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| Musician
January 26, 2026, 22:01:00 GMT permalink Post: 12027674 |
The docket at https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA25MA108 is unchanged from the previous hearing, with the exception of some personal items that have been removed. Last edited by Musician; 27th January 2026 at 16:52 . Subjects
NTSB
NTSB Docket
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| WillowRun 6-3
January 27, 2026, 16:55:00 GMT permalink Post: 12028094 |
Strongly concur with DaveR.
There are, in the facts developed by the NTSB investigation, not merely holes in the Alpine-country cheese which "line up." There are instead multiple lines through the cheese. It's more like the cheese has been shot through with a dozen rounds by Dirty Harry. Subjects
NTSB
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| Undertow
January 27, 2026, 21:50:00 GMT permalink Post: 12028235 |
@Osinttechnical Possibly one of the more damning slides in NTSB history found in the Blackhawk-American Airline s crash investigation. In 2013, a group of local ATC and helicopter pilots proposed moving flight paths to avoid aircraft-helicopter collisions on landing at DCA. The FAA ignored them.
Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
NTSB
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| DaveReidUK
January 27, 2026, 22:35:00 GMT permalink Post: 12028253 |
Strictly speaking, the FAA as regulator doesn't "ignore" NTSB Safety Recommendations.
It responds to them, with either acceptance or rejection, and in the latter case provides its reasons for doing so. It may also suggest alternative means of compliance with the Board's wishes, and in some cases this leads to quite a bit of to-and-froing between the two organisations until a final position is reached. The hearing is about to start on the Probable Cause statements, having had a prolonged debate on proposed amendments to several of the Findings (which are now all agreed). Subjects
FAA
Findings
NTSB
Probable Cause
Safety Recommendations
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| WillowRun 6-3
January 27, 2026, 22:48:00 GMT permalink Post: 12028261 |
Strictly speaking, the FAA as regulator doesn't "ignore" NTSB Safety Recommendations.
It responds to them, with either acceptance or rejection, and in the latter case provides its reasons for doing so. It may also suggest alternative means of compliance with the Board's wishes, and in some cases this leads to quite a bit of to-and-froing between the two organisations until a final position is reached. But the discussion was about a working group organized, convened and conducted by people from the FAA DCA staff and other concerned parties. The output of that group is what got "ignored" Subjects
DCA
FAA
NTSB
Safety Recommendations
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| nachtmusak
January 27, 2026, 22:50:00 GMT permalink Post: 12028262 |
Subjects
ATC
FAA
NTSB
Safety Recommendations
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| Ver5pen
January 27, 2026, 23:08:00 GMT permalink Post: 12028271 |
I don't see a livestream on youtube, but they have some supporting animations.
The caption/transcript is at https://transcript.verbit.co/?transc...WidthMode=true The docket has had more than 60 items added. https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA25MA108 Boardmeeting Overview Animation https://youtu.be/2H_A6mHsHk0 Aircraft Visibility Study https://youtu.be/LJ10ZOcWuC4 Control Tower Visibility Study https://youtu.be/IpcPaBbvwnM I don\x92t know why they chose to create it from the IP\x92s (RHS)\x92s point of view though, the PF was LHS and arguably had a better view of the CRJ the entire time IP seemed like he had his hands full with the RT (they were blocked a few times) and monitoring the PF\x92s flying (she busted the altitude constraint multiple times) definitely an absurd environment and accident waiting to happen (plenty of near misses have been reported subsequently in the same airspace). Americans have all the gear and money but somehow their cowboy side comes out all too often and aviation seems to be one of the biggest candidates. They are lucky they didn\x92t have the obnoxious clown JFK Steve screaming in their ears Subjects
Accident Waiting to Happen
CRJ
Close Calls
NTSB
NTSB Docket
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| DaveReidUK
January 27, 2026, 23:09:00 GMT permalink Post: 12028272 |
Probable Cause Statement:
The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path.
Their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a mid-air collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, as well as the air traffic system's overreliance on visual separation. In order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see and avoid concept. Also causal was the lack of effective pilot applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a mid-air collision. Additional causal factors were were the tower team's loss of situational awareness and degraded performance due to a high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions, and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real time operational risk factors, which resulted in miss prioritization of duties, inadequate traffic advisory advisories, and the lack of safety alerts to both flight crews. Also causal was the Army's failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of air tolerances on barometric altimeter in their helicopters, which resulted in the crew flying above the maximum published helicopter route altitude. Contributing factors include the limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crew's. An unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strain the DCA Atct workforce and degraded safety over time. The Army's lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, D.C. Helicopter routes. The FAA's failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including Ads-b in and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational changes based on previously identified risk that were known to management and the absence of effective data sharing and analysis among the FAA aircraft operators and other relevant organizations. Subjects
Barometric Altimeter
DCA
FAA
NTSB
Probable Cause
Route Altitude
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
Visual Separation
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| Equivocal
January 27, 2026, 23:50:00 GMT permalink Post: 12028296 |
Originally Posted by
NTSB
The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path.
Subjects
ATC
FAA
NTSB
Probable Cause
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| WillowRun 6-3
January 28, 2026, 03:09:00 GMT permalink Post: 12028338 |
"The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path."
The PC statement should be read in its entirety, and at the conscious risk of ripe cliche, context matters. The Board did not assign the probable cause to the intersecting flight routes as such. For one thing, Chair Homendy repeatedly since the early days of the Board investigation has hammered upon the fact that the vertical separation was as little as 75 feet without any procedural separation (such as the helos holding at Haines Point). And also since the start of the investigation, time and again the complexity of the DCA airspace, and the (in my strident opinion) very messed up operation of DCA with regard to - as ATC staff testified - just "making it work", have been emphasized. Plus the refusal of FAA ATO to act upon the input from the helicopter working group several years ago, plus FAA's declining to note "hot spots" on charts. And the staffing issues, and lack of fidelity to SMS on the part of FAA and to some extent the Army as well. And there were, quite obviously, many findings of fact which are necessarily part of the context for reading . . . and understanding, the PC determination. A person need not be an aeronautical engineer, airspace architect, or civilian or military aviator to understand from the get-go that intersecting flight paths might be found across the NAS. I'll stand to be corrected but I do not think - having watched the entirety of the hearing today - that the criticism of the Probable Cause finding is a valid, fair or accurate assessment of the Board's work in this investigation. WillowRun 6-3 Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
Findings
Helicopter Working Group
Hot Spots
NTSB
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy
Probable Cause
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
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| artee
January 28, 2026, 03:16:00 GMT permalink Post: 12028339 |
"The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path."
The PC statement should be read in its entirety, and at the conscious risk of ripe cliche, context matters. The Board did not assign the probable cause to the intersecting flight routes as such. For one thing, Chair Homendy repeatedly since the early days of the Board investigation has hammered upon the fact that the vertical separation was as little as 75 feet without any procedural separation (such as the helos holding at Haines Point). And also since the start of the investigation, time and again the complexity of the DCA airspace, and the (in my strident opinion) very messed up operation of DCA with regard to - as ATC staff testified - just "making it work", have been emphasized. Plus the refusal of FAA ATO to act upon the input from the helicopter working group several years ago, plus FAA's declining to note "hot spots" on charts. And the staffing issues, and lack of fidelity to SMS on the part of FAA and to some extent the Army as well. And there were, quite obviously, many findings of fact which are necessarily part of the context for reading . . . and understanding, the PC determination. A person need not be an aeronautical engineer, airspace architect, or civilian or military aviator to understand from the get-go that intersecting flight paths might be found across the NAS. I'll stand to be corrected but I do not think - having watched the entirety of the hearing today - that the criticism of the Probable Cause finding is a valid, fair or accurate assessment of the Board's work in this investigation. WillowRun 6-3 Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
Findings
Helicopter Working Group
Hot Spots
NTSB
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy
Probable Cause
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
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| WillowRun 6-3
January 28, 2026, 03:39:00 GMT permalink Post: 12028346 |
First, I have taken something posted on this thread some time ago as a deeply important article of faith. It was (I'm not quoting it exactly but from memory) "they owned the airspace of the last several hundred feet of the final approach to 3-3." The effort to paint them as negligent by the (estimable and highly successful) plaintiff lawyers frankly makes me want to puke. And I don't care one iota that some or several of those lawyers own their own aircraft and have pilot licenses. They didn't build hours, did they? And, .... it's one thing to try build a case against the airline company, but something else to assail the deceased pilots. Relatedly, and second, I tend to think the NTSB sees this in somewhat the same way. But the NTSB really excoriated the FAA, and it richly deserved it too. This was - it cannot be said too often AFAI-am concerned - a systemic failure. So between being revolted by the effort to invade the ownership of those last few hundred feet of airspace or flight path of Bluestreak 5342 on final to 3-3 on the night of 29 January 2025, and gunning for bear in the form of a complacent, ridiculously evasive if not obstructionist if not dishonest FAA, the Board had zero-decimal-zero tolerance or inclination for assigning causal factors to two dead pilots on final to 3-3. And that's EVEN IF the airline company should have done more. Third, and I don't know if it would be viable, but to the extent that the accountability for this accident lies mostly with FAA, and somewhat with the Army pilots and Army, then aren't the pilots victims too, rather than negilgent party-defendants? Shouldn't their estates have legal representation, as a party-intervenor in the case? That is what I meant earlier, who speaks for them? As we all know, the Board does not find fault. I somewhat think the lawyers seeking their contingency fee will probably, I guess, be talking about "fault." But the Army pilots are a bit different. It is distasteful and unseemly to criticize them, as they were in service, and just as much victims of the systemic failures as Bluestreak 5342's two pilots. And Uncle Sam, why, he's already admitted fault. Fourth and last, yes, the airline company will get raked over the coals for not having outsmarted the failures of the FAA. Jackpot justice, what a way to improve the architecture and operation of the NAS. (With apologies to a very estimable and deservedly highly well-respected airline industry attorney - a real one - who at a conference in Paris oh, a couple three years or so ago, made the point that plaintiff lawyers should not be the ones setting aviation policy through liability lawsuits.) What good is a lawyer clodding around a pilot's forum on the internet without a rant now and again, eh? Subjects
Accountability/Liability
FAA
NTSB
Probable Cause
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