Posts about: "Fuel Cutoff" [Posts: 181 Pages: 10]

Chiefttp
2025-06-18T00:09:00
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Post: 11904785
Originally Posted by Sailvi767
I agree with what you posted however the solution is so simple that I can’t believe a professional flight crew would not handle it without much of a blip. Push the trust levers forward.
Salvi, just spitballing here, a low alt capture is simple to rectify, but if you’re not expecting it ( perhaps a wrong MCP alt setting) coupled with a HUD , which focuses your attention on it, not the thrust levers, and add to the mix an inexperienced F/O. I can
also see in the final moments of desperation, reaching down and turning the Fuel Control Switches, OFF-THEN-ON, in the hope that an engine will come to life, if they believed that the engine was dead. This may be the reason the RAT extended? Just thinking out loud.

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EDLB
2025-06-18T19:15:00
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Post: 11905486
@syseng68k
Consensus here is, that both engines where stopped by a closing fuel cut off valve, wich yields a fast loss of N2. The generators then shut down very quick as does the thrust in a few seconds. This is supported by the quick RAT extension which allowed the crew to control the flight. The APU did autostart too. A thrust changed with the thrust leaver to idle is much slower and would not result in the dramatic change in performance. Thrust set to idle will not engage the RAT since the electric generators would still work. So a thrust leaver changed to idle or any intervention by Autothrust (AT) would not yield to the RAT extension. Something or someone activated a fuel cut off. How and why that happened is the big question, the investigators have to answer.

25 users liked this post.

Nick H.
2025-06-18T21:30:00
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Post: 11905563
Originally Posted by EDLB
@syseng68k
Consensus here is, that both engines where stopped by a closing fuel cut off valve, wich yields a fast loss of N2. The generators then shut down very quick as does the thrust in a few seconds. This is supported by the quick RAT extension which allowed the crew to control the flight. The APU did autostart too. A thrust changed with the thrust leaver to idle is much slower and would not result in the dramatic change in performance. Thrust set to idle will not engage the RAT since the electric generators would still work. So a thrust leaver changed to idle or any intervention by Autothrust (AT) would not yield to the RAT extension. Something or someone activated a fuel cut off. How and why that happened is the big question, the investigators have to answer.
A naive glider pilot question: if fuel cut off was (inconceivably) selected, would both fuel control levers have been flipped downwards from Run to Cutoff? And if they were then immediately flipped back to the Run position, how much time would have been needed to achieve enough thrust to maintain altitude?


Surlybonds
2025-06-18T21:47:00
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Post: 11905569
The fuel cutoff switches can't be "flipped" in either direction; they have to be lifted over a detent and then moved, a very positive action.

6 users liked this post.

777ret
2025-06-18T22:38:00
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Post: 11905597
Originally Posted by EDLB
@syseng68k
Consensus here is, that both engines where stopped by a closing fuel cut off valve, wich yields a fast loss of N2. The generators then shut down very quick as does the thrust in a few seconds. This is supported by the quick RAT extension which allowed the crew to control the flight. The APU did autostart too. A thrust changed with the thrust leaver to idle is much slower and would not result in the dramatic change in performance. Thrust set to idle will not engage the RAT since the electric generators would still work. So a thrust leaver changed to idle or any intervention by Autothrust (AT) would not yield to the RAT extension. Something or someone activated a fuel cut off. How and why that happened is the big question, the investigators have to answer.
The simplest answer: Lo Lvl Alt Cap; Thrust to Idle; Startle Factor; Inappropriate Memory Items : ( RAT deployed; insufficient time for Eng relight.

3 users liked this post.

sycamore
2025-06-18T22:49:00
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Post: 11905602
As an ex-tp, I would consider those cut-off switches a danger, and they should have guards either side of each.
Shirtsleeves/watches etc. can get caught, lift switch.
Very poor design. Would not pass `military-muster.`

Last edited by T28B; 18th Jun 2025 at 23:12 . Reason: Fixed your punctuation.

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OldnGrounded
2025-06-18T23:16:00
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Post: 11905612
Originally Posted by sycamore
As an ex-tp, I would consider those cut-off switches a danger, and they should have guards either side of each.
Shirtsleeves/watches etc. can get caught, lift switch.
Very poor design. Would not pass `military-muster.`
They're guarded by the switch design/operation itself. To move one of them, the toggle handle has to first be pulled outward.

6 users liked this post.

bbofh
2025-06-19T01:30:00
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Post: 11905658
The 787-8 landing gear retraction is primarily hydraulic, using the center hydraulic system for the main operation. However, the alternate gear extension system utilizes a dedicated electric pump to pressurize fluid from the center hydraulic system for gear extension. Obviously due its size and weight and staged retraction, the effort required to raise and stow the gear greatly exceeds that required for extension.

The main gear retraction/extension is controlled by the center hydraulic system.

It is apparent that the hydraulics failed when the engines shut down after breaking the down-locks and leaving the Main Landing gear bogeys in the tilt position, ready for a next step internal stowage and door closure (that was now never to happen). It is therefore apparent that the dual engine failure and consequent automated RAT extension was precipitated by this gear selection or retraction cycle and thus likely to be either WoW micro-switch or 5G Radar altimeter-effect associated. Due to accumulator depletion, the electric pump load would have spiked to replenish it. This may have precipitated the dual engine shutdown due to an unfiltered electrical surge affecting the Ground/Air microswitches (or a local 5G transmission affecting the RADALT) and resetting the TCMA.

The RADALT? Another plausibility? Because of the furore over a spasticated frequency allocation by the US FCC, the US FAA had finally “bought in” and declared that individual nations and their airline operators were responsible for their own 5G frequency spectrum allocations and for taking essential steps to ensure mitigation of the interference effects upon aircraft automated landings and other critical systems caused by their own national approved 5G spectrum decisions. It was admittedly a situation calling for extensive modifications to (and shielding for) the three radar altimeters fitted for redundancy considerations to all modern airliners... for Category 3 ILS approach and landing in zero/zero visibility conditions. The RADALT also features in many air-ground sensing applications. (eg the 747-8).

This was an unusual FAA “passing of the buck” to manufacturers such as Honeywell etc. (to sort out with client operators). But then again, it was not the US FCC’s right to dictate the specific 5G frequencies internationally. These spectrum allocations now vary over the wide selection of 5G phones available (and also nationally). 5G Radar Altimeters constitute a part of the ground/Air sensing that changes the TCMA from ground mode (able to fuel-chop engines) to the air mode (inhibited from doing so)... Ground activation is acceptable ...where fuel chopping of uncommanded thrust can prevent runway sideways excursions or runway length overruns. The question now becomes: “Is it more (or less) safe having an automated fuel-chopping capability on BOTH your left and right, rather than leaving it to the pilot to react via his center console fuel cut-off switches... in the unlikely event of a runaway engine after landing (or during an abandoned take-off)?

5G Frequency Variations

The frequencies of 5G phones vary nationally based on the frequency bands allocated and used by different carriers in each country. In the United States, for example, carriers such as AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and others use a combination of low-band, mid-band, and high-band 5G frequencies. Low-band 5G frequencies typically range from 600 MHz to 1 GHz, mid-band 5G frequencies range from 1.7 GHz to 2.5 GHz, and high-band 5G (mmWave) frequencies start at 24 GHz and go up to 40 GHz . These frequencies are allocated by regulatory bodies such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and can vary between countries based on spectrum availability and regulatory decisions. In other countries, the specific frequency bands used for 5G may differ, leading to variations in the frequencies supported by 5G phones. Additionally, the deployment of 5G networks can also influence the frequencies used, with some countries focusing more on sub-6 GHz bands while others prioritize mmWave technology.

5G interference? It may be an avenue worth exploring?

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Capn Bloggs
2025-06-19T01:40:00
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Post: 11905665
Originally Posted by Sycamore
As an ex-tp, I would consider those cut-off switches a danger, and they should have guards either side of each.
Shirtsleeves/watches etc. can get caught, lift switch.
Very poor design. Would not pass `military-muster.`
Agree. The two most important controls in the aeroplane, sitting there in a wide-open, unprotected space. After an incident where a manual fell off the coaming (can't remember if a switch got bashed into the Off position), we put guards on our non-787 fuel switches:
Ours:

787:


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Seamless
2025-06-19T09:30:00
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Post: 11905864
Originally Posted by Nick H.
The 787 fuel controls do have guards on each side but they're hard to see in the photo I posted. Here's a better angle:
Has this been discussed already?

https://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/NM-18...SIB_NM-18-33_1

The FAA recommends that all owners and operators of the affected airplanes incorporate the following actions at the earliest opportunity: 1) Inspect the locking feature of the fuel control switch to ensure its engagement. While the airplane is on the ground, check whether the fuel control switch can be moved between the two positions without lifting up the switch. If the switch can be moved without lifting it up, the locking feature has been disengaged and the switch should be replaced at the earliest opportunity.

Last edited by Senior Pilot; 19th Jun 2025 at 11:13 . Reason: Image

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Capn Bloggs
2025-06-19T10:22:00
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Post: 11905892
Originally Posted by DTA
That failure can be the result of physical damage or wear so that the knob is stuck in the pulled position. It would not be obvious if you did not look closely.
Yes, and probably much to @Roo's disgust, we had an instance where an engine shut down all by itself in the cruise; it was concluded that the fuel switch hadn't been "locked" in the ON position and was just sitting on the edge. It was then highlighted to all of us that the FCOM stated "give it a good jiggle" to make doubly sure it was locked in ON.

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Seamless
2025-06-19T12:27:00
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Post: 11905984
Originally Posted by Kraftstoffvondesibel
The spec sheet says 100,000 cycles.
Switches fail sometimes. I have changed lots of lots of malfunctioning toggle switches in my day.
But both at the same time?
It has to be a common thing happening at the same time.
Someone slipping both switches into a worn middle detent is such a thing though, that is one habit that could be developed. A slight bump at takeoff and they both go to cutoff.
The switches themselves are on-on 4 pole toggles, and doesn\x92t fail into one position over the other, and gravity would prefer the cutoff position in this design.
This isn\xb4t quite right. They could both have had a malfunction without this being an issue until something or someone hit them at the same time (e.g. on rotation). It\xb4s just another theory which isn\xb4t less plausible than many others.

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Capn Bloggs
2025-06-19T12:29:00
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Post: 11905985
Originally Posted by syseng68k
Have a few of that type here
That is not a Boeing Fuel switch.
Lead Balloon
2025-06-19T12:45:00
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Post: 11905991
The discussion about the fuel control switch design is interesting so far as it goes, but I'm more interested in the physical arrangements under the bracket to which they're fitted and the associated connection and wiring arrangements. No doubt the arrangements are designed so as to reduce to 'vanishingly small' the probabilities of any common shorts to the wrong places, but who knows, for sure, how the switches and connections and wiring were installed in the accident aircraft, or whether there was a piece of swarf or other FOD that ended up somewhere that it should not have been (i.e. anywhere on the aircraft) during manufacture or maintenance.

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Capn Bloggs
2025-06-19T12:55:00
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Post: 11906000
Originally Posted by syseng68K
I guess it depends on the model
Obviously. If yours is the switch I think it is (with the metal, unscrewable dome) then yes, it is very different. Very hard to "balance" yours in the middle.
Not so the Boeing fuel switches: they can be relatively easily "sat" in the middle, on the centre raised bit and could be bumped either way. Hence our (non-787) FCOM saying make sure you jiggle them when you put it in the On position to confirm it's locked there.

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Xeptu
2025-06-19T12:57:00
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Post: 11906003
Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
That is not a Boeing Fuel switch.
That's a Beechcraft Kingair starter switch
OldnGrounded
2025-06-19T13:06:00
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Post: 11906009
Mods, feel free to remove this if you think it's not contributing.

Folks, the exchange here about the cutoff switches ("fuel control switches") is exactly the kind of discussion that contributes meaningfully to our collective understanding of one possible causal or contributing factor in the accident. Smart, well-informed people politely considering and evaluating the suggestions of others. No snark or sniping. Love it.

16 users liked this post.

OldnGrounded
2025-06-19T13:51:00
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Post: 11906035
Originally Posted by bbofh
Has anybody the skill, knowledge, hands-on system familiarity or diagrammatic access to examine the
Ground/Air,
gear-handle,
gear doors
gear position lights
emergency extension,
Throttle lever position and
W.o.W. circuitry - in any sanguine detail?
I hope/wish. I accept that it's not at all likely that TCMA is the/a culprit in this crash, but it is, like the cutoff switches, one of the few things designed and intended to shut down an engine in a very big hurry. It would be good to know as much as possible about how it determines the aircraft's ground/air state.

And add the radio altimeter(s). I think, but don't know, that they provide inputs to the FADEC TCMA function also.


Last edited by T28B; 19th Jun 2025 at 14:38 . Reason: brackets completed

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Seamless
2025-06-19T14:08:00
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Post: 11906053
I have read most of the thread (old and new). As a lawyer working in forensic investigations, I am constantly involved in problem-solving. My field of work also includes complex investigations related to insolvencies, which almost always require an analysis of the causes behind a specific, established outcome. In doing so, I naturally also have to deal with probabilities. However, it often turns out that the most likely or plausible explanation does not reflect what actually happened.

Many of the considerations I’ve read fail because the simultaneous failure of both engines is extremely unlikely, leading to a constant search for higher-order causes. It was suggested that an incorrect altitude setting led to an early thrust reduction. However, this would not explain the deployment of the RAT (Ram Air Turbine), especially since the thrust could have been readjusted. FADEC and TCAM are highly redundant systems, and TCAM failure is unlikely due to WOW (Weight on Wheels) logic, making a simultaneous engine failure after VR equally improbable.

With that said, and with regard to my question concerning the AD that relates to the fuel control switches (FCS), my thought—and it was nothing more than that—was that their activation becomes more probable if it can occur accidentally. That’s how I came across SAIB: NM-18-33.

Another user then brought up an iPhone. That notion would, of course, be dramatic—but how unlikely is it really that after approximately 10,000 actuations between December 2013 and June 2025, the two FCS no longer lock perfectly? Considering all of this, I find it quite conceivable that the A/T slightly reduced thrust in the first seconds after VR (e.g., if an incorrect target altitude had been entered) and that an object lying between the thrust levers and the FCS could have pushed the FCS into the “Off” position. Due to the buttons on top of the switches, which provide some resistance, it’s even possible that the object both pulled and pushed them.

But all of this is speculation. The investigation report will bring clarity.

Even if my theory is not confirmed, I still believe that the positioning and mechanism of the FCS are suboptimal. Switches of such critical importance should be better protected, and movements in the area in front of the switches (like reducing thrust) should not follow the same direction as shutting off the fuel supply. A different switching direction alone would provide more safety—especially considering that the FCS are protected laterally by metal plates.

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Aerospace101
2025-06-19T14:11:00
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Post: 11906054
Originally Posted by PBL
It does not follow that MCAS malfunction is a software malfunction.
As far as I know, the software functioned exactly as it was specified/required to function. The problem did not lie in the quality of the software, as you suggest. It lay in the functional requirements for the function, and the hazard analysis of those requirements, and those are manufacturer tasks.
I thought this was a very good point. There are some detailed posts discussing the TCMA patent including this post . Is it possible the TCMA software functioned exactly as specified, and the issue is input data into TCMA?

In a total electrical failure, when the system switches to emergency battery power, how are input variables like rad alt and wow switches processed? (these were inputs someone mentioned on the 747-8, have the TCMA inputs been identified yet?)

I speculate the gear truck forward tilt is a symptom of a C hydraulic failure caused by a total electrical failure around the time of VR. Once they got 10 deg nose up on the rotation, with a total electrical failure, could the FADEC receive erroneous rad alt or wow inputs, and how would TCMA handle these inputs in the transition from ground to air logic?

What is baffling is the simultaneous nature of the suspected dual engine shutdown. There is no obvious asymmetry, with the flight path or rudder movements. If the engine fuel control switches had been manually cut one at a time, there should have been some visible flightpath change or flight control response. Something happened to both engines at exactly the same time.

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