Posts about: "NTSB Docket" [Posts: 14 Page: 1 of 1]¶

Up to 205 documents now in the docket, including composite CVR transcript. Couple of things jumped out:

1. PAT25 PF started to turn right at Cabin John (American Legion Bridge), which would have taken them toward Great Falls; i.e., up the Potomac. IP had to tell PF to turn left, which would start track down Potomac River (helo route 1). Odd. Not the best SA by PF.

2. No discussion in the PAT25 cockpit about the called CRJ traffic.

3. PSA Captain/PF expressed to PM a preference for continuing to runway 1 but accepted runway 33. Media will make a big deal out of this. I don\x92t think it is.

Yes, radar alt was a recorded parameter on the accident helocopter FDR. See the Flight Data Recorder (Helicopter) Factual Report in the NTSB docket.

NTSB Overview/Updates
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...CA25MA108.aspx
The docket is linked at the bottom of that page.

NTSB Public Docket
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA25MA108
The docket contains evidence related to the investigation. Many NTSB investigations have public dockets; often they're released with the final report.

In the docket:
10-HELO-A FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Documen...0L_FDR-Rel.pdf

Not that the NTSB are going to apportion blame in their report, that isn\x92t their function. But it\x92s quite clear there were (and are) unsafe practices going on among controllers and operators in FAA/DOD land. Read the docket testimony here from page 463 onwards to about 468 or until you get bored.

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Documen...dacted-Rel.pdf

Clearly Army pilots are calling visual on very distant traffic which they haven\x92t actually identified and can\x92t see, and controllers are believing them and contracting responsibility for collision avoidance to them. The Standards pilot being interviewed here (the most experienced Army pilot NTSB spoke to) even says \x91..I know it\x92s bad\x85\x92 but condones the practice because otherwise the PAT helos would have to hold!

The logic displayed here is totally crazy.

If ATC have taken the trouble to issue a traffic advisory to a helo, why does the helo pilot think it\x92s reasonable to assume the traffic (which they haven\x92t seen!) will be no factor. The Controller has called out that particular traffic to the helo pilot for a reason he\x92s become aware of, like the traffic\x92s intended flight path will shortly become a collision risk to the helo.

The TCAS display according to the video in the investigation docket did show the traffic all the way to impact. It was the last chance to avert this accident.

TCAS gave a TA just prior to that, why should TCAS have lost track?
That's why I don't understand all the fuzz about ADS-B in the UH60. TCAS in the CRJ worked as designed, including RA inhibit down low.
the CRJ crew getting a visual on the UH60 some seconds earlier could have saved them as well, one of many items on the 'could have saved them' list.


I've wondered a couple of times, what if.... the CRJ crew had failed to spot the UH60 all together. Now a left-banking evasive manoeuver was started, and only the left wing was substantially shredded by the rotor.
If they would has kept wings level, maybe both wings would have narrowly escaped major damage, only MLG and belly at risk of the main rotor.
But it all doesn't matter, really. 'Fate is the hunter' and they got caught.

Docket info cites MilSpecs controlling altimeter accuracy for PAT25 aircraft; e.g., \xb130 ft at sea level. Part 43 lists altimeter accuracy of \xb120 ft at sea level. I don’t think these differences are going to adversely impact the safety of military aircraft operating in civilian airspace. The cause of CAs/RAs lies elsewhere.

Bit of confusion here . TCAS is not a separation tool , it is a last minute anti collision system . You are not obliged to monitor the screen, definitively not at 300ft on finals Not sure the CRJ crew noticed it . . Fact is the CRJ crew was not passed the traffic info . the reason why has been covered in the NTSB docket ( interview of the controller)
In class B , controllers will provide separation between IFR and VFR however they can delegate separation to an aircrfat visually following a strict procedure and phraseology .and issuing an ATC Instruction : " maintain visual separation "

I recall this testimony (and had been avoiding trying to find it in the videotaped record).

If I understand the way the q&a progressed, and especially the definition provided by the examiner during the q&a of the Army pilot, "procedurally separate" means the airspace design is such that if both aircraft adhere to their assigned routes, the Route 4 helicopter operation can safely cross the approach path to 3-3 (and, though it should be obvious, please correct this if I've said it incorrectly or without enough precision). But as the Army pilot as well as the med evacuation group chief testified, they took steps to avoid operating across the approach path if there was DCA traffic - which the examiner referred to as "mitigations".

(The wash machine of my mind is cycling through some further thoughts on how the facts emerging from the hearings and certain items in the (voluminous) docket are likely to interact with the relevant legal issues and, in turn, how that appears likely to impact the looming NAS, FAA, and "new ATC system" reforms.)

I would have thought that the IG office that is part of any particular organization within the federal government, and especially the senior level people in such offices, develop a deep understanding of their "client's" activities. Perhaps not.

I also seem to recall that somewhere in this thread ..... maybe it was a different thread ..... a handful of posts described the Army's own investigation process for accidents such as this, and the admittedly vague recollection includes reference having been made to the rank of the officers who typically run those processes or something else about the process. (Maybe about different levels of inquiry and hearing boards?) It would be logical for an IG not blessed with aviation expertise to nonetheless avail themselves of people with experience conducting official investigations, which would close much or even most of the gap.

Also, the NTSB hearing included testimony by Army witnesses who may not have had aviation expertise in the sense of flying but who according to the information from the hearing and Board docket were members of the Army's cadre of aviation experts. They could possibly be assigned to work with the IG (.....though I don't know how it actually works, obviously).

Some reactions and at least attempts at valid observations.

FAA and ATCOs. Did the Department of Justice's Answer to the Complaint throw the controller(s) "under the bus?" Yes, and no. In brief, the Answer does not state that the controllers' acts or omissions were a cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the accident.

The Complaint alleges a long list of allegedly negligent acts by the controller(s) in Paragraph 250, which starts on page 158 and runs on to 164 (in the Answer). Without having studied the pleadings for hours upon hours (as one might do in actual practice) perhaps I've missed something -- but I think the only admission made by DOJ with regard to the controllers is that a very specifically cited FAA rule or procedure of some sort was not followed: "the DCA local controller did not comply with \xb6 7-2-1(a)(2)(d) of FAA Order JO 7110.65AA, chg. 3, Air Traffic Control (Sept. 5, 2024)." This specific admission is made recurrently in the Answer, amidst many other denials of (again, unless I missed something) everything else in the massive and detailed Paragraph 250 of the Complaint.

Edit [forgot to include]: the Complaint alleges generally the following about FAA and the ATCOs.
"the Federal Aviation Administration\x92s air traffic controllers failed in their two most important priorities, namely to separate aircraft in airspace and issue Safety Alerts when aircraft are in an unsafe proximity to one another; that the air traffic controllers on duty failed to abide by numerous other policies and procedures, including that air traffic control failed to provide traffic advisories to both aircraft and air traffic control failed to resolve an aural and visual Conflict Alert that advised air traffic control that the two aircraft were on an unsafe and converging collision course; and that the air traffic controllers failed in their duties concerning the \x93tower team concept\x94 within an air traffic control facility so that all controllers assist each other to prevent, amongst other things, a mid-air collision. The Defendants\x92 [meaning, both the U.S. and the airlines] collective failures (for which they are jointly and severally liable) caused, and/or contributed to this senseless and entirely avoidable tragedy."

So, "no", because the DOJ does not admit ATC was a cause-in-fact and proximate cause (both needed for liability, if I recall 1-L) but yes, first, specifically with regard to the FAA Order, and second, for all of the reasons ATC Watcher invokes. Whether those several factors would ever be considered for inclusion in an Answer to a big tort case such as this is doubtful . . .BUT especially after the fireworks over Section 373, watch for the NTSB report to lay it all out. (And incidentally, the Complaint now includes several excerpts from NTSB hearing and docket - not sure if these were part of the original Complaint. The Answer is the first pleading in response to the Complaint and it has become the Master Complaint, as I understand it, because it is the pleading on behalf of all the plaintiffs, regardless of whether they are represented by the attorneys who filed the very first Complaint in the case. Further, according to press reports (WSJ print edition today) both the airline companies filed motions to dismiss. Thankfully, or maybe not, my Pacer account is acting up, so, no comment....)

2. The airline and its parent company. The Complaint paints a very negative picture about the acts and omissions of the airline companies and the two pilots of 5342. The Answer was filed only on behalf of the United States (FAA and Army) and so the DOJ does not address the specific allegations forming the claims against the airline - this is standard practice. Still, I found this in the Answer (re: Para. 174): "The United States admits that the AE5342 pilots failied to maintain vigilance and to see and avoid PAT25".

I am refraining from trying to summarize or comment on the many aspects of the story about the airline pilots and airline companies alleged in the Complaint. It is a very detailed story. It probably if not certainly will outrage people in the industry writ large. I've not practiced tort law, either suing or defending, but that won't stop me from saying that it seems pretty clear that the trial lawyers are gunning for the airline company deep pockets, the availability of punitive damages when those are not awardable against the Federal Government, the availability of a jury trial, and insurance policies. To state the obvious.

As for the Army, Para. 253 starts on page 168 and runs to 176; the DOJ admits some but not all of the many specifically alleged negligent acts and omissions by the Army and those pilots.

One other little item caught my attention. In paragraph 106, reference is made to "risk assessment" stuff the Army aviation unit conducted or did not conduct. "Risk Assessment", that wouldn't be the same thing as showed up in Section 373, by chance?

(For information, the case number in federal district court in D.C. is 1:25-cv-03382-ACR.)

The official announcement is at https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-rele...A20260112.aspx . It mentions the meeting is set to start Tuesday, Jan. 27 at 9 a.m. Eastern time, and has a link to their live webcast. In my experience, the meetings are usually also available on Youtube.

The docket at https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA25MA108 is unchanged from the previous hearing, with the exception of some personal items that have been removed.

I don't see a livestream on youtube, but they have some supporting animations.
The caption/transcript is at https://transcript.verbit.co/?transc...WidthMode=true
The docket has had more than 60 items added. https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA25MA108

Boardmeeting Overview Animation

Aircraft Visibility Study

Control Tower Visibility Study

that recreation is incredible, kudos to NTSB

I don\x92t know why they chose to create it from the IP\x92s (RHS)\x92s point of view though, the PF was LHS and arguably had a better view of the CRJ the entire time

IP seemed like he had his hands full with the RT (they were blocked a few times) and monitoring the PF\x92s flying (she busted the altitude constraint multiple times)

definitely an absurd environment and accident waiting to happen (plenty of near misses have been reported subsequently in the same airspace). Americans have all the gear and money but somehow their cowboy side comes out all too often and aviation seems to be one of the biggest candidates. They are lucky they didn\x92t have the obnoxious clown JFK Steve screaming in their ears