Posts about: "Safety Recommendations" [Posts: 10 Page: 1 of 1]¶

I don't see anything in the above which states or implies that the provision in question is a good idea, or even just a neutral idea -- but then, the post perhaps (or likely) wasn't intended to state point of view on the provision's wisdom or absence of wisdom.

But regardless, I'm just trying to "noodle" (as a higher-seniority level lawyer in the same firm once used the term) how such a provision was inserted into the NDAA. I might have been taken in too much by press releases and watching hearings, but the current leadership of the House T&I (Transportation and Infrastructure) Committee has not given - to at least this one observer - any reason to think they would move in a direction contrary to the urgent safety recommendations made by NTSB soon after the accident (which were in fact implemented by DOT soon thereafter). So where is this coming from, this provision?

I won't try to argue leverage against any of the links in the reasoning in the quoted post. For one thing, the cynicism - not saying it isn't valid or warranted - on which the reasoning is based is sharper and more basic than the cynicism I usually experience. But this avoidance still doesn't address the question, where did the provision originate, and why?

Perhaps it is coming from the Executive branch and the Congress people involved feel pressure, for all sorts of Jet-Blasty reasons. The Pentagon might not want the adverse publicity of a trial which casts very unfavorable light. And with the recently announced systems integrator contract for the new ATC system, likewise, trial developments showing governmental incompetence would be seen as impeding the rest of the required appropriations. Not least, the public hype for the new ATC system has frequently referred to the work being completed in three or four years. Reliable sources (including a long time senior ATCO in a major European country with current involvement in a major ATCOs organization) scoff at the idea that all the necessary steps could possibly be completed in less than 8 to 10 years (including but not limited to site acquisition, construction, training on new equipment, not to mention sufficient rosters of ATCOs and then doing the relocations necessary if main facilities are actually consolidated). A really negative trial in Washington would not be helpful with regard to continuing to tout the expected so-very-rapid arrival of the new ATC system which will - it is said - make up for many years of lost time in the NAS.

I'm not arguing that this is what happened - just, what is the root of the provision? I mean, unless one believes it's a good idea, then I guess the "what if" is answered by saying, "good idea". Or even....
"That's good thinking there, Cool Breeze." (Couldn't resist the Boomer aside.)

According to reporting published today by The Air Current - one of its periodic articles reporting on air safety which are not paywalled - the NTSB will meet on January 27. The meeting will include revealing and voting on the probable cause determination produced by its investigation into the DCA midair collision 29 January 2025.

The reporting indicates that the Board's final report is expected within two weeks.

Various safety recommendations also are anticipated to be on the agenda for the NTSB's January 27 meeting.

Of particular interest, among many other factors involved in this horrifically senseless accident (my characterization, not found in TAC reporting as such), is whether the NTSB's meeting which will mark the end of its official investigatory process will touch upon the controversial section of the NDAA, Section 373 (subject of previous posts at the time of passage, upthread).

That's about to be partly answered, with the caveat that it's never in the NTSB's remit to assign blame to individuals. Currently at around #20 of 71 Findings, which will presumably be followed by the Probable Cause statements.

There will follow a raft of Safety Recommendations (I haven't been keeping count of how many have been referred to), though it's not clear whether they will be explicitly listed during the hearing.

Strictly speaking, the FAA as regulator doesn't "ignore" NTSB Safety Recommendations.

It responds to them, with either acceptance or rejection, and in the latter case provides its reasons for doing so. It may also suggest alternative means of compliance with the Board's wishes, and in some cases this leads to quite a bit of to-and-froing between the two organisations until a final position is reached.

The hearing is about to start on the Probable Cause statements, having had a prolonged debate on proposed amendments to several of the Findings (which are now all agreed).

True with regard to NTSB rec's.

But the discussion was about a working group organized, convened and conducted by people from the FAA DCA staff and other concerned parties. The output of that group is what got "ignored"

The comment in question says the proposal came from a group of pilots and ATC staff though, which I don't imagine was put together by the NTSB.

48 Safety Recommendations to follow (32 of them addressed to the FAA).

Those can wait until tomorrow ...

As new information has emerged I have just rebuilt the website that re-organises this long thread by subject.
You can find it here: https://paulross.github.io/pprune-th...DCA/index.html

All 1,829 posts are organised into 68 subjects.

Changes:

• Added link to NTSB findings, probable cause and final recommendations.
• Added subjects: 'Accountability/Liability', 'Findings', 'NTSB Docket', 'Barometric Altimeter', 'Route Altitude', 'Hot Spots', 'Final Report', 'Probable Cause', 'Safety Recommendations', 'Helicopter Working Group'.

Around 20% of the posts on the thread are excluded because I can't pick up a subject from that post so please contact me if you feel that you contribution has been excluded.

The project is here: https://github.com/paulross/pprune-threads .
Issues can be raised here: https://github.com/paulross/pprune-threads/issues or PM me with ideas.

Yes, it's hard to see how it could work any other way - but it does of course mean that a proportion of NTSB Safety Recommendations will ultimately not be adopted on cost or other grounds.

For example, the FAA are now going to make 25-hour CVRs mandatory on all new-build airliners, as recommended (a while back) by the NTSB, but an accompanying SR that they should also be retrofitted to all airliners currently flying was rejected, not unreasonably, by the FAA.

Legislation

From House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee website 19 February 2026

Washington, DC \x96 The comprehensive legislative response to the various aviation safety issues raised by the tragic 2025 midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and a UH-60 Army Black Hawk helicopter at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) was released today by the bipartisan leaders of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.
The Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency (ALERT) Act of 2026 addresses all 50 safety related recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which concluded its thorough investigation and issued its final report on February 17, 2026.

The ALERT Act considers all of the NTSB\x92s findings of probable cause that contributed to the accident and responds to each of the NTSB\x92s 50 safety recommendations to provide a thorough and holistic legislative solution to improve U.S. aviation safety. Critical safety issues the bill addresses include:

Establishing requirements for equipping collision mitigation, avoidance, and alerting technologies and systems for civil fixed-wing and rotorcraft;
Improving helicopter route design, guidance, and separation;
Preventing loss of separation (near-miss) incidents;
Addressing deficiencies in the FAA\x92s safety culture;
Enhancing air traffic control training and procedures, particularly during high traffic;
Strengthening the safety of the DCA airspace \x96 one of the nation\x92s busiest and most congested airspaces;
Repealing section 373(a) of the last National Defense Authorization Act; and more.
The ALERT Act is led by Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO), Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA), Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-AL), and Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA).

[Quotes from Congressmen omitted]

Link to the text of the ALERT Act: https://transportation.house.gov/components/redirect/r.aspx?ID=486957-71714618

Link to a section by section summary of the ALERT Act:
https://transportation.house.gov/news/email/show.aspx?ID=RFS3V7AWS4PPNV2MA2XZXHULM4