this is to say that the NTSB should speed up its process and deliberations. But at the same time, if during this Assembly the Secretary of Transportation shows up - as happened during the previous Assembly - to speak on behalf of the United States, I hope the Secretary has very, very good speechwriters because it will be hard to say anything meaningful when the state of affairs is in such disarray.

Edit:
On July 17 the White House nominated former Delta Airlines Capt. and U.S. Navy aviator Jeffrey Anderson to the position of Permanent Representative to ICAO with the rank of Ambassador. Timing of Senate confirmation hearing is presently unknown.

NTSB Overview/Updates
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...CA25MA108.aspx
The docket is linked at the bottom of that page.

NTSB Public Docket
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA25MA108
The docket contains evidence related to the investigation. Many NTSB investigations have public dockets; often they're released with the final report.

In the docket:
10-HELO-A FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Documen...0L_FDR-Rel.pdf

H 'n' H.
Ordinarily I have no objection to lawyer bashing (and I've been known (in non-anonymous mode) to tell one or more good lawyer jokes).

Before stating why I object to the aspersion you've cast on legal types in the context of the DCA mid-air collision and the litigation arising from it, I'll suggest that probably most all forum posters (and readers), if not literally all, have heard either an ex-husband or ex-wife relate their unrequited frustration and anger at how the other spouse "got everything", "ripped me off", "took me to the cleaners" and so on. And then someone else will say, "yeah, and the lawyers are the only ones who profit in a divorce." The contradiction is rarely called out, but it is no less a contradiction.

But as to this case. The passenger manifest of the PSA flight isn't necessary to make this point, but I'm sure the estimable Mr. Clifford would consume hours of argument and pages of supporting documents making it clear that 64 lives were cut short, and many were people in the prime of their adult lives - not that one life should be worth more than any other life in compensation in court proceedings, but taking for example the relatively early career attorneys who perished in the accident, their earnings potential over the course of their careers is less speculative than, say, projections about one of the youthful skaters (although I'm pretty sure there are standards which have been worked out in the mine run of personal injury and wrongful death cases). My point is, this case will yield quite significant damage awards in the end. Yes, I realize that issues of immunity of federal agencies will have to be surmounted; having posted a lot about theses issues I realize they exist. Yet the citations of FAA orders, procedures, and rules in the Complaint does suggest that plaintiffs are ready to overcome the immunity argument. And I'm leaving for another day and place the consideration, how do you think it would affect the FAA in the long run to argue that "na na you can't get me" because of "legal technicalities" when it is pretty predictable at this point that NTSB in its final report will be, shall we say, either unkind or unsparing to FAA, or both, in assessing causes and effects.

So the case is likely, if not certain, to pay out big. The lawyers will get - unless legal counsel are using very different formulas than are typical in cases of this type - about one-third.

How is it then that only the lawyers do well? The argument is not about whether big-ticket damage awards can replace a lost loved one. The argument is about whether only the lawyers do well. "Grief" begins with the same four letters as "Grievance" and the crash victims' families certainly are individuals aggrieved by the negligence of some or all of the defendants. Maybe we can split semantic fibers over whether having their grievance abated by significant financial compensation is within the meaning of "doing well" - but under the facts of this case and their tragic losses, I think they will be at least "doing better". And so not only the lawyers.

This all having been said, apologies accepted, naturally.
WR 6-3

Looks basically correct, though I would add some points.

- The bill mandates a "risk assessment", but does not explain what that entails, or how the person making that assessment should be qualifed. A simple check box on the waiver form, "I assessed the risk to civil aviation", would presumably suffice.

- The civil aviation authorities (DOT, FAA, airlines) have no input on these assessments. This is why Homendy calls it a "whitewash", because it sounds like someone cares about risk, but there's no actual assurance the risk would be managed.

- Because these and other important provisions are so poorly defined, Homendy called the section badly written, and she's right. You need to know what the bill is talking about, or the ambiguity leads to court cases.

- we have seen a legislative effort to mandate ADS-B IN, which may be ongoing behind the scenes, and possibly scheduled to a push with the release of the final report. However, ADS-B IN is useless (in this context) if the military doesn't send ADS-B. I think that explains Homendy's level of anger.

I believe, without this provision, the Army needs to fix their ADS-B gear, and go to the FAA if they need a waiver for those top secret missions.

According to reporting published today by The Air Current - one of its periodic articles reporting on air safety which are not paywalled - the NTSB will meet on January 27. The meeting will include revealing and voting on the probable cause determination produced by its investigation into the DCA midair collision 29 January 2025.

The reporting indicates that the Board's final report is expected within two weeks.

Various safety recommendations also are anticipated to be on the agenda for the NTSB's January 27 meeting.

Of particular interest, among many other factors involved in this horrifically senseless accident (my characterization, not found in TAC reporting as such), is whether the NTSB's meeting which will mark the end of its official investigatory process will touch upon the controversial section of the NDAA, Section 373 (subject of previous posts at the time of passage, upthread).

A lot of what you guys are complaining about was in fact adressed by the hearing, and will be addressed by the final report.

As new information has emerged I have just rebuilt the website that re-organises this long thread by subject.
You can find it here: https://paulross.github.io/pprune-th...DCA/index.html

All 1,829 posts are organised into 68 subjects.

Changes:

• Added link to NTSB findings, probable cause and final recommendations.
• Added subjects: 'Accountability/Liability', 'Findings', 'NTSB Docket', 'Barometric Altimeter', 'Route Altitude', 'Hot Spots', 'Final Report', 'Probable Cause', 'Safety Recommendations', 'Helicopter Working Group'.

Around 20% of the posts on the thread are excluded because I can't pick up a subject from that post so please contact me if you feel that you contribution has been excluded.

The project is here: https://github.com/paulross/pprune-threads .
Issues can be raised here: https://github.com/paulross/pprune-threads/issues or PM me with ideas.

Waiting to see what becomes of the controversial Section 373 in the recent NDAA.
_________________________
Joint Statement of House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and House Armed Services Committee Bipartisan Leaders on NTSB\x92s Recommendations to Address DCA Crash
For Immediate Release: February 06, 2026
[Committee contacts omitted]

Washington, DC \x96 The bipartisan leaders of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the House Armed Services Committee today issued a joint statement regarding the National Transportation Safety Board\x92s (NTSB) recently approved recommendations to address the January 29, 2025, midair collision at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA).
Joint statement from House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO), House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA), House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-AL), and House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA):

\x93Now that we have received the approved recommendations and probable cause from the NTSB on the tragic DCA midair collision that claimed 67 lives, and with the NTSB\x92s final report expected in a matter of days, we are working on a comprehensive legislative solution to address what we\x92ve learned. It is our firm belief that meaningful improvements to the safety of our airspace require the full and fair consideration of all of the NTSB\x92s recommendations. We are continuing to evaluate the information and analysis gathered and put forward by the NTSB, and we will work together expeditiously on legislation to ensure a crash like this can never happen again.\x94

These are the guys responsible for stalling the ROTOR act that the Senate passed with bipartisan support last year.

https://www.politico.com/live-update...-bill-00764270 .
The journalists asked Homendy about it on the day of the board meeting, and she diplomatically said she'd been busy with the DCA midair documents since the board meeting and final report were coming up, but she also reiterated she wants ADS-B IN on every aircraft, so...

The NTSB has the enviable role of being able to champion safety absent any other consideration. The FAA and politics in general need to balance that with economic, business and other interests, so the outcomes are pretty much guaranteed to be compromises falling short of what we would want.

Final Report published.

Page 242 ff. in the final report pretty much exonorates the PF in the helicopter, in my opinion.
.

They requested visual separation and gave affirmation they had the other aircraft in sight. Failing to check the altimeter to a known datum was the least contributor.

I was just quoting from the final report, Page 12“

”with 56 hours in the previous year and

4.4 hours in the previous 60 days. The pilot had 136 hours of NVG time, 2.9 hours of

which were in the previous 60 days.”

For Chiefttp:
The question of currency, proficiency, and recency fairly leap off of the page, yes.
Inconvenient facts never stopped a lawyer from bringing a case to court, though.
No, it does not.
Wrong. Visual lookout is a responsibility for all members of the crew. That's a shared responsibility, and briefed before every flight. Note that in a Blackhawk, there are a variety of zones where the pilots are effectively blind (starting at about the four o'clock position and reaching to about 8 o'clock position) but the forward quarter isn't usually one of those. (Won't comment on the goggle issue here...)
Not just pre-flight checks.
I am not sure how much low level, over water, at night flying that you have done, but I have done quite a bit of that. If you are flying in such a regime, and there is a substantial mismatch between your radalt, and your baralt, and you have a hard altitude limit, you don't ignore your radalt.

repeatedly in the CVR transcript of the Blackhawk the instructor tells the PF they are straying from their clearance

the PF had also shown their handling skills were not to standard earlier in the check ride (I\x92ve seen it mentioned their abandoning a manoeuvre earlier would\x92ve been a fail normally) hence monitoring their trainees parameters would\x92ve been even more taxing for the instructor

I don\x92t know how anyone can pretend these things didn\x92t at least play a part in the Swiss cheese.

if the PF had been as equally capable as the instructor and performing their scan (the CGI reenactment shows that much of the CRJ\x92s flatboats occurred within the PF\x92s side of the scan) would the outcome have been different? Possibly.

the conduct of that flight was the final hole in the Swiss cheese arguably

Legislation

From House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee website 19 February 2026

Washington, DC \x96 The comprehensive legislative response to the various aviation safety issues raised by the tragic 2025 midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and a UH-60 Army Black Hawk helicopter at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) was released today by the bipartisan leaders of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.
The Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency (ALERT) Act of 2026 addresses all 50 safety related recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which concluded its thorough investigation and issued its final report on February 17, 2026.

The ALERT Act considers all of the NTSB\x92s findings of probable cause that contributed to the accident and responds to each of the NTSB\x92s 50 safety recommendations to provide a thorough and holistic legislative solution to improve U.S. aviation safety. Critical safety issues the bill addresses include:

Establishing requirements for equipping collision mitigation, avoidance, and alerting technologies and systems for civil fixed-wing and rotorcraft;
Improving helicopter route design, guidance, and separation;
Preventing loss of separation (near-miss) incidents;
Addressing deficiencies in the FAA\x92s safety culture;
Enhancing air traffic control training and procedures, particularly during high traffic;
Strengthening the safety of the DCA airspace \x96 one of the nation\x92s busiest and most congested airspaces;
Repealing section 373(a) of the last National Defense Authorization Act; and more.
The ALERT Act is led by Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO), Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA), Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-AL), and Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA).

[Quotes from Congressmen omitted]

Link to the text of the ALERT Act: https://transportation.house.gov/components/redirect/r.aspx?ID=486957-71714618

Link to a section by section summary of the ALERT Act:
https://transportation.house.gov/news/email/show.aspx?ID=RFS3V7AWS4PPNV2MA2XZXHULM4