Posts about: "Annex 13" [Posts: 26 Pages: 2]

No. The investigation team will. \x91We\x92 might in 2028 perhaps. That\x92s the fundamental failing of Annex 13 and all who play by its rules now. It worked in 1980, just, but it\x92s totally unfit for purpose in 2025.

No. The investigation team will. ‘We’ might in 2028 perhaps. That’s the fundamental failing of Annex 13 and all who play by its rules now. It worked in 1980, just, but it’s totally unfit for purpose in 2025.

Just because everybody today wants immediate answers ?
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Let investigators investigate , analyse and make recommendations in peace .But if there is a major technical flaw detected the aircraft type will be immediately grounded . In the next days not in 2028\x85
Annex 13 still works relatively well as a global standard .

No, because people have answers but unreasonably keep them secret.. I don’t think you’ve been a State SIA investigator. I’ve worked many cases in which we had a very clear, comprehensive, understanding, months or at worst several years before it was shared. I do understand why SIAs take so long, I just came to realise there’s no reason for it, and I’ve seen the damage it does. The huge majority of crashes don’t involve a, ‘major technical flaw’, why should that be the qualification for telling people, including those very grievously and deeply affected, the truth? Then there’s the awful history of secretive draft reports (the old 12.1) and final reports - Clutha qv. It’s beyond time for change.

They normally publish a preliminary report a lot sooner than 3 years after the accident as far as I know.

from the EASA statement yesterday :
​​​​​​​No mention of UK

This is assuming too much. There are legal and technical reasons why the CVR may not have been downloaded yet or, if it has, why no information has been released.

In an ICAO Annex 13 investigation, interested states and experts are invited to participate. In this investigation, investigators from the US and UK are participating (there may be others as well), and experts from Boeing (and possibly component manufacturers) have also been invited. The lead investigators will often hold off on recovering data from the CVR and FDR, or examining the data, until there's agreement between the interested parties on how to go about doing it. With the distances involved, travel logistics could easily delay examining the data by a couple of days.

In some cases, the board leading the investigation doesn't have the internal expertise to recover data from the CVR and FDR. In these cases, agreement needs to be reached on which technical experts are going to take the lead on recovery. I don't know if the Indian AAIB has internal expertise or if they need to find external expertise to recover the data.

In some cases the CVR and FDR can be damaged and technical experts need time to come up with a plan to repair the recorders and recover the data.

Annex 13, Article 5.12 prohibits the release of CVRs and analysis/opinions from FDRs, unless the investigators decide that the benefits of the disclosure would outweigh the adverse impact that release would have on future investigations. This rule exists to encourage full cooperation in investigations from participants in the industry, including pilots and operators. India's accident investigation rules are consistent with Annex 13: see section 17 of the Aircraft Investigation of Accidents and Incidents Rules, 2017. So even if the CVR and FDR have been analyzed, it may well be that information isn't being disclosed to the public because they haven't reached any definitive conclusions yet that they're confident will end up in the final report.

At this time I think whether or not the 787 fleet will be subjected to a grounding order is indeterminate. The recorder units have been available for enough time so that it is reasonable to believe the fundamental "what" of the accident has been identified, even though the "how" and "why" will require more information than will be found in the recorders. I don't think the status of this component of the investigation points one way or the other to a grounding order.

However, the fact that the very highly authoritative poster fdr has anticipated a grounding order, and if I understood the very succinct (adjacent) post by another such authoritative person, PJ2 also anticipates it .... while I do not claim to understand their reasoning or the aeronautical or systems information on which it is based, but despite anything else I'm not going to disagree.

Several prior instances have been referenced. The deferral of a grounding order following Lion Air 610 strikes me as part of the overall MCAS debacle; regulatory capture, "narrative management" by the OEM. This accident has happened in a considerably different context. The previous grounding order that gives some concern is the one issued after American 191.

Not the order itself. Rather, after the non-U.S. operators had inspected their fleets and were able to report whether or not any engine-attachment structures (I don't want to get it wrong so I'm not specifically referring to "pylon" or "bolt" etc.) were damaged, they sought lifting of the order. The FAA Administrator kept it in place. The non-U.S. operators sued in federal court, arguing (at hopefully only slight over-simplification) that the U.S. was obligated by international convention to accept the airworthiness certificates of the other States in which those operators were legally organized. They won their case, too. . . . .

But at the time British Caledonian among other non-U.S. operators challenged the FAA Admin. to lift the grounding order, were any of those non-U.S. operators aware only of the proper maintenance condition of their engines' attachments, or were they also aware of the change in the aerodynamic qualities of the aircraft resulting from the asymmetric slats caused, in turn, by the severance of the hydraulics? If they did not yet know about the fact that the asymmetric slats caused the stall speed to increase, then their airworthiness certificates should not have been given legal deference. (If anyone knows the state of knowledge of the non-U.S. operators when they first challenged the FAA's grounding order, any information (or reprimand either for my lack of knowledge or thread drift) via PM will be greatly appreciated.)

So if the 787 fleet is in fact subjected to a grounding order, one hopes that the conditions for lifting it will be determined with great clarity. Not to drift over the edge, but the MAX order and its lifting might not give great confidence on this point.

Related to all this is the suggestion, way upthread, that Annex 13 is no longer fit for purpose. Respectfully stated, but I disagree. What would be proposed to update it? Until this tragic accident is resolved, what prospect is there to engage Member States (of ICAO) plus all the credentialed observer organizations in the process to rewrite it? Also, since Sully changed retirement careers the U.S. has not had a Permanent Rep to ICAO (let alone one confirmed by the Senate for Ambassador rank).

What about keeping the investigation process and results insulated from the pressures for drawing into the litigation process? Early disclosures of partial information would tend to erode that insulation - and for what gain?

The phrase by Icarus (post at 09:25) is one I would like to borrow - though giving attribution to an anonymous callsign could get tricky . . . . "narrative management, damage control, and pass the liability parcel."

SLF/attorney here, and staying in (what I hope will be seen as) very narrow limits for posting here.

Disclosures of information by unofficial sources during on-going Annex 13 investigations would not seem to be unusual - not to excuse the occurence. If I'm reading OldnGrounded's post (at 10:04) correctly, it isn't really unexpected.

I went back and reread the AvH report from which gear lever's post (at 4:27; AvH link at 4:43) was taken. Yes, AvH misidentifies an ELT. But consider: the content of the unofficially-sourced statement about the CVR-type portion of the forward recorder does not appear to have indicia of unreliability. To the contrary, as other posters have pointed out, by now the CVR-type portion of the recorder would have been read in all likelihood. Further, the rest of the June 17th unofficially-sourced statement aligns with the absence of any emergency ADs, or at least most all of that statement aligns that way. As for how the unofficial source was described, well of course that description would be vague or ambiguous - for one thing, the AvH wants to keep its source inside the flow of events and information.

As long as this post already is risking intrusion on the serious aviation-community discussion going on, I'll just add that the mods are to be greatly appreciated for many more forum hours into the future, for their incessant attention to the threads. Thank you!

Additionally, the lithium-ion batteries in the 787 design required compliance with "Special Conditions" in order to gain type certification. The addition of the Special Conditions at least strongly suggests that FAA's certification process brain-trust had maintained some vigilance with regard to the batteries once the type started operating, i.e., given their newness.

At this time, the fault or flaw at the root of this accident and how that fault or flaw worked through aircraft components and systems has not been identified publicly. It might not even have been identified .... I'm not convinced that separating "what" from "how and why" as a semantics exercise is enough to conclude the Annex 13 officials know the root cause yet. Maybe they do, maybe not.

And if they do not, then the contrast with the situation where FAA was, it seemed, keeping a close eye on battery issues in particular, is relevant.

...Yet...

The state is not yet required to report more than the preliminary report IAW Annex 13, however, the observations that are readily available to the investigators and the OEM teams will not be conducive to good nights sleep by any of them.

The regulator is not in a position to make an EAD or other airworthiness directive without a justifiable basis, and the very fact this is suggestive of a failure mode that is catastrophic, even though obviously low probability doesn't permit the risk to be accepted. With the system architecture on the B787, if viewed as a Bayesian assessment, the highest probability remains an environmental item outside of the design as approved. The problem with that area as we have seen before, it is very difficult to prove events with icing (Roselawn etc) or moisture ingress in most cases, it will likely require a forensic teardown of the control systems of the engine to determine what damage may have occurred before impact. That is a daunting proposition when the area involved has been at the center of the impact and post impact fire. I have more confidence in the systems engineers and software than the ability to maintain an environment that does not cause adverse outcomes.

Background info from "The Hindu", Ahmedabad plane crash: Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau yet to decide where black box data will be decoded

Black Boxes
Preliminary Report

I can guarantee you that the investigation is way ahead of this thread as they won't be stuck on a hamster wheel of irrelevant theories. The investigators are under no obligation to keep the general public informed minute by minute of where the investigation is. They are obliged under annex 13 to release a preliminary report in 30 days of the accident then its every 6 months, if there is anything to report. Anything that is important to release to the engine and airframe manufacturers will be done as a separate part of the process. Having been involved in the investigation process I can tell you from first hand experience that pet theories, as expounded on these pages, are like trying to cure cancer with just a petrie dish.

The June 30, 2025 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology (reviewed from an email with "Editors' Picks" sent to subscribers) includes an article dated June 27 by Sean Broderick, about the investigation of Air India 171. It relates some new facts or factual infomration (as well as coverage of many facts in the public domain for some time already).

One theme of the article is that the timing of release of information, in general about the investigation and specifically about data discovered in the recorder(s), appears inconsistent with other facts about the investigation. In support of this theme, the AW&ST article quotes a former NTSB investigator (with specific aircraft accident investigation experience).

The article also refers to the progress of work at the accident site (including an estimate of the number of workers involved) and the presence of aircraft accident investigation professionals from highly experienced authorities and entities (U.S. NTSB, U.K. AIB, Boieng, GE). It is pointed out - certainly with respect and diplomatic tone - that the aircraft accident investigation authority of India has relatively less experience in such matters. And that the presence of more experienced participants in the investigation (as accredited representatives, if I hopefully recall study of Annex 13 correctly) would suggest that guidance to the India authority has been available.

As the foregoing suggests the article asserts, in a thematic sense, that the timing of information release is not consistent with factual information about the investigation. (It also generally suggests that information typically is released by investigation authorities earlier within the initial 30-day time period provided for by Annex 13 .... but that generalization, while true in some cases, isn't backed up with anything specific of a factual nature.)

Mods, I hope this adds to the thread and if not please don't miss the bin when it gets tossed.

I think that it is understandable that the Indian accident investigation team leaders are being very cautious about when and what information to release. This is probably the first "really big" accident investigation they have done that has achieved so much international attention. I am sure that they want to be certain that when they do release information it is accurate and carefully presented, simply to avoid any embarrassment that might arise from a hasty or less than carefully thought out disclosure.

For that reason, I think we ought to give the Indian investigators the benefit of the doubt and assume that they simply want to make sure that when they do make a statement it is 'bulletproof' and reflects well on their skill, professionalism, and the processes that they have followed.

I'm fairly certain that's a misquote. Annex 13 requires ICAO countries to produce a preliminary report in 30 days\x97which India's AAIB seems to be doing\x97and a final report in a year.

I've seen a quote saying, "In accordance with international protocols, release of information on the air crash probe rests solely with the Indian authorities." This means that while there are other parties to the investigation, India's AAIB has the final say over what goes in these reports, in accordance with Annex 13. But ICAO would not say that India has the option not to release a report.

Annex 13 is held in high regard among attorneys practicing in international civil aviation legal matters. And by other types of professionals as well. So it was in a sense validating to read, in a number of posts way upthread, about the strict confidentiality obligations imposed on the individuals conducting or otherwise participating in the investigation. Also validating (in the same sense) to read the quoted post by za9ra22.

Without so much as hinting at approving of unauthorized leaks of information or statements purporting to be information from or about the investigation, the context which this accident has yielded is important. The first accident involving this type, and the different design fundamentals of the type (heavier use of electrical systems), would make any investigation authority especially careful not to issue incorrect statements. Perhaps the AAIB in India could be credited with understanding the high regard in which Annex 13 is held, and wanting, ..... perhaps desperately wanting, not to screw this up, not only in general terms but especially given the context. And add in the seemingly mystifying answers to what happened to Flight 171. If Annex 13 had a sentient presence, I'm convinced (mere SLF and attorney as I am) that it would concur with a "be careful, be very careful" approach to anything outside the tight circle of confidentiality within which the investigation occurs.

When I saw the article in The Air Current, on one hand I hoped for the sake of the reputation of the publisher that the unnamed sources were legitimately informed, but at the same time, would not anyone legitimately informed have been subject to rather strict confidentiality and nondisclosure obligations?

If this thread was a private discussion between experienced accident investigators, all participants would understand and agree with WillowRun's point above. But, his post would likely have been unnecessary on such a thread / forum, as it was in response to assertions about the Indian investigation process and agenda that are uninformed, and seemingly "Western" biased.

I am a "Western" born and raised former aircraft accident investigator who, later in life, lived and worked in India (and a dozen other "non-Western" countries). The allusions to lack of transparency, experience or professionalism on the part of the AAIB of India are uncalled for. They also show a lack of understanding of Indian rules and regulations as well as ICAO SARPS.

Enough said

Whilst I agree with your sentiment, could I suggest another perspective?

I have lost close friends and colleagues in civil aircraft accidents and done my best to support their families afterwards. It is common in that situation that the families are desperate for any news (who/what/when/where/how/why) and it can make big difference if they get good quality information and right now . They don't care about Annex 13 procedures or timelines.

Case in point: UTA772. A close friend was on that. I spent some time with his family immediately afterwards. Official UK government sources were unwitting so basically useless. I managed to hack into a major news organisation's computer network that gave me access to their news feeds (Agence France Presse was the best, naturally). Then I could give the family the information which they craved. With that access I was also able to find out the three other UK victims families (one I then realised was a colleague) and put them in touch with each other. I think that their common suffering brought some, but tiny, comfort to the families.

My point is that the families of this accident will be scouring the Internet for information. They might come across this thread. They might find it, in a small way, helpful. That depends on the quality of the posts here.

I have rebuilt the site that organises this thread by subject here: https://paulross.github.io/pprune-th...171/index.html

Changes:

• Built the thread up to July 10, 2025, 12:31:00
• Add subjects: Relight, 51 Day Issue, Fuel Cutoff Switches (detent), ICAO, Fuel Cutoff Switches, Memory Items, Annex 13, Simulation Scenarios.
• Various technical fixes should give a better/more accurate presentation.

Project is here: https://github.com/paulross/pprune-threads
Raise issues here https://github.com/paulross/pprune-threads/issues or PM me.