Posts about: "Hot Spots" [Posts: 7 Page: 1 of 1]¶

"It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights." - DC isn't actually that big of a city or that brightly lit, and it seems the UH-60 was heading south west, well away from DC toward a not very dense part of suburban N. Virginia. Mostly they would see a very wide part of the Potomac river ahead, and in the distance on the western shore is a Daingerfield island (US park service land and mostly unlit), the GW parkway going N/S for a couple hundred meters (all the parkways are dangerously unlit IMO) followed by some low level typical suburb condos of a couple stories towards Potomac Yard, which other than street lights or the sign from Target is not very bright. I kayak there all the time and there's nothing much to see looking westward. I've been out of KVKX at night and can see that area and it's not dazzling.

"Radar useless as the aircraft are too low." - It seems there's valid radar returns from both aircraft. the FAA has a good diagram of the Potomac TRACON radar sites, about 10 different radars, and having visited the TRACON several times, they readily explain there's another nearly facility that is a duplicate of their radar feed, but for national security. I assume there's coverage till the river service for security to prevent someone from sneaking up the river with bad ideas

"Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. " - I fly in the area and in my experience everyone is on the same VHF, they might be also duped to UHF and can hear everybody on my handheld. You hear AF-1 all the time on freq.

"The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic" - Most of the area NE of the airfield in a prohibited area, and there's a lot of military installations within 5 miles of DC that they are shuttling around, so that path seems perfectly acceptable given the numerous constraints. there's nothing wrong with a helo corridor as long as you stay within it and maintain the prescribed altitude. Also, it's not like KDCA is some secret place, the flight paths are pretty well known if that's where you work. It's popular to sit in parks on both ends and watch the planes, there's literally millions of local people that know exactly the planes are coming and going on both directions. so if you're a helo there, you know where the hot spots are. Likewise, its not just any helo in that area, everyone is vetted, fingerprinted in the inner FRZ.

" on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone" - The UH-60 was not going to DCA, the assumption was it was using the helo route 4 corridor. All the UH-60Ls I've seen have full glass with moving map and I'm assuming a magenta line for the helo corridor.

Fun Fact - Calling it "Reagan" will get you tarred and feathered in the area. Folks refuse to utter the name and for years (decades) the Metro refused to rename the station until legally forced.

And that's not counting inhibited TA/RAs at low level ​​​​​​

NASA and company safety departments may be collecting and shelving reports, but shouldn't there be a central collation to enable identification of hot spots so they can be mitigated?

There is one already, been operating for years.

https://www.asias.faa.gov/apex/f?p=100:1::::::

"Low point of the whole hearing....." (Downwind_Left)

Also a high point - let me explain. ..... First, it was one of a goodly number of instances when Chairwoman Homendy proved all over again why she is an outstanding servant of the public interest.

But most observers of how the Board has operated over the past several years already would have agreed with that (imo).

Personally I didn't observe the elbowing on livestream but when the Chair noted it and that witnesses would be moved, it made sense. Together with the now widely derided rationale (on Wednesday) for not adding a notation on the helicopter route charts - in some terminology or nomenclature if "hot spots" was unavailable - the FAA witnesses in question, as I assessed their statements until that point, had been working mightily to give this accident an air of "excused inevitably." I need to point out this slam on their apparently questionable sincerity-plus-candor explicitly does not include the ATCT supervisor who testified at length and, in my view, honorably.

I don't want to comment yet on whether the accident victims' families will have a valid legal argument about the issue of "in trail" spacing, with regard to which one of the FAA witnesses in question described the matter in quite divergent terms from the way in which the Potomac Tracon official described it. But even reserving further comment, still it appears that if the answer for why the "in trail" memo was not acted upon favorably is that Runway 3-3 was going to be used more frequently, doesn't that answer: (a) mean that the pace of approaching and landing aircraft, in and of itself and also when combined with departures, would remain intense for DCA, and (b) the continued high tempo would also continue to complicate the proper - which is to say safe - control of helicopter flights most especially in the glaring light of the fact that Route 4 intersects the approach path to 3-3? As raw material for the legal argumentation that the FAA's actions and omissions were ministerial, and not matters of policy, this could be another call of, blood in the water.

(Of course all concerned know that the "unwritten policy" choice was to move traffic and hope for safe outcomes only. Maybe that often-criticized approach taken in the United States would prove out in an actual courtroom battle as a regrettable but nevertheless sufficient "policy decision" so as to allow sovereign immunity. But does the United States FAA really want to litigate this issue? Against some of the strongest and most experienced advocates ever to enunciate "Approach" in a courtroom? My understanding is the families, or some of them at least, are rep'd by attorneys and counselors who .... aren't finding time to sit in Starbux and post here.)

There were two other, at least, pieces of FAA testimony that, in my deposition-taking days, would have gone on for some hours more. No one could say what the Assistant LC was doing at the critical times. How could this not have been nailed down in the interviews? Also, what in the world is "debriefing" after training? How and why was that more important than keeping the helicopter position staffed?

I wish not to cast aspersions on any DCA ATCOs whatsoever. The testimony about why FAA did not get both alcohol and drug testing done in accordance with established rules was just another piece of shattered credibility - but as Board Member Inman stated, there is no basis to believe or think those kinds of problems were factors, and so that's not the point here. I mean, it wasn't clear fatalities had occurred very, very soon after the event? Good grief.

Perhaps the contretemps afoot in the investigations - and surrounding public relations affairs - in Korea and India have led me to some misunderstandings, but has it become time to think about whether the U.S. should have an AAIB? and not combine aviation into the general category of Transportation? For now, Member Inman said it well and succinctly: "Do better."

Absolutely agree.
The Air Current just published a review of those systemic failures. Well worth the reading time. (And TAC publishes stuff on safety matters freely available, not behind pay wall.)

It won't endear anyone to the people running the show in the federal interagency and who have responsibility for the conceptual design, architecture and implementation of the U.S. "ATC Modernization" programme (European spelling done deliberately here) but it strikes this SLF/attorney as remarkably clear that unless a full accounting of what went horribly and tragically wrong in DCA airspace on the night of 29 January 2025 is done and done tranparently, any hope for a successful rebuilding of the ATM components of the U.S. NAS is about slim, to none. Just one small but illustrative example. ATCOs at DCA wanted "hot spots" of potential traffic conflict noted on charts. FAA HQ denied the request. Why? It didn't have in place a standardized method of marking such notations on charts. This actually was testified to at the Board hearing.

"The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path."

The PC statement should be read in its entirety, and at the conscious risk of ripe cliche, context matters. The Board did not assign the probable cause to the intersecting flight routes as such. For one thing, Chair Homendy repeatedly since the early days of the Board investigation has hammered upon the fact that the vertical separation was as little as 75 feet without any procedural separation (such as the helos holding at Haines Point). And also since the start of the investigation, time and again the complexity of the DCA airspace, and the (in my strident opinion) very messed up operation of DCA with regard to - as ATC staff testified - just "making it work", have been emphasized. Plus the refusal of FAA ATO to act upon the input from the helicopter working group several years ago, plus FAA's declining to note "hot spots" on charts. And the staffing issues, and lack of fidelity to SMS on the part of FAA and to some extent the Army as well. And there were, quite obviously, many findings of fact which are necessarily part of the context for reading . . . and understanding, the PC determination.

A person need not be an aeronautical engineer, airspace architect, or civilian or military aviator to understand from the get-go that intersecting flight paths might be found across the NAS. I'll stand to be corrected but I do not think - having watched the entirety of the hearing today - that the criticism of the Probable Cause finding is a valid, fair or accurate assessment of the Board's work in this investigation.
WillowRun 6-3

I find it interesting that the actions of the crew of PSA5342 were not included as Probable Cause. How do you think this will affect the lawsuit against them?