July 12, 2025, 07:08:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920265
To those who still try to put the blame on the switches...
- If the switches were defective (wrong type without the detent was installed), this airplane has been in operation for 10+ years - somebody would have noticed.
- If the switches were defective due to wear, it's impossible that both would fail simultaneously at exactly the same time. Have you ever seen all FOUR wheel bearings in a car fail within one second of each other?
- If this was an electric issue (spilled coffee theory), there is no way that ALL electrical contact simultaneously shorted into the exact condition to cut off the fuel. We would see one or two contacts fail first and some kind of "command disagreement", but not a nearly instantaneous total failure. Maybe only if somebody spilled a glass of mercury over the switches ...
The only plausible explanation is that somebody moved them (for a reason unknown).
- If the switches were defective (wrong type without the detent was installed), this airplane has been in operation for 10+ years - somebody would have noticed.
- If the switches were defective due to wear, it's impossible that both would fail simultaneously at exactly the same time. Have you ever seen all FOUR wheel bearings in a car fail within one second of each other?
- If this was an electric issue (spilled coffee theory), there is no way that ALL electrical contact simultaneously shorted into the exact condition to cut off the fuel. We would see one or two contacts fail first and some kind of "command disagreement", but not a nearly instantaneous total failure. Maybe only if somebody spilled a glass of mercury over the switches ...
The only plausible explanation is that somebody moved them (for a reason unknown).
Ditto for the idea of the physical detents failing, causing the switch lever to drop at the worst time. Not impossible, again, but both switches within a second of each other? Very low odds.
Am I correct in thinking that engine cutoff would in flight would trigger a warning on EICAS?
July 12, 2025, 10:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920467
SLF. But I've read in full both original threads and this thread.
The Preliminary Report is written in excellent English, so I think one should pay close attention to what it says.
One thing I noticed is that at the bottom of P4 NTSB are stated as "..participated in the investigation". However UK AAIB are only stated as "visited the site". My reading is that UK AAIB are not participating?
Another is that some items on the timescale are v precise, others much more vague.
A question :
If the fuel switches were moved to cutoff, for whatever reason, what exactly would each pilot see as an EICAS warning. I'm still unclear why one pilot asked the other why he cut off - actual observation of the action, or message.
The Preliminary Report is written in excellent English, so I think one should pay close attention to what it says.
One thing I noticed is that at the bottom of P4 NTSB are stated as "..participated in the investigation". However UK AAIB are only stated as "visited the site". My reading is that UK AAIB are not participating?
Another is that some items on the timescale are v precise, others much more vague.
A question :
If the fuel switches were moved to cutoff, for whatever reason, what exactly would each pilot see as an EICAS warning. I'm still unclear why one pilot asked the other why he cut off - actual observation of the action, or message.
July 12, 2025, 12:25:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920578
AI171 Threads by Subject
I have rebuilt the site that organises these three threads by subject here:
https://paulross.github.io/pprune-th...171/index.html
Changes:
Raise issues here https://github.com/paulross/pprune-threads/issues or PM me.
Changes:
- Build threads up to July 12, 2025, 11:59:00 (built at July 12, 2025, 13:03:09).
- Add thread about the published report: Preliminary Air India crash report published
- Add subjects: "Guards", "Timeline (Preliminary Report)", "EICAS", "RUN/CUTOFF", "Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin", "SAIB NM-18-33", "Gear Lever", "Startle Effect" and "Cockpit Area Audio".
- Minor improvements to the index.html page.
Raise issues here https://github.com/paulross/pprune-threads/issues or PM me.
July 12, 2025, 18:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920729
Too many people not wanting to acknowledge what is staring them in the face.
The switches were physically moved to cut off. The report says so, they will have heard them on the CVR.
The switches don\x92t move unless you intend to move them. You can give me all the worn mechanism, SAIB, phone/ipad theories you like. You\x92re clutching at straws.
If you had a massive brain fart and moved one to cutoff by mistake, you would realise instantly. These switches are distinctive in sound and feel. You would know what you had done before you had even released it in the cut off position.
Almost instantly you would get aural warnings and pages of EICAS Warnings and advisory\x92s. You\x92d get a massive clunk and momentary blanking of screens as power transferred.
if it was a mistake, you would instantly move it back to run\x85..you sure as hell wouldn\x92t double down and do the second engine.
it\x92s very sad, but I fear it is staring us in the face.
The switches were physically moved to cut off. The report says so, they will have heard them on the CVR.
The switches don\x92t move unless you intend to move them. You can give me all the worn mechanism, SAIB, phone/ipad theories you like. You\x92re clutching at straws.
If you had a massive brain fart and moved one to cutoff by mistake, you would realise instantly. These switches are distinctive in sound and feel. You would know what you had done before you had even released it in the cut off position.
Almost instantly you would get aural warnings and pages of EICAS Warnings and advisory\x92s. You\x92d get a massive clunk and momentary blanking of screens as power transferred.
if it was a mistake, you would instantly move it back to run\x85..you sure as hell wouldn\x92t double down and do the second engine.
it\x92s very sad, but I fear it is staring us in the face.
July 12, 2025, 18:54:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920749
Question:
What messages, if any, are displayed on-screen when the fuel cutoff switches are re-positioned (especially to OFF)? I'm wondering if the pilot who asked about the shutoff SAW the other pilot manipulate the switches or if he was alerted by a message... or perhaps he looked down at rollback and realized they were in the OFF position.
What messages, if any, are displayed on-screen when the fuel cutoff switches are re-positioned (especially to OFF)? I'm wondering if the pilot who asked about the shutoff SAW the other pilot manipulate the switches or if he was alerted by a message... or perhaps he looked down at rollback and realized they were in the OFF position.
I believe (long time ago experience) there is an EICAS alert popping up when the fuel control switches are moved to cutoff. However, Boeing has a philosophy of "inhibits" below 400ft the aural alert indicating an EICAS has popped up is one of them. So as PF you would have to look at the EICAS during rotation, read the alert, then look down at the switches instantly.
July 12, 2025, 19:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920769
I don\x92t know if the FDR measures the switch position or the electrical signal. The latter is probably more likely, although there has been much discussion around potential scenarios involving accidental switch movement as well as possible causes of electrical glitches. Let\x92s assume that the switches were actually moved, and ignoring the \x93bad faith\x94 scenario, we need a situation that encompasses the switches being moved to Cutoff by one pilot, this action being queried by the other pilot and denied by the pilot who moved the switches.
For consideration, here is a possible scenario that hasn\x92t been mentioned yet and encompasses the frailty of human performance. The report mentions that the flight crew on the immediately prior flight had written up a "STAB POS XDCR" status message, and that troubleshooting was carried out. I wonder if the scenario could be that the accident crew received a Stabiliser EICAS message on or around take-off and the Capt (who was PM) decided to action the first checklist item immediately from memory, by intending to move the Stab switches to Cutoff but moving the fuel switches instead. As in all modern Boeings, the Stabiliser Cutoff switches are immediately next to the Fuel Cutoff switches and operate in the same sense (i.e. down for Cutoff). They are guarded and never normally moved but, with an intent to move the stab switches, \x93muscle memory\x94 (cerebellum activation if you prefer) may have taken the Captain\x92s hand to the Fuel switches, which are operated on every flight. The FO (who is PF) is manually flying at this stage sees and queries it. The Capt denies it, as he doesn\x92t realise what he has done (confirmation bias perhaps). After a few seconds, the terrible mistake is realised, and the fuel switches are moved back to run, but sadly too late and the Capt makes a Mayday call.
Perhaps a bit of a stretch but not as much of a stretch as many of the other scenarios in this thread. I think it is a real possibility. Sadly, the only other explanation that I can see is the deliberate \x93bad faith\x94 scenario, which we would all hope is incorrect.
Fly Safe
PJ88
For consideration, here is a possible scenario that hasn\x92t been mentioned yet and encompasses the frailty of human performance. The report mentions that the flight crew on the immediately prior flight had written up a "STAB POS XDCR" status message, and that troubleshooting was carried out. I wonder if the scenario could be that the accident crew received a Stabiliser EICAS message on or around take-off and the Capt (who was PM) decided to action the first checklist item immediately from memory, by intending to move the Stab switches to Cutoff but moving the fuel switches instead. As in all modern Boeings, the Stabiliser Cutoff switches are immediately next to the Fuel Cutoff switches and operate in the same sense (i.e. down for Cutoff). They are guarded and never normally moved but, with an intent to move the stab switches, \x93muscle memory\x94 (cerebellum activation if you prefer) may have taken the Captain\x92s hand to the Fuel switches, which are operated on every flight. The FO (who is PF) is manually flying at this stage sees and queries it. The Capt denies it, as he doesn\x92t realise what he has done (confirmation bias perhaps). After a few seconds, the terrible mistake is realised, and the fuel switches are moved back to run, but sadly too late and the Capt makes a Mayday call.
Perhaps a bit of a stretch but not as much of a stretch as many of the other scenarios in this thread. I think it is a real possibility. Sadly, the only other explanation that I can see is the deliberate \x93bad faith\x94 scenario, which we would all hope is incorrect.
Fly Safe
PJ88
July 12, 2025, 20:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920799
Question - For those of you with good simulator access.
What - Exactly - are the Flight Deck Effects that would be seen (and in what order?) in the scenario that PM Operated #1 then #2 to cutoff, whilst in flight with APU not running?
e.g. - What screens would blank? for how long? Master Caution? EICAS Messages? Chimes/Aural Alerts?
Intent behind this question is, If PF Does not see the switches operated, what reasonably is the amount of time it would take to look at those switches? Where is the attention initially directed?
What - Exactly - are the Flight Deck Effects that would be seen (and in what order?) in the scenario that PM Operated #1 then #2 to cutoff, whilst in flight with APU not running?
e.g. - What screens would blank? for how long? Master Caution? EICAS Messages? Chimes/Aural Alerts?
Intent behind this question is, If PF Does not see the switches operated, what reasonably is the amount of time it would take to look at those switches? Where is the attention initially directed?
July 12, 2025, 20:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920812
Question - For those of you with good simulator access.
What - Exactly - are the Flight Deck Effects that would be seen (and in what order?) in the scenario that PM Operated #1 then #2 to cutoff, whilst in flight with APU not running?
e.g. - What screens would blank? for how long? Master Caution? EICAS Messages? Chimes/Aural Alerts?
Intent behind this question is, If PF Does not see the switches operated, what reasonably is the amount of time it would take to look at those switches? Where is the attention initially directed?
What - Exactly - are the Flight Deck Effects that would be seen (and in what order?) in the scenario that PM Operated #1 then #2 to cutoff, whilst in flight with APU not running?
e.g. - What screens would blank? for how long? Master Caution? EICAS Messages? Chimes/Aural Alerts?
Intent behind this question is, If PF Does not see the switches operated, what reasonably is the amount of time it would take to look at those switches? Where is the attention initially directed?
One EICAS and one PFD is on the battery (most likely the left seat PFD) - they might momentarily flicker but will not 'blank'.
You get an EICAS message when you set the fuel switch to CUTOFF - something like "ENGINE X CUTOFF" (not sure of the 787 wording, but it would be something to that effect.
While I doubt the PF would be actively monitoring EICAS during TO, with the sudden audio change to the engine noise as well as the sudden loss of acceleration, I'd expect him to take a quick look at EICAS to see what the (
) the engines are doing. Plus, if the PF was in the right seat and his PFD blanked - I'd expect him to look across to see what's on either the standby or the left seat PFC, and perhaps EICAS.
July 12, 2025, 22:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920880
No simulator access, but I do know this much:
One EICAS and one PFD is on the battery (most likely the left seat PFD) - they might momentarily flicker but will not 'blank'.
You get an EICAS message when you set the fuel switch to CUTOFF - something like "ENGINE X CUTOFF" (not sure of the 787 wording, but it would be something to that effect.
One EICAS and one PFD is on the battery (most likely the left seat PFD) - they might momentarily flicker but will not 'blank'.
You get an EICAS message when you set the fuel switch to CUTOFF - something like "ENGINE X CUTOFF" (not sure of the 787 wording, but it would be something to that effect.
And that would explain the weird (at least to me) question of the pilot to the other one “why did you do that” because normally, every time you see the message SHUTDOWN it is always a result of crew action (and that is quite often as you do that about every sim ride).
Last edited by golfyankeesierra; 12th July 2025 at 23:10 .
July 12, 2025, 23:06:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920911
Tdracer has certainly explained that separation of cabling runs etc would have it very improbable that a single cable fault or short would impact both engines simultaneously in the same way. The CVR data is derived from local sensors with a dedicated battery backup, however all the FDR data and the fuel shut off commands are electrical signals which ultimately have a common source in the aircraft power buses. A water ingress into the EE bay at rotate which momentarily shorted all the low voltage buses to higher AC voltage is unlikely but is it unlikely to the same extent.
What bothers me is that message about the stab cutoff switches on the previous flight. It's a bit of a strange coincidence, since those switches are quite close to the fuel switches. I'm thinking that maybe some liquid could have been spilled during the previous flight over the area of the fuel switches and stab cutoff switches. Perhaps it initially affected just the stab switches. Then, during the accident flight, the acceleration and/or the rotation might have caused residual liquid to move and cause some issue for both fuel switches. Then, as the acceleration stopped after the loss of thrust and the aircraft stopped climbing, maybe the liquid moved again and the fuel switches recovered. But I admit this seems very unlikely.
July 12, 2025, 23:30:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920926
No simulator access, but I do know this much:
One EICAS and one PFD is on the battery (most likely the left seat PFD) - they might momentarily flicker but will not 'blank'.
You get an EICAS message when you set the fuel switch to CUTOFF - something like "ENGINE X CUTOFF" (not sure of the 787 wording, but it would be something to that effect.
While I doubt the PF would be actively monitoring EICAS during TO, with the sudden audio change to the engine noise as well as the sudden loss of acceleration, I'd expect him to take a quick look at EICAS to see what the (
) the engines are doing. Plus, if the PF was in the right seat and his PFD blanked - I'd expect him to look across to see what's on either the standby or the left seat PFC, and perhaps EICAS.
One EICAS and one PFD is on the battery (most likely the left seat PFD) - they might momentarily flicker but will not 'blank'.
You get an EICAS message when you set the fuel switch to CUTOFF - something like "ENGINE X CUTOFF" (not sure of the 787 wording, but it would be something to that effect.
While I doubt the PF would be actively monitoring EICAS during TO, with the sudden audio change to the engine noise as well as the sudden loss of acceleration, I'd expect him to take a quick look at EICAS to see what the (
) the engines are doing. Plus, if the PF was in the right seat and his PFD blanked - I'd expect him to look across to see what's on either the standby or the left seat PFC, and perhaps EICAS.
CVR should have recorded the beeper too, inhibits are for ground only.
July 13, 2025, 14:45:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921364
It would have been useful if more of the CVR data had been released so as to see the crew interaction. Also the language used on what was released seems to refer to a third person.
However, from an operator perspective. Captain PM, FO PF. PF selects TOGA and follows the thrust levers, Captain confirms Thrust Set and replaces FO hands on the Thrust Levers. 80Kt call by PM, acknowledged by PF. Aircraft calls V1, Captain should withdraw hands from Thrust Levers and calls Rotate at Vr. PM is looking for confirmation the aircraft is climbing and calls Positive Rate. PF confirms and calls Gear Up. At this point the PF will be looking through the HUD looking to follow the flight director, the PM would be checking LNAV had engaged and at 400\x92 checking THR REF and VNAV SPD. However, at this point a loss of thrust occurred. So how was this apparent to the PF who would have been looking out with both hands on the control wheel. Reduction in pitch? GPWS call-out? Decreasing N1 on the engine instruments? EICAS ENG SHUTDOWN? What did the PM see? Who called out the situation? Were any actions called for? At some point as the generators went off line all the FO instruments would have blanked. Did the Captain assume control? I don\x92t think I would have been thinking about the Fuel Cut-Off switches at that point, yet they were specifically mentioned which does mean the switches were moved and it wasn\x92t some internal fault.
Hopefully, as the CVR is further analysed some more information will come to light.
However, from an operator perspective. Captain PM, FO PF. PF selects TOGA and follows the thrust levers, Captain confirms Thrust Set and replaces FO hands on the Thrust Levers. 80Kt call by PM, acknowledged by PF. Aircraft calls V1, Captain should withdraw hands from Thrust Levers and calls Rotate at Vr. PM is looking for confirmation the aircraft is climbing and calls Positive Rate. PF confirms and calls Gear Up. At this point the PF will be looking through the HUD looking to follow the flight director, the PM would be checking LNAV had engaged and at 400\x92 checking THR REF and VNAV SPD. However, at this point a loss of thrust occurred. So how was this apparent to the PF who would have been looking out with both hands on the control wheel. Reduction in pitch? GPWS call-out? Decreasing N1 on the engine instruments? EICAS ENG SHUTDOWN? What did the PM see? Who called out the situation? Were any actions called for? At some point as the generators went off line all the FO instruments would have blanked. Did the Captain assume control? I don\x92t think I would have been thinking about the Fuel Cut-Off switches at that point, yet they were specifically mentioned which does mean the switches were moved and it wasn\x92t some internal fault.
Hopefully, as the CVR is further analysed some more information will come to light.
July 13, 2025, 18:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921494
It would have been useful if more of the CVR data had been released so as to see the crew interaction. Also the language used on what was released seems to refer to a third person.
However, from an operator perspective. Captain PM, FO PF. PF selects TOGA and follows the thrust levers, Captain confirms Thrust Set and replaces FO hands on the Thrust Levers. 80Kt call by PM, acknowledged by PF. Aircraft calls V1, Captain should withdraw hands from Thrust Levers and calls Rotate at Vr. PM is looking for confirmation the aircraft is climbing and calls Positive Rate. PF confirms and calls Gear Up. At this point the PF will be looking through the HUD looking to follow the flight director, the PM would be checking LNAV had engaged and at 400\x92 checking THR REF and VNAV SPD. However, at this point a loss of thrust occurred. So how was this apparent to the PF who would have been looking out with both hands on the control wheel. Reduction in pitch? GPWS call-out? Decreasing N1 on the engine instruments? EICAS ENG SHUTDOWN? What did the PM see? Who called out the situation? Were any actions called for? At some point as the generators went off line all the FO instruments would have blanked. Did the Captain assume control? I don\x92t think I would have been thinking about the Fuel Cut-Off switches at that point, yet they were specifically mentioned which does mean the switches were moved and it wasn\x92t some internal fault.
Hopefully, as the CVR is further analysed some more information will come to light.
However, from an operator perspective. Captain PM, FO PF. PF selects TOGA and follows the thrust levers, Captain confirms Thrust Set and replaces FO hands on the Thrust Levers. 80Kt call by PM, acknowledged by PF. Aircraft calls V1, Captain should withdraw hands from Thrust Levers and calls Rotate at Vr. PM is looking for confirmation the aircraft is climbing and calls Positive Rate. PF confirms and calls Gear Up. At this point the PF will be looking through the HUD looking to follow the flight director, the PM would be checking LNAV had engaged and at 400\x92 checking THR REF and VNAV SPD. However, at this point a loss of thrust occurred. So how was this apparent to the PF who would have been looking out with both hands on the control wheel. Reduction in pitch? GPWS call-out? Decreasing N1 on the engine instruments? EICAS ENG SHUTDOWN? What did the PM see? Who called out the situation? Were any actions called for? At some point as the generators went off line all the FO instruments would have blanked. Did the Captain assume control? I don\x92t think I would have been thinking about the Fuel Cut-Off switches at that point, yet they were specifically mentioned which does mean the switches were moved and it wasn\x92t some internal fault.
Hopefully, as the CVR is further analysed some more information will come to light.
Interestingly ENG 1 was cut off first\x85
July 13, 2025, 18:12:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921504
Agreed - our ex. colleagues facebook group of some 200 ex heavy guys thought that, perhaps, it was to shift the blame. The investigators only know the switches were set to off then on and who said what but not who did what.
If the FO was flying he would be rotating to a target climb out pitch / following FDs and probably glancing out too and he'd certainly be busy, probably too busy to see the Captain move the switches and his first indication would be a deceleration together with the EICAS/ECAM displaying dozens of warnings with associated audio ......can't imaging the FO, whilst flying, turned to the left and shutdown both engines and the Captain never saw it or intervened .... doing all this as he pretty much as he rotated. If I was in the left seat I would have caught the FO's arm before he touched a switch. The transcript, actual words and voice tones will be very illuminating and, of course, we may have more surprises to come.
If the FO was flying he would be rotating to a target climb out pitch / following FDs and probably glancing out too and he'd certainly be busy, probably too busy to see the Captain move the switches and his first indication would be a deceleration together with the EICAS/ECAM displaying dozens of warnings with associated audio ......can't imaging the FO, whilst flying, turned to the left and shutdown both engines and the Captain never saw it or intervened .... doing all this as he pretty much as he rotated. If I was in the left seat I would have caught the FO's arm before he touched a switch. The transcript, actual words and voice tones will be very illuminating and, of course, we may have more surprises to come.
EICAS on Boeing . We don\x92t use the term ECAM that\x92s Airbus I think
July 13, 2025, 18:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921526
Former Boeing Engineer on the 787 (prob should put this in my profile at some point but newbie on the forum), but personally flown nothing bigger than a 172.
Longer I think about this the more I lean towards purposeful but not intentional action slip cutoffs by the captain. Some people have commented on sim training captains doing this to reset quicker (i wouldn't know).
We know FO was flying and initial cut offs are 1 then 2, which to me says CAPT did it. But also relights were 1 then 2 which tells me CAPT also did that one most likely.
Also comments around 10 seconds of delay being a long time, that's REALLY fast in my opinion especially considering, 1. this is a situation that is never trained for and 2. All sorts of lights changing, displays flickering, whole right side of the cockpit basically turning off and 3. Your really close to the ground and transitions (from takeoff to climb) lend themselves hard things to break your mind out of. That has to be a very jarring experience that needs likely a few seconds just to re-orient themselves. I'm honestly impressed they got them re-lit that fast, but assuming training with engine out and re-start procedures likely gave them a hint fuel switches from the EICAS messages.
Very confident Boeing FlightOps engineers and training captains have run through this in the sim quite a few times now.
Longer I think about this the more I lean towards purposeful but not intentional action slip cutoffs by the captain. Some people have commented on sim training captains doing this to reset quicker (i wouldn't know).
We know FO was flying and initial cut offs are 1 then 2, which to me says CAPT did it. But also relights were 1 then 2 which tells me CAPT also did that one most likely.
Also comments around 10 seconds of delay being a long time, that's REALLY fast in my opinion especially considering, 1. this is a situation that is never trained for and 2. All sorts of lights changing, displays flickering, whole right side of the cockpit basically turning off and 3. Your really close to the ground and transitions (from takeoff to climb) lend themselves hard things to break your mind out of. That has to be a very jarring experience that needs likely a few seconds just to re-orient themselves. I'm honestly impressed they got them re-lit that fast, but assuming training with engine out and re-start procedures likely gave them a hint fuel switches from the EICAS messages.
Very confident Boeing FlightOps engineers and training captains have run through this in the sim quite a few times now.
July 13, 2025, 20:22:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921611
Good advice when talking into a mirror - what it's got to do with EICAS v ECAM I don't know but it does explain why you were "checking" - good luck
July 13, 2025, 20:50:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921641
My thoughts are that the thrust levers are something that 'were' moved by foreign objects (unlike all the silly speculation wrt the switches). That foreign object being the EICAS Screen/instrument panel/windscreen support structure AT impact.
July 13, 2025, 23:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921764
I've reviewed the report a couple of more times since then, with some of the insights offered by PPRuNers to aid me. It had seemed to me, on first read, that they (whomever approved the final language of the report that we have all read) were hanging the FO out to dry...but...that may have been me reading too much between the lines . As others have noted, there's a lot not said.
Other comments in this thread had already made me think that the younger pilot was the PF and that it was he who had challenged the PM because he would have been focused on flying the aircraft and would have had neither the time nor the inclination to adjust the critical fuel cut off switches which you yourself categorically claim would never be mistaken for other switches.
I've got some thoughts on compartmentalization still cooking in my head, to include "where was the captain's attention during take off, something he'd done hundreds of times?" I do not yet have those thoughts in coherent enough form to concisely present them to the very critical (as well it should be!) audience here.
The CRM piece has me grabbing at straws. I had mentioned in a previous post the bit about No Fast Hands and Confirmation of important switches/handles/levers before activating as general CRM principals, which it seems someone did not adhere to.
Nothing (yet) can tell me "what did the captain see with his eyes during the three seconds between leaving the ground and the switches being moved?"
I am not sure how much of the EICAS info ends up being recorded on the EAFR/FDR, or if there was a light that illuminated before the switches were moved, perhaps triggering a 'fast hands' moment / error...
Perhaps a subsequent report can shed some light on that.
And yes, it might have been an attempt at suicide for {X reasons} which are known only to someone who is now dead.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 13th July 2025 at 23:33 .
July 14, 2025, 04:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921852
I was thinking about this scenario when PF with the HUD down. The fuel switches are not in my field of view, so if you weren\x92t expecting it (and you wouldn\x92t be), a complete loss of thrust at v2 would come as a surprise to you as there are no engine indications on the HUD. I am not sure the PF would look down at the fuel switches in this situation, maybe at the EICAS but likely you will be busy flying the aircraft and leave the troubleshooting to the PM.
So if it were deliberate by the PM, the PF would be very slow to identify the problem. Unless you saw it happen (very unlikely), it would be virtually unrecoverable.
So if it were deliberate by the PM, the PF would be very slow to identify the problem. Unless you saw it happen (very unlikely), it would be virtually unrecoverable.
July 14, 2025, 08:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921931
Agree security camera's are everywhere but in cockpits.
They will add valuable information to enhance crash investigations and accelerate corrective actions.
E.g. it can automatically activate when flight characteristics, EICAS or crew actions deviate from expected references.
They will add valuable information to enhance crash investigations and accelerate corrective actions.
E.g. it can automatically activate when flight characteristics, EICAS or crew actions deviate from expected references.